NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-2759, 24-6394 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00197-JLR-1 v. MEMORANDUM*
JESUS RUIZ-HERNANDEZ, AKA Christo Jesus Escobar Solares
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 19, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Jesus Ruiz-Hernandez appeals from his conviction of twenty-one counts
charging money laundering and forced labor involving seven victims. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), (d), 1594(a), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), 2; 8 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(ii). As the
parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
1. We dismiss Ruiz-Hernandez’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel without prejudice to his ability to raise it in 28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceedings. “As a general rule, we do not review challenges to the effectiveness
of defense counsel on direct appeal.” United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601,
605 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). There are “two extraordinary exceptions
to this general rule: (1) where the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to
permit determination of the issue, or (2) where the legal representation is so
inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.” Id. (citation modified).
Neither exception applies here. Ruiz-Hernandez identifies several instances
of allegedly deficient performance, but as “counsel has not yet had an opportunity
to explain his actions” and the court “cannot tell from the record whether [each
decision] was a calculated stratagem or a mere oversight,” the record is not
sufficiently developed. Id. at 606 (citation modified). Nor was counsel’s
performance so inadequate as to obviously violate the Sixth Amendment. See
United States v. Osorio-Arellanes, 112 F.4th 647, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2024).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruiz-
2 24-2759 Hernandez’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. See United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d
1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). “In general, a defendant who can
afford to hire counsel may have the counsel of his choice unless a contrary result is
compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly administration of
justice.’” United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The motion to withdraw was made less than three months before trial, after
trial had been continued for almost a year at Ruiz-Hernandez’s request. The
district court denied the motion based on its timing and the likely impact on the
trial date, potential witness availability issues, and evidence that Ruiz-Hernandez
was trying to tamper with witnesses—all of which fall squarely within the
recognized grounds for denying such a motion. See id.; United States v. Garcia,
924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991) (considering the timeliness of the motion to
withdraw).
3. The evidence was sufficient to convict Ruiz-Hernandez of forced labor as
to AV2. Ruiz-Hernandez concedes that the evidence was sufficient to show
exploitation and financial leverage and harassment, but contends that the forced
labor statute does not punish this type of conduct. Indeed, the statute includes only
four means of obtaining labor under the statute—(1) force or restraint; (2) serious
harm or threats; (3) abuse of law or the legal process; or (4) plans intended to cause
3 24-2759 the person to believe that not performing labor would cause that person or another
to suffer harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4). But the statute defines “serious harm”
broadly to include “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including
psychological, financial, or reputational harm.” Id. § 1589(c)(2) (emphasis added).
As such, Ruiz-Hernandez’s conduct properly fell within the statutory definition of
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4), and there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Ruiz-Hernandez used prohibited means to obtain AV2’s labor.
4. Because Ruiz-Hernandez did not properly preserve his objections to the
jury instructions, we review for plain error. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d
1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2009). An “[e]rror is plain where it is ‘clear and obvious.’”
Id. at 1255 (internal citation omitted).
The district court did not plainly err in using the term “involved” rather than
“included” in instructing the jury on the relationship of aggravated sexual abuse to
forced labor in Count 1. Ruiz-Hernandez argues that the court erred in using the
term “involved” rather than “included,” as “include[d]” conveys that the
aggravated sexual abuse “shared a nexus with forced labor,” rather than “just occur
during the time or in the place of forced labor.” Neither this circuit nor any other
appears to have addressed this issue, and “[a]n error cannot be plain where there is
no controlling authority on point.” United States v. Thompson, 127 F.4th 1204,
1210 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To the extent there is a meaningful
4 24-2759 difference between “includes” and “involves,” such “potential for confusion” does
not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1018
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “a confusion that would only afflict law students or
lawyers” does not rise to the level of plain error).
5. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury that “harbor,”
as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), means “provide shelter to.” This
definition is consistent with our precedent. See United States v. Acosta de Evans,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-2759, 24-6394 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00197-JLR-1 v. MEMORANDUM*
JESUS RUIZ-HERNANDEZ, AKA Christo Jesus Escobar Solares
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 19, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Jesus Ruiz-Hernandez appeals from his conviction of twenty-one counts
charging money laundering and forced labor involving seven victims. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), (d), 1594(a), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), 2; 8 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(ii). As the
parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
1. We dismiss Ruiz-Hernandez’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel without prejudice to his ability to raise it in 28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceedings. “As a general rule, we do not review challenges to the effectiveness
of defense counsel on direct appeal.” United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601,
605 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). There are “two extraordinary exceptions
to this general rule: (1) where the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to
permit determination of the issue, or (2) where the legal representation is so
inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.” Id. (citation modified).
Neither exception applies here. Ruiz-Hernandez identifies several instances
of allegedly deficient performance, but as “counsel has not yet had an opportunity
to explain his actions” and the court “cannot tell from the record whether [each
decision] was a calculated stratagem or a mere oversight,” the record is not
sufficiently developed. Id. at 606 (citation modified). Nor was counsel’s
performance so inadequate as to obviously violate the Sixth Amendment. See
United States v. Osorio-Arellanes, 112 F.4th 647, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2024).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruiz-
2 24-2759 Hernandez’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. See United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d
1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). “In general, a defendant who can
afford to hire counsel may have the counsel of his choice unless a contrary result is
compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly administration of
justice.’” United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The motion to withdraw was made less than three months before trial, after
trial had been continued for almost a year at Ruiz-Hernandez’s request. The
district court denied the motion based on its timing and the likely impact on the
trial date, potential witness availability issues, and evidence that Ruiz-Hernandez
was trying to tamper with witnesses—all of which fall squarely within the
recognized grounds for denying such a motion. See id.; United States v. Garcia,
924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991) (considering the timeliness of the motion to
withdraw).
3. The evidence was sufficient to convict Ruiz-Hernandez of forced labor as
to AV2. Ruiz-Hernandez concedes that the evidence was sufficient to show
exploitation and financial leverage and harassment, but contends that the forced
labor statute does not punish this type of conduct. Indeed, the statute includes only
four means of obtaining labor under the statute—(1) force or restraint; (2) serious
harm or threats; (3) abuse of law or the legal process; or (4) plans intended to cause
3 24-2759 the person to believe that not performing labor would cause that person or another
to suffer harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4). But the statute defines “serious harm”
broadly to include “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including
psychological, financial, or reputational harm.” Id. § 1589(c)(2) (emphasis added).
As such, Ruiz-Hernandez’s conduct properly fell within the statutory definition of
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4), and there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Ruiz-Hernandez used prohibited means to obtain AV2’s labor.
4. Because Ruiz-Hernandez did not properly preserve his objections to the
jury instructions, we review for plain error. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d
1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2009). An “[e]rror is plain where it is ‘clear and obvious.’”
Id. at 1255 (internal citation omitted).
The district court did not plainly err in using the term “involved” rather than
“included” in instructing the jury on the relationship of aggravated sexual abuse to
forced labor in Count 1. Ruiz-Hernandez argues that the court erred in using the
term “involved” rather than “included,” as “include[d]” conveys that the
aggravated sexual abuse “shared a nexus with forced labor,” rather than “just occur
during the time or in the place of forced labor.” Neither this circuit nor any other
appears to have addressed this issue, and “[a]n error cannot be plain where there is
no controlling authority on point.” United States v. Thompson, 127 F.4th 1204,
1210 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To the extent there is a meaningful
4 24-2759 difference between “includes” and “involves,” such “potential for confusion” does
not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1018
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “a confusion that would only afflict law students or
lawyers” does not rise to the level of plain error).
5. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury that “harbor,”
as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), means “provide shelter to.” This
definition is consistent with our precedent. See United States v. Acosta de Evans,
531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tydingco, 909 F.3d 297, 302–
04 (9th Cir. 2018).
6. The district court did not plainly err in giving the jury a general
knowledge instruction that included the following sentence: “The government is
not required to prove that the defendant knew that his acts or omissions were
unlawful.” We have previously held that giving this instruction in a money
laundering case may be reversible error, depending on the language of the specific
money laundering instruction. See United States v. Stein, 37 F.3d 1407, 1409–10
(9th Cir. 1994). But we have also found no error when the district court added the
qualifier “as to money laundering” to the general knowledge instruction and added
a paragraph to the money laundering instruction clarifying that the defendant must
know that the property being laundered represented proceeds of a crime. See
United States v. Knapp, 120 F.3d 928, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 24-2759 Here, the district court applied the second corrective from Knapp, but not the
first, placing this case somewhere between Knapp and Stein. “An error cannot be
plain where there is no controlling authority on point and where the most closely
analogous precedent leads to conflicting results.” Thompson, 127 F.4th at 1210
(citation modified). Because neither Knapp nor Stein directly controls, any error in
the instructions was not so “clear and obvious” as to be plain. Kilbride, 584 F.3d
at 1255 (citation modified).
DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
6 24-2759