United States v. Webb

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 25-3173
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-3173 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 11, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-3173 (D.C. No. 5:11-CR-40078-JAR-1) VIROK D. WEBB, (D. Kan.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Virok Webb, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s

order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

We construe Webb’s pro se filings liberally, but we do not act as his 1

advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). Appellate Case: 25-3173 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 2

BACKGROUND

In 2014, Webb pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In connection with his guilty plea, he

entered into a plea agreement with the government pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(1)(C). The plea agreement proposed a term of imprisonment of not less than

20 years or more than 30 years, to be followed by a supervised release term of ten

years. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss a second drug conspiracy

charge and a murder charge against Webb and to limit its 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1)

information to one prior felony drug conviction.

At sentencing, the government argued for imprisonment of 30 years, while

Webb sought a 20-year term. A presentence report (PSR) was prepared, which

calculated Webb’s total offense level for the drug offense at 39. But it recommended

a higher base offense level of 43, relying on a cross-reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1

for first-degree murder. The cross-reference was based on Webb’s role in the murder

of Crystal Fisher to prevent her from providing information about his drug crime to a

United States law enforcement officer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). Given

Webb’s criminal history category of III, the PSR calculated his advisory Guideline

range at 360 months to life. The district court accepted the plea agreement; overruled

Webb’s objections to the PSR, including his objection to the cross-reference to

§ 2A1.1; and sentenced him to a term of 360 months (30 years), to be followed by ten

years of supervised release.

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Webb appealed. We dismissed his appeal, finding his claims were barred or

wholly frivolous. United States v. Webb, 651 F. App’x 740, 745 (10th Cir. 2016).

He then filed a § 2255 motion. The district court denied the motion, along with his

motion to amend to add a Sixth Amendment claim, and we affirmed. United States v.

Webb, No. 21-3091, 2022 WL 11493541, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2022).

In 2024, Webb filed his first compassionate release motion. The district court

denied the motion. He appealed, but we dismissed his appeal for failure to prosecute.

On June 23, 2025, Webb filed his current compassionate release motion. In

denying the motion, the district court determined that Webb had not shown

extraordinary or compelling circumstances that justified compassionate release. It

rejected Webb’s claim that if sentenced today, due to changes in the law under the

First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), his mandatory minimum sentence would have been

15 years instead of 20 years, and that his advisory Guideline range would be

calculated at 210 to 262 months. It explained that even if the FSA changed his

statutory minimum, that would not have changed the court’s sentence, which was

based on a binding plea agreement for an imprisonment term between 20 and

30 years. In addition, Webb’s revised guideline calculation based on drug quantity

did not account for the court’s cross-reference to the murder guideline. The court

noted it had found this cross-reference appropriate at sentencing based on its finding

that Fisher had been killed at Webb’s direction because she was reporting his drug

crimes to law enforcement. Finally, the court noted it had found the PSR’s

attribution of drug quantities to Webb, which was nearly fifteen times the amount

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stipulated in the plea agreement, supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The

district court concluded Webb had not received a higher sentence than would likely

be imposed if he were sentenced today, and he was not serving an “unusually long

sentence” as contemplated by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.

The court also considered Webb’s evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation.

It applauded those efforts, but determined that by itself, that factor could not

establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing his sentence.

The district court then ruled that even if Webb had been able to show

extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors

weighed against compassionate release. 2 The court summarized the evidence

showing Webb was implicated in the brutal murder of Fisher, only hours after she

was approached by law enforcement to act as a confidential informant and to provide

information about Webb’s drug trafficking organization. It heavily weighed this

evidence, “in addition to the evidence of Webb’s drug distribution activity, as

illustrative of the serious and lethal nature and circumstances of the offenses in this

case.” R., vol. 1 at 446. The district court did not find that Webb’s history and

2 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; (3) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (4) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (5) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 4 Appellate Case: 25-3173 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 5

characteristics, in terms of his post-sentencing conduct, outweighed the nature and

circumstances of the offense. Nor did his efforts at rehabilitation, albeit

commendable, or any challenges posed by medical conditions, compel a finding that

compassionate release was warranted. Finally, Webb’s completion of programs

while in prison and his strong work ethic did not assure the court that after serving

less than half of his sentence, he was no longer a threat to the public.

DISCUSSION

The compassionate release statute allows a court to reduce a sentence in

“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances if such a reduction is consistent with

the Sentencing Commission policy statements and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before granting a motion for compassionate release a

district court must conduct a three-step test in which it addresses (1) “whether

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction”; (2) whether a

reduction is consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements; and

(3) whether, in the court’s discretion, the applicable § 3553(a) factors warrant the

reduction authorized by steps one and two. United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035,

1042-43 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[D]istrict courts may

deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others.” Id. at 1043

(internal quotation marks omitted).

We review an “order denying relief on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse

of discretion.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021).

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Under this standard, we will reverse the district court’s ruling if it relied on an

“incorrect conclusion of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v.

Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court’s determination that the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing

factors did not warrant compassionate release is dispositive here. The weighing of

these factors is committed to the district court’s discretion when it is ruling on a

compassionate release motion, and we will not reverse based on that weighing

“unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error

of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”

United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 949 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A court need not discuss every factor, nor must it mention every mitigating

fact a defendant raises to support a compassionate release motion. See id. at 948.

Rather, the court must set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties’

arguments and had a reasoned basis for its decision. See id. Because we do not

require a specific discussion of the § 3553(a) factors to impose a Guidelines sentence,

we do not require anything more detailed “to justify imposing or maintaining under

either paragraph of § 3582(c) a sentence within the recommended range of the

applicable guidelines.” Id.

Webb has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in weighing the

applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors. He asserts the district court breached his

plea agreement and violated due process by cross-referencing the murder guideline

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and attributing more cocaine to him than he agreed to in the plea agreement. 3 He

argues that if sentenced today, his minimum sentence and guideline range would

have been significantly lower. But the district court carefully explained why the

sentence Webb is serving, which was (1) within the range he agreed to in his

11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, (2) warranted by the nature and circumstances of his

offenses; (3) factually supported by the evidence; and (4) would not have been

different had he been sentenced today, did not warrant compassionate release under

the applicable § 3553(a) factors. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s determination.

Webb further argues that he has completed all First Step Act programming and

the BOP no longer considers him a risk. But he fails to show the district court

abused its discretion in determining that his post-sentencing record and rehabilitation,

even if commendable, did not outweigh the circumstances of his offenses.

Finally, Webb remarks that the district court failed to consider as a § 3553(a)

factor his sentencing disparity with his co-defendant Kennin Dewberry, who he states

has already been released. But he fails to explain the alleged disparity in light of

Dewberry’s specific sentencing factors such as conduct and criminal history, as

3 To the extent Webb argues “that [his] sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,” his proper remedy would be to seek authorization to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to raise that claim, because the district court could not grant the relief he seeks through compassionate release. United States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277, 1288 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Appellate Case: 25-3173 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 8

compared with Webb’s. This argument is not adequately developed for our review.

See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (this court need not

consider inadequately briefed arguments).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s denial of Webb’s motion for compassionate

release.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge