United States v. Walters

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-2115
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-2115 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/22/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 22, 2025 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-2115 (D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00275-KG-1) EDWARD WALTERS, (D. N.M.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

In this appeal, Edward Walters challenges the substantive

reasonableness of his 72-month sentence for various weapons offenses

stemming from an armed standoff he had with police. He argues the district

court erred in imposing a 15-month upward variance based on facts that

were captured in the applicable sentencing guideline range, which created

*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-2115 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/22/2025 Page: 2

an unwarranted sentencing disparity. Exercising jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

I

Walters pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a

firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (count 1), making an

unregistered firearm or explosive device, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(f), 5871

(count 2), and possession of a firearm or explosive device not registered with

the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,

5861(d), 5871 (count 3). He admitted that he knew he was subject to a state-

court protective order when he possessed firearms, ammunition, and two

pipe bombs.

According to the presentence investigation report (PSR), Walters

committed the crimes during an armed stand-off with police. His son called

the police reporting that Walters was at a residence in violation of a

restraining order and threatening to shoot his wife. When police arrived,

they found Walters in the garage with his wife, a tactical shield, and a

Kevlar helmet. His wife said he was armed; he said he “was there for an

intervention and stated, ‘[I]t’s about to go down. Get everybody out of the

house,’” Aple. Br. at 2. Police removed Walters’ wife and children from the

home. Walters then barricaded himself inside and at one point threw a pipe

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bomb outside. That prompted the police to evacuate surrounding neighbors

and inform the local school district to reroute buses and lock down a school.

After several hours of negotiations, police arrested Walters and searched

the residence. They recovered a pistol, a rifle, two pipe bombs, and silencers.

Walters admitted he built the pipe bombs, stating his “plan was ‘to end the

intervention by having a standoff with the Sheriff’s Office.’” Id. at 3. He also

said that he had just been released from jail for violating a restraining order

that prohibited him from contacting his wife.

The PSR determined Walters’ base offense level was 20. See United

States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). The PSR

added two levels because the offenses involved a destructive device,

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), and an additional four levels because Walters

used a firearm in connection with another felony, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

The PSR then subtracted two levels for acceptance of responsibility,

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and one level because he pled guilty, U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1(b), yielding a total offense level of 23.

The PSR assigned Walters a criminal history category of I because he

had no criminal convictions or criminal history points. However, under

“Other Criminal Conduct,” the PSR listed four prior domestic-violence

related arrests, all involving his wife. He was arrested for battery in 2012,

when he admitted to shoving his wife toward their children during an

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argument. Then he was arrested in May 2022 for assault (attempted battery

on a household member) and criminal damage to property of a household

member after he allegedly threw bottles at his wife’s feet and struck holes

in his daughter’s door with a flashlight. In August 2022, he was arrested

for aggravated stalking (violation of a protective order) when he was

allegedly on his wife’s property in violation of a restraining order. And in

September 2022, he was arrested on another charge of aggravated stalking

(violation of a protective order) when he was at a residence after police told

him he could not be there.

The PSR also described Walters’ personal history, including his

military service in the regular Army and Army National Guard, where he

reported that he received an Honorable discharge. Walters also denied any

mental health conditions, but he was speaking to a counselor at the

Veterans’ Affairs office to be evaluated for post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD). He had also been prescribed medication to help him discontinue

alcohol use, but he ceased taking that medication.

With a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of I,

Walters’ advisory sentencing guidelines range was 46 to 57 months. But the

PSR noted an upward departure might be appropriate under U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.14 due to Walters’ endangerment of the public welfare. The PSR also

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determined that an upward variance might be justified when considering

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

For his part, Walters moved for a downward variance, arguing he was

going through a difficult time with the end of his 30-year marriage, he was

seeking an evaluation for PTSD, and his veteran’s benefits would afford him

access to mental health and substance abuse treatment. He also asserted

his conduct was already accounted for and reflected in the calculation of the

advisory guidelines. The government countered that a sentence at the upper

end of the guidelines was appropriate based on the seriousness of the stand-

off and the PSR’s finding that he had a “recidivist pattern of domestic

violence.” R. I at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings and guideline

calculations without objection and then varied upward to impose a

72-month sentence. Walters timely appeals and contends his sentence was

substantively unreasonable because the aggravating facts of his case were

already captured in the underlying guidelines range and there was an

unwarranted sentencing disparity with other defendants convicted of

similar offenses.

II

“We review [the substantive reasonableness of a sentence] for abuse

of discretion, focusing on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable

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given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Lucero, 130 F.4th 877, 886 (10th Cir.

2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e will reverse a [sentencing]

determination only if the court exceeded the bounds of permissible choice.”

United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it

renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly

unreasonable.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not presume a sentencing

variance is unreasonable. Id. Rather, “[w]e uphold even substantial

variances when the district court properly weighs the § 3553(a) factors and

offers valid reasons for the chosen sentence.” Lucero, 130 F.4th at 887

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e must give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a

whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d

910, 917 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

Walters first contends his sentence is substantively unreasonable

because the district court varied upward based on facts that were already

captured in his sentencing guideline range. He points out that the

guidelines already accounted for his use of multiple firearms, a tactical

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shield, and destructive devices; he caused neighbors to be evacuated and a

school placed on lockdown; he had served in the military; and he had a

“recidivist pattern of domestic violence.” Aplt. Br. at 13. This argument

fails, however, because “district courts have broad discretion to consider

particular facts in fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even

when those facts are already accounted for in the advisory guideline range.”

Barnes, 890 F.3d at 921 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

The question is whether the district court adequately analyzed the § 3553(a)

factors in explaining its sentence. See id. at 916 (“[T]he adequacy of the

court’s consideration and explanation of the § 3553(a) factors is the

keystone of our analysis.”). “A sentence is more likely to be within the

bounds of reasonable choice when the court has provided a cogent and

reasonable explanation for it.” Id. at 917.

Here, the district court provided a comprehensive explanation for its

sentence. It began by generally observing that Walters “put a lot of people

in great fear for their own personal safety, not only [his] wife, [his] kids, but

probably those cops that show[ed] up, even if they’re just doing their jobs.”

R., vol. 3 at 23. More specifically, in considering Walters’ history and

characteristics, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the district court acknowledged his

military service and job with the state patrol in which he saw “some very

troubling things . . . that could cause trauma,” R. III at 25. The district court

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also noted it would be beneficial for him to be evaluated for PTSD. Id. But

the district court determined the circumstances of this case were “more

troubling than the face of the offenses” because he had been previously

arrested four times for domestic-violence related offenses. Id. at 23. The

district court described those arrests and noted he had been subject to

protective orders that prohibited him from contacting his wife and family

but he “blatantly disregarded those orders.” Id. at 24-25. The district court

also noted his “very troubling history of violence, threats of violence, and

. . . conduct that was threatening.” Id. at 25.

Additionally, the district court considered the serious and violent

nature of the offense, the need to promote respect for the law, and its

obligation to impose a just punishment while protecting the public.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (C). The district court explained that Walters’

conduct was “egregious” and “different from similarly situated defendants

charged with similar offenses.” Id. at 26. It impacted the surrounding

neighborhood and “young students in an elementary school,” requiring the

mobilization of “almost a full scope of local law enforcement.” Id. The

district court further explained that Walters had “manufactured two pipe

bombs and stated [his] intention” was “a standoff with . . . law enforcement

officers.” Id. He also possessed multiple firearms and ammunition and he

made the pipe bombs knowing he was subject to a court order that

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prohibited him from possessing firearms. He also “refused to comply with

commands to disarm [himself] and to surrender for several hours.” Id.

Under these circumstances, the district court indicated an above-guideline

sentence was warranted. Given this cogent and eminently reasonable

explanation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in justifying its

sentence, including its variance from the applicable guidelines range.

B

Walters nevertheless contends his sentence results in an

unwarranted disparity with other defendants convicted of similar offenses.

In particular, he says he received a higher sentence than the defendants in

three prior cases: United States v. Kostich, 197 F. App’x 753 (10th Cir.

2006), United States v. Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2001), and

United States v. Berres, 777 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2015).

The district court was obligated “to consider ‘the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records

who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’” Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). But “[n]o two cases

are identical, and a comparison of an individual sentence with a few

counsel-selected cases involving other defendants sentenced by other judges

is almost always useless.” United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1372

(10th Cir. 2015) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Indeed, as best we can tell from Kostich, Eaton, and Berres, none of

these cases involved a defendant with a history of domestic violence-related

arrests who was armed with firearms and pipe bombs and who also

threatened to shoot his wife. None of the cases involved a defendant who

barricaded himself in a home intending to engage in an armed stand-off

with police. And none of those cases involved a defendant who deployed a

pipe bomb in a manner that posed a grave public safety risk requiring the

evacuation of a neighborhood and lockdown of a school for hours while police

negotiated with the defendant to surrender.

Absent such similarities and other comparative factors, Walters fails

to convince us that the district court’s sentence results in an unwarranted

sentencing disparity with similarly situated defendants. Moreover, the

district court’s explanation and application of the § 3553(a) factors to the

unique and “egregious” facts and circumstances of this case show a

permissible choice and resulted in a reasonable sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge