NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3408 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:21-cr-02281-SHR-JR-4 v. MEMORANDUM* ELIAS SAMBRANO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Following a guilty plea, Elias Sambrano was convicted of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 60
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). months of imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum, and now appeals his
sentence. We affirm.
1. Sambrano challenges the district court’s finding that he is ineligible for
safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Section 3553(f) allows the
sentencing court to depart from a mandatory minimum sentence for first-time,
nonviolent drug offenders who played a minor role in the offense and who have
made a good-faith effort to cooperate with the government. See United States v.
Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996). The statute prescribes five
requirements for relief; if the defendant fails to establish any one of the five
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, he is ineligible for safety-valve
relief, and the mandatory minimum will apply. See United States v. Ajugwo, 82
F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996).
We review for clear error a district court’s factual finding that a defendant is
ineligible for safety-valve relief. United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100,
1103 (9th Cir. 2007). Under that standard, “a reviewing court must ask ‘whether,
on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The district court found that Sambrano did not provide a complete and
truthful proffer as required by section 3553(f)(5). To satisfy the truthful-proffer
2 23-3408 requirement, a defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that
were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); accord U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). This “tell all you can tell”
requirement mandates that a defendant disclose “all information at his disposal
which is relevant to the offense,” often including “details concerning other parties
to the crime, such as the source who provided defendant with the drugs and other
persons in the chain of distribution, if known.” Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 939. The
disclosure requirement also applies to uncharged conduct related to the offense of
conviction. United States v. Miller, 151 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1998).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Sambrano was not
entirely forthcoming and truthful. For example, it appears that Sambrano lied when
he told prosecutors that he received no money from the sale of one kilogram of
cocaine on November 2, 2020, for which he was convicted. Sambrano’s defense
attorney came close to conceding at Sambrano’s sentencing hearing that Sambrano
made money off the transaction, explaining that Sambrano “didn’t get any profits
at all,” and “[a]t best, he was going to make a commission.” Additionally, the
government’s wiretap intercepts from November 11, 2020, showed Sambrano
attempting to make a profit in a future sale, so the district court was entitled to
believe that Sambrano had profited from the November 2 sale. In another example
3 23-3408 of Sambrano’s lack of candor, prosecutors confronted Sambrano with a transcript
of an intercepted call in which Sambrano mentioned that his cousin in Santa Ana,
Mexico, was looking to get back into the drug trade. In response to questions about
his cousin’s identity, Sambrano told prosecutors that his cousin did not exist. The
district court was entitled to conclude that Sambrano had not shared everything he
knew.
2. Sambrano also argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for being an “organizer” and in declining
to apply an additional one-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Even assuming that the district court erred in its Guidelines
calculations, any error was harmless because “the district court ‘would have
imposed the same sentence absent the errors.’” United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d
1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092,
1106 (9th Cir. 2001)); see United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030
n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Because Sambrano’s conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute carried a mandatory minimum five-year sentence,
the district court had no discretion to impose a sentence lower than the one
Sambrano received. See United States v. Thornton, 444 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.
2006).
4 23-3408 3. Sambrano argues that the district court committed error at sentencing by
providing insufficient reasoning for its sentencing decision, thereby precluding
meaningful appellate review, and by failing to address inconsistencies between its
Guidelines calculation and the calculation in the presentence report. Because
Sambrano did not make those objections below, we review for plain error only.
United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2012). The plain-error
standard of review dictates that reversal is warranted only where there has been (1)
an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3408 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:21-cr-02281-SHR-JR-4 v. MEMORANDUM* ELIAS SAMBRANO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Following a guilty plea, Elias Sambrano was convicted of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 60
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). months of imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum, and now appeals his
sentence. We affirm.
1. Sambrano challenges the district court’s finding that he is ineligible for
safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Section 3553(f) allows the
sentencing court to depart from a mandatory minimum sentence for first-time,
nonviolent drug offenders who played a minor role in the offense and who have
made a good-faith effort to cooperate with the government. See United States v.
Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996). The statute prescribes five
requirements for relief; if the defendant fails to establish any one of the five
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, he is ineligible for safety-valve
relief, and the mandatory minimum will apply. See United States v. Ajugwo, 82
F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996).
We review for clear error a district court’s factual finding that a defendant is
ineligible for safety-valve relief. United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100,
1103 (9th Cir. 2007). Under that standard, “a reviewing court must ask ‘whether,
on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The district court found that Sambrano did not provide a complete and
truthful proffer as required by section 3553(f)(5). To satisfy the truthful-proffer
2 23-3408 requirement, a defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that
were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); accord U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). This “tell all you can tell”
requirement mandates that a defendant disclose “all information at his disposal
which is relevant to the offense,” often including “details concerning other parties
to the crime, such as the source who provided defendant with the drugs and other
persons in the chain of distribution, if known.” Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 939. The
disclosure requirement also applies to uncharged conduct related to the offense of
conviction. United States v. Miller, 151 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1998).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Sambrano was not
entirely forthcoming and truthful. For example, it appears that Sambrano lied when
he told prosecutors that he received no money from the sale of one kilogram of
cocaine on November 2, 2020, for which he was convicted. Sambrano’s defense
attorney came close to conceding at Sambrano’s sentencing hearing that Sambrano
made money off the transaction, explaining that Sambrano “didn’t get any profits
at all,” and “[a]t best, he was going to make a commission.” Additionally, the
government’s wiretap intercepts from November 11, 2020, showed Sambrano
attempting to make a profit in a future sale, so the district court was entitled to
believe that Sambrano had profited from the November 2 sale. In another example
3 23-3408 of Sambrano’s lack of candor, prosecutors confronted Sambrano with a transcript
of an intercepted call in which Sambrano mentioned that his cousin in Santa Ana,
Mexico, was looking to get back into the drug trade. In response to questions about
his cousin’s identity, Sambrano told prosecutors that his cousin did not exist. The
district court was entitled to conclude that Sambrano had not shared everything he
knew.
2. Sambrano also argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for being an “organizer” and in declining
to apply an additional one-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Even assuming that the district court erred in its Guidelines
calculations, any error was harmless because “the district court ‘would have
imposed the same sentence absent the errors.’” United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d
1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092,
1106 (9th Cir. 2001)); see United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030
n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Because Sambrano’s conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute carried a mandatory minimum five-year sentence,
the district court had no discretion to impose a sentence lower than the one
Sambrano received. See United States v. Thornton, 444 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.
2006).
4 23-3408 3. Sambrano argues that the district court committed error at sentencing by
providing insufficient reasoning for its sentencing decision, thereby precluding
meaningful appellate review, and by failing to address inconsistencies between its
Guidelines calculation and the calculation in the presentence report. Because
Sambrano did not make those objections below, we review for plain error only.
United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2012). The plain-error
standard of review dictates that reversal is warranted only where there has been (1)
an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)); United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 973, 978
(9th Cir. 2021). We find no plain error.
The district court correctly calculated a final guideline range, explaining on
the record that the sentencing range was 60 to 71 months, based on a total offense
level of 24 and a criminal history category of II. Sambrano is correct that in
addition to announcing the correct calculations at the sentencing hearing and in its
statement of reasons, the district court also adopted the presentence report without
change, and the final report contained internal inconsistencies regarding
Sambrano’s criminal history category and the applicable guidelines range. But
because the district court correctly determined Sambrano’s offense level, criminal
5 23-3408 history category, and guideline range both at the sentencing hearing and in its
statement of reasons, and correctly imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, any
inconsistency in the presentence report did not affect Sambrano’s substantial
rights. And although the district court’s explanation for its sentence was brief, it
provided a sufficient record for meaningful appellate review.
AFFIRMED.
6 23-3408