USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4266
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHANIE ANN ALLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00003-TSK-MJA-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2026 Decided: January 26, 2026
Before AGEE, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Shaina L. Richardson, Morgantown, West Virginia, Carrington N. Napier, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Stephanie Ann Allen pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl,
both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced her to
151 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a state sentence she was already
serving, and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Allen’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether Allen received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the proceedings below and whether Allen’s guilty plea was valid. Counsel also
questions whether Allen’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable because,
at sentencing, the court commented on an unrelated criminal case, and it denied Allen’s
request that her sentence run concurrently with her state sentence. Although informed of
her right to do so, Allen has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
which it informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the rights
she is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charges to which she is pleading
guilty, and the possible consequences of her guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The
court must also ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or
promises extrinsic to the plea agreement, and that a factual basis exists for the plea. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3); see United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2017)
(discussing proof required to establish factual basis). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11
plea colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 3 of 5
States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Because Allen
did not seek to withdraw her guilty plea in the district court, we review the adequacy of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing only for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621,
622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error
if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation
modified).
We have reviewed the transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy and conclude that the
magistrate judge fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements and ensured that Allen’s plea
was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. We thus discern
no plain error warranting correction in the acceptance of Allen’s guilty plea and conclude
that her guilty plea is valid.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).
We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district court
committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing]
Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If “the
district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness review “takes into account
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 4 of 5
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” Id. (citation modified). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” Id.
With respect to the procedural reasonableness of Allen’s sentence, the district court
correctly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the parties’ arguments and Allen’s
individualized circumstances, offered Allen the opportunity to allocute, and explained why
the chosen sentence was appropriate. Further, although the court commented on an
unrelated criminal case during the sentencing hearing, it did not impermissibly rely on the
facts of that case to formulate Allen’s sentence. Instead, the court crafted Allen’s sentence
based on her criminal history, pretrial violations, and the nature and seriousness of her
offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that Allen’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Turning to substantive reasonableness, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining Allen’s request to have her federal sentence run
concurrently with her undischarged state sentence. The court acknowledged Allen’s state
sentence but declined to impose her federal sentence to run concurrently with the state
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USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4266
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHANIE ANN ALLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00003-TSK-MJA-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2026 Decided: January 26, 2026
Before AGEE, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Shaina L. Richardson, Morgantown, West Virginia, Carrington N. Napier, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Stephanie Ann Allen pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl,
both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced her to
151 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a state sentence she was already
serving, and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Allen’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether Allen received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the proceedings below and whether Allen’s guilty plea was valid. Counsel also
questions whether Allen’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable because,
at sentencing, the court commented on an unrelated criminal case, and it denied Allen’s
request that her sentence run concurrently with her state sentence. Although informed of
her right to do so, Allen has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
which it informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the rights
she is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charges to which she is pleading
guilty, and the possible consequences of her guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The
court must also ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or
promises extrinsic to the plea agreement, and that a factual basis exists for the plea. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3); see United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2017)
(discussing proof required to establish factual basis). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11
plea colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 3 of 5
States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Because Allen
did not seek to withdraw her guilty plea in the district court, we review the adequacy of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing only for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621,
622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error
if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation
modified).
We have reviewed the transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy and conclude that the
magistrate judge fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements and ensured that Allen’s plea
was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. We thus discern
no plain error warranting correction in the acceptance of Allen’s guilty plea and conclude
that her guilty plea is valid.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).
We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district court
committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing]
Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If “the
district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness review “takes into account
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4266 Doc: 25 Filed: 01/26/2026 Pg: 4 of 5
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” Id. (citation modified). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” Id.
With respect to the procedural reasonableness of Allen’s sentence, the district court
correctly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the parties’ arguments and Allen’s
individualized circumstances, offered Allen the opportunity to allocute, and explained why
the chosen sentence was appropriate. Further, although the court commented on an
unrelated criminal case during the sentencing hearing, it did not impermissibly rely on the
facts of that case to formulate Allen’s sentence. Instead, the court crafted Allen’s sentence
based on her criminal history, pretrial violations, and the nature and seriousness of her
offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that Allen’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Turning to substantive reasonableness, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining Allen’s request to have her federal sentence run
concurrently with her undischarged state sentence. The court acknowledged Allen’s state
sentence but declined to impose her federal sentence to run concurrently with the state
sentence after considering the relevant Guidelines recommendations, basic principles of
fairness, Allen’s criminal history, and her violations of her pretrial conditions by
continuing to traffic fentanyl. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), (b); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5G1.3; United States v. Lynn, 912 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing
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district court’s discretion to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence after “considering
the [§ 3553(a)] factors”). We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision
here. Accordingly, we conclude that Allen’s sentence is substantively reasonable.
We review de novo an ineffective assistance of counsel claim made on direct appeal
but “will reverse only if it conclusively appears in the trial record itself that the defendant
was not provided effective representation.” United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320, 326
(4th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citation modified). Because the present record does not
conclusively show that Allen’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Allen’s claims are
not cognizable on direct appeal and “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion.” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508 (4th Cir. 2016).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Allen, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Allen requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Allen.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED