United States v. Duluc-Mendez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1767
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 24-1767

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee,

v.

VÍCTOR MIGUEL DULUC-MÉNDEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Rikelman and Aframe, Circuit Judges, and Elliott,* District Judge.

Robert Fitzgerald, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, District of Puerto Rico, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appellate Unit, were on brief, for appellant. Emelina M. Agrait-Barreto, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

October 15, 2025

* Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation. AFRAME, Circuit Judge. After serving approximately half

of his 240-month sentence for participating in a carjacking

resulting in death, Víctor Miguel Duluc-Méndez (Duluc) moved for

compassionate release to care for his ailing mother. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). In his motion, Duluc detailed his mother's poor

health, his siblings' inability to care for her, and his

substantial post-conviction rehabilitation. The government filed

an opposition, and the next day, the district court denied Duluc's

motion in a brief order, concluding that relief was unwarranted

because Duluc failed to demonstrate that his siblings were unable

to care for his mother and his criminal record. The court did not

mention Duluc's rehabilitation. We now vacate and remand because,

on the present record, we cannot conclude that the court considered

Duluc's rehabilitation-based arguments.

I.

In 2013, Duluc and a juvenile took a car by force in a San Juan,

Puerto Rico, public housing project. The pair detained the car's

driver and traveled with him to an ATM, where Duluc used the

driver's ATM card to withdraw $150. They then went to a rural

area in the stolen car. Once there, the juvenile instructed the

driver to inspect a flat tire. The driver complied, and the

juvenile fatally shot him. The police stopped Duluc approximately

two weeks later while driving the stolen car. He fled the scene

but was apprehended the next day. Duluc admitted to the carjacking

- 2 - but denied knowing that the juvenile was intending to shoot the

driver.

Shortly thereafter, a grand jury indicted Duluc for

participating in a carjacking with the intent to cause serious

bodily injury or death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2119(3), and for using a

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, id.

§§ 2, 924(c), (j). In due course, Duluc pleaded guilty to the

carjacking count, and the district court dismissed the firearm

count. The government requested a 240-month sentence, which the

court imposed.

In December 2023, after serving about ten years in

prison, Duluc filed a pro se motion, explaining that he wished to

seek compassionate release and requesting the appointment of

counsel to assist him in doing so. The court appointed counsel,

who filed a supplemental motion on Duluc's behalf in July 2024.

In the supplemental motion, Duluc explained that his mother, who

previously suffered from cardiovascular problems and arthritis,

now also suffered from worsening dementia. According to Duluc,

her new symptoms had left her unable to drive or follow complex

conversations, which in turn had caused her to miss medical

appointments, to forget to take her medications, and on several

occasions, to become lost when trying to return to her home. Duluc

related that, because of his mother's deteriorating condition, her

doctor had advised that she "need[ed] assistance with her

- 3 - activities of daily living." And he stated that none of his

siblings could assist her, providing letters from three of them,

in which each sibling explained that they were incapable of helping

their mother because they did not live in Puerto Rico, did not

have sufficient space for her to live with them, or had obligations

or medical problems of their own that made them unable to provide

the necessary care. A fourth sibling was estranged from Duluc's

mother and, at the time of Duluc's motion, his mother did not know

his whereabouts.

Duluc also detailed his substantial rehabilitation. He

related that he had completed more than one thousand hours of

rehabilitation programming offered by the Bureau of Prisons

("BOP"), had been entrusted with leadership positions in the

facilities where he had been incarcerated, and had become a tutor

and mentor to fellow prisoners. He included letters from several

BOP employees recommending his early release, as well as letters

from inmates describing Duluc's support for them. He also

explained his religious development while in prison; in an attached

letter, an assistant chaplain at Duluc's facility described Duluc

as "the Christian leader to the [prison's] Hispanic community," "a

vital part of chapel services," and "a great leader and man of

faith." Duluc argued that this "extraordinary rehabilitation

. . . further support[ed]" his release.

