United States v. Ronald R. Rewald

889 F.2d 836, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 159, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16951, 1989 WL 135361
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 13, 1989
Docket85-1353
StatusPublished
Cited by143 cases

This text of 889 F.2d 836 (United States v. Ronald R. Rewald) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ronald R. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 159, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16951, 1989 WL 135361 (9th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Ronald R. Rewald was convicted on ninety-four counts of a criminal indictment charging mail fraud, interstate transportation of stolen securities or money, false statement to a federal officer, perjury, falsely representing accounts as being insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), securities fraud, failure to maintain books and records as required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), fraud by an investment advisor, income tax evasion, and subscribing to a false document. Re-wald committed these crimes by swindling hundreds of investors in his investment firm out of millions of dollars. His principal defense at trial, and now on appeal, is *839 that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) told him to spend the investors’ money extravagantly so as to cultivate relationships with foreign potentates and wealthy businessmen who would be useful intelligence sources. We reject all of Rewald’s arguments save one, which requires a remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I

In 1978, Rewald and a partner, Sunlin L.S. Wong, formed an investment firm named Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dilling-ham and Wong (Bishop Baldwin), located in Honolulu, Hawaii. Rewald, a charming and captivating salesman, immediately began luring investors into Bishop Baldwin’s “investment savings account” with a promised guaranteed return of twenty percent and an additional five to seven percent, depending on Bishop Baldwin’s earnings. The investors ultimately numbered 400, and their investments — sometimes an individual’s life savings — totaled $22 million. After a group of investors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition, a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee took over Bishop Baldwin on August 4, 1983, finding it virtually without assets to repay the $17 million owing to investors.

Rewald’s misrepresentations about Bishop Baldwin and its investment savings account were bold and imaginative. He claimed that Bishop Baldwin was one of the largest and most venerable investment firms in Hawaii, with roots dating back sixty-five years. He falsely described the firm’s clientele as having included, among others, the last four presidential administrations and Elvis Presley, with individual investors having an average worth of $4 million. Rewald told of a two-year waiting list to become Bishop Baldwin clients and a reported ninety percent rejection rate of those who applied.

Rewald sometimes described the investment savings accounts as merely a breakeven accommodation for the firm’s wealthiest clients. Despite this laissez-faire front, Bishop Baldwin’s investment consultants aggressively sought money from any and all sources, motivated by huge commissions of up to fifty percent. In addition to the enormous rate of return, Rewald promised investors that Bishop Baldwin pursued an “ultraconservative investment policy” and that the investment savings accounts were guaranteed by the FDIC, Lloyds of London, or some other insurer.

A key aspect of the fraud scheme was to discourage investors from withdrawing their funds. Rewald told investors that their “earnings” were tax free unless withdrawn. In addition, Bishop Baldwin maintained the facade of investor prosperity through periodic mailings of letters and reports to investors, purportedly documenting the firm’s glowing financial performance.

Rewald conceded at trial that he had made these and numerous other false promises to investors and that he spent investor money on countless luxuries, including the purchase of a polo club. His sole defense was that the CIA had directed him to create Bishop Baldwin and to operate it for the CIA’s benefit, and that the CIA had promised to reimburse Bishop Baldwin for all these expenses because they were incurred in initiating and maintaining intelligence contacts. In short, he argued that he lacked the criminal intent necessary for conviction.

Prior to trial, Rewald filed an affidavit outlining his alleged relationship with the CIA, claiming to be a covert CIA agent. He said that all his actions relevant to the indictment were carried out on the orders of the CIA. Specifically, Eugene Welch, Chief of the CIA Domestic Collection Division’s (DCD) Honolulu Office, instructed him and Sunlin Wong to set up the Bishop Baldwin firm for the CIA’s benefit. Re-wald also stated that he was provided with fake degrees in business administration and law from Marquette University. His mission was to cultivate social and business contacts with wealthy and well-placed businessmen and government officials.

Rewald’s affidavit also stated that the CIA expanded its use of Bishop Baldwin to include transferring funds through the firm’s investment savings accounts to cov *840 ert foreign intelligence operations. The CIA also used the accounts to shelter funds of highly placed foreign diplomats and businessmen who sought to “export” currency to the United States. Rewald’s most dramatic accusation was that the CIA used Bishop Baldwin to facilitate arms sales to several foreign countries.

II

While Rewald did not take the stand, extensive evidence of his relationship with the CIA was introduced at trial, primarily through the testimony in the government’s case-in-chief of several former CIA officials. Welch of the Honolulu DCD office was the first to meet Rewald. The DCD’s mission is to collect intelligence data on foreign persons and matters from private American citizens (known as “contacts”) who voluntarily offer to assist the CIA. These contacts sometimes will telephone the DCD with unsolicited information that the contact feels would be of assistance to American intelligence officials. The DCD’s telephone number is listed under “Central Intelligence Agency” in the telephone book, and officers such as Welch are known as overt agents, because they are publicly acknowledged to be CIA officials. A contact usually develops information from meeting a foreign citizen while traveling abroad.

After a long career in the CIA, Welch moved to Honolulu in September 1976 to become chief of the DCD’s field office there. This office had one clerical employee and one professional employee — the chief. Welch had never been to Hawaii before moving there in 1976, and as he approached retirement he considered Hawaii a desirable assignment. Before moving to Hawaii Welch had not heard of Re-wald. Indeed, he had not heard of Rewald until June 30, 1978, when he received a telephone call from him at the office.

Rewald told Welch that he recently had returned from visiting a Far Eastern country that he thought would be of intelligence interest. Rewald asked to meet Welch, expressing great sympathy for the CIA and the intelligence community at large. Believing Rewald to be a potentially helpful contact, Welch agreed to meet him for lunch. At their meeting on July 6, 1978, Rewald told Welch that he owned a chain of retail sporting goods stores and that he planned to travel extensively throughout the Far East, including China and Japan, to establish manufacturing sources for sporting goods. Rewald said his company was called Consolidated Mutual Investment Corporation (C.M.I.), and that it originated in Wisconsin, although it had failed there. Rewald also said that he had been a professional football player with the Cleveland Browns, that he had B.A. and M.A. degrees from Marquette University, and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Deleon
323 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (D. New Mexico, 2018)
United States v. James Lloyd
807 F.3d 1128 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Padilla
639 F.3d 892 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Carona
571 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. California, 2008)
United States v. WR Grace
408 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Montana, 2005)
United States v. $1,790,021 in U.S. Currency
261 F. Supp. 2d 310 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2003)
Fink v. Montes
44 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. California, 1999)
United States v. Saya
980 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Hawaii, 1997)
Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of Targets
918 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. California, 1996)
Lynes v. Mitchell
894 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. New York, 1995)
United States v. Jackson
863 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Kansas, 1994)
United States v. Javier Toscano-Padilla
996 F.2d 1229 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Mike Benavidez
992 F.2d 1220 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
889 F.2d 836, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 159, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16951, 1989 WL 135361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ronald-r-rewald-ca9-1989.