United States v. Todji Kijuan Martin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: April 3, 2023
• Docket: 22-5278
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0152n.06

No. 22-5278

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Apr 03, 2023 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) v. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) TODJI KIJUAN MARTIN, TENNESSEE ) ) Defendant-Appellant. OPINION )

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Todji Kijuan Martin was classified as a career

offender for sentencing purposes based on two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence or

a controlled substance offense, including a 2008 conviction for attempted second degree murder

in Tennessee. Second degree murder was then defined as (1) a knowing killing of another, or (2)

a killing of another resulting from the unlawful distribution of certain drugs. Tenn. Code § 39-13-

210(a) (2008). Martin challenged the career offender designation at sentencing, but the district

court concluded that attempted second degree murder in Tennessee is a crime of violence under

the Sentencing Guidelines, applied the career offender sentencing enhancement, and sentenced

Martin to 151 months’ imprisonment. Martin appeals that determination and requests

resentencing. Because Tennessee’s second degree murder statute is divisible, and the subsection

of the statute that Martin was convicted under requires some use of force or attempted use of force,

we AFFIRM. No. 22-5278, United States v. Martin

I. BACKGROUND

Martin was charged in 2019 with seven counts of possession with intent to distribute a

mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, and one count of conspiracy to

possess with the same intent, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. He

entered into a written plea agreement on July 8, 2021. He pleaded guilty to five counts of

possession with intent to distribute, and the United States agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.

Under the agreement’s terms, if Martin was determined to be a career offender under USSG §

4B1.1 for purposes of sentencing, he retained the right to appeal that finding.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) generated for sentencing classified Martin as

a career offender based on “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense,” USSG § 4B1.1, placing him in criminal category VI with a

guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Martin’s two qualifying convictions were

a 2007 conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (which he does not dispute

was a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines) and a 2008 conviction for attempted

second degree murder in Tennessee. At the time of his conviction, the Tennessee second degree

murder statute defined the offense as: “(1) A knowing killing of another; or (2) A killing of another

that results from the unlawful distribution of any Schedule I or Schedule II drug, when the drug is

the proximate cause of the death of the user.” Tenn. Code § 39-13-210(a) (2008).

Martin objected to the PSR on the grounds that he was not a career offender and should

have been sentenced under a lower Guidelines range. According to Martin, attempted second

degree murder in Tennessee was not a predicate offense for purposes of career offender designation

because it was not categorically a crime of violence. The Government’s response to Martin’s

objections included as exhibits the indictment and judgment in the Tennessee attempted second

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degree murder case, and the probation office filed an addendum to the PSR explaining that Martin

had committed attempted second degree murder by trying to kill someone knowingly, not by

distributing a Schedule I or II drug.

At Martin’s sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that: attempted second degree

murder in Tennessee was a crime of violence under the Guidelines because the statute was divisible

(meaning that it was written disjunctively); documents showed that Martin had been convicted

under the “knowing killing” subsection of the statute; and an attempted knowing killing required

some use of force or attempted use of force. The district court overruled Martin’s objection and

found that he was properly classified as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1. After calculating

the advisory Guidelines range (151 to 188 months’ imprisonment) and considering the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Martin to 151 months’ imprisonment. Martin timely

appeals, arguing that the district court erred in applying the career offender sentencing

enhancement and that, setting the enhancement aside, the district court imposed an unreasonable

sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Career Offender Classification

Because Martin challenged his career offender classification below, we review de novo the

district court’s determination that his prior conviction is a crime of violence. United States v.

Fields, 53 F.4th 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 2022). He argues that: (1) the district court erred in

concluding that the Tennessee second degree murder statute is divisible; (2) even if the district

court properly concluded that the statute is divisible, the documents the district court considered

do not support its conclusion that attempted second degree murder is a crime of violence; and

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(3) regardless, United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), puts an end to any claim that an

attempt crime can serve as a predicate offense for career offender designation.

Generally, a defendant is considered a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines if,

among other requirements, he “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of

violence or a controlled substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). A crime of violence is any felony

that “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another,” or (2) is one of a list of enumerated offenses including murder and voluntary

manslaughter. USSG § 4B1.2(a). These two clauses are respectively known as the elements and

enumerated clauses. Because the Guidelines elements clause “mirrors the elements clause in the

Armed Career Criminal Act [ACCA],” “we typically interpret them the same way” and may rely

on ACCA cases in our analysis. United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2017).

In determining whether a state criminal conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, the

court must decide “whether the elements of the offense require that the defendant engage in the

conduct defined” by the Guidelines. United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329, 335 (6th Cir. 2020)

(emphasis omitted). “This categorical inquiry means we look only to the elements of the offense

set forth in the statute itself, rather than the particular facts of the defendant’s case.” Id. (citing

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). But if a statute is divisible—i.e., it “sets out

one or more elements of the offense in the alternative”—the court applies the modified categorical

approach and may “consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions,

to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps

v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). “The court can then do what the categorical approach

demands: compare the elements of the crime of conviction (including the alternative element used

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in the case) with the elements of the generic crime.” Id. If the elements of the conviction are the

same or narrower, it constitutes a crime of violence.

1. Divisibility of Tennessee’s Second Degree Murder Statute

Statutes that have “multiple alternative elements” are divisible and therefore subject to the

modified categorical approach. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016). Statutes are

not divisible, however, where they merely “enumerate[] various factual means of committing a

single element” of the offense. Id. at 506 (emphasis added) (“[S]uppose a statute requires use of

a ‘deadly weapon’ as an element of a crime and further provides that the use of a ‘knife, gun, bat,

or similar weapon’ would all qualify. . . . [A] jury need not find . . . any particular item [was

used].”). Such statutes are indivisible, and the formal categorical approach applies.

Martin argued at sentencing and now on appeal that Tennessee’s second degree murder

statute is indivisible because it creates a single crime, second degree murder, that can be

accomplished by two alternative means: either knowing killing or killing resulting from unlawful

distribution of any Schedule I or Schedule II drug, when that drug is the proximate cause of the

user’s death. The Government maintains that the statute is divisible.

When “authoritative sources of state law,” such as state supreme courts, definitively

confirm whether a statute is divisible, we “need only follow what [they] say[].” Mathis, 579 U.S.

at 518. “And if state law fails to provide clear answers,” the court can “peek” at certain record

documents (indictments and jury instructions among them) “for help in making [the]

determination” whether a statutory list “contains means or elements.” Id. (quoting Rendon v.

Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473-74 (9th Cir. 2015)) & n.7. For example, “an indictment and jury

instructions could indicate, by referencing one alternative term to the exclusion of all others, that

the statute contains a list of elements, each one of which goes toward a separate crime.” Id. at 519;

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see United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2016) (considering state precedent and

pattern jury instructions in means-or-elements analysis).

Turning first to the statute at issue, Tennessee second degree murder is “(1) a knowing

killing of another; or (2) a killing of another that results from the unlawful distribution of any

Schedule I or Schedule II drug, when the drug is the proximate cause of the death of the user.” 1

Tenn. Code § 39-13-210(a) (2008). The statute does not specify whether its subsections are means

or elements, but “[t]he ‘ordinary use’ of the conjunction ‘or’ is ‘almost always disjunctive, that is,

the words it connects are to be given separate meanings.’” United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d

1054, 1065 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013)) (other

quotation omitted). Disjunctive phrasing thus tends to “suggest[] two alternative elements.” Id.

at 1066.

The two subsections of § 39-13-210(a) also have different mens rea requirements: the

“knowing killing” subsection, 210(a)(1), states the requisite mens rea outright, whereas the

“unlawful distribution” subsection, 210(a)(2), is silent on that issue. According to the state

Sentencing Commission, the statute “makes clear that the requisite mens rea for second degree

murder is the ‘knowing’ killing of another or that the killing be done recklessly as a result of

unlawful distribution of a Schedule I or Schedule II drug.” Tenn. Code § 39-13-210 sentencing

commission cmt. (2008).

State courts have treated the two subsections as distinct. In one appeal of a second degree

murder conviction for a knowing killing, the jury charge explained that, “[f]or [the jury] to find

the defendant guilty of this offense, the state must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the

1 Martin was convicted of attempted second degree murder. A person commits criminal attempt in Tennessee when, in relevant part, he acts “with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense.” Tenn. Code § 39-12-101(a). Our analysis focuses on the second degree murder statute accordingly.

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existence of the following essential elements: (1) that the defendant unlawfully killed the alleged

victim; and (2) that the defendant acted knowingly.” State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2002) (emphasis added). Reviewing the appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal

Appeals noted that the two subsections of § 39-13-210(a) have different mens rea requirements

and “confine[d] [its] analysis . . . to that form of second degree murder specifying the ‘knowing

killing of another.’” Id. at 787. In another direct appeal of a second degree murder conviction for

unlawful distribution, the same court described the state’s burden as obtaining a conviction “under

Code section 39-13-210(a)(2)”—not the second degree murder statute more generally. State v.

Pack, 421 S.W.3d 629, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). See also State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422,

431-32 (Tenn. 2010) (defining second degree murder, “[a]s pertinent to [the] case,” as § 39-13-

210(a)(1) “knowing killing”).

Other documents support the conclusion that the statute is divisible. Tennessee’s pattern

jury instructions for the two subsections differ. Compare Tenn. Pattern Jury Instruction – Crim.

7.05(a) (second degree murder due to knowing killing), with Tenn. Pattern Jury Instruction – Crim.

7.05(b) (second degree murder due to unlawful distribution of drug). And, although the indictment

in Martin’s case charges him with violations of § 39-13-210 without citing a specific subsection,

each charged count of attempted second degree murder states that he “unlawfully and knowingly

attempt[ed]” to kill. That language matches the mens rea of the “knowing killing” subsection and

that subsection only.

Each of Martin’s arguments to the contrary fails. He first compares the Tennessee second

degree murder statute to a Washington second degree murder statute that the Ninth Circuit decided

did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. See United States v. Vederoff,

914 F.3d 1238, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019). Not only does the Washington statute have different elements

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than the Tennessee one, but also Washington courts had already concluded that the statute in

question was indivisible when the Vederoff court analyzed it. Id. at 1247-48. The two statutes are

not comparable. See United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 715 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding one

statute indivisible does not imply that another “with entirely different elements” should be

classified as such).

Martin then suggests that, because Tennessee courts have not definitively ruled on whether

the second degree murder statute has alternative means or elements, we should evaluate the second

degree murder statute by looking to the first degree murder statute, Tennessee Code § 39-13-202.

It is true that the Tennessee Supreme Court has described the first degree murder statute as

“encompass[ing] both premeditated murder and felony murder,” both of which are “means by

which criminal liability for first degree murder may be imposed.” State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710,

721 (Tenn. 2001). But describing a statute generally is not the same as articulating how it works

or how it should be interpreted, and Tennessee courts have treated premeditated and felony murder

as having different elements and requiring different mental states.2 See id. at 721. Regardless,

whether or not Tennessee’s first degree murder state is divisible, a finding of indivisibility as to

“one crime” “in no way implies that another crime with entirely different elements and

circumstances should likewise be classified as such.” Vanhook, 640 F.3d at 715.

Finally, Martin claims that Tennessee courts do not require the government to prove, or a

jury to find, which of a set of multiple alternative means was used to commit a single crime. The

cases he cites in support deal either with convictions for aiding and abetting (a theory of liability,

2 Martin also incorrectly analogizes this case to Carter v. State and State v. Hurley, both of which concerned the propriety of sentencing someone to death (or even doing so twice) based on a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder without specifying whether the conviction was for premeditated murder or felony murder. See 958 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tenn. 1997); 876 S.W.2d 57, 69-70 (Tenn. 1993) (“Both crimes constitute first degree murder. T.C.A. § 39-2-202 provides alternate means by which the offense may be committed. There was only one first-degree murder, and there should be only one punishment.”).

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not a separate offense), see State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170-73 (Tenn. 1999); State v.

Wilson, No. M1999-01848-CCA-R3CD, 1999 WL 1209787, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17,

1999), or situations where the state charged and proved at trial multiple variants of the same

offense, State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 775, 778 (Tenn. 1998); Ward v. State, No. M2011-

00122-CCA-R3PC, 2012 WL 1417287, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2012). In sum, Martin’s

theory is not supported by caselaw.

Taking as a whole the statute’s construction, Tennessee state caselaw, the pattern jury

instructions, and the indictment in this case, we conclude that the Tennessee second degree murder

statute is divisible. See United States v. Jackson, No. 20-5769, 2021 WL 7909375, at *2 (6th Cir.

Mar. 30, 2021) (finding same).

2. The Modified Categorical Approach

Because the statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach applies, and the panel

may look at a “limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative [element] formed the

basis of the defendant’s prior conviction[.]” Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir.

2016) (quoting United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2013)). This class includes

charging documents and judgments. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); see United

States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873, 881 (6th Cir. 2014).

The indictment charged Martin with violations of § 39-13-210 generally, without

mentioning a specific subsection, but the language of each charged count of attempted second

degree murder matches the mens rea of the statute’s “knowing killing” subsection, 210(a)(1). The

indictment does not mention any of the elements required to indict a defendant under the “unlawful

distribution” subsection, 210(a)(2). Based on the indictment, the sentencing court correctly

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concluded that Martin was convicted under the “knowing killing” subsection of the second degree

murder statute.

In fact, Martin’s attorney conceded this point at sentencing:

THE COURT: [I]f the Court concludes that the applicable second degree murder statute is divisible, does Mr. Martin agree that the approved Shepard documents here, the Indictment and the Judgment, show that he was convicted of second degree murder under the knowing killing section of the statute, not the distribution of a drug section? MARTIN’S COUNSEL: Yeah, I think that by – I don’t have any dispute with that because I have read those documents, too[.] . . . And they do say I believe it’s . . . intentional or knowingly[.] THE COURT: Knowingly. MARTIN’S COUNSEL: Yeah, it’s not drug distribution. Martin’s “attorney cannot agree in open court with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then

charge the court with error in following that course.” United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182

(6th Cir. 1990); see United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 2002).

Martin has waived any argument that the Shepard documents do not sufficiently show which

subsection of the statute he was convicted of violating. See United States v. Mabee, 765 F.3d 666,

671 (6th Cir. 2014).

The remaining question is whether attempting a knowing killing of another “has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). “Physical force” is “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to

another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); see Knight v. United States,

936 F.3d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying Johnson definition in an ACCA context). Relatively

“minor” uses of force, such as “hitting, slapping, shoving, grabbing, pinching, biting, and hair

pulling,” may suffice. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 554 (2019) (quoting United States

v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 182 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)). And “the knowing or

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intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force. . . . [A] ‘bodily

injury’ must result from ‘physical force.’” Castleman, 572 U.S. at 169-70.

The Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed in a published opinion whether attempted murder—

specifically, an attempted knowing killing—is a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ elements

clause. See Jackson, 2021 WL 7909375, at *2 (unpublished opinion finding that facilitation of

“knowing killing” variant of second degree murder in Tennessee was categorically a crime of

violence). Every circuit to consider the issue has concluded that it is. See United States v. Báez-

Martínez, 950 F.3d 119, 132 (1st Cir. 2020) (because “death is the ultimate injury,” murder

requires violent force, and “if murder requires violent force because death results, then attempted

murder does, too, because the defendant attempted to reach that result”); Hill v. United States, 877

F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding attempted murder under Illinois law a categorically violent

felony); United States v. Peeples, 879 F.3d 282, 287 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Because it is impossible to

cause bodily injury without force, it would also be impossible to cause death without force. Thus,

an attempt to cause death would also require the use or attempted use of force.”); United States v.

Sanchez, 940 F.3d 526, 534-35 (11th Cir. 2019) (evaluating New York’s second degree murder

statute and finding that knowing causation of death “necessarily involves the use of physical force

because it is impossible to cause death without applying force that is capable of causing pain or

physical injury”). Accord United States v. Studhorse, 883 F.3d 1198, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 2018)

(analyzing Washington’s attempted first degree murder statute, which requires that a defendant

have taken “a substantial step in causing another’s person’s death with the intent to cause that

person’s death”). In a similar vein, a Sixth Circuit panel recently found that, under Kentucky law,

“[c]omplicity to commit murder always requires the use of physical force, because . . . in every

murder, the murderer uses physical force in some way to cause a death.” United States v. Harrison,

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54 F.4th 884, 889 (6th Cir. 2022); see id. at 890 (citing Báez-Martínez and Peeples among other

cases in support).

At sentencing, Martin conceded that attempting the knowing killing of another has as an

element the attempted use of physical force against the person of another:

THE COURT: And you would agree with me that if it is divisible and we’re looking at just the knowing killing, the knowing killing of another person would practically require some use of force or attempted use of force. MARTIN’S COUNSEL: Well, I don’t think I can make a reasonable argument that it would not. Yeah, I think it would have to apply. It would have to have some kind of knowing use of force in that particular stretch. And in his reply brief, he acknowledges that the caselaw supports the Government’s argument.

Martin’s primary argument is that, although courts may previously have found attempted

murder to be a crime of violence, almost all of the Government’s cited caselaw predates United

States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). He calls that case a “game changer” that prohibits the

panel from reaching the same conclusion as other circuits did before.

In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a

crime of violence under the ACCA’s elements clause. Id. at 2020. Justice Gorsuch explained

“that to win a case for attempted Hobbs Act robbery the government must prove two things: (1)

The defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of actual or

threatened force, and (2) he completed a ‘substantial step’ toward that end.” Id. (emphasis

omitted). The Court concluded that, “whatever a substantial step [toward the completion of a

Hobbs Act robbery] requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used,

attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property.” Id. In

response to the argument that, because completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of

violence, so should attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the Court explained:

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The elements clause does not ask whether the defendant committed a crime of violence or attempted to commit one. It asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence—and it proceeds to define a crime of violence as a felony that includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. If Congress had wanted the elements clause to do the kind of work the government supposes, it could have easily said so. For example, it might have swept in those federal crimes that require as an element “the use or threatened use of force” and those “that constitute an attempt to commit an offense that has such an element.” But that simply is not the law we have. Id. at 2022. The “problem” was that “no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires the

government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even

threatened to use force. Individuals . . . who are arrested before they can threaten anyone may be

convicted too.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

Taylor does not change the outcome here. A completed Hobbs Act robbery does not

require the use or attempted use of force; it can be committed by threat of force alone. Id. at 2020.

So the elements clause does not encompass attempted Hobbs Act robbery: “[a]lthough the

elements clause covers the use of force, the attempt to use force, and the threat to use force, it does

not cover attempts to threaten the use of force.” Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th 1334,

1346 (11th Cir. 2022). But murder does require the use of force, and “[b]ecause the completed

crime of murder has as an element the use of force, the attempt to commit murder has as an element

the attempted use of force.” Id. at 1347 (distinguishing Taylor); see United States v. Taylor, 979

F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (“[W]here a crime of violence requires

the use of physical force . . . the corresponding attempt to commit that crime necessarily involves

the attempted use of force.”).

Martin’s only rejoinder is that Taylor’s holding extends to all attempt crimes, not just

attempted Hobbs Act robbery, based on how broadly the opinion discusses the elements clause.

All Taylor does is articulate how courts should conduct the elements clause analysis: the question

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is not whether the accused attempted to commit a crime of violence but whether the crime of

conviction itself—whether completed or an attempt—is a crime of violence. See 142 S. Ct. at

2022. Here, it is. Because Martin’s attempted second degree murder conviction was for a crime

of violence, his classification as a career offender was correct.

B. The Sentence’s Reasonableness

Martin also challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, charging the district court with

“thr[owing] out his guidelines range” because the sentencing judge stated that it would impose a

151-month term of imprisonment “even if Mr. Martin’s advisory guideline range had not included

the 4B1.1 enhancement . . . given Mr. Martin’s conduct, serious criminal history, and the danger

that he presents to this community.” According to Martin, the district court failed to explain why

such a significant variance would be appropriate, and the explanation it did provide heavily

weighed Martin’s criminal history, a factor the Guidelines already consider.

Martin’s hypothetical assumes the career offender classification was improper. The district

court did not impose a variance; it sentenced him at the lowest end of the applicable Guidelines

range. See United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (within-Guidelines sentences

presumed substantively reasonable). And, after hearing from both Martin and the Government,

the district court considered each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. To the extent that Martin

challenges the imposition of a variance, we decline to address that argument because there was no

variance; Martin was sentenced within the Guidelines range based on his career offender status.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Martin’s sentence.

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