United States v. Viana-Hernandez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-3084
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3084 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cr-02135-LL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JUAN VIANA-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 19, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: HIGGINSON, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.**

The Government appeals the district court’s order dismissing the charge

against Defendant Juan Viana-Hernandez with prejudice, after previously allowing

Viana-Hernandez to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court stated it dismissed

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, sitting by designation. Viana-Hernandez’s case under its supervisory authority because it concluded that

the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly undermined the imposition of its lawful

sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and reinstate

Viana-Hernandez’s judgment and sentence.

1. This case is not moot. “For a dispute to remain live without being

dismissed as moot, ‘[t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the

outcome of the lawsuit.’” Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1160–61 (9th Cir.

2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478

(1990)). The Government has a live interest in this case: the reinstatement of Viana-

Hernandez’s guilty plea and sentence. See Garding v. Mont. Dep’t of Corrs., 105

F.4th 1247, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 2024) (discussing how the state had an interest in a

vacated judgment to avoid a new trial).

2. The Government did not waive its objection to the district court dismissing

the charge against Viana-Hernandez. The Government argued against the dismissal.

At the April 22, 2024, order to show cause hearing, the district court noted “I’ve

considered an order to show cause why somebody shouldn’t be held in contempt. I

think the best and most direct and probably least offensive response to this is just to

dismiss the case. The Government wants to appeal, have at it.” “[W]aiver is the

‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

2 24-3084 (1938)). Looking at the entirety of the record and the district court transcripts, the

Government did not waive its objection.

3. A district court’s use of its supervisory powers is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987). The

district court abused its discretion by allowing Viana-Hernandez to withdraw his

plea and then dismissing the charge against him. “We have accepted that ‘[a]ll

federal courts are vested with inherent powers enabling them to manage their cases

and courtrooms effectively and to ensure obedience to their orders.’” United States

v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Aloe Vera of

Am., Inc. v. United States, 376 F.3d 960, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). The

Supreme Court has suggested that a district court should invoke its supervisory

authority in limited circumstances such as “to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring

that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations” or “to deter illegal conduct.”

United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).

“Whatever the scope of” the district court’s “‘inherent power,’ however, it

does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426

(1996). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 11(e) requires that “[a]fter the

court imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere, and the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack.”

3 24-3084 The set-aside did not occur on either direct appeal or collateral attack. The district

court thus violated Rule 11(e).

The district court based its dismissal on the BOP’s conduct. But here, the

BOP expressed staffing and safety concerns at the Metropolitan Correction Center

San Diego with letting Viana-Hernandez enter and exit the facility every weekend.

The BOP offered placements in other facilities. While the district court may make

recommendations, the BOP has “plenary control” over the location of confinement.

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011). Although the district court found

that the BOP’s alternatives were unreasonable, the BOP’s actions were not improper,

much less outrageous, and did not justify either allowing Viana-Hernandez to

withdraw his plea or dismissing the charge against Viana-Hernandez. See United

States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Proper regard for judicial

integrity does not justify a ‘“chancellor’s foot” veto’ over activities of coequal

branches of government.” (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435

(1973))).

The district court was concerned that the BOP’s alternate locations would

effectively undermine its sentence of intermittent confinement. But there were other

means available to the parties, and to the district court, to address changes in

circumstance that may have permitted modifications to Viana-Hernandez’s sentence

or to the terms of his probation. For example, the district court, under Rule 36, could

4 24-3084 have corrected an error in the judgment. Alternatively, Viana-Hernandez (or the

Government) could have moved to modify the terms of Viana-Hernandez’s

probation under Rule 32.1(c). Following the issuance of our mandate, the district

court may find that conditions have changed, and/or other bases exist for exercising

its discretion to modify the sentence, including through Rule 32.1(c) or Rule 36, and

including based on the possible lack of an appropriate facility for intermittent

confinement.

The district court abused its discretion under the Rules and the limits of its

supervisory authority by dismissing the Government’s charge against Viana-

Hernandez after permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. Viana-Hernandez’s judgment and

sentence are REINSTATED.

5 24-3084