- 4 - Finally, Duluc argued that his release would be

consistent with the pertinent sentencing factors under title 18,

section 3553(a). Again, he placed principal emphasis on his

post-conviction rehabilitation, describing how he had "completed

virtually every program offered" by the facilities in which he had

been incarcerated, helped other prisoners graduate from high

school, and assisted the chaplain in "teaching the Bible." His

significant progress, he explained, demonstrated that he would not

be a danger to the community, showed that deterrence and

rehabilitation goals had been accomplished, and prepared him for

successful release into society.

The government opposed Duluc's motion. It argued that

Duluc had failed to show that he was the only available caregiver

for his mother. It described the "non-specific reasons as to why

[Duluc's] mother could not move to the mainland with his siblings

or why any of [Duluc's] siblings cannot travel to Puerto Rico -- at

least temporarily -- to provide care for their mother" as

"commonplace concerns to all families with aging parents."

Regarding Duluc's rehabilitation, the government asserted that "a

defendant's rehabilitation alone does not warrant compassionate

release," citing several decisions to that effect. The government

did not specifically respond to Duluc's argument that the

section 3553(a) sentencing factors favored release.

- 5 - The day after the government filed its opposition, the

district court denied Duluc's motion in a short order, reproduced

in full below:

Defendant Víctor Miguel Duluc-Méndez's [supplemental motion] is DENIED.

[Duluc] has not demonstrated any extraordinary and compelling reason to grant him compassionate release. He argues that he is the only child who can take care of his ailing mother, but he has other siblings. The reasons he gives for his siblings not being able to take care of his mother are not convincing. They are commonplace concerns to all families with aging parents. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); USSG 1B1.13. In addition, his criminal record weighs against release. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Later that day, Duluc filed a motion for

reconsideration. Duluc noted that the government had not

challenged the evidence of his rehabilitation nor argued that the

section 3553(a) factors favored further incarceration. He also

asked the district court to reconsider its view about the inability

of his siblings to care for his mother or, at a minimum, to hold

an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The court denied Duluc's

motion the following day without further explanation.

II.

Subject to limited exceptions, a district court may not

reduce a sentence that it has imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides one such exception, permitting a

district court to grant a defendant what is commonly known as

- 6 - compassionate release. See id. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v.

Vega-Figueroa, 139 F.4th 77, 79 (1st Cir. 2025). In pertinent

part, section 3582(c)(1)(A) states that, "upon motion of the

defendant," the court "may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . ,

after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the

extent they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary

and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that

such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements

issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A compassionate-release motion thus presents a district

court with "a multi-step inquiry." United States v. Burgos-Montes,

142 F.4th 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2025). First, the court must assess

whether the defendant has set forth "extraordinary and compelling

reasons" that warrant a sentence reduction, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); next, it must ask whether the reduction "is

consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13.1 "If the defendant is eligible for compassionate release

1 On November 1, 2023, the United States Sentencing Commission's policy statement on motions for compassionate release initiated by prisoners took effect. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Previously, district courts had broad discretion that was "unconstrained by any policy statement currently in effect[] to consider whether a prisoner's particular reasons [were] sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to warrant compassionate release." United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2022). That is no longer the case for motions, such as this one,

- 7 - under these two criteria," the court must then consider "the

relevant [section] 3553(a) sentencing factors" and determine

whether, "in its discretion" and "under the particular

circumstances of the case," the reduction is warranted.

Burgos-Montes, 142 F.4th at 57 (quoting United States v. Saccoccia,

10 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021)). A district court may grant

compassionate release only if the defendant satisfies each of these

steps. See United States v. D'Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir.

2024).

We review the denial of a compassionate-release motion

for abuse of discretion. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4. Under

that standard, we review "legal questions de novo, factual findings

for clear error, and judgment calls with some deference to the

district court's exercise of discretion." Id. at 5 (quoting Akebia

Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020)).

Duluc contends that the district court made an error of

law, and thereby abused its discretion, when it failed to consider

his argument that his post-conviction rehabilitation combined with

his family circumstances amounted to an "extraordinary and

compelling reason" supporting release under the statute and the

Sentencing Commission's policy statement. Separately, but in a

that were filed after the relevant policy statement went into effect. See United States v. Gonzalez, 68 F.4th 699, 704 n.2 (1st Cir. 2023).

- 8 - similar vein, he asserts that the court also abused its discretion

by failing to consider his post-conviction rehabilitation in its

analysis of the section 3553(a) factors. We address Duluc's

arguments in turn.2

A.

We begin with Duluc's claim that the district court

failed to consider his argument that his mother's declining health

and his siblings' inability to care for her, combined with his

substantial post-conviction rehabilitation, provided the

"extraordinary and compelling reasons" necessary to reduce his

sentence under the compassionate-release statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), and the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy

statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Applying the prescribed "multi-step inquiry,"

Burgos-Montes, 142 F.4th at 57, we first address whether the

defendant has set forth "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

under section 3582(c)(1)(a). In considering a motion for

compassionate release under this section, we have instructed

district courts to conduct a "holistic" inquiry, United States v.

Gonzalez, 68 F.4th 699, 700 (1st Cir. 2023), "consider[ing] any

complex of circumstances raised by a defendant as forming an

2 Duluc also contends that the district court erred in concluding that he was not his mother's only available caregiver. For reasons we will explain, we do not reach this argument because of our disposition of his other two contentions.

- 9 - extraordinary and compelling reason warranting relief," D'Angelo,

110 F.4th at 48 (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 28). The statute

precludes "rehabilitation alone" from serving as "an extraordinary

and compelling reason for compassionate release," United States v.

Sepulveda, 34 F.4th 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2022); see 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(t). But that limitation does not stop a defendant from

combining rehabilitation with other factors to establish an

extraordinary and compelling reason. See United States v.

Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022) (differentiating between

what can be "considered in an 'extraordinary and compelling'

determination" and what itself can "qualify as extraordinary and

compelling" (emphasis omitted)); Gonzalez, 68 F.4th at 704-05

(similar); see also United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 659 (4th

Cir. 2024) ("While Congress did specify that rehabilitation alone

cannot be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason for

release, it may be considered as one factor among several under

[section] 3582(c)(1)(A).").

The Sentencing Commission's policy statement for

compassionate-release motions takes a similar approach. See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Section 1B1.13 permits "rehabilitation of the

defendant while serving the sentence [to] be considered in

combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to

what extent a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is

warranted." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d) (emphasis added). Among the

- 10 - "other circumstances," id., the policy statement specifically

identifies the "[f]amily [c]ircumstances of the [d]efendant," id.

at § 1B1.13(b)(3).

Because Duluc's combination argument was cognizable

under section 3582(c)(1)(A) and section 1B1.13 of the sentencing

guidelines and was also supported by evidence of his rehabilitation

and his mother's serious medical condition, the district court was

obligated to consider it. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S.

481, 487 (2022) ("[D]istrict courts are always obligated to

consider nonfrivolous arguments presented by the parties."); see

Davis, 99 F.4th at 659 (concluding that the district court "abused

its discretion in overlooking [the defendant's] evidence of

rehabilitation" when considering whether the defendant established

an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release).

Yet, the order denying Duluc's compassionate-release motion did

not acknowledge Duluc's combination argument or otherwise suggest

that the court had evaluated its merits. Rather, the order

addressed -- and found wanting -- Duluc's family circumstances,

which were just one part of his combination argument.

The government argues that we may infer that the district

court implicitly rejected Duluc's combination argument. See

United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006)

(en banc) (observing that "a court's reasoning can often be

inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties . . . with

- 11 - what the judge did"). To do so, the government seizes on the last

sentence of its opposition to Duluc's supplemental motion, which

urged that Duluc's arguments be rejected "both individually and as

a whole." The government posits that the court, in essentially

adopting the government's position, implicitly rejected the

combination argument.

The problem for the government, however, is that this

sentence, read in full, asked the court to reject Duluc's arguments

specifically "[f]or the reasons" presented in the government's

opposition. And the government nowhere addressed Duluc's argument

that his family circumstances and rehabilitation combined amounted

to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. Rather, the

government asserted that "a defendant's rehabilitation alone does

not warrant compassionate release" (emphasis added). That is a

correct statement of law, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(d), but one that is non-responsive to Duluc's combination

argument.

The record in this case, like the district court's order,

does not suggest that the court appreciated and considered Duluc's

combination argument. The close resemblance between the court's

reasoning and some of the government's arguments causes concern

that the court, like the government, overlooked the combination

argument or believed that it was unavailable as a matter of law.

Cf. United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 137 F.4th 25, 32-33 (1st Cir.

- 12 - 2025) (noting "concern" that the government's arguments may have

caused the district court to misunderstand applicable precedent).

Our concern on this point is amplified by three

additional considerations. First, the district court denied

Duluc's motion without a hearing and before he could file a reply,

meaning that Duluc had no opportunity to draw the matter to the

court's attention, and the government had no opportunity to clarify

or elaborate upon its position. Second, Duluc's combination

argument was nuanced and somewhat novel: None of our prior

decisions squarely addressed the combination issue presented here,

and the policy statement expressly permitting Duluc's combination

argument based on rehabilitation became effective only a month

before Duluc filed his motion. See U.S.S.G., App. C Supp., amend.

814 (Nov. 1, 2023). Finally, given that Duluc's combination

argument was the centerpiece of his motion, we expect that the

court would have addressed the argument if the court had

appreciated it.

We express no view on the merits of Duluc's combination

argument. Nor do we address the district court's conclusion that

Duluc's family circumstances were "commonplace" and therefore

insufficient, which the government advances as an alternative

basis for affirmance. Whether Duluc made a sufficient showing

about his family circumstances depends, in part, on how convincing

the district court found the other aspect of his proposed

- 13 - combination, i.e., his rehabilitation.3 And on this record, it is

"impossible to determine" whether the district court considered

that part of Duluc's argument. Cruz-Rivera, 137 F.4th at 33

(quoting United States v. Mendez, 802 F.3d 93, 98 (1st Cir. 2015)).

Because this uncertainty renders abuse-of-discretion review of the

first two aspects of the compassionate-release inquiry

"unworkable," we must remand unless we may affirm the denial of

Duluc's motion based on the third aspect of the inquiry, the

section 3553(a) factors. See id. (quoting Mendez, 802 F.3d at

98).

B.

As mentioned earlier, even where a defendant

demonstrates an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence

reduction that is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's

policy statement, the district court may still deny relief based

on the pertinent section 3553(a) sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 55

(1st Cir. 2022). Here, the court based its denial of Duluc's

motion in part on section 3553(a) considerations, citing the

statute and stating that Duluc's "criminal record weigh[ed]

3 For similar reasons, we do not address the government's argument, advanced for the first time on appeal, that Duluc's mother is not incapacitated as the word is used in section 1B1.13.

- 14 - against release." Duluc argues that this analysis, which did not

mention his rehabilitation, was inadequate.

"[T]he same ground rules" that govern the district

court's consideration of the section 3553(a) factors in the

context of sentencing "[g]enerally . . . apply" to

compassionate-release motions. D'Angelo, 110 F.4th at 49; see

Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 55-56. This means that although the

"district court, when conducting a section 3553(a) analysis, need

not tick off each and every factor in a mechanical sequence,"

Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 10, or address every argument that a party

advances, it must provide enough explanation for us to be able to

"'discern to some extent [its] reasoning' for why it ruled as it

did," D'Angelo, 110 F.4th at 49 (quoting Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th

at 55-56). In doing so, the court "cannot 'completely ignore[]'

a party's central argument." United States v. Flores-Nater, 144

F.4th 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Colón-Cordero, 91 F.4th 41, 55 (1st Cir. 2024)).

Duluc's post-conviction rehabilitation was his central

section 3553(a) argument. Duluc explained in his supplemental

motion that "[r]ehabilitation goals [were] fully consistent with

a reduction," noting that he "ha[d] completed virtually every

program offered, sometimes more than once," and "worked his way to

a top position in the food department, earning the trust of the

facility and staff." To the same end, he related how "[h]is

- 15 - exceptional engagement with programming [had] led him to become a

mentor, indispensable to the facility's academic and religious

curriculum," and how "[h]e ha[d] helped other prisoners graduate

from high school and assisted the chaplain in teaching the Bible."

Duluc also featured his rehabilitation in discussing the other

sentencing factors, such as the absence of risk that he posed to

the community, his ability to comply with supervision, and the

lack of necessity for further deterrence. Duluc's rehabilitation,

in sum, was the dominant theme of his section 3553(a) argument.

The district court's order, however, did not mention

Duluc's rehabilitation and stated only that Duluc's "criminal

record weigh[ed] against release."4 Although Duluc's criminal

record was relevant to multiple section 3553(a)

factors -- including the need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of the offense and to protect the public from further

crimes of the defendant, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) -- Duluc's key

argument was, as already mentioned, that his criminal conduct had

been mitigated by his post-sentencing rehabilitation. Whether

that is so is a judgment call, but we cannot conclude that the

district court exercised that judgment where its order contained

4 Duluc interprets the district court's reference to his "criminal record" to refer only to two misdemeanors that predated the crime for which he is presently incarcerated. We think it is fairly inferred, however, that the court considered Duluc's most recent conviction, for which he has served over a decade in prison, to be part of his "criminal record."

- 16 - no mention of Duluc's rehabilitation and there is no other

indication that the court had considered the argument.

We recognize that the judge who denied Duluc's

compassionate release motion was also Duluc's sentencing judge.

In such cases, a less detailed analysis of the section 3553(a)

factors may be enough because the sentencing judge "necessarily

acquires an intimate knowledge of the offense of conviction and

the history and characteristics of the offender . . . [that] does

not vanish into thin air when the judge later considers the

offender's motion for compassionate release." Texeira-Nieves, 23

F.4th at 57.

Here, however, Duluc's section 3553(a) argument centered

on a factor -- namely, his post-conviction rehabilitation -- that

came about after the district court sentenced him. His essential

argument below, as here, is that he has fundamentally changed

during the more than a decade that he has spent in prison, and

that this change should be accounted for when weighing the

section 3553(a) considerations. Duluc's showing on this score was

strong enough that it warranted a response. See Davis, 99 F.4th

at 661 ("[A]lthough [the defendant's] judge was also the sentencing

judge, the ten-year gap between proceedings . . . allowed for both

foreseeable and unforeseeable changes in circumstances during the

interim. This possibility strengthens the argument that the judge

needed to offer more than a mere recitation of [the defendant's]

- 17 - original criminal behavior" in analyzing the section 3553(a)

factors). Remand is therefore necessary for the district court to

consider and address Duluc's rehabilitation in its section 3553(a)

analysis.

C.

We address one final point. Duluc asks not only for a

remand to consider rehabilitation evidence but also that we order

that his motion be granted. We decline that request. As we have

previously explained, compassionate-release rulings are

discretionary and "the allocation of functions between trial and

appellate courts strongly suggests that the district court" should

ordinarily "be afforded the opportunity to apply [the

compassionate-release] standard in the first instance." United

States v. Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2023). Several

aspects of this case -- including our uncertainty over whether the

district court properly considered Duluc's combination argument;

our inability to ascertain whether the district court evaluated

the effect of Duluc's rehabilitation in its section 3553(a)

analysis; and the time that has passed since Duluc filed his

supplemental motion, during which his family circumstances may

have changed -- make remand particularly prudent. There may be

rare instances where granting compassionate release is the only

possible outcome, "[b]ut before we put this case into that

category, [we should] allow the district court to consider the

- 18 - full record under the proper framework." Id. at 87 (second

alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th

167, 178 (4th Cir. 2023) (Harris, J., concurring in part)). We

are remanding for that purpose.

III.

For the reasons stated, we vacate the district court's

order denying compassionate release and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

- 19 -