JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
For the reasons stated below, defendant-appellant Joseph Martin’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Martin argues that we could not find probable cause because (1) the redacted affidavit “contains no particularized information regarding whether Martin, or the e-mail account registered to his home, possessed child pornography,” as required by [85]*85Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), and (2) it is error to conclude that the primary purpose of the “girls12-16” e-group was to trade child pornography because the site also supported the exchange of textual messages and therefore allowed its members to engage in protected speech. Upon review, we adhere to our view that probable cause existed because there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime would be found at Martin’s residence.
After we announced our decision in this case, another panel of this Court — in United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir.2005) — addressed the validity of a related search warrant, which was also executed in connection with “Operation Candyman.” The Coreas panel, however, was presented with the separate question whether the redacted affidavit was sufficient to support a showing of probable cause where the defendant was a member of the “Candy-man” e-group, not the “girlsl2-16” e-group. And the Coreas panel’s review was limited to those features associated with the Candyman site, including its far less descriptive title and welcome message.1
The Coreas panel recognized these distinctions:
Arguably, Martin might be distinguished from the instant case on the ground that the defendant there had joined a different group, girlsl2-16. Even a first-time visitor, according to the Martin majority, would have instantly recognized the unlawful nature of girlsl2-16, since its “welcome message,” longer and more detailed than Candyman’s, “unabashedly announced that its essential purpose was to trade child pornography.”
Coreas, 419 F.3d at 157. Nonetheless, the Coreas panel determined that this panel “did not ... regard such distinctions as decisive” because we noted, in a separate [86]*86part of our opinion, that the internal operational characteristics of the two sites were indistinct. Id. The Coreas panel concluded that we viewed “the differences between the websites as immaterial and regarded the Candyman welcome message as explicit enough to warrant an inference of unlawful purpose.” Id. Based in part on this perception of our holding, the Coreas panel held that the Martin decision compelled it to uphold the denial of suppression of the evidence of activity on the Candyman site. Id. at 159.
Although the Candyman welcome message was not before this panel, we need to clarify that we do not view the differences between the two welcome messages as “immaterial.” To the contrary, the girlsl2-16 welcome message was an integral component of our probable cause determination.
As we explained in our prior decision, the probable cause standard simply requires a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the magistrate] ..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular case.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Two interrelated points, however, are worth emphasizing. First, probable cause only requires “‘the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)). Second, “ ‘[o]nce it is established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime.’ ” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir.1976)). Thus, “it is untenable to conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of a crime and is subject to arrest.” Id. at 559, 98 S.Ct. 1970. Rather, “valid warrants to search property may be issued when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises.” Id.
With these standards in mind, we turn to the two principal arguments advanced by Martin in his petition for rehearing: first, that because the e-group supported lawful functions, we could not conclude that the group’s primary purpose was to facilitate the trade of child pornography; and second, that the redacted affidavit cannot support a finding of probable cause because it “contains no particularized information regarding whether Martin, or the e-mail account registered to his home, possessed child pornography.”
As our earlier decision held, we have no difficulty concluding from the redacted affidavit that the primary purpose of the girlsl2-16 e-group was to facilitate the generation, inventory, and exchange of child pornography. The redacted affidavit states that individuals that sought membership in the e-group were presented with the name of the group and its detailed welcome message, which unabashedly announced that the group’s essential purpose was to trade child pornography, and that the e-group’s members were actively uploading and downloading child pornography on the site and exchanging e-mail with illicit attachments.
The fact that this technology could also have been put to innocent or protected uses does not alter our conclusion. Thus, the fact that the majority of e-mail ex[87]*87changed on the site was only textual does not diminish the fact that a significant quantity of e-mail contained image-files of child pornography, and that hundreds of picture- and video-files were readily available for download on the girls12-16 e-group site. Cf. United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (“The fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged, however, does not negate probable cause.”).
In any event, we cannot accept that the level of wholly textual e-mail somehow suggests that the group’s website was being used for predominantly lawful, or even protected, activities. All text is not protected by the First Amendment. Text-based e-mail that helps others “meet,” “chat up,” and sexually exploit children is not protected speech.
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JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
For the reasons stated below, defendant-appellant Joseph Martin’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Martin argues that we could not find probable cause because (1) the redacted affidavit “contains no particularized information regarding whether Martin, or the e-mail account registered to his home, possessed child pornography,” as required by [85]*85Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), and (2) it is error to conclude that the primary purpose of the “girls12-16” e-group was to trade child pornography because the site also supported the exchange of textual messages and therefore allowed its members to engage in protected speech. Upon review, we adhere to our view that probable cause existed because there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime would be found at Martin’s residence.
After we announced our decision in this case, another panel of this Court — in United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir.2005) — addressed the validity of a related search warrant, which was also executed in connection with “Operation Candyman.” The Coreas panel, however, was presented with the separate question whether the redacted affidavit was sufficient to support a showing of probable cause where the defendant was a member of the “Candy-man” e-group, not the “girlsl2-16” e-group. And the Coreas panel’s review was limited to those features associated with the Candyman site, including its far less descriptive title and welcome message.1
The Coreas panel recognized these distinctions:
Arguably, Martin might be distinguished from the instant case on the ground that the defendant there had joined a different group, girlsl2-16. Even a first-time visitor, according to the Martin majority, would have instantly recognized the unlawful nature of girlsl2-16, since its “welcome message,” longer and more detailed than Candyman’s, “unabashedly announced that its essential purpose was to trade child pornography.”
Coreas, 419 F.3d at 157. Nonetheless, the Coreas panel determined that this panel “did not ... regard such distinctions as decisive” because we noted, in a separate [86]*86part of our opinion, that the internal operational characteristics of the two sites were indistinct. Id. The Coreas panel concluded that we viewed “the differences between the websites as immaterial and regarded the Candyman welcome message as explicit enough to warrant an inference of unlawful purpose.” Id. Based in part on this perception of our holding, the Coreas panel held that the Martin decision compelled it to uphold the denial of suppression of the evidence of activity on the Candyman site. Id. at 159.
Although the Candyman welcome message was not before this panel, we need to clarify that we do not view the differences between the two welcome messages as “immaterial.” To the contrary, the girlsl2-16 welcome message was an integral component of our probable cause determination.
As we explained in our prior decision, the probable cause standard simply requires a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the magistrate] ..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular case.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Two interrelated points, however, are worth emphasizing. First, probable cause only requires “‘the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)). Second, “ ‘[o]nce it is established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime.’ ” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir.1976)). Thus, “it is untenable to conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of a crime and is subject to arrest.” Id. at 559, 98 S.Ct. 1970. Rather, “valid warrants to search property may be issued when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises.” Id.
With these standards in mind, we turn to the two principal arguments advanced by Martin in his petition for rehearing: first, that because the e-group supported lawful functions, we could not conclude that the group’s primary purpose was to facilitate the trade of child pornography; and second, that the redacted affidavit cannot support a finding of probable cause because it “contains no particularized information regarding whether Martin, or the e-mail account registered to his home, possessed child pornography.”
As our earlier decision held, we have no difficulty concluding from the redacted affidavit that the primary purpose of the girlsl2-16 e-group was to facilitate the generation, inventory, and exchange of child pornography. The redacted affidavit states that individuals that sought membership in the e-group were presented with the name of the group and its detailed welcome message, which unabashedly announced that the group’s essential purpose was to trade child pornography, and that the e-group’s members were actively uploading and downloading child pornography on the site and exchanging e-mail with illicit attachments.
The fact that this technology could also have been put to innocent or protected uses does not alter our conclusion. Thus, the fact that the majority of e-mail ex[87]*87changed on the site was only textual does not diminish the fact that a significant quantity of e-mail contained image-files of child pornography, and that hundreds of picture- and video-files were readily available for download on the girls12-16 e-group site. Cf. United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (“The fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged, however, does not negate probable cause.”).
In any event, we cannot accept that the level of wholly textual e-mail somehow suggests that the group’s website was being used for predominantly lawful, or even protected, activities. All text is not protected by the First Amendment. Text-based e-mail that helps others “meet,” “chat up,” and sexually exploit children is not protected speech. And the First Amendment offers no protection to those that use e-mail to promote the exchange of child pornography in violation of the statute at issue in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (proscribing attempt and conspiracy). Moreover, the redacted affidavit and record before us on this appeal establish that the vast majority of textual messages sent to the members of the e-group were generated automatically each time a new file was uploaded onto the site. The purpose of this function was straightforward: it was to inform members of “the name of the file, the date and the time that the file was posted, the location of the file on the [girls 12 — 16] E-group web site, and the e-mail address of the individual who posted it.” Berglas Aff. at 19, 22-23. Far from suggesting a robust forum for protected speech, these e-mails alerted members to new child pornography available for download and are themselves powerful evidence of criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3) (prohibiting the reproduction of child pornography for distribution by computer).
We also have no difficulty concluding that the activity of subscribing to the girls12-16 e-group, after being prompted by its name and welcome message, and adhering to membership despite the site’s contents, was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. In reaching such a finding, we need not conclude that there was probable cause to arrest Martin; we need only conclude that there was a fair probability that the premises to be searched contained contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 558-59, 98 S.Ct. 1970.
In this case, the redacted affidavit established that individuals that sought membership in the e-group were presented with the name of the group and its detailed welcome message; that members of the e-group were actively uploading and downloading child pornography on the site and exchanging e-mail with illicit attachments; and that a large majority of the text-only e-mail was generated automatically as a means to inform members that new child pornography had been uploaded onto the site. Finally, the affidavit stated that an e-mail address associated with Martin’s household (Joeym@optonline.net) was enlisted and remained on the membership rolls until the group was suspended by Yahoo!. From these statements, a reasonable magistrate could conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime would be found at the premises where a computer was used to access the girlsl2-16 site.
The facts in Martin are analogous to joining a collective organization that may happen to include members who advocate for the legalization of marijuana, but whose creed, which is carefully iterated on a plaque adjacent to the entranceway, provides that the collective is a means to [88]*88generate, inventory, and barter and exchange marijuana. In such a setting, a reasonable magistrate would have no difficulty in finding that there is a fair probability that each member’s store within the collective contains marijuana or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime associated with the production or exchange of marijuana. The girlsl2-16 e-group is no different. Each member affirmatively joined a collective designed to facilitate the trade of child pornography; it stands to reason that each member’s store — i.e., each member’s networked computer — was likely to contain child pornography or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of the exchange of child pornography.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), does not compel a contrary result. In Ybarra, the police received information from a confidential informant that the bartender at a public tavern was in possession of heroin packets. Id. at 87-88, 100 S.Ct. 338. Acting on the basis of this information, the police obtained a warrant authorizing them to search the bartender and the tavern. Id. at 88, 100 S.Ct. 338. Upon entering the tavern, however, the police also conducted “frisk” searches of the patrons, one of whom was Ybarra. When Ybarra was frisked, the police discovered a cigarette pack containing six tinfoil packets of heroin. Id. at 89, 100 S.Ct. 338. Ybarra was subsequently indicted and found guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the police lacked probable cause to search Ybarra.
The Court stressed that the only thing the police knew about Ybarra upon entering the tavern and up to the point when he was searched was that he was present in the tavern, along with others, at a time when the police had a reasonable basis to believe that the bartender had heroin to sell. This alone was insufficient to constitute probable cause.
United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court explained, “a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 338 (emphasis added).
The website in the instant case, however, is quite different from the public tavern in Ybarra. An e-mail associated with Martin’s residence was used to gain access to a website whose primary purpose was to facilitate the exchange of child pornography. Thus, unlike the patrons in Ybarra, who happened to find themselves in a public tavern during a police raid, anyone joining the girlsl2-16 site was on notice that the site was an active marketplace for the illicit trade of child pornography. Under these circumstances, the district court’s refusal to suppress the child pornography downloaded onto Martin’s computer was not error.
Judge Pooler’s dissent relies on the view that any possibility of lawful activity negates probable cause. She also takes the position that the girlsl2-16 e-group cannot have an unlawful primary purpose where there are lawful secondary uses for the group’s site. We disagree with both of these arguments. As the phrase implies, probable cause deals with probabilities, not certainties. Under Judge Pooler’s standard, a search warrant could only issue where a magistrate is satisfied that the police will necessarily find contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime. This is plainly not the standard for probable cause.
The internet is not a safe haven for illicit conduct. Rather, it is a digital community where the zeros and ones that translate into visible and audible expressions have [89]*89legal consequences. Although we will be diligent to guard against unlawful searches and seizures, even at the digital divide, the internet does not present an exception to established principles of probable cause.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in our original opinion, Martin’s petition for rehearing is Denied.