United States v. Roderick Reed

490 F. App'x 633
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 19, 2012
Docket12-10306
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 490 F. App'x 633 (United States v. Roderick Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Roderick Reed, 490 F. App'x 633 (5th Cir. 2012).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Roderick Gene Reed, federal prisoner #46988-019, appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking modification of his life sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine and cocaine base. Reed argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion. He asserts that Amendment 750 and the Fair Sentencing Act effectively raised the threshold amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutorily mandated life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841 to 280 grams and that he was responsible for only 240 grams of crack cocaine.

A district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir.2009).

The district court correctly determined that Reed was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on his two pri- or felony drug convictions. A mandatory minimum statutory penalty overrides the retroactive application of a new guideline. See United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir.1994). Because Reed’s sentence of life imprisonment was statutorily mandated, he was not “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2); see Pardue, 36 F.3d at 431. Additionally, contrary to Reed’s assertion, the Fair Sentencing Act has no applicability to him because he was sentenced before it took effect. See United States v. Dog-gins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir.2011).

Reed also challenges his sentence on grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to apply the enhancement and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. “A modification proceeding is not the forum for a collateral attack on a sentence long since imposed and affirmed on direct appeal.” United States v. Hernandez, 645 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir.2011). A § 3582(c)(2) motion “is not a second opportunity to present mitigating factors to the sentencing judge, nor is it a challenge to the appropriateness of the original sentence.” United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.1995). Accordingly, to the extent that Reed challenges his original sentence, he cannot obtain relief under § 3582(c)(2).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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Related

United States v. Benjamin Blount
575 F. App'x 496 (Fifth Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
490 F. App'x 633, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-roderick-reed-ca5-2012.