United States v. Vega-Figueroa

139 F.4th 77

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Docket: 23-1125
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSÉ A. VEGA-FIGUEROA, a/k/a Pito Casco,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Gelpí and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Frank D. Inserni Milam for appellant.

Jeniffer Vélez Pérez, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

June 4, 2025 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant José A.

Vega-Figueroa ("Vega") is serving multiple life sentences for his

role in a 1990s drug-trafficking operation. In February 2021,

Vega sought release from prison by moving for compassionate

release. The district court denied that motion and Vega now

appeals, contending that the district court neither adequately

addressed his "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for release

nor adequately addressed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing

factors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background

Vega has appeared before this court many times. See,

e.g., United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744, 747 (1st Cir.

2000); United States v. Vega-Figueroa, No. 09-1077 (1st Cir.

July 29, 2009); United States v. Vega-Figueroa, No. 12-1754 (1st

Cir. Aug. 8, 2012); United States v. Vega-Figueroa, No. 14-1247

(1st Cir. Mar. 31, 2015); United States v. Vega-Figueroa, No.

18-1906 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2019). Consequently, we assume the

parties' familiarity with much of the procedural and factual

- 2 - background and recite here only the information necessary to

explain our decision.1

In 1994, Vega was charged in the Superior Court of Puerto

Rico, Carolina Section, with ten counts related to various criminal

offenses. See Vega-Figueroa, slip op. at 1. Those charges

included, in relevant part: (1) unlawful possession, use, and

transportation of several guns; and (2) two counts of first-degree

murder for the deaths of Reynaldo Colón González ("Colón González")

and Melvin Flores-Montalvo ("Flores-Montalvo"). Id. On

October 11, 1995, a jury acquitted Vega of all charges. Id.

In 1997, however, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment against Vega. Id. at 2. It was alleged that Vega,

along with a co-defendant, was "in charge of an extensive criminal

enterprise involving the sale and distribution of heroin, cocaine,

crack cocaine, and marijuana" in Puerto Rico between 1990 and 1997.

Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d at 748. As the district court in that

case described it, the enterprise was a "very dangerous and violent

drug gang." See Vega-Figueroa, slip op. at 4. The indictment

charged Vega with various counts, including: (1) aiding and

abetting in a continuing criminal enterprise; (2) conspiring to

distribute in excess of five kilograms of heroin, in excess of

1The district court's Opinion and Order provides a more fulsome history. See United States v. Vega-Figueroa, No. 3:97-cr-00072-CVR, slip op. at 1-4 (D.P.R. Dec. 12, 2022).

- 3 - five kilograms of cocaine, and in excess of 100 kilograms of

marijuana; and (3) the unlawful use of firearms during and in

relation to a drug-trafficking offense. The indictment also listed

the aforementioned murders of Colón González and Flores-Montalvo

as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. After a thirty-day

trial, the federal jury found Vega guilty on all counts.

Following the verdict, a Presentence Investigation

Report ("PSR") was prepared; it set forth a base offense level of

43. The PSR included homicide-related facts, which were the basis

for an increase in Vega's sentencing exposure under the

then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district

court sentenced Vega on February 19, 1999. The district court's

sentence included concurrent life sentences, one each as to Counts

One and Two, and a five-year term as to Count Three.

Shortly after sentencing, Vega appealed his conviction

and sentence to this court. See Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744. In

that appeal, Vega raised ten issues, including various evidentiary

challenges. Id. at 747-57. We affirmed Vega's conviction after

evaluating his contentions. Id. at 758. Following our decision,

Vega unsuccessfully continued to seek relief from his sentence.

See, e.g., Mot. for Retroactive Appl. of Sentencing Guidelines,

No. 3:97-cr-00072-CVR (D.P.R. May 14, 2008), ECF No. 758; Mot. to

Vacate Sentence, No. 3:97-cr-00072-CVR (D.P.R. Nov. 12, 2013), ECF

- 4 - No. 917; Mot. to Validate, No. 3:97-cr-00072-CVR (D.P.R. June 28,

2016), ECF No. 1014.

The procedural history of the present appeal is

comparatively short. Vega filed a request for compassionate

release with the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") on May 11, 2020. There,

he emphasized his increased risk of complications from COVID-19,

given his preexisting medical conditions. On July 20, 2020, the

Warden of FCI Coleman -- FCI Coleman being the location where Vega

is incarcerated -- denied Vega's request, citing the BOP's

"extraordinary measures to contain the spread of COVID-19."2 Vega

then moved for compassionate release in the District of Puerto

Rico on February 8, 2021.

Vega's motion was brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(a), the provision governing sentence reductions

(colloquially known as the compassionate release provision). Vega

argued that he was entitled to relief due, in part, to the BOP's

allegedly negligent monitoring and treatment of his type 2 diabetes

and his increased risk of COVID-19-related complications due to

his diabetes. He also emphasized his "having been placed in

jeopardy twice for the same conduct on like charges (murder in the

2 Vega refers to the prison where he is housed as "FCC Coleman," while the government refers to it as "FCI Coleman." Federal Correctional Institution, Coleman, "FCI Coleman," is an Institution located within the Federal Correctional Complex, Coleman, "FCC Coleman." We adopt "FCI Coleman" here.

- 5 - first degree)." Finally, Vega asserted that his rehabilitation

efforts, analyzed under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing

factors, supported a sentence reduction.

The government opposed Vega's motion, arguing that Vega

had presented neither extraordinary and compelling reasons for

compassionate release nor evidence that he was not a danger to the

community. The government pressed that Vega's health conditions

did not rise to the level of severity required under the U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13 policy statement.3 Further, in arguing that Vega

continued to present a danger to the community, the government

highlighted Vega's central role in the "dangerous and violent"

drug gang.4

The district court denied Vega's motion on December 12,

2022. It found that the "roughest part" of the pandemic had passed

and that the BOP "had taken necessary steps" to protect

3We have recognized the section 1B1.13 policy statement as non-binding to prisoner-initiated motions. See United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 23 (1st. Cir. 2022). That decision held that the policy statement here was not binding for prisoner-initiated petitions. Id. The government makes clear that its briefing below relied on the policy statement as binding because it was "filed on February 19, 2021, before this Court's" Ruvalcaba decision. Our Ruvalcaba opinion issued on February 15, 2022. Id. On appeal, the government concedes that the district court incorrectly treated the section 1B1.13 policy statement as binding. 4The government also noted Vega's in-prison infractions, including his participation in a fight in 2004, his possession of a weapon in 2005, and his having not followed safety regulations in 2016.

- 6 - incarcerated individuals. It further found Vega's medical

conditions fell outside of the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) policy

statement, which it considered binding. The district court also

rejected Vega's argument on acquitted conduct, stating that

acquitted conduct could be used in making guideline

determinations. On the parties' section 3553(a) arguments, the

district court determined that, "on balance," Vega was "still a

danger to the community." It thus concluded Vega had not met the

requirements for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582.

This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. The Legal Framework

We begin our discussion with a brief explanation of the

statutory framework governing compassionate release, "[t]he First

Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, modified 18

U.S.C. § 3582, the compassionate release statute." United States

v. D'Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in

original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Under the First

Step Act, district courts may "grant prisoner-initiated

compassionate release motions once movants 'fully exhaust[]' their

administrative remedies with the BOP." Id. at 48 (alteration in

original). After administrative exhaustion, federal courts are

authorized to reduce an incarcerated individual's sentence if

(1) "extraordinary and compelling" reasons exist for doing so;

- 7 - (2) "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;" and (3) the

sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counsel in

favor of such a reduction. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 18-19 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (citations omitted).

In reviewing motions for compassionate release,

"district courts enjoy broad discretion, and may conduct a holistic

review to determine whether the individualized circumstances,

taken in the aggregate, present an 'extraordinary and compelling'

reason to grant compassionate release."5 United States v.

Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26

F.4th at 27-28). To grant relief, the court must find that "such

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued

by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Finally, the court must "consider any applicable section 3553(a)

factors and 'determine whether, in its discretion, the

reduction . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the

particular circumstances of the case.'" Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 19

5The United States Sentencing Commission has issued a policy that "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) fall into six categories. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Those categories are: (1) medical circumstances; (2) age; (3) family circumstances; (4) the defendant having been a "[v]ictim of [a]buse" while in custody; (5) other reasons "similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4);" and (6) the defendant's having "received an unusually long sentence." Id.

- 8 - (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Saccoccia, 10

F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021)). "A district court may grant a

compassionate release motion only if it finds that the movant

satisfies each step." D'Angelo, 110 F.4th at 48 (citations

omitted).

We review a district court's denial, or grant, of a

motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion.

Trenkler, 47 F.4th at 46 (citing Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 19).

"Questions of law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact are

reviewed for clear error." Id.

B. Analysis

With this background understanding, we turn to the

parties' arguments. Vega argues that the district court erred in

its assessment of the section 3553(a) factors. He contends that

the district court wrongly concluded that leaders of

drug-trafficking organizations are categorically ineligible for

sentence reductions, even though no such categorical bar exists.

He also argues that the district court failed to consider "any and

all new" section 3553(a) factors and that a proper analysis of the

factors would show that he is not a danger to the community. 6 We

6Given our ultimate conclusion -- that the district court's analysis of the section 3553(a) factors is sound -- we decline to address the parties' arguments on the "extraordinary and compelling" reasons to either deny or grant his request for release. See United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2022) ("[A] district court's decision to deny

- 9 - first address Vega's contention that he provided the district court

with "multiple circumstances" and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that

were not adequately considered.7 Vega argues that the

section 3553(a) factors counsel in favor of his release. Citing

Third and Fourth Circuit opinions, he argues that the "court must

consider any and all new" section 3553(a) factors. Vega contends

that he poses a "minimum risk level" of recidivism. To support

his claim that he does not present a "danger to others," Vega

points to his age (54 years old) and his current reliance on

crutches.

By contrast, the government argues Vega has failed to

demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. The

government highlights Vega's key role in a "very dangerous and

violent drug gang," alongside three infractions he committed while

imprisoned. The government contends that, given those

compassionate release may be affirmed solely on the basis of its supportable determination that the section 3553(a) factors weigh against the granting of such relief." (citations omitted)). There are seven section 3553(a) factors. 7 They include: (i) "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," (ii) "the need for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense," (iii) "the kinds of sentences available," (iv) the guidelines, (v) "any pertinent policy statement," (vi) "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities[,]" and (vii) "the need to provide restitution to any victims." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Fargas-Reyes, 125 F.4th 264, 269 n.3 (1st Cir. 2025) (describing "how a federal district judge approaches sentencing," including the seven section 3553(a) factors).

- 10 - circumstances, the district court was "well within its discretion

in finding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against

Vega's release." We agree with the government's conclusion.

Vega's argument, that a district court's review of a

motion for compassionate release must be holistic and

individualized, is sound. As we have cautioned: "[I]n conducting

their reviews, district courts should be mindful of the holistic

context of a defendant's individual case when deciding whether the

defendant's circumstances satisfy the 'extraordinary and

compelling' standard." Trenkler, 47 F.4th at 49–50. That is not

to say, however, that a district court must provide an exhaustive

explanation analyzing every factor. See United States v.

Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2023) ("[D]istrict

court[s] need not consider every potential configuration of

grounds for compassionate release but, rather, [their] analysis

'should be shaped by the arguments advanced by defendants.'"

(quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 68 F.4th 699, 706 (1st Cir.

2023))).

In fact, we have been "pellucid" in explaining "that a

district court, when conducting a section 3553(a) analysis, need

not tick off each and every factor in a mechanical sequence."

Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 10. Indeed, "we presume -- absent some

contrary indication -- that a sentencing court considered all the

mitigating factors and that those not specifically mentioned were

- 11 - simply unpersuasive." Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (citing United

States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 154 (1st Cir. 2005). Here, our

normal presumption applies, as Vega has not developed any argument

that "some contrary indication" exists. Given Vega has not made

any argument that the presumption described in Saccoccia does not

apply here, his argument fails.

The district court appropriately reviewed Vega's

rehabilitation efforts and concluded that, on balance, he still

presents a danger to the community. It stated that it

"recognize[d] [Vega's] efforts towards rehabilitation," and

referenced a quote from a "UNICOR" foreman that Vega had

"demonstrated his integrity and resolve to rehabilitative change."

See Vega-Figueroa, slip op. at 10-11. Given his crimes and prison

record, though, the district court still found that a reduction

would be inconsistent with reflecting the seriousness of the

offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just

punishment for the offense. We have held that it is appropriate

to consider the danger an individual presents to the community

under § 3553(a)(2)(C). See D'Angelo, 110 F.4th at 50 (citations

omitted). As we recognized in D'Angelo, section 3553(a)(2)(C)

concerns "public protection, a concept that necessarily entails

the danger that a defendant poses to the community." Id.

(citations omitted). The district court's denial of Vega's motion,

based on its assessment of the danger he poses to the community,

- 12 - falls within its discretion. See id. And we find no abuse of

discretion in the district court's assessment of the

section 3553(a) factors.

Vega also argues that the district court erroneously

concluded that "leaders of drug-trafficking organizations are not

eligible for sentence reductions." In making this argument, Vega

only contends that the district court made this alleged error in

its order denying his motion for reconsideration. That order,

however, is not directly at issue on appeal, and Vega does not

advance any argument as to how the language in the denial of the

motion for reconsideration should influence our understanding of

the denial that is at issue before us. Indeed, the language in

the denial that Vega appealed differs sufficiently from the

language in the denial for reconsideration, such that Vega needed

to advance some argument explaining why the language in the

appealed denial indicates that the district court applied a

categorical bar. But, given that Vega made no such argument, we

consider this challenge waived for lack of development. See United

States v. Cortés-Maldonado, 939 F.3d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 2019)

(citing United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990));

see also Rife v. One W. Bank, F.S.B., 873 F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir.

- 13 - 2017) (citing Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d

25, 29 (1st Cir. 2015)).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

- 14 -