United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza

213 F. App'x 624

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

*

Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. He claims the district court abused its discretion in admitting out-of-court statements, denying his motion for severance, and denying his motion for a new trial. He also claims the government presented insufficient evidence to support either conviction. We affirm.

The district court properly admitted Eduardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s out-of-court statements. A co-conspirator’s out-of-court statements are admissible if corroborated by additional evidence establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant was aware of the conspiracy.¹ Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s knowledge of the conspiracy was corroborated by physical evidence, the eyewitness testimony of a confidential informant, and his own admissions. Because sufficient additional evidence established Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza was aware of the conspiracy, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Eduardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s statements.

The district court was within its discretion in denying Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s motion for a severance. A trial court must sever a trial only if joinder is “so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial economy.” ² In evaluating the prejudicial effect of joinder, a trial court must consider the following factors, among others: “(1) whether the jury may reasonably be expected to collate and appraise the individual evidence against each defendant; (2) the judge’s diligence in instructing the jury on the limited purposes for which certain evidence may be used; (3) whether the nature of the evidence and the legal concepts involved are within the competence of the ordinary juror; and (4) whether [the defendant can] show, with some particularity, a risk that the joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a rehable judgment about guilt or innocence.” ³ The trial court considered these factors and reasonably concluded severance was unnecessary.

The district court properly denied Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. A district court confronted with a colorable claim of juror misconduct “must undertake an investigation of the relevant facts and circumstances.... So long as the fact-finding process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented, the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of correctness.”⁴ The district court reasonably explored Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s claims of juror misconduct and reasonably concluded that a new trial was not necessary.

The district court properly concluded the government presented sufficient evidence to support Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Sufficient evidence to support a conviction exists when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁵ The physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, admissions against interest, and wiretap recordings were sufficient to support Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza’s convictions.

We AFFIRM, but grant a limited REMAND to allow the district court to determine whether it would have imposed a different sentence if it had viewed the Sentencing Guidelines as advisory.⁶

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 . United States v. Castaneda, 16 F.3d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir.1994). See also Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ("A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).

2 . United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 926 (9th Cir.1980).

3 . United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1241 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted).

4 . Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc).

5 . Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (9th Cir.2000).

6 . See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc).