22-2100-cr United States v. Saint Clair
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 22-2100-cr
ASA SAINT CLAIR, a/k/a SEALED DEFENDANT 1,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: EMILY DEININGER, Assistant United States Attorney (Olga I. Zverovich, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JONATHAN ROSENBERG, Rosenberg Law Firm, Brooklyn, New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment, entered on September 16, 2022, is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Asa Saint Clair appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after
a jury trial at which he was found guilty of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, for his
participation in a scheme to defraud investors in World Sports Alliance (“WSA”). Saint Clair
was sentenced principally to forty-two months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised
release. On appeal, Saint Clair challenges: (1) the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a September 2019 search warrant; (2) the sufficiency of
the evidence adduced at trial; and (3) the admission of prior acts evidence. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we reference
only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
I. Motion to Suppress
On September 25, 2019, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Apartment
43B at 845 United Nations Plaza in Manhattan (the “Subject Premises”) for evidence of securities
fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice (the “Subject Offenses”). 1 The affidavit
supporting the warrant application alleged that WSA had participated in two market-manipulation
schemes in 2013 and 2014, and that it had produced potentially fraudulent agreements in response
1 The government obtained this warrant in connection with a separate investigation into WSA. In February 2020, the government obtained a second search warrant permitting it to search the electronic devices seized from the Subject Premises for evidence of the instant wire fraud offense.
2 to a 2018 grand jury subpoena seeking documents related to these schemes. It also stated that the
Subject Premises served as both WSA’s office and Saint Clair’s residence. Before trial, Saint
Clair moved to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to the warrant, arguing that the information
supporting probable cause was stale by the time the warrant was issued. The district court denied
his motion. Saint Clair now challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on
staleness grounds, and additionally argues that the warrant lacked particularity and was overbroad.
“On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review legal
conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199,
208 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“In evaluating probable cause in any given case, a judge must ‘make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”
United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (alteration adopted) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). We “generally accord[] substantial deference to the finding
of an issuing judicial officer that probable cause exists.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). However, “we may conclude that a warrant lacks probable cause where the
evidence supporting it is not sufficiently close in time to the issuance of the warrant that probable
cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search—that is, where the facts supporting criminal
activity have grown stale by the time that the warrant issues.” Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In
determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate [judge] is required to assess whether the
information adduced in the application appears to be current, i.e., true at the time of the application,
3 or whether instead it has become stale.”). There is “no bright-line rule for staleness,” Walczyk v.
Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 162 (2d Cir. 2007), and “the passage of time is not controlling and is but one
factor to be considered, along with the kind of property sought and the nature of the criminal
activity,” United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 181 (2d Cir. 2004).
Saint Clair contends that, because “the warrant application was based on concerns that
securities fraud had allegedly occurred in 2013 and 2014” and “[t]he related obstruction of justice
charge was based on conduct occurring approximately one year prior to the warrant,” the warrant
was based on stale information and thus lacked probable cause. Appellant’s Br. at 31. We
disagree.
As Saint Clair acknowledges, the supporting affidavit alleged that WSA committed one of
the Subject Offenses—obstruction of justice—in approximately 2018. 2 Moreover, while the
market-manipulation schemes underlying the other Subject Offenses occurred in 2013 and 2014,
the affidavit included specific facts suggesting that WSA continued to maintain documents related
to the schemes at the Subject Premises at the time of the search in September 2019. See Singh,
390 F.3d at 182 (“The affidavit established probable cause to believe that [defendant] continued
to maintain business records evidencing fraud at his residence during the more than twenty months
that elapsed between the last known occurrence of the facts relied on and the issuance of the
warrant.”). For instance, the affidavit stated that WSA, operating out of the Subject Premises,
2 The affidavit does not specify when WSA produced the allegedly fraudulent documents to the government. It does state, however, that the government served WSA with the grand jury subpoena “[o]n or about February 12, 2018” and requested information from a foreign government, which ultimately contradicted the documents produced by WSA, “[i]n or about 2019.” Supp. App’x at 10–11. Accordingly, it appears that WSA committed the alleged obstruction of justice offense (i.e., produced fraudulent documents) around 2018.
4 had produced documents related to the schemes in response to the grand jury subpoena, thus
indicating that it maintained such records at least into 2018. The affidavit additionally confirmed,
based on WSA’s website and interviews with a building employee, that WSA continued to operate
out of the Subject Premises as of the date of the warrant application. It also described WSA’s use
of email communications in furtherance of the schemes, and explained that, “where computers are
used in furtherance of criminal activity, evidence of the criminal activity can often be found months
or even years after it occurred.” Supp. App’x at 12; see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d
786, 804 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that warrants to search defendant’s residence and vehicles
were not based on stale information because they “sought to discover items that [defendant] could
reasonably be expected to retain”). Thus, because the affidavit established “a fair probability that
. . . evidence of [the Subject Offenses would] be found” at the time of the search, the warrant was
not based on stale information and was supported by probable cause. Raymonda, 780 F.3d at 113
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Additionally, Saint Clair argues for the first time on appeal that the warrant lacked
particularity and was overbroad. “It is well-settled that the failure to assert a particular ground
in a pre-trial suppression motion operates as a waiver of the right to challenge the subsequent
admission of evidence on that ground [and that] [t]his oversight will be excused only for good
cause.” United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added and alterations
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In any event, even on the merits, Saint
Clair’s particularity and overbreadth arguments are unpersuasive.
Saint Clair argues that the warrant “failed to specify the items to be seized by their relation
to the designated crimes.” Appellant’s Br. at 35; see also United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71,
5 99 (2d Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138
S. Ct. 2206 (2017) (summarizing the particularity requirement). In particular, he asserts that the
warrant provision authorizing the seizure of “[e]vidence concerning the identity or location of, and
communications with, employees of WSA, co-conspirators in the Subject Offenses, [and] foreign
government officials,” Supp. App’x at 20, was “ambiguous and could easily be interpreted to allow
the search and seizure of all communications of WSA employees, without limitation,” Appellant’s
Br. at 35. Saint Clair contends that the warrant should have limited the scope by defining “co-
conspirators” and “government officials” and imposing a time limit on the items subject to seizure.
“But the particularity requirement is not so exacting,” United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845
(2d Cir. 1990), and “a search warrant does not necessarily lack particularity simply because it is
broad,” Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100. A warrant need only be “sufficiently specific to permit the
rational exercise of judgment by the executing officers in selecting what items to seize.” United
States v. Shi Yan Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The warrant here identified the Subject Offenses and described the
categories of evidence of those offenses authorized for seizure; it was therefore sufficiently
particular and “the Fourth Amendment [was] not violated [merely] because the officers executing
the warrant [may have had to] exercise some minimal judgment” in determining the items to seize.
Riley, 906 F.2d at 845. At oral argument, government counsel conceded that it would have been
better practice to include a temporal limitation in the warrant. See In re 650 Fifth Avenue &
Related Props., 934 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that warrant was not particularized
in part because it lacked “temporal scope for the items to be seized”). We need not pursue the
point, however, because we conclude, in any event, that the officers executing the warrant
6 reasonably relied on the magistrate judge’s issuance of the warrant consistent with the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159, 179–80, 183–84
(2d Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) in declining to suppress search
of electronic records on particularity grounds in light of officers’ good-faith reliance on warrant).
Saint Clair also asserts that the warrant was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of
his personal records and devices, even though the warrant application “lacked any allegation that
[he] had ever engaged in any wrongdoing.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. To be sure, a “description of
the objects to be seized is defective if it is broader than can be justified by the probable cause upon
which the warrant is based.” United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 446 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the fact that certain items seized from the
Subject Premises belonged to Saint Clair personally does not mean that their seizure was not
supported by probable cause. See, e.g., Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2017)
(explaining that probable cause to search a place “is not to be confused with probable cause to
think that the person whose premises are to be searched is implicated in the crime.”); United States
v. Martin, 426 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[O]nce it is established that probable cause exists to
believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any property
which the magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence
of the crime.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, despite Saint Clair’s
assertion to the contrary, the warrant application alleged facts indicating that Saint Clair was
involved in at least the obstruction of justice offense. Because there was probable cause to search
the Subject Premises and to believe that any records and devices therein may contain evidence of
the criminal activity that was the subject of the search, the warrant was not overbroad in
7 authorizing the seizure of such items belonging to Saint Clair that were located in the Subject
Premises.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Saint Clair challenges the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, arguing that the
government failed to prove a scheme to defraud. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. United States v. Requena, 980 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir. 2020). A defendant who
makes such a challenge “bears a heavy burden.” United States v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 821, 832 (2d
Cir. 2022). In reviewing whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, “we are
required to draw all permissible inferences in favor of the government and resolve all issues of
credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2021).
We must affirm the conviction “if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The essential elements of the crime of wire fraud are: “(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money
or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use of the . . . wires to further the scheme.” United
States v. Greenberg, 835 F.3d 295, 305 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “In order to prove the existence of a scheme to defraud, the government must also prove
that the misrepresentations were material and that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent.”
United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “Intent may be proven through circumstantial evidence, including by
showing that defendant made misrepresentations to the victim(s) with knowledge that the
statements were false.” United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999).
8 After reviewing the trial record, we find Saint Clair’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence unpersuasive. Drawing all permissible inferences and resolving all credibility issues in
favor of the government, the evidence at trial established that Saint Clair knowingly made false or
misleading statements regarding WSA’s relationship with the United Nations (“UN”) to induce
investors to provide funds for the development of IGObit, a cryptocurrency developed by WSA.
Several investors testified at trial that Saint Clair’s representations regarding WSA’s relationship
with the UN were material to their decision to invest in IGObit. For example, Kyle Zukowski
testified that Saint Clair told him WSA was “affiliated” with the UN, and that their “affiliation was
important” to his (Zukowski’s) decision to invest in IGObit. Supp. App’x at 241, 243; see also
id. at 364, 366 (Tamara Lowrimore, an investor in IGObit, testifying that Saint Clair told her he
was “affiliated” with the UN and that she thought this “made it sound like [WSA] was a really
important company”). John Mitchell likewise testified that, based on his review of the WSA
website and IGObit marketing materials, 3 he understood WSA and the UN to be “affiliated in
some way” or “partners in some capacity,” and that this relationship influenced his decision to
invest in IGObit. Id. at 302–03.
Evidence in the trial record further shows that Saint Clair knew that these representations
were false. Indeed, on cross-examination, Saint Clair acknowledged that it “would have been an
untrue statement to say we had an affiliation with the United Nations.” Supp. App’x at 478; see
also id. at 475 (Saint Clair testifying that, when he joined WSA in 2016, part of his job was to
“[r]eestablish” WSA’s relationship with the UN). The government also introduced a WhatsApp
3 The evidence at trial showed that Saint Clair was responsible for the information on the IGObit and WSA websites and preparing marketing materials such as the IGObit whitepaper.
9 message that Saint Clair sent to the president of WSA in April 2018, stating that they “lost more
IGObit sales . . . due to lack of UN affiliation.” Supp. App’x at 130. Based on this evidence, a
rational jury could find that Saint Clair made material misrepresentations to the IGObit investors
regarding WSA’s affiliation with the UN, and that Saint Clair knew that the statements were false.
On appeal, Saint Clair ignores this evidence in the record, arguing that the government
improperly relied on his failure to repay the IGObit investors to prove fraudulent intent, because
it could not prove the falsity of his representations regarding WSA’s relationship with the UN.
Saint Clair contends that certain evidence in the record, including the testimony of two UN
employees and a cease-and-desist letter from the UN to WSA, did not conclusively show that his
statements regarding WSA’s relationship with the UN were false. However, even if this evidence
could give rise to competing inferences, “we are required to draw all permissible inferences in
favor of the government,” Willis, 14 F.4th at 181, and, as we concluded above, sufficient other
evidence in the record permitted the jury to rationally find that Saint Clair’s statements were false.
Moreover, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Saint Clair’s conviction, regardless of
whether the investors were repaid or whether Saint Clair attempted to make IGObit succeed. See
United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 280 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding instruction to jury that
“[n]o amount of honest belief on the part of a defendant that the scheme will ultimately make a
profit for the investors, or not cause anyone harm, will excuse fraudulent actions or false
representations by him or her” (internal quotation marks and record citation omitted)).
Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
10 III. Prior Acts Evidence
The government introduced at trial the testimony of two witnesses—Georgianna Daniels
and Mei Hwang—who had previously invested in Saint Clair’s businesses and were never repaid.
Prior to trial, the district court ruled this evidence could be admitted for the purpose of showing
Saint Clair’s intent or absence of mistake under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). On appeal,
Saint Clair challenges the admission of this evidence, arguing that the described prior acts were
not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue and were unduly prejudicial. We disagree.
We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 662 (2d Cir. 2021). We will reverse such a ruling only when it is
“manifestly erroneous” or “arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 788
(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although Rule 404(b) prohibits
the admission of evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” to prove a defendant’s character or
criminal propensity, it permits the admission of such evidence to show, inter alia, a defendant’s
intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), (2); accord United States v.
Dupree, 870 F.3d 62, 76 (2d Cir. 2017). Thus, under this Circuit’s “inclusionary approach,” prior
act evidence offered for any proper purpose is admissible so long as it is relevant to an issue at
trial and the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice. United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403. To be relevant to the issue of knowledge or
intent, prior act evidence “must be sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue to permit the jury to
draw a reasonable inference of knowledge or intent from the other act.” United States v. Cadet,
664 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That said,
11 “[e]vidence of other acts need not be identical to the charged conduct to show knowledge or intent
pursuant to Rule 404(b), so long as the evidence is relevant in that it provides a reasonable basis
for inferring knowledge or intent.” Id. at 32–33.
Saint Clair argues that the evidence offered through Daniels and Hwang was irrelevant,
because they did not testify “that they were defrauded by the defendant,” “that the original purpose
of the investment was improper,” or “that the defendant or anyone working on his behalf had made
misleading statements to get them to invest.” Appellant’s Br. at 55. However, this argument
ignores the similarities between the prior acts and the charged conduct, and the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn with respect to Saint Clair’s intent. For example, both Daniels and
Hwang testified that they invested in Saint Clair’s companies pursuant to promissory notes, which
entitled them to monthly payments and equity shares once the companies went public. They
further testified that, after Saint Clair failed to repay the loans, he promised that they would receive
the payments owed after he completed other deals he claimed were pending in Dubai and
elsewhere. Saint Clair provided the IGObit investors with similar promissory notes and, after
failing to repay the loans, promised the IGObit investors that they would receive the payments
after he completed other deals he claimed were pending in Dubai and Morocco. Given these
similarities, Daniels’s and Huang’s testimony was probative on the issue of whether Saint Clair
intended to repay the IGObit investors or whether his failure to do so was an innocent mistake.
See United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Where a defendant claims that
his conduct has an innocent explanation, prior act evidence is generally admissible to prove that
the defendant acted with the state of mind necessary to commit the offense charged.”). Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony under Rule 404(b).
12 We similarly find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its Rule 403 balancing.
The Rule 404(b) evidence did not involve conduct more inflammatory than the charged crime, see
United States v. Livoti, 196 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1999), and any potential prejudice was
minimized by the district court’s repeated instructions to the jury emphasizing the proper purpose
for which this evidence could be considered, see United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 223 (2d
Cir. 2006). Therefore, Saint Clair’s challenge to the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence is
without merit.
* * *
We have considered Saint Clair’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court