United States v. Wilfrid Lazarre

14 F.3d 580, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2998, 1994 WL 29900
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 22, 1994
Docket91-5524
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 14 F.3d 580 (United States v. Wilfrid Lazarre) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wilfrid Lazarre, 14 F.3d 580, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2998, 1994 WL 29900 (11th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This case considers whether an assistant district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) can be an official holding a “high level decision-making or sensitive position” under § 201.1(b)(2)(B) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). We conclude that he can.

I. Facts and Background

Appellant Wilfrid Lazarre is a Haitian emigre and United States citizen. Until his arrest, he was an activist for Haitian refugees, especially those at the Krome Avenue detention center (Krome) in Miami, Florida.

Lazarre was introduced to Kenneth Powers, an INS assistant district director for detention and deportation with oversight responsibility for Krome. 1 As an assistant director, Powers decided whether a Krome detainee was eligible for parole pending deportation or exclusion proceedings. If so, he decided what would be an appropriate bond.

After meetings between Lazarre and Powers on the status of certain refugees, Lazarre proposed a scheme by which both Lazarre and Powers could profit from paroling some detainees. Powers ultimately agreed. 2 The record shows that for the next five months, Lazarre paid Powers to influence the establishment of immigration bonds and the parole of Haitians at Krome. Some of these detainees were, as a- matter of law, ineligible for parole, but were released anyway.

Lazarre was finally convicted of giving, offering and promising money to a public official with the intent to influence an act by the public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A). At sentencing, the court found Powers was an “official holding a high level decision-making or sensitive position” and enhanced Lazarre’s offense level eight points. See USSG § 201.1(b)(2)(B). On appeal, Lazarre argues Powers was not such an official so the enhancement was inapplicable. We disagree.

II. Discussion

Section 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) of the USSG provides for an eight point offense level enhancement when the offense involved bribery of a high level official. 3 Application note one gives examples of officials falling under this provision. It cites “prosecuting attorneys, judges, agency administrators, supervisory law enforcement officers, and other governmental officials with similar levels of responsibility.” Because Powers’ level of discretion and responsibility was similar to that of a supervisory law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney or judge, we conclude that the enhancement was proper.

In his capacity as an assistant director, Powers could parole aliens pending deportation or exclusion proceedings. And he was authorized to set bonds, which were usually required as a condition of parole, or to release a detainee on his own recognizance. He reviewed each request for parole individually. Other INS employees who also received parole requests from family members, *582 attorneys or the community advised Powers on the merits of some cases. But Powers had the final authority to set bond and to deny or to grant a parole request. 4

In executing his authority, Powers was supposed to follow general parole criteria established by federal regulations and district director Smith. 5 But, in fact, he had, because of his position, the power to set people free who did not meet the appropriate standards. Unusual cases were very occasionally referred by Powers to director Smith. 6 But Powers made the final decision in most cases whether each immigrant could be paroled and what bond should be set in each alien’s case. Lazarre knew that Powers was essentially the only person in a position to accomplish Lazarre’s goal of getting Haitian detainees paroled — rightly or wrongly.

Powers’ discretion is similar to that given a supervisory law enforcement official or a prosecuting attorney or even a judge setting bail. Each of those officials must work within certain confines. They are guided by specific policies and are restrained to a degree by rules and regulations. But these jobs involve the exercise of substantial discretion; and each enjoys sufficient autonomy to implement established guidelines and make substantive decisions based on the unique circumstances of individual cases. Application note one to section 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) says that officials given similar responsibility, such as Powers, should be considered high level officials for purposes of the enhancement. 7

We recognize that some difficult line drawing may ultimately be necessary. As other courts have said, the ability of a public official to exercise some decision-making authority does not necessarily qualify him as a high level official or the holder of a sensitive position and trigger the enhancement. See Stephenson, 895 F.2d at 877-78. But ours is not a close case. Powers, as an assistant INS district director, exercised significant discretion to set bonds, and parole or detain immigrants in Florida. The power to grant or to deny parole is a significant and sensitive power. 8 Cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 972 (11th Cir.1984) (“[p]arole is an act of extraordinary sovereign generosity ...”). And it is sufficient to qualify him as a person occupying a sensitive position and trigger the enhancement. Cf. Harrington v. United States, 748 F.Supp. 919, 931 (D.P.R.1990) (finding an INS district director, whose discretion to grant parole visas was guided by general regulatory considerations, was immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act from suit based on damages incurred when he exercised his discretion).

The district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. Powers was one of four assistant district directors working under district director Richard Smith. He was third in line behind the deputy district director. The delegation of power to parole immigrants and set bonds is as follows: the United States Attorney General has statutory authority to parole aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. This authority has been delegated to the INS Commissioner, which has redelegated it to district directors. These district directors have in turn delegated the power to assistant district directors.

2

. Initially, he declined. He then reported the incident to his supervisors and the Justice Department. The Department asked him to participate in the scheme to aid in their investigation of Lazarre.

3

.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 F.3d 580, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2998, 1994 WL 29900, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wilfrid-lazarre-ca11-1994.