United States v. Ronald W. Plewniak

947 F.2d 1284, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189, 1991 WL 236858
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 2, 1991
Docket91-3541
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 947 F.2d 1284 (United States v. Ronald W. Plewniak) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ronald W. Plewniak, 947 F.2d 1284, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189, 1991 WL 236858 (5th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

On February 26, 1987, Ronald Plewniak was convicted of federal crimes arising out of a conspiracy to defraud several United States sugar refineries. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment followed by five years of probation. The district court also imposed restitution in the amount of $1.4 million. Three years after his conviction, Mr. Plewniak filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that a conflict of interest rendered his defense counsel ineffective, and that the district court improperly imposed restitution. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Mr. Plewniak challenges the district court’s rulings on the claims presented in his § 2255 motion as well as the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

*1286 I. BACKGROUND

On February 20, 1986, Ronald Plewniak was indicted for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 545, 550, 1343, and 49 U.S.C.App. § 121. The crimes arose out of a scheme to divert sugar to the U.S. domestic sugar market after purchasing the sugar for exportation and sale outside the United States. Mr. Plewniak made an enormous profit on this diversion of sugar because U.S. agricultural subsidies kept domestic sugar prices substantially higher than world market sugar prices.

The illegal sugar transactions began with the purchase of sugar from a domestic sugar refinery. Mr. Plewniak or one of his conspirators would falsely represent to the selling refinery that they were buying sugar for exportation and sale in the world market. Mr. Plewniak and his conspirators would then pay the lower world market price for the sugar, now designated “export sugar,” and Mr. Plewniak would give fraudulent ocean bills of lading to the refiner showing that the sugar had been exported. These bills of lading entitled the refiner to a “drawback” under U.S. agricultural programs equal to the difference between the domestic price of sugar, which was then approximately $27 per hundred weight, and world market price for sugar, approximately $12 per hundred weight. The subsidy or “drawback” caused the refiner to realize the domestic price of sugar on the sale.

Mr. Plewniak generated a huge profit by reselling the export sugar in the domestic market after purchasing it at the lower world market price. In each of the transactions for which he was indicted, Mr. Plewniak sold the export sugar to Lentz Milling Company of Reading, Pennsylvania for approximately $23 per hundred weight, a price somewhat lower than the domestic price but still much higher than the price at which the sugar was purchased. Mr. Plewniak profited by more than $1.4 million in the transactions for which he was indicted.

II. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Mr. Plewniak was represented by Herbert L. Greenman in his criminal proceedings. Prior to the trial, Mr. Greenman joined the law firm Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Schuler and James as a partner. Another partner at this law firm, Paul Cambria, represented Henry Lentz and Lentz Milling Company, the purchaser of Mr. Plewniak’s illegally diverted sugar. Mr. Lentz had testified under a grant of immunity at the grand jury investigation and was scheduled as a witness for the prosecution at Mr. Plewniak’s trial. Shortly before the trial, the prosecutor brought to the attention of the district judge the potential conflict of interest created by the law firm’s representation of both Mr. Plewniak and Mr. Lentz. The judge held a hearing on the morning of trial to discuss the matter with Mr. Plewniak and Mr. Lentz. At that hearing, Mr. Plewniak expressed his desire to waive all objections to the conflict and to continue to have Mr. Greenman represent him in spite of the conflict.

Mr. Lentz was called as a witness at the trial. On direct examination by the prosecutor, he testified that he bought sugar at a substantial discount from Mr. Plewniak, but he claimed that he did not know that the sugar was illegally diverted export sugar. On cross examination, Mr. Greenman did not attack Mr. Lentz’s credibility regarding his knowledge or involvement in the illegal transactions. Mr. Greenman’s questions emphasized that Mr. Lentz believed that the transactions were proper, and that this belief was reasonable. Mr. Lentz’s testimony bolstered the defense theory that Mr. Plewniak was unaware of any illegality in the transactions.

In his § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, Mr. Plewniak claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his law firm’s concurrent representation of Mr. Lentz created a conflict of interest. To invalidate his waiver of that conflict of interest, Mr. Plewniak made two arguments: first, that his waiver was not voluntary and intelligent; and second, that even if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent, the trial court erred by accepting his *1287 waiver because the conflict was unwaiva-ble.

Requirements for a Voluntary and Intelligent Waiver

A criminal defendant may waive his right to conflict-free defense counsel if his waiver is voluntary and intelligent. United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir.1975). 1 In Garcia, the Fifth Circuit advised the district courts to conduct a hearing, now known as a Garcia hearing, to inquire into the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver. The court’s role at the hearing is to ensure that the defendant (1) is aware of the conflict of interest, (2) knows the potential consequences of continued representation under such a conflict, and (3) understands that he has a right to counsel unfettered by the conflict of interest. United States v. Casiano, 929 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir.1979)).

Mr. Plewniak’s claim goes to the second of these three requirements. Mr. Plewniak claims that his waiver was not voluntary and intelligent because the trial court failed to investigate the potential effects of the conflict and explain them to Mr. Plewniak at the Garcia hearing. Mr. Plewniak claims that his misunderstanding was further compounded by Mr. Green-man’s misrepresentations to him about Mr. Lentz’s role in the prosecution’s case. Reviewing Mr. Plewniak’s § 2255 motion, the district court rejected this claim, finding Mr. Plewniak’s waiver voluntary and intelligent based on Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Omale
Fifth Circuit, 2022
United States v. Sherman Fields
761 F.3d 443 (Fifth Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Fairchild
Fifth Circuit, 2004
Harvey v. State
97 S.W.3d 162 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Harvey, Belinda v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002
United States v. Bates
Fifth Circuit, 2000
Farris v. Johnson
Fifth Circuit, 1998
United States v. Carlyle
964 F. Supp. 8 (District of Columbia, 1997)
United States v. Phillips
952 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. Texas, 1996)
United States v. George Aubin
87 F.3d 141 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)
Tyson v. DIST. COURT FOR FOURTH JUD. DIST.
891 P.2d 984 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
947 F.2d 1284, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189, 1991 WL 236858, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ronald-w-plewniak-ca5-1991.