United States v. Wright

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-844
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-7126 & 25-844

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:23-cr-000492-PA-1

v. MEMORANDUM* RYAN WRIGHT, AKA Ryan Petetit,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 12, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. ***

Defendant-Appellant Ryan Wright pled guilty to conspiracy to commit

honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, and 1346. He challenges

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. a condition of supervised release requiring that he “not engage, as whole or partial

owner, employee or otherwise, in any business involving loan programs,

telemarketing activities, investment programs or any other business involving the

solicitation of funds or cold-calls to customers” without a probation officer’s prior

approval. We affirm.

1. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must contemporaneously

object and identify the “specific substantive basis” for the objection, which

“provides the district court with an opportunity to address the error in the first

instance and allow[] this court to engage in more meaningful review.” United

States v. Hackett, 123 F.4th 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.

51(b). When the party fails to object on the ground advanced on appeal, we review

for plain error. United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009).

At the sentencing hearing, the district court announced that it was

contemplating imposing several conditions—including the occupational restriction

at issue here—that had not been previously brought to the parties’ attention.

Wright objected because he had not been aware the court was considering these

conditions. The court twice offered him a remedy to cure the problem: a

continuance so he could review the proposed conditions, consider them, and

formulate specific substantive objections. Wright twice declined.

2 24-7126 & 25-844 Wright’s desire to expedite sentencing does not excuse his repeated choice

to forgo creating a record that would “allow[] this court to engage in more

meaningful review.”1 Hackett, 123 F.4th at 1010. To prevail, Wright must show:

(1) an error (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) that affects his substantial rights, and

(4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993) (citation

modified).

2. An occupational restriction imposed as a condition of supervised

release must bear “a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1); e.g., United States v.

Britt, 332 F.3d 1229, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2003). We have routinely affirmed

occupational restrictions prohibiting a defendant from engaging in, or requiring a

probation officer’s prior approval for, the type of business or employment that

facilitated or motivated his crimes. E.g., United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 874–

76 (9th Cir. 2007).

At his change of plea hearing, Wright admitted to committing the overt acts

charged in Count 1 of the First Superseding Indictment, which include that he

twice directed an investor to pay a bribe, repeatedly used company money to pay

1 Moreover, it appears Wright received sufficient notice even without the court’s offer of a continuance. See United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2004).

3 24-7126 & 25-844 bribes, and sometimes solicited money from investors to recoup those costs. On

plain-error review, the relationship between Wright’s offense conduct and the

occupational restriction on loan programs, telemarketing activities, soliciting

investments, and other jobs soliciting funds is “reasonably direct.”

3. Unless the condition implicates a “particularly significant liberty

interest,” the court “need not state at sentencing its reasons for imposing each

condition of supervised release, so long as its reasoning is apparent from the

record.” United States v. Magdaleno, 43 F.4th 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022). Such

conditions requiring more explanation may include, for example, those prohibiting

association with a child or life partner, United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082,

1091–92 (9th Cir. 2012), those “compelling a person to take antipsychotic

medication,” United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004), and

those requiring measurement of a man’s “sexual response to various visual and

auditory stimuli” through a device placed on his genitals, United States v. Weber,

451 F.3d 552, 561–63 (9th Cir. 2006). The occupational restriction Wright faces is

plainly not of a kind.

Nothing in our case law interprets U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 to require the court to

articulate its reasoning on the record before imposing an occupational restriction.

See Betts, 511 F.3d at 875–76. On its face, the guideline simply states the higher

substantive standards for imposing occupational restrictions, not an additional

4 24-7126 & 25-844 procedural requirement. Any arguable procedural error did not amount to plain

error.

4. Finally, the occupational restriction is not unconstitutionally vague or

overbroad. To avoid vagueness, a condition of supervised release need only

“provide people of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of what is prohibited.”

United States v. Sims, 849 F.3d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017). We agree with the

government that the catch-all provision “any other business involving the

solicitation of funds or cold-calls to customers” indicates that the condition covers

only “companies that directly solicit funds from individuals for investment.” So

construed, the condition is not vague, and any legitimate overbreadth concerns fall

away.

Wright’s other vagueness arguments are meritless. A person of ordinary

intelligence, not to mention a sophisticated financial criminal, would read “not

engage, as whole or partial owner, employee or otherwise” as obviously covering

acting as an independent contractor, consultant, or board member. If an

opportunity arises about which Wright is genuinely unsure, he need only seek the

probation officer’s permission and, if necessary, go to the sentencing court.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir.

2014).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-7126 & 25-844