United States v. Western Electric Co.

627 F. Supp. 1090, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJanuary 13, 1986
DocketCiv. A. 82-0192
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 627 F. Supp. 1090 (United States v. Western Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Western Electric Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511 (D.D.C. 1986).

Opinion

*1093 OPINION

HAROLD H. GREENE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court for decision are a number of motions by various Regional Holding Companies for clarification of the decree. 1 The motions represent the view of several of the Regional Companies 2 that they are entitled under the decree to engage in a substantial range of telecommunications activities without obtaining waivers pursuant to section VIII(C) of the decree. In each case, the proffered interpretation is opposed by other entities, both commercial and governmental, which argue that the particular activities are prohibited by the decree.

After careful scrutiny of all the relevant factors, the Court has determined that the interpretations of the decree advocated by the Regional Companies in these motions are inconsistent with the language, history, and purposes of the decree, 3 and that all *1094 the motions for clarification 4 must therefore be denied. Before discussing the motions in detail, it is appropriate to restate the basic purpose underlying the prohibitions imposed by the decree on the local companies.

I

General Considerations

A central rationale for the divestiture of AT & T was the recognition that, when one company engages both in monopoly activi ties — e.g., the provision of local telecommunications service — and in competitive activi ties — e.g., the provision of interexchange 5 and information services — it possesses the incentive and the ability improperly to exploit its local monopoly power in at least two ways.

First, such a company may subsidize its competitive ventures with income generated by the local telephone ratepayers (who, unlike the customers of a competitive enterprise, lack the ability to go elsewhere for their telephone service and who can therefore be charged whatever rates the local regulators can be persuaded to approve); 6 and second, it can give preferential treatment 7 to its own competitive affiliates, thereby impeding the success of non-affiliated competitors or even forcing them out of business. 8 Evidence was adduced by the government in the trial of this case that the Bell System was guilty of such practices. 9

The history of the government’s struggles with AT & T 10 indicated to those who negotiated and approved the current consent decree that, when the local companies were divested to continue on their own the provision of the local monopoly telecommunications services, they had to be prohibited from engaging also in competitive long dis *1095 tance and information services. 11 Accordingly, a specific prohibition to that effect— one of the few decree provisions directly applicable to the local companies — was incorporated in the decree. 12

The logic of such a provision was as obvious as its incorporation in the decree was crucial. Without it, the result of the break-up would have been to exchange one nationwide monopoly with the incentive and ability to exploit monopoly power and injure competition for several smaller monopolies with the identical incentives and abilities. The only distinction between the “old” Bell System and the present Regional Company system was and is that the Bell monopoly was nationwide in scope while each of the seven Regional Companies possesses an equally powerful monopoly 13 in a particular geographic region. 14

Insofar as the threat of injury to competition, competitors, and ratepayers is concerned, that distinction is one without a difference, for the “bottleneck” 15 monopolies continue to exist as before. These bottlenecks — i.e., the local companies with their ownership of the local switching systems and thus of the pathways which the interexchange and information providers must use if they wish to reach the ultimate consumers 16 —merely changed hands: instead of being controlled by the management of AT & T, they are now being controlled in each region by the management of a particular Regional Company. However, the ability to exploit the bottlenecks anticompetitively has remained precisely the same. It was on this basis that the prohibition against the provision of interex-change and information services became a central part of the decree.

That prohibition has far from outlived its usefulness. 17 Indeed, it could with some justification be argued that the Regional Companies, though obviously smaller than the Bell System, present dangers to competition that are in some respects even greater than those presented by that System.

AT & T was imbued with a service mentality, a tradition dating from the days of the chairmanship of Theodore Vail and continued through that of John deButts and Charles Brown. Although the company may have engaged in some or all of the anticompetitive activities with which it was charged, the balance wheel of the service tradition was always present. By contrast, the Regional Companies, or some of them, *1096 indicate by their public statements, their advertisements, and their rush to diversification, combined with their relative lack of interest in basic telephone service itself, 18 that an ascent into the ranks of conglomerate America rates far higher on their list of priorities than the provision of the best and least costly local telephone service to the American public. 19 Anyone faced with the prospect of permitting these companies to enter competitive markets, particularly the interexchange and the information markets, 20 would therefore have to exercise considerable caution lest the companies be empowered, even encouraged, to use their local monopoly advantage as a means to decimate the competition in these markets and thus to enhance further their conglomerate ambitions. 21

Moreover, unlike the Regional Companies, the Bell System was constrained significantly by the 1956 consent decree in that many of the newer technological markets, e.g.,

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Bluebook (online)
627 F. Supp. 1090, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-western-electric-co-dcd-1986.