United States v. Williams

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 22, 2025
• Docket: Criminal No. 2021-0377
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. Criminal Action No. 21-377 (BAH)

ANTHONY ROBERT WILLIAMS, Judge Beryl A. Howell

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The United States government moves to dismiss, with prejudice, the one-count

Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 162, against defendant Anthony Williams. Gov’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice Pursuant to Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 48(a) (“Gov’t’s

MTD”), ECF No. 166. This defendant was initially found guilty, after a four-day jury trial, of all

five federal charges against him, including one felony count for Obstruction of an Official

Proceeding and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2) and 2, and four

misdemeanor offenses, including Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or Grounds, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1); Disorderly and Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building

or Grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2); Disorderly Conduct in a Capitol Building, in

violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D); and Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol

Building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). Verdict Form at 1-2, ECF No. 116.

Defendant’s own words from January 6, 2021, captured on video, describe his conduct that day as

“storm[ing] the stairs of the Capitol, push[ing] the cops back,” getting “maced and pepper

sprayed,” and “hit[ting] everybody.” Gov’t’s Trial Ex. 4.1; see also Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. at

15, ECF No. 120 (quoting the video taken by defendant marked as Gov’t Trial Ex. 4.1); Gov’t’s

Rep. on Photo & Video Evid. Supp. the Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. (“Video Evid.”) at 2, ECF No.

1 128 (describing Gov’t’s Trial Exhibit 4.1). In case his words left any doubt, defendant proudly

stated that “we took this fucking building”—referring to the United States Capitol. Id. In doing

so, defendant’s actions were motivated by his belief that the 2020 presidential election was stolen,

see Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. at 6-10 (summarizing the voluminous evidence presented at trial on

this point), despite no evidence of any outcome-determinative election fraud ever having been

uncovered, let alone confirmed, by any federal, state, or local government agency or in any court

of law.

Notwithstanding the strong evidence of this defendant’s criminal conduct, for the reasons

explained below, the government’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the pending

indictment against defendant is dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence presented at trial showed that, immediately after the 2020 presidential

election and in the months leading up to the certification of the Electoral College vote on January

6, 2021, the defendant in this case “was determined to go to Congress to overturn the results [of

the election] on January 6, 2021,” see Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. at 6-10 (summarizing evidence),

and used violent and militaristic language to refer to his anticipated actions to do so, see id. at 7

(collecting evidence of defendant’s statements suggesting violence, including that Democrats

“may end up hung for treason”); id. at 8 (describing defendant’s statements claiming that “we’ll

take to war”); id. at 9 (discussing defendant’s expressed intent to “Storm the Swamp,” and

describing additional evidence). On January 6, 2021, defendant and his friend joined the crowds

marching to the Capitol after President Trump’s “Stop the Steal” rally at the Ellipse, see id. at 10,

and upon arriving, helped other rioters climb bicycle racks to ascend the Northwest stairs of the

Capitol Building, see id. at 10-13 (summarizing video evidence, transcribing trial testimony, and

2 showing pictures). During this time, defendant described that his fellow rioters were “in a shoving

match” with law enforcement officers and, in his own words, described the group as “rioting.” Id.

at 15 (quoting trial testimony). When the rioters successfully broke the line of law enforcement

officers guarding the Northwest Stairs to the Capitol Building, defendant celebrated successfully

pushing past the law enforcement line with other rioters. Id. After ascending the stairs to the

Upper Northwest Terrace, defendant stole water bottles stashed for use by law enforcement

officers. See id. at 15-16 (providing a picture and summarizing other evidence).

Defendant then entered the Capitol with the first large wave of rioters to breach the

building. Id. at 16-17. Inside the Capitol, defendant joined a group of rioters confronting a line

of law enforcement officers in the Crypt and helped the crowd breach the line. See id. at 17-19.

At trial, the Assistant to the Secret Service Special Agent in Charge testified about the danger this

and other actions posed to Vice President Pence. Id. at 19 (quoting trial testimony). Defendant

then moved to the Capitol Rotunda, where he made statements such as “we took this fucking

building,” “desperate times, desperate measures,” and “you gotta do whatchu gotta do when shit

gets fucking desperate.” Id. at 21 (quoting evidence from trial). When law enforcement officers

instructed rioters to leave the Rotunda, and then had to use force to make them do so, defendant

actively resisted the officers, pushing back against them. See id. at 21-23 (summarizing trial

evidence about defendant’s conduct in Rotunda). In the days, weeks, and months after the riots,

defendant continued to brag about his actions on the day. See id. at 23-25 (quoting defendant’s

numerous statements).

At the close of the trial, defendant was found guilty on all of the charges against him.

Verdict Form.

3 Defendant appealed his conviction, see Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 133, and moved for

bond pending appeal, ECF No. 135, which motion was denied. After the Supreme Court granted

certiorari to consider the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Fischer v. United States, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C.

Cir. 2023), cert. granted, 144 S. Ct. 537 (2023), and rev’d and remanded, 603 U.S. 480 (2024),

defendant renewed his motion for bond pending appeal, ECF No. 140, which motion was granted,

Order, ECF No. 152; see also United States v. Williams, No. 21-cr-377, 2024 WL 1253949 (D.D.C.

Mar. 25, 2024). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Fischer decision, the D.C. Circuit ordered

that defendant’s felony obstruction conviction be vacated, see Mandate of USCA, ECF No. 154,

and the government advised that it was considering filing a potential new charge, see Joint Status

Report, ECF No. 157. The government subsequently filed a Superseding Indictment, ECF No.

162, charging defendant with one felony count of Civil Disorder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

231(a)(3), see id.

Despite the government expending significant time and resources in identifying defendant,

investigating his criminal conduct, filing two separate indictments against him, see Indictment,

ECF No. 13; Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 162, proceeding to trial and securing convictions

on all five counts against him, see Verdict Form, and vigorously contesting his motions for bond

pending appeal, see Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Bond Pending Appeal, ECF No. 136; Gov’t’s

Opp’n to Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Bond Pending Appeal, ECF No. 143, the government now

seeks to dismiss the pending Superseding Indictment against defendant under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 48(a), see Gov’t’s MTD.

II. DISCUSSION

Courts have limited power when the federal government decides to stop prosecuting a

criminal defendant. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (recognizing

4 the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d

733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (recognizing same prosecutorial discretion in “decisions to dismiss

pending criminal charges”). At the same time, the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have both

recognized that the “leave of court” requirement in Rule 48(a) “obviously vest[s] some discretion

in the court.” Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977); United States v. Ammidown,

497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that this rule “gives the court a role in dismissals

following indictment”). This discretion is granted in part to “guard[] against abuse of prosecutorial

discretion.” Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620. To ensure that the government’s request for dismissal

of criminal charges “sufficiently protects the public,” the government may be required to submit

“a statement of reasons and underlying factual basis,” which must be “substantial” to justify the

dismissal and not “a mere conclusory statement.” Id.

Here, the government’s cursory motion provides no factual basis for dismissal. Instead,

the single paragraph explanation included in the one-page dismissal motion cites “as the reason

for this dismissal,” only a presidential proclamation “dated January 20, 2025, Granting Pardons

and Commutation of Sentences for Certain Offenses Relating to the Events at Or Near the United

States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Gov’t’s MTD at 1. This cited proclamation, inter alia, directs

the Attorney General “to pursue [the] dismissal with prejudice to the government of all pending

indictments against individuals for their conduct related to the events at or near the United States

Capitol on January 6, 2021.” See PROCLAMATION, (Jan. 20, 2025) (capitalization in original),

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/granting-pardons-and-

commutation-of-sentences-for-certain-offenses-relating-to-the-events-at-or-near-the-united-

states-capitol-on-january-6-2021/. The only reason provided for this instruction, as set out in the

Proclamation’s introduction, is the assertion that this action “ends a grave national injustice that

5 has been perpetrated upon the American people over the last four years and begins a process of

national reconciliation.” Id.

No “national injustice” occurred here, just as no outcome-determinative election fraud

occurred in the 2020 presidential election. No “process of national reconciliation” can begin when

sore losers, whose preferred candidate loses an election, are glorified for disrupting a

constitutionally mandated proceeding in Congress and doing so with impunity. That merely raises

the dangerous specter of future lawless conduct by other sore losers and undermines the rule of

law. Yet, this presidential pronouncement of a “national injustice” is the sole justification provided

in the government’s motion to dismiss the pending indictment. See Gov’t’s MTD.

Having presided over scores of criminal cases charging defendants for their criminal

conduct both outside and inside the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, which charges were

fully supported by evidence in the form of extensive videotapes and photographs, admissions by

defendants in the course of plea hearings and in testimony at trials, and the testimony of law

enforcement officers and congressional staff present at the Capitol on that day—including at the

trial of this defendant—this Court cannot let stand the revisionist myth relayed in this presidential

pronouncement. The prosecutions in this case and others charging defendants for their criminal

conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, present no injustice, but instead reflect the diligent

work of conscientious public servants, including prosecutors and law enforcement officials, and

dedicated defense attorneys, to defend our democracy and rights and preserve our long tradition

of peaceful transfers of power—which, until January 6, 2021, served as a model to the world—all

while affording those charged every protection guaranteed by our Constitution and the criminal

justice system. Bluntly put, the assertion offered in the presidential pronouncement for the pending

motion to dismiss is flatly wrong.

6 Still, the D.C. Circuit has cautioned that a district court judge has “no power” “to deny a

prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s

exercise of charging authority.” Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742; id. at 737 (“It has long been settled that

the Judiciary generally lacks authority to second-guess those Executive determinations, much less

to impose its own charging preferences.”). Despite finding that the sole reason relied upon by the

government to dismiss the charges in this case—i.e., an incorrect assertion in the presidential

proclamation—is neither substantial nor factually correct, the government’s view of the public

interest does not clearly fall within the types of reasons found to provide legitimate grounds to

deny the government’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges. See United States v. Flynn, 507 F.

Supp. 3d 116, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2020) (collecting examples where a government motion to dismiss

should be denied as not serving “legitimate prosecutorial interests,” because the motion “was a

sham or deception,” “was based on ‘acceptance of a bribe, personal dislike of the victim, and

dissatisfaction with the jury impaneled,’” or was meant to favor “politically well-connected

individuals” (citations omitted)). Therefore, the government’s motion to dismiss the indictment is

GRANTED.

Nothing about the government’s reasoning for dismissal warrants entry of dismissal with

prejudice, however. Dismissal with prejudice is a complete adjudication of the matter and would

bar any further prosecution of defendants for their offense conduct at issue. See Brown v. Amtrak

Corp., No. 03-7003, 2003 WL 22433755, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 2023) (“A dismissal ‘with

prejudice’ is a final judgment on the merits which bars further litigation between the same parties.”

(citing Bd. of Trs. of the Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1489

n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1996))); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 368 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)

(“The dismissal with prejudice of criminal charges is a remedy rarely seen in criminal law, even

7 for constitutional violations.”). This result would be improper here, where the evidence presented

at trial and relied on by the jury to find this defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt provides

ample basis for criminal prosecution. See also Thorp v. District of Columbia, 142 F. Supp. 3d 132,

145 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that dismissal with prejudice “reflect[s] on the merits of the underlying

action” (quoting Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and citing Kenley v.

District of Columbia, 83 F. Supp. 3d 20, 42 (D.D.C. 2015)). Instead, the government’s reliance

on a policy assertion made in the presidential proclamation that such prosecutions should not be

continued warrants only “render[ing] the proceedings a nullity and leav[ing] the parties as if the

action had never been brought,” Magliore v. Brooks, 844 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2012)

(quoting Thoubboron, 809 A.2d at 1210), which is achieved by granting the government’s motion

to dismiss without prejudice, see id.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons above, the government’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 166, is granted to the

extent that the Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 162, against defendant is dismissed, but denied

as to the request that this dismissal be “with prejudice.” Accordingly, it is hereby—

ORDERED that the Superseding Indictment against defendant, ECF No. 162, is

dismissed without prejudice; it is further

ORDERED that the status conference scheduled for January 24, 2025, is VACATED; it

is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

Date: January 22, 2025

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge