United States v. Williams

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 30, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk

No. 02-20997 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUAN JOSE WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-02-CR-139-1 --------------------

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Jose Williams appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for

being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Relying on our decision in United States v. Emerson,

270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002),

that the Second Amendment affords individuals a protected right to

bear arms, Williams argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not

narrowly tailored in light of the interplay of the Second Amendment

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. and the regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce

Clause, is overly broad in its reach given the legislative history

of its intent, and unevenly burdens a fundamental right in

violation of equal protection by relying on inconsistent state law

definitions.

Although Williams orally mentioned Emerson and the Second

Amendment at his rearraignment, he did not make the above arguments

in the district court either at rearraignment or at sentencing.

Therefore, our review is for plain error. See United States v.

Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). We specifically

recognized in Emerson that "it is clear that felons, infants, and

those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms."

Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added). In light of this

recognition, we conclude that Williams has failed to demonstrate

plain error. See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64

(5th Cir. 1994)(en banc).

Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Jones v. United

States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.

598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),

Williams also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an

unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power

because the regulated activity does not substantially affect

interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that his indictment

was defective for failing to allege that his specific offense

substantially affected interstate commerce and that the factual

2 basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence

established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines

at some unspecified point in the past.

Williams raises his arguments solely to preserve them for

possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments

are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent. See United

States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).

AFFIRMED.