United States v. Robinson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: September 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-8078
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 19, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-8078 (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00063-CAB-1) LESTER B. ROBINSON, (D. Wyo.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before McHUGH, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Lester B. Robinson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for

compassionate release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Robinson pled guilty in 2010 to production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2251(a) & (e), for taking explicit photographs of his niece, including some in which

he was touching her genitals. A probation officer prepared a presentence

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 2

investigation report (PSR), which summarized that in addition to the conduct of

conviction, Robinson possessed hundreds of videos of child pornography and used

the internet to exchange child pornography and contact children. The PSR also

reported that his adult daughters told an FBI agent Robinson had sexually molested

them as young girls. One of them also described that abuse to the probation officer.

Based on Robinson’s offense level and criminal history, the PSR calculated his

advisory Guidelines sentence as life imprisonment, but that was reduced to the

statutory maximum of thirty years. However, the plea agreement Robinson entered

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), stipulated to a twenty-year

prison sentence. The sentencing judge accepted that agreement “reluctantly,”

indicating he did so only so the victim would not need to testify at trial, and stating

he would otherwise have sentenced Robinson to at least thirty years. R. vol. 3 at 33.

Robinson filed the motion underlying this appeal in July 2024, arguing his age

and numerous medical problems establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to

shorten his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 1 The district court denied

the motion. It correctly observed that to reduce his sentence it “must find that

[Robinson] has demonstrated each of the following: [1] the existence of some

‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction; [2] that such

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission; and [3] that early release would be consistent with any relevant

1 The district court had denied an earlier motion for early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) that Robinson filed during the Covid-19 pandemic. 2 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 3

sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” R. vol. 4 at 336 (citing United

States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021)). The district court found the

third requirement was not satisfied because “the requested reduction would be wholly

inconsistent with the § 3553(a) . . . factors.” Id. at 341.

Addressing those factors, the court found the “seriousness of the offense” and

Robinson’s “history and characteristics” weighed against a sentence reduction. Id. It

described his offense as “horrific,” summarizing that he “exploited a girl of only nine

or ten years with developmental disabilities,” while “in the girl’s home on a family

visit, with both the girl’s family and Defendant’s family in the home when he

molested the girl in her room.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, the court found Robinson’s “uncharged and contested sexual abuse

conduct . . . just as troubling.” Id. It noted he was “caught when his house was

searched in connection with his sharing child pornography over the internet,” but was

not charged for that conduct; that he had “boasted that his collection of child

pornography included more than 500 videos”; and that his daughters reported he had

molested them at a “very young” age. Id. at 341 & n.10 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court recognized Robinson’s objections to the PSR were unresolved

and some of the uncharged conduct was “contested,” but it “agree[d] with the

Government that there is way too much smoke . . . not to have been fires aplenty.”

Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court also found several other § 3553(a) factors weighed against a

reduction. It found Robinson posed a threat to the community because, despite his

3 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 4

age and medical problems, “low risk is not no risk,” and “[his] apparently

unquenchable thirst for . . . child pornography continues to present significant

concerns about further criminality,” even if his infirmity makes it less likely he will

commit “a ‘hands on’ assault.” Id. at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding “just punishment,” the court found Robinson “fail[ed] to fully

acknowledge the great deal he received” under his plea agreement. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Given his below-Guidelines sentence, it found a reduction

would create unwarranted sentencing disparities. Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). As to rehabilitation, the court found the record showed “no meaningful

history of programming or treatment to address or reduce the sexual psychopathology

that led to [Robinson’s] conduct.” Id. at 343. To the contrary, it cited evidence

showing his “outright refusal of such treatment,” and that he “seems to deny that he

was ever a pedophile.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court acknowledged Robinson’s medical problems but rejected his

argument based on allegedly “subpar” care in prison. Id. at 342. It cited records

showing he received ongoing medical care, and a warden’s assessment that his

conditions are “not terminal or debilitating” and “can be managed and treated within

a correctional facility.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was also

persuaded early release “would prematurely create an additional measure of fear and

uncertainty” for Robinson’s victims. Id. at 339. And it concluded that “[g]iven the

gravity of the conduct at issue, one would expect unambiguous sincere remorse . . .

but such is not in the record.” Id. at 343.

4 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 5

Robinson appealed. His anticipated release date is April 1, 2027.

II. Legal Standards

A. Compassionate Release

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) allows a defendant to move for a sentence reduction

if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” This is

commonly referred to as “the compassionate release statute.” McGee, 992 F.3d at

1039 (internal quotation marks omitted). To obtain relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a

defendant must show (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence

reduction; (2) the request is consistent with Sentencing Commission policy

statements; and (3) the relevant § 3553(a) factors support his request. See id. at

1042. District courts may deny compassionate release if any of those requirements is

lacking, without needing to address the others. See id. at 1043.

B. Standard of Review

The “wide sentencing discretion” given to district courts “carries forward to

later proceedings that may modify an original sentence.” Concepcion v. United

States, 597 U.S. 481, 490–91 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we review the denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2024). “A district court

abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly

erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the § 3553(a) factors, “we do not reweigh the § 3553(a) factors on

appeal.” United States v. Lewis, 116 F.4th 1144, 1178 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 5 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 6

145 S. Ct. 1110 (2025) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “Because

the weighing of [those] factors is committed to the discretion of the district court, we

cannot reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the lower court

made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the

circumstances.” United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 949 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

As detailed above, the district court gave a thorough and well-reasoned

explanation for concluding the § 3553(a) factors do not support reducing Robinson’s

sentence. Its explanation was more than sufficient to show it did not abuse its

discretion. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 948 (stating the district judge “need only set forth

enough to satisfy the appellate court that she has considered the parties’ arguments

and has a reasoned basis for exercising her own legal decisionmaking authority.”

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Robinson’s arguments on appeal are unavailing. 2 First, he argues the district

court erred by relying on his daughters’ statements that he molested them, which he

contends are “untrue” hearsay, so that the district court’s “reliance on [an] erroneous

factual premise is grounds for remand.” Attach. to Aplt. Opening Br. at 1–2. But

unless specifically restricted, district courts have discretion “to consider any relevant

materials . . . in modifying [a] sentence.” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 494. In

2 Because Robinson is pro se, we liberally construe his filings but do not act as his advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 6 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 7

particular, “proscriptions regarding the admission of hearsay evidence . . . do not

apply to sentencing.” United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148, 1228 (10th Cir.

2025). Thus, the district court was not prohibited from considering the daughters’

statements. See id.; see also United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir.

2013) (“[H]earsay statements may be considered at sentencing if they bear some

minimal indicia of reliability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Other than his own conclusory assertion that his daughters’ statements were

untrue, Robinson gives no reason they lacked the reliability required for the district

court to consider them. 3 Moreover, the district court identified their statements as

only one part of the record of “uncharged and contested sexual abuse conduct.”

R. vol. 4 at 341. This also included: Robinson’s possession of a huge collection of

child pornography; the investigation showing he traded child pornography online; his

admission to contacting children online; and the fact that “five members of

[Robinson’s] then-family and two mental health care professionals [had] asserted he

had engaged in prior, similar uncharged conduct.” Id. at 288. The district court did

not abuse its discretion in finding this record sufficiently “troubling” to weigh against

reducing Robinson’s sentence. Id. at 341.

3 Robinson’s citation to United States v. Burman, No. 21-7200, 2023 WL 4231740 (4th Cir. June 28, 2023) (unpublished) is unavailing. There, the district court mis-stated that the defendant had conspired to distribute “15 to 50 kilograms of cocaine base . . . . rather than cocaine,” an error material to his Guidelines range. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The district court here considered some unproven conduct, but did not rely on any similar, clearly erroneous factual premise. 7 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 8

Second, Robinson argues the district court “did not fairly account for [his] frail

health, physical limitations . . . and advanced age,” when finding he would pose a

danger if released. Attach. to Aplt. Opening Br. at 2–3. We disagree. The district

court recognized Robinson’s health problems but concluded there is still a danger he

would access or disseminate child pornography. Robinson emphasizes his many

medical problems, including being legally blind, and contends it is “obvious . . . [he]

is physically unable to be much of a danger to anyone.” Id. at 3. But it is not self-

evident his impairments would prevent him from committing further crimes,

including accessing child pornography, upon release. His arguments do not show the

district court abused its discretion in finding he poses a risk to the community. 4

Third, Robinson argues the district court did not adequately consider the

medical evidence when finding a sentence reduction would create an unwarranted

sentencing disparity. We are satisfied the district court adequately considered his age

and medical problems. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 947 (stating the facts allegedly

4 Robinson argues his warden was wrong to find his medical conditions were not “debilitating,” so the district court abused its discretion by relying on the warden’s assessment. Attach. to Aplt. Opening Br. at 4. But even if his medical conditions meet the definition of “debilitating,” that does not undermine the conclusion that he poses a risk of committing further crimes despite his impairments. He also argues the district court did not consider a test score allegedly showing he has a low recidivism risk. But the district court found he “[did] not attach any record substantiating” this claim. R. vol. 4 at 338. Robinson’s brief on appeal does not cite where in the record the referenced test score(s) might be found. We therefore do not attempt to resolve this argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring an appellant’s opening brief to support his contentions “with citations to the . . . parts of the record on which [he] relies”); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the [pro se] litigant’s attorney in . . . searching the record.”). 8 Appellate Case: 24-8078 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Page: 9

establishing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release are

relevant to the § 3553(a) analysis). But it found a sentence reduction unwarranted,

considering the § 3553(a) factors as a whole. Robinson’s argument asks us to

reweigh those factors to give more weight to his medical conditions. But doing so

would be contrary to our standard of review on appeal. See Lewis, 116 F.4th at 1178.

Fourth, Robinson argues the district court gave excessive weight to only one

§ 3553(a) factor, namely, his “conduct from nearly two decades ago.” Attach. to

Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. To the contrary, many of the § 3553(a) factors supported the

district court’s decision, including the nature and circumstances of the offense;

Robinson’s history and characteristics; and the need to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, to provide just punishment, to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and

to protect the public. See §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) & (C), (a)(6).

IV. Conclusion

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s

motion for compassionate release, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge