United States v. Robert William Stage

464 F.2d 1057, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7776

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 24, 1972
• Docket: 71-2585
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

Stage appeals from his conviction for violating the Dyer Act (18 U.S.C. § 2312).

He was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 20, 1970, on state charges unrelated to the federal offense. He was confined in the county jail from August 20 to August 26, 1970, before he was taken before a magistrate. On August 25, 1970, he signed a “waiver of rights” and confessed to a Dyer Act violation. During the six-day interval from his arrest and confinement to the date that he appeared before a United States Commissioner, he was interrogated by the local sheriff, by detectives from the sheriff’s office, and by several FBI agents. Federal and state law enforcement officers frequently attended each other’s interrogation sessions.

At the outset of his custody, federal agents began questioning him about interstate transportations of stolen cars. On August 20, one of the agents gave him a Miranda warning. Stage said that he did not want to make any statements until he could talk to a lawyer. The questioning continued, and no lawyer was supplied to him.

The confession was obtained in violation of both the Miranda and Mc-Nabb rules and of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).¹ The Government argues that the confession was nevertheless admissible because Stage signed a waiver of his rights. A waiver is involuntary as a matter of law when it is made by one who has been theretofore detained in custody for five days without being taken before a readily available magistrate, who has been subjected to questioning by relays of law enforcement officers during his detention, and who has not been supplied with counsel despite his expressed desire for such assistance.

Apart from the confession, the evidence was inadequate to sustain the conviction. On February 20, 1970, a man went to a Florida automobile salesman, represented that he wanted to buy a used car, and was given a 1969 Cadillac to test drive around the block. The man and a woman companion drove away in the Cadillac and did not return. Seven months later a man drove the same Cadillac into a California used-car lot. The man indicated that he wanted to trade the Cadillac for another used car. A salesman lent him a Lincoln Continental to test drive. The man drove away the Lincoln and did not return. The California salesman identified Stage as the man who took the Continental. The Florida salesman’s identification of Stage as the man who took the Cadillac was equivocal. He testified that he “couldn’t be positive.” The witness’s lack of certitude is understandable: he was asked to identify a man whom he had seen briefly over a year earlier,

The evidence would have been sufficient to prove that Stage stole the Continental, a crime with which he was not here charged. The question is whether evidence that Stage had possession of the Cadillac in California that had been stolen in Florida seven months before and the equivocal identification of Stage as the man who took the Cadillac were sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stage transported the Cadillac in interstate commerce, knowing it to have been stolen. We think not. The lapse of time between the Florida theft and the California exchange, and the uncertain identification of Stage as the Florida thief engender reasonable doubt of Stage’s guilt. The Government fully developed the available evidence at the time of trial. No useful purpose would be served by remanding the cause for a new trial.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to dismiss the indictment.

1 . 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) provides:

“(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer.” (Emphasis added.)

Accord, United States v. Halbert (9th Cir. 1970) 436 F.2d 1226; Smith v. United States (9th Cir. 1968) 390 F.2d 401; Cote v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 357 F.2d 789, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 173, 17 L.Ed.2d 110.