United States v. Saenz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: March 31, 1998
• Docket: 96-40546
• Status: Published

Opinion

REVISED, March 31, 1998

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 96-40546 ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BALTAZAR SAENZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas _________________________________________________________________ February 2, 1998

Before DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL*,

District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-appellant Baltazar Saenz was convicted

following a jury trial on one count of conspiracy to possess with

the intent to distribute a quantity in excess of 100 kilograms of

marijuana, and one count of possession with the intent to

distribute approximately 1,185 pounds of marijuana.

* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

p:\cases\5thcir\96-40546\96-40546.op6 1 The primary basis for Saenz’s challenge to his conviction

is that the district court deprived him of a fair trial by

questioning witnesses in a manner and to a degree that made the

court appear to be partial to the prosecution.1 Saenz argues that

the district court’s questions of the chief prosecution witness and

of the defendant confused the jury as to the court’s function and

led the jury to believe that the court favored the prosecution’s

case. The government responds that the court was merely attempting

to clarify fact issues for the jury and that it did not create an

appearance of favoring the prosecution’s case.

We hold that under the unusual combination of

circumstances present here, the cumulative effect of the trial

court’s questions deprived Saenz of a fair trial. We reverse and

remand for a new trial.

I. Factual Background

In late 1994 and early 1995, the United States Customs

Service (“Customs”) office in Brownsville, Texas began an

undercover sting operation designed to identify marijuana

traffickers. Customs suspected Israel Soto-Zamarano (“Soto”) of

running a drug trafficking organization. Customs planned to have

an undercover agent pose as a truck driver and offer to transport

a large shipment of marijuana for Soto. The goal was not to make

1 Saenz also asserts that the government made prejudicial and inflammatory remarks that deprived Saenz of a fair trial; the district court improperly charged the jury; and the government presented insufficient evidence to convict Saenz of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. This court does not reach these grounds.

2 immediate arrests, but to identify other suspected traffickers and

expand the investigation.

An undercover Customs agent established contact with Soto

as planned. Soto arranged to deliver approximately 1,185 pounds of

marijuana to the undercover agent in Brownsville on February 8,

1995, for shipment to the Tampa, Florida area. Israel Soto’s

brother, Ernesto Soto, was to receive the marijuana in the Tampa,

Florida area. Israel Soto gave the agent a Florida telephone number

for Ernesto Soto. Israel Soto intended to travel to Florida to

oversee the delivery of the marijuana to his brother. However, on

February 9, 1995, Israel Soto was arrested in Brownsville on an

unrelated charge of weapons possession and incarcerated in the

Cameron County jail. Customs agents found Baltazar Saenz’s name

and telephone number on a piece of paper in Israel Soto’s wallet.

Despite Israel Soto’s arrest, Customs proceeded with the

marijuana delivery as planned. Customs flew the marijuana to

Tampa. The delivery to Ernesto Soto was scheduled to occur at 6:00

p.m. on February 14, 1995, in a motel parking lot in Wesley Chapel,

Florida. At 3:00 p.m. that day, a Customs agent conducting

surveillance of the motel parking lot saw a white-paneled “bobtail”

truck and a beige, wood-paneled Jeep Cherokee pull into the motel

parking lot. The agent described the maneuvers he observed as

“counter-surveillance” measures. The Jeep left the parking lot at

approximately 3:45 p.m. The agent saw four people in the Jeep but

could not identify them at that time.

3 Later that afternoon, an undercover Cameron County

deputy sheriff, Abraham Rodriguez, met Ernesto Soto in a motel room

in Wesley Chapel, Florida. Rodriguez was to receive $20,000 for

the marijuana. Ernesto Soto did not have the money but said that

he would return shortly to make the payment. At approximately

6:00 p.m., Ernesto Soto returned to the motel parking lot in the

Jeep Cherokee. He gave deputy Rodriguez approximately $9,780 and

the keys to the white truck to use to deliver the marijuana.

Rodriguez agreed to meet Ernesto Soto later that night in a nearby

parking lot to make the delivery. Deputy Rodriguez drove the truck

back to a Customs warehouse and loaded the marijuana. Customs also

installed a “kill-switch” in the truck that would allow the driver

to stall the vehicle.

At 7:30 p.m., Customs agents observed the Jeep Cherokee

in the designated parking lot. At approximately 7:45 p.m., deputy

Rodriguez drove the delivery truck to within one-half block of the

parking lot and flipped the kill-switch, stalling the truck near

the entrance of the lot. When deputy Rodriguez got out of the

truck and lifted the hood, the Jeep drove into the parking lot.

Rodriguez saw four people in the Jeep and was able to identify

Ernesto Soto in the back seat. As part of the prearranged plan,

after Rodriguez gave Ernesto Soto the keys to the delivery truck,

a police car pulled up behind the truck. Rodriguez told Ernesto

Soto that the deal was off and left the parking lot. Ernesto Soto

entered a restaurant next to the parking lot. Customs agents kept

4 him under surveillance. Ernesto Soto and Israel Soto were arrested

at a later date.

On December 5, 1995, Saenz was charged in two counts of

a multicount indictment: in count one with conspiracy to possess

marijuana with the intent to distribute, and in count three with

possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Saenz was arrested in Florida on January 8, 1996. After a jury

trial held on March 7 and 8, 1996, the jury convicted Saenz on both

counts. The court sentenced Saenz to a total of seventy-eight

months of imprisonment. Saenz timely appealed.

II. The Evidence as to Baltazar Saenz

The government’s case against Saenz on both the

conspiracy and possession counts was short on physical evidence.

Customs obtained the license plate number of the Jeep Cherokee and

later learned that it was registered to Baltazar Saenz. Saenz’s

name and telephone number were on a piece of paper found in Israel

Soto’s wallet.

Neither deputy Rodriguez nor the Customs agents involved

in the events of February 14, 1995 in Florida were able to place

Saenz inside the Jeep. Rodriguez testified that he saw four

individuals in the Jeep; he identified one of the back seat

passengers as Ernesto Soto and described the other back seat

passenger as “a short guy with an Afro.” From photographs,

Rodriguez later identified the front seat passenger as Joe Saenz,

Baltazar Saenz’s brother. Rodriguez could only state that Baltazar

5 Saenz “[t]ends to look like the driver of the vehicle. Of the

Cherokee.”

The government’s case against Saenz was based largely on

Israel Soto’s testimony. Soto pleaded guilty and as part of his

plea agreement agreed to testify against Saenz. Soto’s sentencing

was delayed until after the trial. At trial, Soto testified that

he met Saenz in Florida in 1983, when they both worked for a sod

company. Soto testified that he and Saenz “sometimes . . . used to

get together, have a few beers.” Soto testified that he and Saenz

“used to be pretty good friends,” and went so far as to say that he

“love[s] the guy [Saenz].” Soto testified that he kept in touch

with Saenz after Soto moved to Brownsville, Texas in 1989. In

approximately 1993, Soto borrowed $1,000 from Saenz and did not

repay the loan. Soto testified that he and Saenz agreed that “if

we ever get something done, he could have deducted from that.”

Soto testified that “something” meant “[g]et some marijuana

business done”; their agreement was that “[i]f I ever get some

marijuana or something, [to] give [Saenz] a call and we work it out

together.” Soto testified that in December 1994, after he arranged

to transport the marijuana to Florida, he called Saenz to ask

whether Saenz would receive the shipment and try to sell the

marijuana. According to Soto, Saenz agreed.

Soto testified that on February 9, 1995, he made a

collect call to Saenz to tell him that “everything was going to be

fine” and that the load was “on its way.” Soto placed this call

from the Cameron County jail. Telephone records confirmed two

6 collect calls, each lasting seven to ten minutes, made from the

Cameron County jail to Saenz’s Florida residence on February 12 and

13, 1995. The records also showed seventeen telephone calls, each

lasting approximately one minute, placed from Soto’s residence in

Lyford, Texas to Saenz’s Florida residence between December 30,

1994 and March 1, 1995. The telephone records also showed several

calls from Saenz’s residence in Florida to the Brownsville, Texas

area during the same period, but none to Soto’s Lyford, Texas

residence.

Soto testified that on February 15, 1995, after his

release from jail, he called Saenz to “find out how things were

going [with the load].” According to Soto, Saenz said that

“everything went wrong” and that he suspected a set-up because the

delivery truck had been in good condition when delivered to deputy

Rodriguez. Saenz said that the load had been confiscated and that

he had paid $9,780 to Rodriguez. Soto also testified that during

the telephone call, Saenz said that he had gone back to pick up

Ernesto Soto in the parking lot about an hour after Saenz had left

in the Jeep.

Soto denied that he held “anything against Mr. Saenz

personally” and explained that he was testifying against Saenz

“[b]ecause I realize we made a mistake and I wanted to make it up

to me.” No other witnesses testified to Saenz’s involvement in

any aspect of the trafficking operation.

Beatrice Saenz, Saenz’s wife, testified for the defense.

She testified that she accepted two collect telephone calls from

7 Soto because she thought that the calls were from her cousin, whose

first name is also Israel. In each of the two collect calls, the

caller asked if Saenz was home; Saenz’s wife replied that her

husband was at work and hung up. Saenz’s wife also testified that

she did not take a telephone call from “Israel” on February 15, but

that her brothers, who lived at the Saenz residence, may have done

so. Saenz’s wife also testified that her husband took her out for

dinner the night of February 14, 1995.

Saenz testified on his own behalf. His testimony

differed from Soto’s in numerous respects. Saenz testified that he

first met Soto in 1986, not 1983. Saenz denied that he and Soto

were “close friends” or “best friends,” but described Soto as a

“co-worker” that Saenz knew “at work but that was about it.” Saenz

conceded that he had loaned Soto money, but only $500, not $1,000.

Saenz agreed that Soto never paid him back, but denied the

existence of any agreement about repaying the loan.

Saenz vigorously denied that he and Soto agreed to sell

marijuana. Saenz denied speaking with Soto about a shipment of

marijuana; speaking with Soto when he called from the Cameron

County jail; and knowing Soto’s brother, Ernesto Soto.

III. The Challenge to the District Court’s Questions to the Witnesses

A. The Applicable Legal Standard

Because Saenz’s trial counsel did not object at trial to

the district court’s questions to the witnesses, this court reviews

the district court’s actions for plain error. See United States v.

Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1856

8 (1997). Plain error is “‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ and, ‘[a]t a

minimum,’ contemplates an error which was ‘clear under current law’

at the time of trial.” United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160,

162-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Olano,

113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993)). “[T]o be reviewable under this

standard an obvious legal error must affect substantial rights. .

. . [P]lain forfeited errors affecting substantial rights should be

corrected on appeal only if they ‘seriously affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at

164 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392 (1936)).

“A trial judge has wide discretion over the ‘tone and

tempo’ of a trial and may elicit further information from a witness

if he believes it would benefit the jury.” United States v.

Rodriguez, 835 F.2d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting United

States v. Adkins, 741 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1984)). Federal Rule

of Evidence 614(b) permits the trial judge to “interrogate

witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” FED. R. EVID.

614(b). In exercising this discretion, the trial court “‘may

question witnesses and elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify

those previously presented.’” United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d

1072, 1087 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Moore v. United States, 598

F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979)). A judge’s questions must be for

the purpose of aiding the jury in understanding the testimony. See

United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1570 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing

Rodriguez, 835 F.2d at 1094). However, the trial court’s efforts

to move the trial along may not come at the cost of “strict

9 impartiality.” United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 974 (5th Cir.

1985).

In reviewing a claim that the trial court appeared

partial, this court must “‘determine whether the judge’s behavior

was so prejudicial that it denied the [defendant] a fair, as

opposed to a perfect, trial.’” Williams, 809 F.2d at 1086 (quoting

United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1985)). We

recently set out the standard to be applied in making this

determination:

To rise to the level of constitutional error, the district judge’s actions, viewed as a whole, must amount to an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of judge and prosecutor.

Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1569; see also United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d

288, 296 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 620 (1996).

Our review of the trial court’s actions must be based on

the entire trial record. United States v. Carpenter, 776 F.2d

1291, 1294 (5th Cir. 1985). “We have consistently held that in

determining whether a trial judge overstepped the bounds of

acceptable conduct -- that is, violated his duty to conduct the

trial impartially -- we must ‘view the proceedings as a whole.’”

United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Williams, 809 F.2d at 1088-89). A trial judge’s comments

or questions are placed in the proper context by viewing the

“totality of the circumstances, considering factors such as the

context of the remark, the person to whom it is directed, and the

presence of curative instructions.” Id. The totality of the

10 circumstances must show that the trial judge’s intervention was

“quantitatively and qualitatively substantial.” Bermea, 30 F.3d at

1569. The number and nature of the court’s questions are

important. United States v. Borchardt, 698 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir.

1983). The cumulative effect must be “substantial” and must

prejudice the defendant’s case. Lance, 853 F.2d at 1182;

Carpenter, 776 F.2d at 1294.

B. The Totality of the Circumstances: An Overview

Several aspects of this trial are particularly important

to this court’s assessment of the impact of the trial court’s

questions of the witnesses. The government’s case against Saenz

rested largely on the testimony of one witness, Israel Soto.

Soto’s testimony provided the jury with Saenz’s motivation for

participating in the marijuana distribution operation. No other

witness corroborated Soto’s testimony about his relationship with

Saenz or the alleged agreement to sell marijuana. No witness

corroborated Soto’s explanation for the telephone calls made from

his residence and from the Cameron County jail to the Saenz

residence in Florida. No other witnesses identified Saenz as among

the participants in the attempted marijuana delivery in Wesley

Chapel, Florida on February 14, 1995.2 The only physical evidence

linking Saenz to the drug operation was that a vehicle registered

to Saenz was used to meet undercover officers in the motel parking

2 Only deputy Rodriguez’s testimony that Saenz “[t]ends to look like the driver of the vehicle” corroborated Soto’s version of the events. Officer Rodriguez observed the Jeep in the dark and could not swear that Saenz was the driver.

11 lot. In short, Soto’s credibility was critical to the government’s

case.

Saenz’s testimony was equally critical. Saenz flatly

contradicted Soto on their alleged agreement to traffic marijuana

as a way for Soto to repay Saenz, and on Saenz’s knowledge of, and

participation in, the marijuana delivery. Saenz presented no

witnesses to corroborate most of his testimony. His credibility

was critical to his defense.

When the jury’s evaluation of witnesses’ credibility is

likely to determine the outcome of a case, questions a judge asks

those witnesses implicating their credibility assume heightened

importance. See United States v. Cisneros, 491 F.2d 1068, 1074

(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 385-87 (2d

Cir. 1996); United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384, 388-89 (2d

Cir. 1988); cf. United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783, 786, 787

(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the court’s negative comment on the

credibility of defense witnesses unduly prejudiced the defendant

because the credibility of the witnesses was decisive to the

outcome). In Filani, the defendant was stopped at a Customs

inspection station in J.F.K. airport. Customs agents searched a

briefcase believed to belong to the defendant and found heroin.

Filani, 74 F.3d at 380. The initial issue at trial was whether the

briefcase belonged to the defendant. The appellate court noted

that the outcome of the trial depended on credibility:

The only witness for the defense was the defendant himself. He testified that he did not own the heroin-filled briefcase and never imported or possessed the contraband. Filani

12 acknowledged having possession of the briefcase, and explained that he had assisted an elderly couple with their bags by carrying their attaché case on his baggage trolley. When he arrived at the customs checkpoint, defendant continued, he left the couple’s bag on his trolley. He brought it to [the Customs agent] only because the customs agent specifically directed him to.

Id. at 381. “When the brief trial concluded, the jury had been

presented with two divergent accounts of the events at J.F.K.

Customs. . . . Thus, the outcome of the trial hinged on

credibility.” Id. Holding that the trial court’s questioning of

the witnesses was error, the court stated:

This failure [to maintain an appearance of impartiality] was especially significant where so much hinged on the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s credibility. We have explained that “a jury’s impression that the court disbelieves [defendant’s] testimony surely affects its deliberations. The jury cannot be regarded as having freely come to its own conclusions about the defendant’s credibility when the court has already indicated, directly or indirectly, that it disbelieves his testimony.”

Id. at 386 (quoting Mazzilli, 848 F.2d at 388) (second brackets in

original).

In Cisneros, the government’s principal witness was a

police officer who testified that he bought heroin from Cisneros

and an accomplice. Cisneros and the alleged accomplice testified

that only the accomplice had sold the heroin to the officer.

Cisneros, 491 F.2d at 1070-71. The court noted:

The testimony presented by each side concerning Cisneros’ involvement in the heroin sale was in stark, irreconcilable conflict; indeed, the trial judge’s comment that “somebody is lying” aptly characterizes the

13 case. Thus the credibility of the witnesses, particularly [the accomplice], was of overriding importance. . . . For Cisneros to prevail, the jury had to believe [the accomplice’s] version of the events.

Id. at 1075. The fact that the credibility of the witness was a

“central element” in the case was crucial to the court’s holding

that the trial court had appeared partial to the prosecution. Id.

at 1074, 1075-76.

Similarly, in this case, the jury was presented with

contradictory accounts of the critical events. The outcome hinged

on whether the jury believed the story offered by Soto, a

cooperating codefendant, or the defendant himself. The trial

court’s questions to these witnesses impacting their credibility

were likely to be of significance to the jury.

Another aspect of this case critical to this court’s

review is that the trial was short and the disputed issues were

neither confusing nor complex. The trial lasted less than two

days. A total of fifteen witnesses testified, many of whom were

law enforcement officers presenting cumulative testimony about the

events of February 14, 1995. The primary issues before the jury

were whether Saenz participated in the conspiracy -- the existence

of which was not challenged -- to carry out the marijuana

trafficking operation; and whether Saenz was in the Jeep Cherokee.

The need for a trial court to question witnesses to

clarify testimony is greatest in a complex or lengthy case with

multiple witnesses. See Williams, 809 F.2d at 1087 (noting with

respect to a complex, eight-week long RICO trial that “[f]or such

14 a trial to proceed smoothly, it was necessary for the trial judge

to exercise tight control over the presentation of the evidence to

the jury”); United States v. Manko, 979 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir.

1992); United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1987)

(citing United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir.

1979)); United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 729 n.5 (8th Cir.

1986). There is a correspondingly reduced need for the court

frequently or actively to question witnesses in a short trial with

clearly defined and straightforward issues.

This case also lacked another justification for a court’s

interrogation of witnesses: the need to expedite testimony on

certain issues or by certain witnesses. See Adkins, 741 F.2d at

748; Borchardt, 698 F.2d at 700; Slone, 833 F.2d at 597; United

States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 775 (4th Cir. 1983). A review of

the record shows that neither Soto’s nor Saenz’s testimony was

repetitive or confusing. There is no indication that counsel were

“unprepared or obstreperous” or incompetently trying the case.

Slone, 833 F.2d at 597; see also United States v. Bland, 697 F.2d

262, 266 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535,

541 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879

(4th Cir. 1970). The judge did not comment that the lawyers were

moving too slowly or wasting time. The judge often allowed the

lawyers to return to the topic on which they had been questioning

the witness before the judge interrupted to question that witness

himself.

15 In relevant aspects, this trial resembled one in which

the Sixth Circuit found the trial court’s interrogation of

witnesses to be excessive:

This was a one-day trial. The principal issue for the jury was whether it would impute possession of the contraband in the apartment to one or another defendant. Counsel for both sides were able and, at all times, conducted themselves properly. The testimony was relatively clear and any difficulties could easily have been handled by counsel had the judge restrained himself.

Hickman, 592 F.2d at 936.

With these aspects of the trial in mind, we consider the

cumulative impact of the specific instances in which the trial

court interrogated Soto and Saenz.

C. The Court’s Questions of Soto

The district court asked numerous questions during Soto’s

direct, cross, and redirect examinations.3 Saenz argues that the

trial court appeared to be partial to the prosecution by eliciting

key details from Soto about Saenz’s agreement to receive and

distribute the marijuana load.

3 The duration of the court’s interruption of the questioning of a witness is a factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry this court must conduct. See Williams, 809 F.2d at 1087 (“A statistical count of court interruptions is pertinent to the inquiry.”). The entire transcript consists of approximately 7,425 lines of witness questions and answers. Soto’s direct examination consists of approximately 725 lines of the trial transcript, including objections made during the testimony. The court’s questioning of Soto, and Soto’s answers to those questions, consist of approximately 152 lines of trial transcript, or 21.0 percent of Soto’s direct examination. The court’s exchange with Soto during defense counsel’s cross-examination consists of approximately 80 out of 600 lines of transcript, or 13.3 percent of the cross-examination. The court’s exchange with Soto during redirect examination consists of approximately 32 out of 135 lines, or 23.7 percent of the redirect examination. Overall, the court’s questions and Soto’s answers consist of approximately 264 out of 1460 lines of transcript, or 18.1 percent.

16 During Soto’s direct examination, the prosecutor

questioned Soto about the beginning of the plan to sell the

marijuana load. When the prosecutor asked Soto if he already had

“buyers or people to deliver it to in Florida,” Soto began to

answer that he “called Baltazar.” The court interrupted and led

Soto through a series of questions that elicited the details of the

agreement between Soto and Saenz:

THE COURT: You called who?

THE WITNESS: Baltazar.

THE COURT: Which Baltazar?

THE WITNESS: Excuse me?

THE COURT: What Baltazar did you call?

THE WITNESS: Baltazar Saenz.

THE COURT: This defendant?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What did you call him for?

THE WITNESS: I called him to tell him I -- it was a load of marijuana going to Florida. To be -- to sell it.

THE COURT: To find buyers?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. Yes.

THE COURT: He was going to sell it?

THE COURT: Okay. Where did you call him from?

THE WITNESS: I called him from -- I was -- I got arrested at that time and I called him from jail.

THE COURT: You called him from jail?

THE WITNESS: From the detention center.

17 THE COURT: You had been arrested?

THE COURT: Okay. So you called him from jail?

THE COURT: To Florida?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, to his house.

THE COURT: What did you tell him?

THE WITNESS: Well, before that we had an agreement, if something come up, just to give him a call and we would get things squared up. And send it to him.

THE COURT: You and he had talked about it before, or what?

THE COURT: About marijuana?

THE COURT: So in connection with that agreement you made this telephone call?

THE WITNESS: That is correct.

THE COURT: And you were expecting him to do what? To receive it?

THE WITNESS: Yes, to receive it and to sell it.

THE COURT: And to sell it?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: That was what he was going to do?

The court’s questions had the effect of emphasizing for

the jury that Saenz agreed to sell the marijuana and that Saenz and

18 Soto had previously agreed to sell marijuana. The government had

not yet questioned Soto on this topic.

The prosecution then questioned Soto about his first

telephone conversation with Saenz about the marijuana. The

questions began as follows:

MR. LARA [prosecutor]: As to this specific 1100-pound load that was seized, when was it that you first made contact with [Saenz]? Do you remember?

THE WITNESS: Well, it was before -- it was before I got in jail. I think I gave him a call.

The court then interrupted and questioned Soto about

where he made the first call to Saenz:

THE COURT: Where did you call him from on that occasion?

THE WITNESS: My house.

THE COURT: Your house where?

THE WITNESS: In Lyford.

THE COURT: In Lyford.

THE WITNESS: To Florida.

THE COURT: Before you were arrested?

THE COURT: What were you arrested for?

THE WITNESS: Well, I was --

THE COURT: Was it this case or something else?

THE WITNESS: No, it was something else. They were charging me with possession of weapon.

THE COURT: But it was something else?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That’s why you were in jail?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

The prosecution then resumed questioning Soto about his

arrest for weapons possession. The court again intervened:

MR. LARA: What happened with the deal with the weapon? What were you -- what happened?

THE WITNESS: I asked a friend of mine to give me a ride and he happened -- he had a gun under his seat. He was drunk. He didn’t have a driver’s license. He didn’t have insurance. So the officer that arrested us, put charge -- DWI charge on him and they tried to put the weapon charge on me. But I never -- I didn’t know the gun was there. So I started going to court and they --

THE COURT: Did they find you guilty for it?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. They dismissed.

THE COURT: So you were acquitted?

THE WITNESS: That is the reason I was in jail.

Before Saenz’s counsel had had an opportunity to question

Soto on this potential ground of impeachment, the court elicited

both that Soto had been acquitted of the charge and his explanation

for being incarcerated. The court continued, asking Soto

additional questions about his conversations with Saenz:

THE COURT: How long before you went to jail do you remember you talked to him about this?

THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay.

THE COURT: As best you remember.

20 THE WITNESS: I think it was December something.

THE COURT: December?

THE COURT: ‘94?

THE COURT: December, ‘94. And what is it that you told him then?

THE WITNESS: I told him that I probably will get a load of marijuana.

THE COURT: What did he tell you?

THE WITNESS: That it was all right. Excuse me. I told him it was right to work it out. He said, “Yes”. And then I said, “Well, as soon as I get it, and get everything straight up, I will send it there and you will be in charge”.

THE COURT: Did you tell him what you wanted him to do with it?

THE WITNESS: Yes, to sell it.

THE COURT: You told him that?

THE COURT: When you were out of jail?

THE COURT: Did he agree?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I even asked him the price. What the price was around there.

THE COURT: What was the price?

THE WITNESS: He told me it was between 750 and 800. Between 500 and 800.

THE COURT: Between 500 and $800?

THE WITNESS: 750 and 800. That’s what he told me.

THE COURT: That he would sell it for?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

These questions, eliciting details of Soto’s and Saenz’s

alleged agreement, began only ten transcript pages into Soto’s

direct examination. The court’s string of short, direct, and

sometimes leading questions created an appearance that the court

was assisting the government in proving its case. See Cisneros,

491 F.2d at 1074. The court’s questioning was similar to that

found to be improper in Bland, 697 F.2d at 263-64, in which the

court’s interrogation of a government witness effectively

established an element of the offense charged against the

defendant. Contrary to the government’s assertion, the court

cannot fairly be said to have been “clarifying” Soto’s testimony;

the prosecution had not yet asked a single question about Saenz’s

involvement in the marijuana trafficking operation.

The court’s questions did not elicit information that the

prosecution was likely to have missed. The mere fact that the

trial court itself, not the prosecution, elicited such damaging

information contributed to the perception that the court was

helping the government. See United States v. Orr, 68 F.3d 1247,

1250 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Interrogation of witnesses by a judge in a

criminal case creates a unique risk that the judge will be

perceived as an advocate.”), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 747 (1996).

The court’s questions contributed to the appearance that the court

was taking over the responsibility of proving part of the

government’s case. Saenz also argues that several of the

court’s exchanges with Soto had the effect of bolstering Soto’s

22 credibility. The first such exchange occurred shortly after

defense counsel began cross-examining Soto. Attempting to impeach

Soto’s credibility through questions about Soto’s prior arrests and

convictions, Saenz’s counsel asked Soto whether he had been

arrested after 1990:

MR. WEISFELD: Okay. And the next time you were arrested after 1990?

THE WITNESS: I got a couple of times arrested for PI.

MR. WEISFELD: Where was that?

THE WITNESS: Here in Brownsville.

THE COURT: PI is public intoxication?

MR. WEISFELD: When was that? Do you remember?

THE WITNESS: Well, I believe it was in 1993.

MR. WEISFELD: And from 1993 till 1995, 1996, were you arrested in the interim? Were you arrested again?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

The court then interrupted defense counsel’s cross-

examination to question Soto about the details of the alleged

agreement with Saenz to receive and sell the marijuana load in this

case, a topic defense counsel had not yet covered in cross-

examination.

THE COURT: Listen to this question. We are about to take our afternoon recess. You said that you called Mr. Saenz in December of ‘94.

THE COURT: And asked him if he was interested -- and you told us the nature of the conversation.

23 Before that time you had been living here in Brownsville?

THE COURT: When was the last time you had talked to him? How much time lapsed or, as we say, passed from the last time you had talked to him?

THE WITNESS: Okay. We talked a few times in-between. Because I went -- I went to Florida to work for a little while and then I came back.

THE COURT: So you would talk to him is what I am asking?

One court has warned that there is a “danger that undue

interference with cross-examination rights will result if a judge

takes over examination by defense counsel.” Hickman, 592 F.2d at

934. In this case, defense counsel had no opportunity to resume

questioning Soto before the court took an afternoon recess. This

stopped counsel’s efforts to cast doubt on Soto’s credibility until

after the court’s questions allowed Soto to reaffirm a part of his

earlier testimony crucial to the government’s case.

After this exchange, and before the afternoon break, the

court continued questioning Soto on a subject covered during Soto’s

direct examination: Soto’s motivation for testifying against Saenz.

The following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: By the way, what did the Government do for you for testifying in this case?

THE WITNESS: What did they do for me?

THE COURT: Yes. Did they offer you something for testifying today?

THE WITNESS: Nothing. Well, they just told me if I tell the truth, I might, I might get maybe little low sentence.

24 THE COURT: Oh, you haven’t been sentenced?

THE COURT: You have not?

THE WITNESS: I have not.

THE COURT: So your case hasn’t been disposed of yet?

THE COURT: It is still pending?

THE COURT: When did you plead guilty?

THE WITNESS: When?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

THE WITNESS: About a month ago.

The government characterizes this exchange as the court’s

attempt to clarify Soto’s testimony for the jury. A trial court

may ask questions to clarify witnesses’ testimony, even if the

questions elicit facts harmful to the defendant. See, e.g.,

Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1570-71. The court’s question about Soto’s

guilty plea followed earlier questions by both the government and

the court about the plea agreement.4 The fact that Soto had not

4 During Soto’s direct examination, the government had already established that Soto was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement: MR. LARA: Okay. You were arrested, you were indicted, for participating in a conspiracy with possession with intent to distribute over a hundred kilograms of marijuana, is that correct?

MR. LARA: And you have pled guilty to that offense, is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

25 been sentenced, however, had not been brought out by either the

government or Saenz’s counsel.5 The court’s last questions before

the afternoon recess emphasized this fact:

THE COURT: So you are still pending sentencing?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I came in front of you.

THE COURT: Before me?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, to plead guilty.

THE COURT: Who do you understand has the ultimate decision, makes the final decision, as far as what sentence you are going to receive?

MR. LARA: As part of your plea agreement with the Government, was it for you to tell us everything you know about this case, is that right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. . . . .

MR. LARA: Okay. So besides telling us what you knew about everything, the other part of the agreement with the Government was that you would make yourself available to testify, is that correct? THE WITNESS: Correct.

MR. LARA: Okay. And we have asked you to come and testify today, is that right? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

The court then interrupted to ask the following questions: THE COURT: The 1100 pound case that you are talking about is this case, the one in which you are listed as a defendant? THE WITNESS: That is correct. THE COURT: Is that the one you pled guilty to that he is talking about? Is that the one he is talking about? THE WITNESS: It is. 5 The court’s questions to Soto about his pending sentence during questioning unrelated to his sentencing distinguishes this case from those in which the trial court waited until the lawyers’ examinations were completed before attempting to clarify issues. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 323 (7th Cir. 1993); Slone, 833 F.2d at 600.

26 THE WITNESS: As far as I know, you are, sir.

The court then broke for the afternoon recess.

In its questions of Soto just before the recess, the

court elicited the following facts about Soto’s plea agreement: (1)

Soto had not yet been sentenced; (2) he had been told that he might

receive a lesser sentence for testifying truthfully; and (3) the

court itself would impose his sentence. The court’s questions may

have been perceived as rehabilitating Soto in the middle of defense

counsel’s cross-examination, on a subject that defense counsel had

not yet addressed and could not immediately address because of the

recess. In United States v. Filani, the Second Circuit held a

similar set of questions to have conveyed an appearance of

partiality: “Questions to [an important prosecution witness],

interrupting the defense cross-examination, read almost as a

‘redirect’ that served to rehabilitate that witness’s testimony,

and further demonstrate that the district court did not believe

defendant’s version of the events.” Filani, 74 F.3d at 386; see

also Hickman, 592 F.2d at 935.

During Soto’s redirect examination, the trial court again

returned to Soto’s pending sentencing. The government was

questioning Soto about an unrelated topic: his alleged agreement

with Saenz to sell marijuana as a way for Soto to repay Saenz. The

court interrupted to ask about Soto’s sentencing:

THE COURT: Clarify something for me. And you may have already done it. I just maybe not have remembered it. What is it that you are getting in return for your plea of guilty? Are they dismissing those other cases against you that they may have known about?

27 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, just told me -- if I tell the truth, if I tell all the truth about this -- all these things that happened, they just might recommend to get maybe little low sentence.

THE COURT: Reduction?

THE WITNESS: Reduction.

THE COURT: Reduction of your sentence?

THE WITNESS: That is correct. That’s it. They didn’t write.

THE COURT: Nobody promised you a thing?

THE WITNESS: Promised me nothing. That’s it.

The trial judge prefaced these questions by saying that

he could not remember Soto’s testimony about the sentencing.

However, the judge’s questions had the effect of emphasizing for

the jury that the court found it important that Soto had not been

promised any benefit for testifying. Such emphasis may have

created the impression that the court believed that Soto had a

particular reason to be truthful. See United States v.

Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir.) (noting that it is the

jury’s likely perception of the judge’s purpose in asking a

question that is determinative), modified on reh’g on other

grounds, 624 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1980); Bland, 697 F.2d at 264.

D. The Court’s Examination of Saenz

“[T]his Court is particularly sensitive to a trial

judge’s questioning of the defendant, because ‘[w]hen a defendant

takes the stand in his own behalf, any unnecessary comments by the

court are too likely to have a detrimental effect on the jury’s

ability to decide the case impartially.’” Carpenter, 776 F.2d at

28 1294 (quoting Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d at 277). This is particularly

true during a defendant’s direct examination, when his credibility

is being established. See Mazzilli, 848 F.2d at 388 (“The jury

cannot be regarded as having freely come to its own conclusions

about the defendant’s credibility when the court has already

indicated, directly or indirectly, that it disbelieves his

testimony.”). As the Second Circuit wrote in United States v.

Manko:

A district court must show particular restraint in questioning a criminal defendant during the defendant’s direct testimony. At this critical phase of the trial, the court must scrupulously insure that its questions do not indicate that the court doubts that the witness is telling the truth. Impeaching the defendant is the job of the prosecution, not the court.

Manko, 979 F.2d at 906 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit has

held that the risks to the defendant posed by the court’s

interrogation during direct examination are so great that “[i]t is

‘clear error for a trial judge to ask questions bearing on the

credibility of a defendant-witness prior to the completion of

direct examination.’” Filani, 74 F.3d at 387 (quoting United

States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988)). While this

circuit has not adopted a per se rule, a careful examination of the

likely impact of the court’s questions to Saenz during direct

examination is required.

The first exchange between the court and Saenz occurred

shortly after Saenz’s lawyer began direct examination. Defense

counsel was questioning Saenz about the loan to Soto that,

29 according to Soto, formed the basis for the subsequent agreement to

distribute marijuana. Defense counsel asked Saenz how much he lent

Soto and why. Saenz was explaining the amount of and reason for

the loan, when the court initiated the following exchange:

THE COURT: When did you loan him the money? In 1993?

THE DEFENDANT: It was one day of 1993. Yes.

THE COURT: Has he ever paid you?

THE DEFENDANT: He never paid me.

THE COURT: Did you ever ask him for it?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I never talked to him before that. I mean after that.

THE COURT: You loaned him $300 and you never talked to him again?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. Because he never came back. Like I say, I was always working, and the only time that I see him is when he came --

THE COURT: Did you know how to get ahold of him?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: You did not?

. . . .

THE COURT: What kind of relationship did you have with him?

THE DEFENDANT: I knew him from work. Like a co-worker. I would do that to -- I am that kind of person. If somebody comes and asks -- especially I see him coming in his pickup truck with a camper and he had -- he had his children in the back. And his wife was right there, too. When he asked me, that’s why I believed him, because he was looking for work.

THE COURT: Then you loaned money to somebody that you didn’t -- that you didn’t know where he lived.

30 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I did.

THE COURT: How did you expect to collect it?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, just hoping that he come back and pay me. I am just that kind of person. I am always getting in trouble with my wife doing that.

THE COURT: Because you loan people [sic] to people?

The record of this exchange suggests that the trial court

expressed disbelief in Saenz’s testimony. The court emphasized

that Saenz did not seek repayment of the money he loaned to Soto:

“You loaned him $300 and you never talked to him again?” Saenz

answered that he trusted Soto to pay him back when he could. The

court’s next question, transcribed by the court reporter as a

statement, expresses incredulity: “Then you loaned money to

somebody that you didn’t -- that you didn’t know where he lived.”

A judge’s expression of disbelief in the defendant’s

testimony is likely to affect the jury’s assessment of the

defendant’s credibility. See Filani, 74 F.3d at 385-86; Mazzilli,

848 F.2d at 388; Victoria, 837 F.2d at 54-55. When a judge’s

questions focus on particular portions of a witness’s testimony,

the jury is likely to attach more weight to the portions on which

the judge’s questions focus. See Cisneros, 491 F.2d at 1075 (“It

strikes us as unlikely that a juror would willingly admit to having

missed something the trial judge considered important, and even

more unlikely that the jury would decline an invitation to consider

something the trial judge clearly believed to be significant.”).

The court’s skeptical questions about Saenz’s explanation of the

31 loan was likely to affect the jury’s evaluation of Saenz’s

credibility.

Later in the direct examination, defense counsel asked

Saenz if he had participated in this attempted marijuana delivery.

Saenz denied any involvement. He denied even knowing Ernesto Soto.

The court interrupted to ask Saenz if he was involved in the

transaction. The court’s questions came just after Saenz’s counsel

had thoroughly questioned Saenz about his alleged involvement and

Saenz had repeatedly denied his involvement:

THE COURT: Did you have anything to do with the marijuana transaction involved in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I am just a hard working man. I have been working ever since I was out of school. I got out of school because I didn’t go -- because I needed to go to work to support my -- help my parents. And I never -- never been in that kind of deal. Never used that kind of drugs. Never been in that.

The court went on:

THE COURT: Well, do you admit that was your vehicle that was -- that we saw a picture of?

THE DEFENDANT: In the picture, it looks like my vehicle. And if they are saying they got the tag, that’s -- that it was my Jeep. It looks like it.

THE COURT: Assuming it was your Jeep, can you explain why it was there when this transaction was going down?

THE DEFENDANT: Why? Well, I didn’t have -- I wasn’t driving the Jeep that day. To me it looked -- if it was -- that Jeep, it was in the shop a little bit over a week for mechanical problems. Between that period of time that they are saying that they saw the Jeep. It was in that shop where I had my forklift repaired.

32 THE COURT: So what is it that you are telling the jury? That somebody from the shop used it for these purposes?

THE DEFENDANT: All --

THE COURT: If it was used for those purposes shown or indicated?

THE DEFENDANT: Well --

THE COURT: What is it you are telling the jury?

THE DEFENDANT: I didn’t have the Jeep. I didn’t have control of that Jeep that week. That week it was in the auto repair shop for mechanical problems. But it was still drivable.

THE COURT: So it is your testimony to this jury that it was at the shop that you -- that you think that that -- that was the place from which that Jeep was used, the Cherokee was used?

THE DEFENDANT: That’s where the Jeep was supposed to be parked, there waiting for parts to get fixed. That’s where it was in-between that period of time.

THE COURT: But it could still travel?

In Filani, the Second Circuit found that similarly

phrased questions of a defendant by a trial court, such as: “Is

that what you are telling me?”; “All I asked you is, do you support

the other children?”; and “No, sir, listen to me,” tainted the

trial. See Filani, 74 F.3d at 382, 385-86.

The court’s repeated question, “so what is it you are

telling the jury?” may have conveyed an impression of the court as

prosecutorial, rather than impartial.6 While courts have been

6 The court twice cut off Saenz’s attempt to answer the court’s question:

33 willing to overlook similarly phrased questions that concerned

collateral or unimportant details, see, e.g., Manko, 979 F.2d at

907, the questions asked here, as in Filani, went to the heart of

the defense.

The court’s questions also forced Saenz to take a

position on whether he believed that someone else may have taken

his Jeep from the repair shop and driven it to the parking lots.

The court renewed its questions about whether anyone else may have

had access to Saenz’s Jeep:

THE COURT: Now, do you know whether any of your brothers drove that Jeep to the event in question?

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know, sir.

THE COURT: Beg your pardon?

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know. I didn’t know --

THE COURT: Did any of your brothers ask you for permission to use that Cherokee?

THE COURT: Would they have asked you for your permission to use it?

THE COURT: They would use it without asking you?

THE COURT: So what is it that you are telling the jury? That somebody from the shop used it for these purposes? THE DEFENDANT: All -- THE COURT: If it was used for purposes shown or indicated?

THE DEFENDANT: Well -- THE COURT: What is it you are telling the jury?

34 THE DEFENDANT: Well, couple of my brothers work for me. And they have -- they use my Jeep. You know, like if we are doing a job, if they needed to go to store or something, they just go and get it.

THE COURT: Without asking you?

THE DEFENDANT: Same way with my other employees.

THE COURT: Wasn’t that Cherokee used for your family?

THE COURT: It was not?

THE COURT: What would your family use?

THE DEFENDANT: Jeep.

THE COURT: Another one?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. That’s my -- that was one of my work vehicles. Remember I had more than one work vehicle. Also had another Jeep that my wife - - the one that my wife drives back and forth to do the bills and collect money and to do other things.

THE COURT: But your brothers had access to the Cherokee?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you are telling this jury that you are sure or you are not sure they were the ones driving the Cherokee on the day in question?

THE DEFENDANT: If I would say I was sure -- no, I am not sure. I am going to be lying if I say they were the ones. I am not sure.

The effect of repeatedly questioning Saenz as to whether

his brothers would use the Jeep without his permission was to

convey skepticism as to Saenz’s explanation that someone else may

have driven the Jeep to the parking lot. The effect was more

pronounced because it was the court’s questions, not counsel’s,

35 that made Saenz commit to the explanation that the court then

challenged.7

IV. The Cumulative Effect of the Court’s Questions

Soto provided the only testimony of an agreement between

Soto and Saenz to distribute marijuana. Saenz flatly denied the

agreement and the conversations Soto described. The only physical

evidence linking Saenz to the February 14 meetings was that the

Jeep was registered in Saenz’s name and that Saenz’s name and

telephone number were in Soto’s wallet. However, it was Saenz’s

brother, not Saenz, who was identified as present in the Jeep.

Saenz testified that his brothers had access to the Jeep, even when

it was in the repair shop. The telephone calls from Soto to the

Saenz residence on February 12, 13, and 15, 1995 were evidence

supporting the government’s case. Saenz testified, however, that

he did not take these calls. Saenz’s wife testified about other

persons who might have taken the calls. The jury could reasonably

have believed Saenz’s testimony over Soto’s.

This trial was not complex or lengthy. It did not

involve repetitive or convoluted testimony. The court’s questions

on occasion repeated points already made by the parties. The

lawyers did not appear to be lagging or confusing the jury. See,

e.g., Orr, 68 F.3d at 1251-52 (“In the context of this somewhat

complicated trial, the court’s brief questioning of three witnesses

7 The court’s questioning of Saenz during direct examination, and Saenz’s answers to those questions, consist of approximately 253 lines out of a total of 1075 lines of transcript, or 23.5 percent of the direct examination. The court did not significantly interrupt Saenz’s cross or redirect examinations.

36 did not create an appearance of partiality toward the

government.”); Lueth, 807 F.2d at 727 (“We have always been

reluctant to disturb a judgment of conviction ‘by reason of a few

isolated, allegedly prejudicial comments of a trial judge,’

particularly in a long trial.” (quoting Bland, 697 F.2d at 265));

Lance, 853 F.2d at 1183; Williams, 809 F.2d at 1090; Adkins, 741

F.2d at 748. The court’s questions did not address collateral

matters and were not asked of insignificant witnesses. Rather, the

court extensively questioned the two key witnesses, one of whom was

the defendant, on matters at the heart of the case. The factors

recognized as justifying extensive court involvement in the

interrogation of witnesses were not present.

The relatively scant evidence against Saenz is another

factor that distinguishes this case from cases in which

overinvolvement was not found to be prejudicial. See, e.g.,

Carpenter, 776 F.2d at 1295 (declining to find prejudice resulting

from improper comments by the trial court in part because the

government had presented “substantial” and “abundant” evidence in

support of the defendant’s guilt); Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d at 277

(noting that the trial court’s prejudicial comments were “isolated

incidents in a four-day trial in which there was ample evidence

upon which to convict the defendant”).

The district court twice instructed the jury that the

court had no opinion about the case and that they were to disregard

37 questions or comments that may reveal an opinion.8 Courts have

often recognized that curative instructions may render

nonprejudicial the court’s partial comments or questions. See,

e.g., Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1571-72; Williams, 809 F.2d at 1088.

“Some comments, however, may be so prejudicial that even good

instructions will not cure the error.” Id. at 1088; see also

Carpenter, 776 F.2d at 1295-96. Several courts have explicitly

found judicial overinvolvement despite curative instructions. See,

e.g., Filani, 74 F.3d at 386; Hickman, 592 F.2d at 936; Cisneros,

491 F.2d at 1075-76; United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359, 368 (5th

Cir. 1973); Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir.

1968).

The cumulative effect of the questioning by the district

court, in a trial lasting only two days, in which the outcome

hinged on the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of two

witnesses, mandates the conclusion that in this case, the court’s

8 Before opening statements the court told the jury:

Federal judges can express their opinion about things, I guess. And Federal judges can and will ask questions. But as we begin our case, I will tell you that I do not have an opinion about this case. And if I do anything during the course of the trial to lead you to believe that I have an opinion about the case, please disregard it. That’s your thing. I don’t want to invade it. I will remember to -- if I remember, I will tell you the same thing at the conclusion of the case. If I ask a question, do not give it any more or less weight than if anybody else asked it. I don’t have an opinion about the case. At the close of evidence, the court stated: As we begin our trial, I told you that I did not have an opinion about the case. I still don’t. So if I did anything during the course of the trial that lead you to believe that I have an opinion about the case, please disregard it. It was not my intention to do so.

38 instructions were insufficient to overcome the prejudicial impact

of the court’s questions and comments. The problem this record

presents is similar to that described in United States v. Cisneros,

in which this court stated:

[W]e believe that the comments here challenged were simply too harmful to be cured by the other instructions given to the jury. The credibility issues before the jury were close, difficult, and extremely important. In such a case commenting on the evidence is a perilous endeavor, to be undertaken with caution lest the slightest suggestion of favor for one side or the other from the supposedly impartial moderator tip the balance and impel a decision. Here the trial judge, in the guise of fair comment, overreached, and by adding evidence on the credibility of a key witness seriously impaired appellant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.

Cisneros, 491 F.2d at 1075-76.

We do not suggest that the district court intended to

skew the jury’s view of the evidence or to convey a bias in favor

of the prosecution. The court’s instructions make this clear.

However, our review focuses on the cumulative effect of the judge’s

questions upon the jury, in the unusual circumstances presented by

this short trial in which the outcome depended largely on the

credibility of two witnesses. See Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d at 276;

see also Lueth, 807 F.2d at 727 (“Our cases addressing the

impartiality of trial judge conduct stress the importance of the

jury’s perception that the judge is favoring the prosecution or

believes the defendant to be guilty.” (emphasis in original)). The

totality of the circumstances in this case lead us to conclude that

the court’s questioning “could have led the jury to a

39 predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of

judge and prosecutor.” Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1569. The court’s

overinvolvement was plain error.

We do not reach Saenz’s three remaining points of error.

We reverse Saenz’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial.