Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 11, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-8030 (D.C. No. 2:06-CR-00084-ABJ-4) JAMES SCOTT SALI, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MORITZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
James Scott Sali, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
In 2007, Sali pled guilty to four drug-trafficking and firearms counts and was
sentenced to 60 years in prison. In 2023, he filed a pro se motion for a sentence
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 2
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As relevant here, the statute provides
that, on motion, a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after
considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent they are
applicable,” but only “if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In his
motion, Sali argued that multiple health issues and what he characterized as an
unusually long sentence, allegedly due to a 15-year sentencing disparity resulting
from stacking his two firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), constituted
extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. He also argued that he
was not going to reoffend and that the § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of granting
a sentence reduction.
The district court denied the motion. The court assumed that Sali’s medical
circumstances and the alleged sentencing disparity amounted to extraordinary and
compelling circumstances that warranted a sentence reduction. But the court found
that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent with the Sentencing Commission’s
policy statement that a defendant not pose “a danger to the safety of any other person
or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” USSG 1B1.13(a)(2).
Among other things, § 3142(g) requires a court to determine whether community
safety would be “reasonably assure[d]” if a defendant is released, taking into account
“(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged”; “(2) the weight of the
evidence against the person”; “(3) the history and characteristics of the person”; and
2 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 3
“(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release.” § 3142(g)(1)–(4).
Applying the § 3142(g) factors, the district court found that Sali’s “storied
history of violent conduct prior to incarceration creates a strong presumption that he
would pose a danger to the safety of another person or to the community.” R. vol. I
at 126. The court noted that his conduct in this case was “undisputedly dangerous”
because it involved “large amounts of methamphetamine, the related use and
deployment of firearms, and his involvement in a scheme to murder a co-conspirator
he suspected was a police informant.” Id. at 127. The court found that his history of
twelve other convictions, including battery, multiple assaults, carrying a concealed
weapon and threatening to behead the victim, and terroristic threats/assaultive
conduct, “serve[d] to generate further caution.” Id. The court rejected Sali’s
contention that since his imprisonment, he was “a changed man,” finding that despite
his claims that he was “staying off drugs” and “learn[ing] how to kick destructive
habits,” Sali had received “a bevy of citations . . . during his incarceration.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Those included citations for “medication abuse
as late as 2021 and three infractions for disruptive behavior as late as 2022.” Id.
at 128. This conduct, the court said, was too recent for Sali “to be given the benefit
of the doubt.” Id. The court further found that Sali did “not appear to have any
sufficient vocational skills to maintain a stable career after incarceration,” and
therefore he “would continue his propensity for violent and disruptive behavior, with
3 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 4
no impediment to dissuade him [from] criminal activity.” Id. For these reasons, the
court denied his motion. The court did not reach the § 3553(a) factors. Sali appeals.1
II. Standard of review
We review a district court’s order denying a motion for a § 3582(c)(1)(A)
sentence reduction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th
1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on
an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court also abuses its discretion “when it makes a
clear error of judgment, exceeds the bounds of permissible choice, or when its
decision is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable
judgment.” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Sali represents himself, we afford his pro se
filings a liberal construction, but we may not act as his advocate. See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed, but the rule of finality is subject to a few
narrow exceptions.” Bradley, 97 F.4th at 1217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Sali filed his notice of appeal while a motion for reconsideration he had filed was still pending.
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Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 11, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-8030 (D.C. No. 2:06-CR-00084-ABJ-4) JAMES SCOTT SALI, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MORITZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
James Scott Sali, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
In 2007, Sali pled guilty to four drug-trafficking and firearms counts and was
sentenced to 60 years in prison. In 2023, he filed a pro se motion for a sentence
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 2
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As relevant here, the statute provides
that, on motion, a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after
considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent they are
applicable,” but only “if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In his
motion, Sali argued that multiple health issues and what he characterized as an
unusually long sentence, allegedly due to a 15-year sentencing disparity resulting
from stacking his two firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), constituted
extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. He also argued that he
was not going to reoffend and that the § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of granting
a sentence reduction.
The district court denied the motion. The court assumed that Sali’s medical
circumstances and the alleged sentencing disparity amounted to extraordinary and
compelling circumstances that warranted a sentence reduction. But the court found
that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent with the Sentencing Commission’s
policy statement that a defendant not pose “a danger to the safety of any other person
or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” USSG 1B1.13(a)(2).
Among other things, § 3142(g) requires a court to determine whether community
safety would be “reasonably assure[d]” if a defendant is released, taking into account
“(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged”; “(2) the weight of the
evidence against the person”; “(3) the history and characteristics of the person”; and
2 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 3
“(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release.” § 3142(g)(1)–(4).
Applying the § 3142(g) factors, the district court found that Sali’s “storied
history of violent conduct prior to incarceration creates a strong presumption that he
would pose a danger to the safety of another person or to the community.” R. vol. I
at 126. The court noted that his conduct in this case was “undisputedly dangerous”
because it involved “large amounts of methamphetamine, the related use and
deployment of firearms, and his involvement in a scheme to murder a co-conspirator
he suspected was a police informant.” Id. at 127. The court found that his history of
twelve other convictions, including battery, multiple assaults, carrying a concealed
weapon and threatening to behead the victim, and terroristic threats/assaultive
conduct, “serve[d] to generate further caution.” Id. The court rejected Sali’s
contention that since his imprisonment, he was “a changed man,” finding that despite
his claims that he was “staying off drugs” and “learn[ing] how to kick destructive
habits,” Sali had received “a bevy of citations . . . during his incarceration.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Those included citations for “medication abuse
as late as 2021 and three infractions for disruptive behavior as late as 2022.” Id.
at 128. This conduct, the court said, was too recent for Sali “to be given the benefit
of the doubt.” Id. The court further found that Sali did “not appear to have any
sufficient vocational skills to maintain a stable career after incarceration,” and
therefore he “would continue his propensity for violent and disruptive behavior, with
3 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 4
no impediment to dissuade him [from] criminal activity.” Id. For these reasons, the
court denied his motion. The court did not reach the § 3553(a) factors. Sali appeals.1
II. Standard of review
We review a district court’s order denying a motion for a § 3582(c)(1)(A)
sentence reduction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th
1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on
an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court also abuses its discretion “when it makes a
clear error of judgment, exceeds the bounds of permissible choice, or when its
decision is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable
judgment.” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Sali represents himself, we afford his pro se
filings a liberal construction, but we may not act as his advocate. See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed, but the rule of finality is subject to a few
narrow exceptions.” Bradley, 97 F.4th at 1217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Sali filed his notice of appeal while a motion for reconsideration he had filed was still pending. The district court denied that motion, but Sali did not amend his notice of appeal to include the order denying the motion for reconsideration or file a new notice of appeal naming that order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider the order denying the motion for reconsideration. See Prager v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1060–61 (10th Cir. 2013). 4 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 5
“One such exception is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).” Id. (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s prerequisites, this court has adopted a three-step
test for district courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for
compassionate release. See United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir.
2021). At step one, “a district court must find whether extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant a sentence reduction.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). At step two, “a district court must find whether such reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
(emphasis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). And at step three, a
district court must “consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether,
in its discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole
or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court must address all three steps before it may
grant a compassionate-release motion, but it may deny such a motion “when any of
the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A)[(i)] is lacking and do[es] not need to
address the others.” Id. at 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sali presents what amounts to two lines of argument. The first is that the
district court erred by ignoring the facts he presented as extraordinary and compelling
circumstances because those facts are relevant to the § 3553(a) analysis. Sali is
correct that a district court cannot “deny compassionate-release relief on the ground
that release is not appropriate under § 3553(a) if the court has not considered the
5 Appellate Case: 24-8030 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 6
facts allegedly establishing extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.”
United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 947 (10th Cir. 2021). But the district court did
not deny Sali’s motion based on the § 3553(a) factors. In fact, the court did not even
reach that step of the analysis. Nor was it required to. See McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043.
Sali’s first line of argument, therefore, fails.
Sali’s second line of argument is that the district court disregarded his efforts
to rehabilitate himself since his 2007 conviction and considered only his criminal
history leading up to that conviction. This line of argument plainly overlooks the
district court’s findings that, despite Sali’s efforts to rehabilitate himself, he had
continued to rack up multiple citations for various infractions, including some very
recent citations involving abuse of medications and disruptive behavior. We see no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s consideration of the facts relevant to the
analysis required under USSG 1B1.13(a)(2) or 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s denial of Sali’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. We
grant Sali’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge