Appellate Case: 24-2065 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 16, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-2065 (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-01940-WJ-2) ALEX VALLEJOS, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Alex Vallejos pleaded guilty to possession of over 500 grams of cocaine with
the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He entered
his plea on the condition that he could appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence—in particular, a red box containing cocaine and statements he
made to Drug Enforcement Administration agents about the box—that the agents
obtained during a traffic stop. On appeal, Vallejos argues the agents’ warrantless
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-2065 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2025 Page: 2
search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. He further asserts that the agents violated his
Miranda rights by questioning him about the box before advising him of those rights.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s
denial of the suppression motion. We conclude that the totality of the
circumstances—including the suspicious nature of Vallejos’s meeting with a known
drug supplier at a public park, the DEA’s multi-year investigation leading up to the
meeting, and the agents’ previous experience with and specialized training in
observing drug deals—gave the agents probable cause to search Vallejos’s vehicle.
Further, because Vallejos was not in custody during the questioning, there was no
Miranda violation.
I.
In September 2018, DEA agents began investigating Arturo Ruiz, a known
drug distributor. They ran several staged drug deals with Ruiz as part of their effort
to identify his supplier. During these transactions, the agents noticed another
individual—Eustacio Montoya—was consistently present near the purchase location
and the location where they believed the drugs were stored. They believed Montoya
was supplying Ruiz with drugs, monitoring the transactions, and collecting a share of
the proceeds.
Throughout the investigation, the agents monitored a phone number (the “5082
number”) that was in frequent communication with Montoya. They learned the 5082
number was subscribed to a Paul Garcia at an address in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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But because they could not locate that name in law enforcement databases, they
believed the name or address was false and became suspicious the individual was
involved in drug trafficking.
In August 2020, agents surveilling Montoya’s house observed a white Kia
sedan parked in the driveway. They also saw two unidentified men talking with
Montoya. One man left, and the other stayed for approximately half an hour before
leaving in the Kia sedan. The agents ran the vehicle’s license plates, found a driver’s
license photograph, and identified the person in the photograph as the same person
they had observed in Montoya’s driveway—Alex Vallejos. Soon after, one of the
agents read in a law enforcement database that Vallejos had previously been arrested
for possible cocaine trafficking in 2006.
One month later, agents saw Montoya’s truck leave a suspected stash house
and drive to a local auto shop, where it stayed for nearly an hour. When Montoya
left, he took a three-turn detour from his next destination, which the government
characterized as “an effort to evade law enforcement and confirm that no one was
following him.” App’x Vol. II at 406 (quotation omitted). The agents discovered
Vallejos had previously sold drugs at the same auto shop. And soon after, the FBI
informed DEA agents that it had conducted controlled drug buys from Vallejos in
2013.
Events came to a head on October 2, 2020. At 2:01 P.M., Montoya texted the
5082 number “Im ready, bud.” Id. At 2:06 P.M., agents observed Montoya placing a
black object in his truck. Ten minutes later, the 5082 number responded “Ok.” Id.
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Montoya then placed a red box in his truck, asked the 5082 number “Whats tha add,”
and began driving after receiving two calls from the number. Id.
At 2:53 P.M., after losing track of Montoya’s truck for twenty-eight minutes,
agents located Montoya at Montano West Park. Montoya received three calls from
the 5082 number at 3:01 P.M., 3:02 P.M., and 3:03 P.M., and a white Kia sedan
arrived at 3:02 P.M. The driver of the sedan—Vallejos—exited his vehicle, brought
a black duffel bag to Montoya’s truck, and returned the bag to his car. He then
returned to the truck and sat in the passenger seat for nineteen minutes. When
Vallejos left, he was carrying a red box, which agents believed was the same box
Montoya had loaded into his truck earlier that day.
Agents stopped Vallejos’s car after the meeting. To protect the Montoya
investigation, they told Vallejos his vehicle matched the description of a car involved
in a violent crime in the area and required him to step out of the vehicle and sit on the
curb. During their search, they found the red box. Vallejos claimed he did not know
what was in the box and that he had just bought a tool from someone. Over
Vallejos’s protest, agents seized the box because they believed it contained illegal
drugs. Agents then briefly handcuffed Vallejos, but ultimately released him from the
scene until the contents of the red box were tested. Laboratory tests confirmed the
red box contained approximately one kilogram of cocaine. After the encounter
ended, agents discovered they had not returned Vallejos’s driver’s license. They
brought it back to the address listed and gave the license to Vallejos’s wife.
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Vallejos was charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent
to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one count of possession with
the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Vallejos moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the agents
(1) lacked probable cause to search his vehicle and (2) violated his Miranda rights
when they questioned him about the contents of the red box during the traffic stop.
The district court denied the motion, reasoning (1) there was ample evidence of drug
trafficking to establish probable cause for the search and (2) Vallejos was not in
custody during the stop, so Miranda warnings were not necessary.
Vallejos entered a conditional guilty plea that allowed him to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress.1 This is his appeal.
II.
Vallejos first argues that the agents’ warrantless search of his vehicle violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Because the agents’ conduct falls within the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, we disagree.
Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district
court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Soza, 643 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011). A district court’s factual
finding is made in clear error only if “the error [is] pellucid to any objective
1 As part of Vallejos’s plea agreement, the government agreed to move to dismiss the conspiracy charge. App’x Vol. II at 427. 5 Appellate Case: 24-2065 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2025 Page: 6
observer,” the finding is “without factual support in the record,” or the panel is “left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v.
Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). In
conducting this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Shuck, 713 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 2013).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “basic purpose of this Amendment” is to “safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (quotation omitted).
“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quotation omitted).
One such exception involves searches of automobiles. We have long held that
“police officers who have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an
automobile that has been stopped on the road may search it without obtaining a
warrant.” United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted). Officers must limit the search to areas “therein that might
contain contraband.” United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted).
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“Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality of the
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or
evidence.” Id. at 1344 (quotation omitted). We understand the “fair probability”
standard “to mean something more than a ‘bare suspicion’ but less than a
preponderance of the evidence at hand.” United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214,
1217 (10th Cir. 2014). And we allow officers to “draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation omitted).
Here, the combination of facts known to the agents gave them reason enough
to believe the red box in the vehicle contained illegal drugs. Before the stop, the
agents’ investigation revealed Montoya was a drug supplier. It also showed Montoya
used his phone to set the time and location of drug deals. And Montoya’s
communications with the 5082 number on the day of the drug deal—which included
discussion of a time, a request for a location, and three phone calls that coincided
with the arrival of the white Kia sedan at a public park—all support the agents’
conclusion that this was a pre-arranged meeting between Montoya and a potential
buyer.2
2 Vallejos established at the district court that the 5082 number was subscribed to another individual—Paul Garcia—who should have been identified in the agents’ database. But based on the timing of the texts and phone calls between Montoya and the 5082 number leading up to the transaction, the agents could have reasonably believed Vallejos was simply using a phone subscribed to someone else’s name. 7 Appellate Case: 24-2065 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2025 Page: 8
Vallejos correctly notes that mere association with a criminal is insufficient to
establish probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 18–19 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
90–92 (1979); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1992)).
But as the district court noted, the agents had evidence beyond mere association:
[M]eeting up with an acquaintance known to frequent the sites of drug purchases, choosing a public park as a meeting place but staying in or near vehicles rather than entering the park itself, transporting a black duffel bag to the acquaintance’s truck and then back to one’s own car, returning to the acquaintance’s truck to sit for nineteen minutes, retrieving a box that resembled one that the acquaintance had placed in his truck shortly before the trip, and bringing it back into one’s own vehicle before driving away . . . is far more indicative of an underhanded transaction.
App’x Vol. II at 411.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Piaget further supports this
conclusion. 915 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1990). There, a man who—like Montoya—had
been under government investigation for drug offenses placed a gray canvas bag in
his truck and then met the defendant in a parking lot. Id. at 139–40. The man
handed the gray canvas bag to the defendant, who then placed the bag in his trunk
and drove toward Dallas, Texas before being stopped and searched by police. Id. at
140. The court concluded these facts were sufficient to establish probable cause to
search the defendant’s car. Id.
Vallejos attempts to distinguish Piaget, noting the officer in that case had a
confidential informant who told him the drug trafficker was planning to send drugs to
Accordingly, Vallejos’s argument that the agents’ belief that “the phone was subscribed falsely cannot be used to support probable cause” fails. Reply Br. at 3. 8 Appellate Case: 24-2065 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2025 Page: 9
Dallas. But though the agents in this case did not have a confidential informant, they
did not need one. The circumstances surrounding the transaction, as discussed above,
independently support a finding of probable cause without the additional information
of where Vallejos was headed after the transaction.
Further, Vallejos’s reliance on other out-of-circuit cases is misplaced. In
United States v. Davis, which presents otherwise similar facts to this case, the
defendant did not receive anything from the drug dealer under investigation. 430
F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, the officers knew only that (1) the defendant met
with a suspected drug dealer, (2) others who had met with the dealer had later been
found with drugs, and (3) there were detergent boxes near the meeting, which had
been used in previous drug deals. Id. at 352. The court specifically distinguished
Davis from other cases in which a defendant left the meeting carrying a bag or
container, as Vallejos did here. Id. at 353 n.1.
Similarly, United States v. Drakeford does not support Vallejos’s position.
992 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2021). There, nothing was exchanged between the defendant
and the drug supplier. Rather, officers justified their search using attenuated facts,
such as the defendant’s picking up of a suspicious bag five to seven days before the
search. Id. at 259. Further, the meeting occurred in broad daylight in front of a
security camera. Id. at 259–60. And after the meeting concluded, the participants
went on a normal shopping trip together, leaving their vehicles unattended. Id. at
265. Drakeford is thus easily distinguishable from this case: Montoya retrieved the
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red box on the same day it was transferred to Vallejos; the meeting occurred at a
public park; and the parties left soon after the transfer occurred.
The last case on which Vallejos relies—United States v. Spears—is similarly
unavailing. 636 F. App’x 893 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). There, the court found
no probable cause where law enforcement stopped and searched a defendant’s car
after he was seen leaving a house under surveillance for drug trafficking. Id. at 895–
97. In making this determination, the court noted that the positioning of the
defendant’s vehicle made it impossible for officers to see whether the defendant left
his car or even interacted with anyone while parked at the suspicious house—an
important detail not present in Vallejos’s case. Id. at 896. Thus, the officers’ search
in Spears was based on a “mere hunch,” rather than probable cause. Id. at 898
None of the cases cited by Vallejos involved a defendant who had a suspicious
interaction at a public park during which he took a container from a man under a
multi-year investigation for supplying drugs. Probable cause in the automobile
context does not require a certainty of criminal activity associated with a vehicle;
rather, it requires a “fair probability that the car contains contraband.” Chavez, 534
F.3d at 1344. And here, the totality of the circumstances leading up to the deal and
the suspicious nature of the interaction itself established a fair probability that the red
box contained illegal drugs. Accordingly, the district court properly denied
Vallejos’s motion to suppress evidence of the box.
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III.
Vallejos next argues that the agents violated his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by questioning him about the contents of the red box
during the traffic stop without first advising him of his rights. Because Vallejos was
not in custody during the questioning, we disagree.
We review de novo the question of whether Miranda applies. United States v.
Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008). “Miranda warnings are required only
‘at the moment [the] suspect is in custody and the questioning meets the legal
definition of interrogation.’” United States v. Wagner, 951 F.3d 1232, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Jones, 523 F.3d at 1239). The parties do not dispute that the
agents’ questioning constituted an interrogation. Accordingly, we address only the
requirement that a suspect be “in custody.”
“An interrogation is custodial when, in light of the objective circumstances of
the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks
omitted). A suspect “is not in custody when he voluntarily cooperates with the
police.” Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, suspects
detained during ordinary traffic stops “are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of
Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). Only when “a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest” is the suspect
in custody. Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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“The determination of custody, from an examination of the totality of the
circumstances, is necessarily fact intensive.” Jones, 523 F.3d at 1240 (quotation
omitted). We have previously considered the following factors: (1) “the extent . . .
the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or
to end the interview at will,” (2) “the nature of the questioning,” (3) the extent police
officers “dominate the encounter,” and (4) “the release of the suspect at the end of
the questioning.” Wagner, 951 F.3d at 1250 (citation modified). “Officers may
‘dominate’ an encounter by displaying a weapon, making physical contact, isolating
the suspect in a police-controlled environment, or appearing in overwhelming
numbers.” Id.; see Jones, 523 F.3d at 1239.
Vallejos makes no attempt in his opening brief to explain what particular facts
would indicate the district court’s conclusion that he was not “in custody” was
improper. Instead, he spends his one-and-a-half-page discussion about Miranda
laying out the basic rules from that case. But even if we perform the application of
those rules on his behalf, his freedom of action was not “curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quotation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The agents did not tell Vallejos he was under arrest, nor
did they give him reason to believe he would not be permitted to leave at the
conclusion of the search (as indeed he was). Further, Vallejos has not argued the
agents were coercive or threatening in their questioning. The agents did not draw
their weapons, order Vallejos to the ground, or use any physical force before or
during the questioning. And though the agents handcuffed Vallejos, they did not do
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so until after they asked him about the contents of the red box. Moreover, despite the
agents’ suspicion that the red box contained illegal drugs, they released Vallejos after
the encounter. Law enforcement arrested Vallejos only after a laboratory test
confirmed the red box contained cocaine.
In sum, Vallejos points to no facts that plausibly suggest he was “in custody”
when the agents questioned him about the contents of the red box. His encounter
with the agents did not involve weapons, force, or other forms of coercion. And he
was released soon after the encounter began. Accordingly, the agents were not
required to give Miranda warnings during the stop.
IV.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Vallejos’s suppression motion.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge