MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOYCE F. MARTIN, C.J., MERRITT, SILER, DAUGHTREY, COLE, CLAY, and GILMAN, JJ., joined. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 494-505), delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which BOGGS, ALAN E. NORRIS, and SUHRHEINRICH, JJ, joined.
OPINION
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
In response to “the growing problem of interstate enforcement of child support,” Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (“CSRA”), Pub.L. No. 102 521, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 340 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994)), to “punish[ ] certain persons who intentionally fail to pay their child support obligations.” H.R.Rep. No. 102-771, at 4 (1992). This case presents the question whether the CSRA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power under Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution. Timothy Gordon Faasse pleaded guilty to violating the CSRA, which criminalizes the willful failure to pay court-ordered child support for a child who resides in another state. He was sentenced by the district court to serve a six-month term of imprisonment and ordered to pay full restitution for past-due support payments. He now challenges the consti[479]*479tutionality of the statute as well as the legality of the district court’s restitution order. All ten of our sister circuits that have considered the constitutionality of the CSRA in Commerce Clause challenges after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), have upheld the statute. We now join them in concluding that the CSRA is an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to the constitutionality of the statute; we also AFFIRM the district court’s order of restitution.
I. FACTS
Timothy Gordon Faasse and Sandra Bowman had a child, Noelle Alexandria Faasse, on December 23, 1990. The couple resided in Lansing, Michigan for the first several months of Noelle’s life. In June 1991, Faasse moved to California; Bowman chose to remain in Michigan with Noelle. In June 1992, Faasse filed a petition in state court to establish his paternity of Noelle as well as visitation rights. The circuit court in Kent County, Michigan adjudged Faasse to be Noelle’s father on January 11, 1994; it also ordered Faasse to pay child support in the amount of $58.25 per week.1 The child support order was made retroactive to December 1992. As a result of the retroactive nature of the award, Faasse found himself $5,391 in arrears on child support.
Faasse was intermittently employed in California2 and his child support payments were sporadic: in 1994, Faasse made four payments to Bowman totaling $633; in 1995, he sent ten payments in the amount of $1,175; in 1996, Faasse provided payments of $690; in 1997, Faasse sent seven payments totaling $5,390; and in 1998, Faasse made one payment of $100.
On July 17, 1997, the government filed a criminal complaint against Faasse in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan alleging that Faasse was in violation of the Child Support Recovery Act for failure to pay court-ordered child support from January 1994 to July 1997. On June 10, 1998, Faasse pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to one count of violating the CSRA. The CSRA at that time provided: “[wjhoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).” 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994).3 Subsection (b) stated that punishment for a first offense under subsection (a) was a fine, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and for [480]*480a subsequent offense, a fine, imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. Id. § 228(b)(1), (2) (1994). The term “past due support obligation” was defined as “any amount—
(A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000....
Id. § 228(d)(1). Faasse was subsequently sentenced by a magistrate judge to a term of 6 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay full restitution, in the amount of $28,438.35, for child support arrearage.
Faasse timely appealed his conviction and sentence to this court.4 He first challenges the constitutionality of the CSRA as an improper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Faasse attacks the statute’s nexus to interstate commerce, asserting that the CSRA creates a “federal criminal enforcement mechanism for pure state law child support obligations” whose only link to interstate commerce is the requirement that parent and child reside in different states. Appellant’s Br. at 9. According to Faasse, this link is insufficient to establish a constitutional basis for Congressional regulation. Faasse also challenges the district court’s order requiring him to pay restitution as an abuse of the district court’s discretion. A panel of this court initially accepted Faasse’s arguments and reversed the district court’s judgment. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir.2000). We granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.2000), and now affirm the judgment of the district court.
II. ANALYSIS
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), Faasse urges us to fashion a narrow and technical definition of commerce that turns on whether the transaction at issue involves trade and is reciprocal in nature. We firmly decline Faasse’s invitation to impose heretofore unknown constraints on Congress’s Commerce Clause power as unsupportable by either Supreme Court or our own precedent. Indeed, we believe that, pursuant to our de novo review of the constitutionality of a statute, United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cir.2000), the CSRA easily passes constitutional muster.
A. Commerce Clause
In one of the Supreme Court’s earliest expositions on the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the notion that “commerce,” as utilized in the Constitution, is limited “to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities .... ” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). The Chief Justice noted that “[cjommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” Id. at 189— 90. Although the Supreme Court’s reli-[481]*481anee on this early understanding of commerce has waxed and waned in the course of this nation’s development, it remains the principal standard by which we evaluate Commerce Clause challenges. While we must remain vigilant to ensure that a federal statute does not trench upon purely local activity, we may only invalidate a congressional enactment passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause if it bears no rational relation to interstate commerce. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981).
In United States v. Lopez the Supreme Court revealed its concern that Congress had so expanded its authority to regulate intra state activity under the guise of its Commerce Clause power that Congress was in danger of “effectually obliterating] the distinction between what is national and what is local and creating] a completely centralized government.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)). Summarizing its prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court articulated “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power[:] First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” Id. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (internal citations omitted). This category includes “an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce.” Id. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624. “Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” Id. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Third, Congress may “regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Although these broad categories may “not satisfy those who seek mathematical or rigid formulas,” they are consistent with the modern Court’s “practical conception of commercial regulation,” id. at 573-74, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (Kennedy, J., concurring), which continues to guide the Court’s resolution of Commerce Clause challenges to federal statutes.
According to Faasse, Congress lacks the power under all three Lopez categories to enact the CSRA. We disagree. The CSRA regulates exclusively interstate cases involving a debtor parent’s obligation to send court-ordered payments through interstate channels of commerce for a child residing in another state. We believe that, at the very least, the CSRA falls within Congress’s power to regulate a “thing” in interstate commerce. Nine of the ten circuits to have upheld the CSRA have held similarly.5 See United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding statute under Lopez’s category two); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1099, 117 S.Ct. 784, 136 L.Ed.2d 727 (1997); (upholding statute under category two); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 904, 118 S.Ct. 258, 139 L.Ed.2d 185 (1997) (upholding statute under category two); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1226 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 764 (1998) (upholding statute under categories one and two); United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033, 118 S.Ct. 1327, 140 L.Ed.2d 489 [482]*482(1998) (upholding statute under category-two); United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 934, 118 S.Ct. 341, 139 L.Ed.2d 264 (1997) (upholding statute under all three categories); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203, 117 S.Ct. 1567, 137 L.Ed.2d 712 (1997) (upholding statute under category two); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1084, 117 S.Ct. 753, 136 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997) (upholding statute under categories two and three); United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 619 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065, 118 S.Ct. 1398, 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998) (upholding statute under category two). Lopez and its progeny simply do not cabin Congress’s authority to prevent the obstruction of things in interstate commerce.
Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“GFSZA”), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), which prohibited the knowing possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. The Court quickly rejected the first two categories of authority as possible constitutional bases for Congress’s enactment of the statute. Turning to the third category, the Court concluded that because the GFSZA was “a criminal statute that by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,” the statute could not stand as a valid regulation under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court evaluated several factors in its assessment whether the GFSZA substantially affected interstate commerce despite the fact that “no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye[:]” first, whether the statute was part of a larger regulation of economic activity in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated; second, whether the statute contained a “jurisdiction element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry” that each firearm possession affected or had an explicit connection to interstate commerce; and third, whether the statute or its legislative history contained congressional findings regarding whether gun possession in a school zone affected interstate commerce. Id. at 561-63, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Answering all three inquiries in the negative, the Court struck down the statute as an impermissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), the Supreme Court elaborated upon the Lopez Court’s category-three analysis in its review of the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994’s civil remedy provision. Section 13981 provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of a “crime[ ] of violence motivated by gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994). The Morrison Court first noted that “a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case.” Morris on, 120 S.Ct. at 1750. The Court then stated that “Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” Id. In striking down the statute, the Court noted that, similar to possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school zone, “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Id. at 1751. Although the Court ostensibly eschewed the creation of a bright-line rule, id., the Court’s holding implied that for a statute which regulates intrastate activity to be upheld under cate[483]*483gory three, it must be “economic” in nature.6
To the extent that Faasse relies on Lopez and Morrison as support for his argument, he reveals a serious misunderstanding of these precedents. Undoubtedly, Lopez and Morrison provide lower courts with significant guidance in their review of federal statutes regulating exclusively intrastate activity. Cf. United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 131 L.Ed.2d 714 (1995) (explaining that the category three “substantially affects” test need only be applied to intrastate commercial activity that has interstate effects). Neither Lopez nor Morrison, however, speaks in much detail to the first or second categories of activity that Congress may validly regulate under its Commerce Clause power. At oral argument, counsel for Faasse stated that Morrison was “aspirational” in nature and that its reasoning should be extended to the other categories of regulation. It is not our practice to decide cases based on a hunch that a decision by the Supreme Court is aspirational. We do know that the instant case indisputably involves the regulation of exclusively interstate transactions and that, as such, it does not implicate the Supreme Court’s preeminent concern in Lopez and Morrison, namely that Congress’s Commerce Clause power, taken too far, will erase the distinction “between what is truly national and what is truly local.” Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1754. The CSRA is, in fine, no different from myriad other Acts of Congress that the Supreme Court has routinely upheld.
B. “Thing” in Commerce
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, Congress’s power to regulate things in interstate commerce is plenary.7 [484]*484See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193, 196 (explaining that the Commerce Clause “comprehend[s] every species of commercial intercourse” among the several states and that Congress’s Commerce Clause power “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution”). Among the reasons the nation’s Founders imbued the national legislature with an explicit grant of power in Article I, § 8, cl. 3 was to ensure that the Congress could regulate commerce that extended beyond an individual state’s borders. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., v. Town of Hamson, 520 U.S. 564, 571, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) (explaining, with respect to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state statute, that “[i]f there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints”) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231); cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.”). Indeed, the Founders recognized that commerce that crossed state lines could exceed the states’ capacity to regulate such commerce uniformly or to enforce the states’ own laws. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, the Supreme Court observed:
The power confined to Congress by the Commerce Clause is declared in The Federalist to be for the purpose of securing the ‘maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States.’... It is the power to legislate concerning transactions which, reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of more states than one; — to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 551-52, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
In exercising its positive Commerce Clause power, “Congress has often passed legislation to help the States solve problems that defy local solution.” Sage, 92 F.3d at 105. Thus, in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971), the Supreme Court noted that legislative history for the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891 et seq., which makes intrastate loan sharking activities a federal crime, reflected Congress’s concern that loan sharking, a significant component of organized [485]*485crime, was a national affliction and required a federal antidote because “[t]he problem simply [could not] be solved by the States alone.” Earlier, in United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384, 67 S.Ct. 332, 91 L.Ed. 359 (1946), the Supreme Court explained that Congress passed the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 413-19, to assist “the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful get away and thus make the state’s detecting and punitive processes impotent.”
When Congress enacted the CSRA in 1992, legislative history reveals that it did so in response to a dilemma it considered national in scope and whose resolution had defied the authority of the individual states. The House Judiciary Committee, which authored a report accompanying the bill that became 18 U.S.C. § 228, stated that the Committee had found that interstate collection of child support was “the most difficult to enforce” and accounted for an “unacceptably high” deficit in child support payments. H.R.Rep. No. 102-771, at 5-6 (1992). According to the report, approximately one-third of child support cases involve children whose non-custodial parent lives in a state different from the child and whose custodial parent must therefore rely on interstate payments of child support. - Among this group relying on interstate payment, fifty-seven percent of the custodial parents reported receiving child support payments “only occasionally, seldom or never.” Id. at 5. After noting that “at least 42 states have made willful failure to pay child support a crime,” the report concluded that “the ability of those states to enforce such laws outside their own boundaries is severely limited.” Id. at 5-6. Indeed, the report found that even though most states had adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which was designed to deal with the extradition of defendants who failed to pay interstate child support, “interstate extradition and enforcement in fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and slow method of collection.” Id. at 6.
As this report makes plain, Congress’s enactment of the CSRA was premised upon a paradigmatic use of its Commerce Clause power over “things” in commerce: to regulate national problems that confound state-by-state solution. As the Second Circuit noted:
All the Act does is enable the United States to help [the state] do what it could not do on its own, namely, enforce [the defendant’s] obligation to send money from one State to another. Congress was not impotent to overcome the obstacles inherent in our Federal system to the enforcement of that obligation.
Sage, 92 F.3d at 105.
Therefore, pursuant to its authority to regulate things in interstate commerce, be they commercial or not, we believe that Congress may properly prohibit a non-custodial spouse from refusing to pay court-ordered child support when the child lives in another state. The CSRA is explicitly premised upon the noncustodial parent’s unfulfilled court-ordered obligation to make an interstate money payment to the custodial parent. Importantly, “[p]ayments stemming from a support obligation will usually travel in interstate commerce by mail, wire, or electronic transfer.” Black, 125 F.3d at 460; cf. United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 226 (6th Cir.1998) (upholding money laundering conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and finding statute valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under category two because “use of federally insured [486]*486banks and/or the transport of monies across state borders to facilitate the money-laundering create a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to allow application of § 1956”). The money payment, or its absence, which would travel through interstate commerce, is the “thing” which Congress may validly regulate.
It matters not, for purposes of the Constitution, whether the child support payment is a tangible thing. In South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 546, 64 S.Ct. 1162, in which the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to regulate interstate insurance contracts, the Court made clear that “Congress can regulate traffic though it consist of intangibles.” The Court also noted that “transactions [may] be commerce though non-commercial; they may be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and information.” Id. at 549-550, 64 S.Ct. 1162; see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000) (upholding Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which forbids the states from selling or releasing drivers’ personal, identifying information, as valid regulation of “thing” in interstate commerce).
Moreover, it is immaterial that the CSRA regulates a defendant’s failure to put a thing in commerce.8 It is true that many federal statutes prohibit, rather than seek to compel, goods or services from passing through interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941) (upholding criminal provision of Fair Labor Standards Act proscribing interstate shipment of goods produced by employees whose wages and hours of employment did not conform to the Act). As the Fifth Circuit noted, however, “[t]he Supreme Court has often held, in several contexts, that the defendant’s nonuse of interstate channels alone does not shield him from federal purview under the Commerce Clause.” Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1229-30; see also Sage, 92 F.3d at 105-06 (rejecting argument that failure to send money does not invoke Commerce Clause power because “[i]f Congress can take measures under the Commerce Clause to foster potential interstate commerce, it surely has power to prevent the frustration of an obligation to engage in commerce”). Thus, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides for equal access to places of public accommodation without regard to race, explaining that the Heart of Atlanta Motel’s refusal to accommodate blacks was an impermissible “obstruction to interstate commerce” because it deterred blacks from engaging in interstate travel; in United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420, 76 S.Ct. 522, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956), the Supreme Court upheld the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which makes illegal robbery or extortion that “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” and thus removes obstacles to interstate commerce; and in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911), the Supreme Court upheld the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, which makes illegal “every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States” and [487]*487thereby furthers interstate commerce that otherwise would have been stifled. If Congress may validly restrict one industry’s restraint on trade or prevent intrastate extortion because it obstructs the flow of interstate commerce, certainly Congress may regulate Faasse’s failure to send payments from California to Michigan as a similar obstruction of interstate commerce.9
The dissent’s contention that Faasse passively failed to engage in commerce, instead of actively obstructed commerce, and that these precedents therefore do not apply to him, is not well taken. Faasse’s failure to act was not “passive” in this case, it was willful, as he was under a state court order to pay child support which he deliberately disobeyed. Indeed, we note that the scienter element in the CSRA requires willfulness: the statute may only be invoked if a defendant “willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State.” 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994). When Faasse pleaded guilty, he acknowledged his guilt as to each and every element of the offense. Thus, by virtue of his guilty plea, Faasse conceded that his failure to pay child support was willful. We conclude that the distinction between “active obstruction” and “passive failure” is, in this case, illusory and we reject any attempt to hide behind it.
We are also nonplused by the assertion that, in some hypothetical situations, a debtor parent and the custodial parent may reside in one state while the minor child resides in another, thereby undermining the rationale for federal regulation. Although such a scenario is unlikely, we note that the debtor parent’s payment must still travel through interstate commerce, thereby making use of the channels of commerce, to reach the child. Moreover, we do not strike down a statute facially because there are hypothetical situations in which the Act’s interstate commerce connection may conceivably be tenuous.10 See United States v. Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir.1997).
Finally, we wish to make clear that this statute does not, as Faasse and the dissent would have us believe, regulate a traditional area of family law best left to the states. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court noted that should the “substantial effects” and aggregation principles for intra state activity be extended too far, it would provide Congress with authority to regulate “family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.” Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1753. First, the CSRA does not rely exclusively upon either the “substantial effects” or aggregation principle for its constitutionality; as [488]*488noted above, it regulates inter-, not intrastate economic activity. Moreover, the statute does not purport to regulate the non-economic activities associated with marriage, divorce, or childrearing under the guise that, in the aggregate, such activities substantially affect interstate commerce. As a regulation of out-of-state debtors who owe court-ordered payments, the CSRA deals exclusively with interstate economic transactions. Cf. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir.2000) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), criminalizing possession of a weapon that has traveled interstate while defendant is subject to domestic violence order, against claim that statute regulates traditional area of family law, because statute’s jurisdictional element ensures it was enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce in firearms). Therefore, we are confident that the statute does not implicate the Court’s concern that Congress may attempt to create federal family law under the pretext of its Commerce Clause power.
Second, the statute does not supplant traditional state statutory enforcement mechanisms. In this case, Michigan remains the exclusive regulator,, and enforcer of all unpaid child support obligations in its state unless the noncustodial parent (or the child) both lives out of state and the parent fails to make payments. In such a situation, Congress made express findings that collection of past-due debts had grown beyond the enforcement capacities of the states. The CSRA does not supplant or preempt state law because it does not implicate the states’ ability or authority to order child support payments, nor does it compel states to enforce such orders.11 Instead, the CSRA merely reinforces state laws which the states were unable to enforce themselves.12 This is a most appropriate use of federal power.13 See South-Eastern, [489]*489Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 552, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (noting that Commerce Clause power “is a positive power ... to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing”).
An interstate court-ordered child support payment clearly is a “thing” in interstate commerce. See Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1229 (“The CSRA ... seeks to prevent the frustration of an interstate commercial transaction that otherwise would have occurred absent the defendant’s dereliction. It is thus subject to federal control [under category two] for that reason.”); Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400 (finding that payments of child support on behalf of an out-of-state child, or the debts resulting from nonpayment, are things in interstate commerce); Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1032 (holding that “[bjeeause child support orders that require a parent in one state to make payments to a person in another state are functionally equivalent to interstate contracts, such obligations are ‘things’ in interstate commerce”) (internal citation omitted); Mussari, 95 F.3d at 790 (“The obligation of a parent in one state to provide support for a child in a different state is an obligation-to be met by a payment that will normally move in interstate commerce — by mail, by wire, or by the electronic transfer of funds. That obligation is, therefore, a thing in interstate commerce and falls within the power of Congress to regulate.”). Therefore, the Congress may freely regulate the interstate court-ordered child support payment, provided we find that the statute’s means are rationally related to its ends, which we do. Thus, we conclude that the CSRA represents an appropriate exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
C. Other Categories of Regulation
Although we have determined that the CSRA validly regulates a thing in commerce within Lopez’s category two, we also believe that the statute is a constitutional regulation of the channels of interstate commerce.14 Accord Crawford, 115 [490]*490F.3d at 1400 (finding CSRA valid regulation under category one because “payment of child support on behalf of an out-of-state child requires the use of channels of interstate commerce”); Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1227 (concluding that CSRA is valid regulation under category one because “the child support obligation — made interstate in nature as a direct consequence of the diversity requirement imposed upon the obligor and the obligee — can be satisfied normally by a payment that necessarily must move in interstate commerce”).
In Lopez, the Court stated that there are two kinds of permissible regulation under the first category of activity: (1) “regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce;” and (2) “an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624. As the Court’s references to United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114, 61 S.Ct. 451 (upholding criminal prosecution under the Fair Labor Standards Act for interstate shipment of lumber which was manufactured intrastate by employees whose wages and hours did not conform with Act) and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 256, 85 S.Ct. 348 (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbidding public accommodations from refusing to serve customers based on race and noting that “the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question”) illustrate, permissible category one regulation encompasses more than simple regulation of the nation’s highways, railroads, or other literal “channels” of commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624. These cases teach that Congress has the power, under category one, to regulate or exclude certain categories of goods from flowing across state lines through the channels of commerce. Our case law is in harmony with the Supreme Court: in United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 784, we upheld, as a category one regulation, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), a statute criminalizing the possession or transfer of a machinegun because the “illegal possession of a machinegun cannot occur without an illegal transfer, which given the national marketplace for machineguns, involves the channels of interstate commerce.” We therefore conclude that, based upon its power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the CSRA was validly enacted under Lopez’s category one.
Finally, we also believe that, although not necessary to our holding today, we could find the CSRA a valid regulation under Lopez’s category three. The statute regulates financial obligations which must move in interstate commerce, via mail, wire, or electronic transfer; it has an explicit jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce-the child and non-custodial parent must reside in different states; and it [491]*491is supported by Congressional findings explaining the effect on interstate commerce of the failure to make court-ordered child support payments. Accord Parker, 108 F.3d at 30; Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400; Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1004 (all upholding CSRA under Lopez’s category three). Congress clearly had a rational basis for enacting the CSRA under its category three Commerce Clause power. In sum, we believe that the CSRA is valid under each of the three Lopez categories.
III. ORDER OF RESTITUTION
Having rejected Faasse’s constitutional challenge to the CSRA, we now turn to his challenge to the district court’s order requiring him to pay $28,438.35 in restitution.15 We review the district court’s decision to order a specific amount of restitution for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Adams, 214 F.3d 724, 730 (6th Cir.2000) (noting also that the legal issue of whether restitution is permitted under law is reviewed de novo).
The CSRA requires a court, upon a conviction under the Act, to order restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 “in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1994). Section 3663(a)(l)(B)(i) requires courts to consider, when determining the amount of restitution to be ordered, “(I) the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of the offense; and (II) the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)®.
Faasse’s sole argument is that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by fading to consider “the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant” when fashioning the restitution order. Specifically, Faasse argues that the magistrate judge did not adequately consider the effect of Faasse’s six-month term of imprisonment and the consequent loss of his job on his earning ability. According to Faasse, “[fjailure to reduce the restitution award in light of Mr. Faasse’s circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion that warrants remand for reconsideration of an appropriate restitution award.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.
In support of his position, Faasse cites to this court’s decision in United States v. Dunigan, 163 F.3d 979, 982 (6th Cir.1999), in which a panel of this court reversed the district court’s imposition of a $311,605 restitution order on a defendant sentenced to thirty-one months in prison. The Duni-gan court determined that the district court had failed to consider, pursuant to the statute, Dunigan’s ability to pay, in light of the defendant’s extremely meager financial assets and the lack of any evidence in the record that the defendant could pay what amounted to $8,000 after-tax dollars per month every month for three years during his supervised release.
We have held that the district court must consider each of the statutory factors in § 3663 when determining the specific amount ordered as restitution. United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir.1996). The district court is not, however, required to make explicit findings about each statutory factor, id., although we held in Dunigan that “a district court must have, at a minimum, some indication that a defendant will be able to pay the [492]*492amount of restitution ordered.... ” Dunigan, 163 F.3d at 982. Thus, we noted that “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it orders restitution in an amount that it finds the defendant is not likely to be able to pay.” Id. (quoting United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1529 (11th Cir.1997)).
In Faasse’s case, we believe that the district court adequately considered the appropriate statutory factors, including the defendant’s financial status. The magistrate judge stated at the sentencing hearing:
I don’t see any resolution of this case other than the one I’m going to impose, and that is the statutory maximum here is six months and I’m going to impose the six-month sentence. If I thought that-and obviously I know that this means the defendant’s going to lose his job. If I thought that letting him keep his job would mean that he would start supporting his child, it’s the last thing in the world I’d do is take his job away from him, but I don’t believe for a moment that getting this particular job at $22,000 a year plus commissions is going to do anything for this child.
The defendant has a long track record here of not supporting the child so what I’m going to do is incarcerate the defendant, make a lesson of him for himself and for others, and at the end of six months then he can decide whether he wants to continue in his obstructionist fashion.
I think the defendant has had means and methods to pay this money all along, he just will not, and in a case where the Court decides that it’s the defendant’s will and not his inability that’s the problem I think this is what the Court ought to do.
J.A. at 107-08. The transcript makes clear that the magistrate judge did not ignore “the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant” when ordering restitution. The magistrate judge explicitly contemplated that Faasse would lose his job when sentencing him but believed that, employed or not, Faasse was not likely willingly to support his daughter. The magistrate judge attributed Faasse’s failure to make child support payments to his lack of “will” to pay, not to his financial inability. Thus, unlike the situation in Du-nigan, in which the district court “expressed considerable doubt that Dunigan ever would be able to pay,” Dunigan, 163 F.3d at 982, the magistrate judge in this case believed that Faasse could pay the child support should he so choose.
Having determined that the magistrate judge did not ignore the appropriate statutory factors, we must consider whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the amount of restitution ordered, or whether the restitution order constituted an abuse of the magistrate judge’s discretion. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), the probation officer should include in the presentence report “information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order” including “information relating to the economic circumstances of each defendant.” The pre-sentence report in this case reflects that Faasse has never earned a consistent livelihood. According to the probation officer’s report, Faasse was in an automobile accident in February 1994. Faasse asserted that this accident prohibited him from working from 1994 to the middle of 1996. J.A. at 123. The probation officer learned from Social Security Administration records that Faasse earned $14,510 in 1994 but had no reported income in 1995. J.A. at 116, 123. The probation officer noted that she “encountered difficulty establishing the defendant’s source(s) of subsis[493]*493tence in 1996.” J.A. at 116. Social Security Administration records reflected that Faasse earned $2,200 in 1996, although he maintained an apartment with a monthly rent of $945.00, .apparently with financial assistance from his family. From July 1996 to August 1997, Faasse earned approximately $1,000 every two weeks. Id. According to Social Security Administration records, Faasse earned approximately $40,000 in 1997. J.A. at 123. From August 1997 to February 1998, Faasse worked for a different employer and earned commissions of unknown sums. Thereafter, Faasse was basically unemployed from February to September 1998, when he was convicted of the present offense, and his income for that period is also unknown. Id.
Based on Faasse’s earnings detailed in the presentence report, it first appears that the magistrate judge had no “indication that [the] defendant w[ould] be able to pay the amount of restitution ordered,” Dunigan, 163 F.3d at 982, particularly in one lump sum payable immediately, as was ordered by the district court. J.A. at 19. As is clear from the above recitation of Faasse’s employment record, however, the presentence report is substantially incomplete. Faasse’s probation officer reported that Faasse’s “views and beliefs regarding the federal criminal justice system [ ] made him uncooperative in the gathering of facts and material relevant to the preparation of the presentence report.” J.A. at 117. The probation officer also found that Faasse “was evasive regarding his personal background, employment, and criminal histories.” Id. In the section on the defendant’s employment record, the presentence report states that the probation officer “encountered difficulty identifying and verifying the defendant’s employment history. The defendant presented false and misleading information to this officer on many occasions.” J.A. at 122. The probation officer concluded:
[I]t is difficult to gauge the defendant’s ability to pay. If his most recent employment works out, he should have the ability to pay restitution ... at a rate deemed reasonable by the Court. After no less than five requests, the defendant has failed to return his Personal Financial Statement to this office.
J.A. at 124 (emphasis added). Because Faasse refused to cooperate with the probation officer by providing a Personal Fi: nancial Statement, see 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (“Each defendant shall prepare and file with the probation officer an affidavit fully describing the financial resources of the defendant, including a complete listing of all assets owned or controlled by the defendant as of the date on which the defendant was arrested, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other information that the court requires .... ”), we do not know whether the presentence report accurately reflects his earnings for the years 1994-98. We also cannot know whether Faasse has undisclosed assets or liabilities.
To the extent that the presentence report is incomplete, we note that “the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that a restitution order far exceeds his resources and earning potential.” Adams, 214 F.3d at 730; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (“The burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant ... shall be on the defendant.”). We believe that Faasse’s unwillingness to provide the probation officer with complete financial and employment information has effectively constrained our decision-making with regard to the amount of restitution. We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that he has not met his burden of persuasion to prove that the restitution order [494]*494exceeds his earning potential or his financial resources. We note, moreover, that even if Faasse does lack the present ability to pay, this court has previously held that a defendant’s indigency is not a bar to an order of restitution because ability to pay is “but one factor for the court to consider....” United States v. Bondurant, 39 F.3d 665, 668 (6th Cir.1994) (noting relevance of other factors including defendant’s intelligence, academic background, and likely ability to obtain a job).
Because the district court did not fail to consider any of the statutory factors and did not order an amount of restitution in excess of what is required by statute, we must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding Faasse responsible for restitution of the full amount of unpaid child support. We also believe that the district court’s order to pay the restitution in a lump sum is not an abuse of discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A) (noting that a restitution order may direct the defendant to make single, lump-sum payment or partial payments at specified intervals). Although the probation officer advised that Faasse could pay restitution “at a rate deemed reasonable by the Court,” J.A. at 124, the magistrate judge explicitly declined to devise a payment plan for the restitution order. J.A. at 108. He based his decision on his belief that Faasse “has had means and methods to pay this money all along, he just will not....” Id. Because Faasse was evasive and recalcitrant in providing financial information to the court, and the burden was his to demonstrate his inability to pay, we cannot conclude that the magistrate judge’s finding is an abuse of discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all respects.