HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
On March 6,1973, a federal grand jury in Atlanta indicted Robert Skipper for importing approximately five pounds of hashish through the mails.1 On July 18,1975, Skipper was arrested, and taken before the United States magistrate in the Southern District of Florida on July 21, 1975. At that time a removal hearing was scheduled for July 31, 1975, and bail was set at “$20,-000 S/B [surety bond].” Skipper waived the hearing and agreed to return to Atlanta. Skipper’s counsel orally requested that bail be reduced. The magistrate assented, and ordered
that the defendant’s Motion for Reduction of Bond be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. The defendant’s bond is hereby reduced to $50.000. Fifty Thousand Dollars Own Recognizance.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS of the defendant’s release are as follows: defendant’s mother Mrs. William E. McQuinn and brother-in-law Mr. Thomas Hunter Henderson. Ill co-sign appearance bond, and the defendant shall reside at: 11435 S.W. 56 St., Miami. Florida during this action.
(The underlined portion was inserted on a prepared form). On the same day an appearance bond 2 was prepared, stating that “if the defendant fails to obey or perform any of these conditions, payment of the amount of this bond shall be due forthwith.” Skipper executed the bond, Thomas Hunter Henderson, III signed on the line marked “SURETY,” and Mrs. McQuinn signed below Henderson’s signature.
On January 9, 1976, Skipper was ordered to appear for arraignment at the United States Courthouse in Atlanta on January 20, 1976. He failed to appear, and on January 27, 1976, the district court in Atlanta ordered the bond forfeited.3
On March 1, 1979, judgment issued on the bond. On April 19, 1979, the court denied remission. The appellant-sureties now seek reversal of the judgment on the [1179] forfeiture, or, in the alternative ask that we hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying their petition for remission.4 The sad circumstances the defendant created for his relatives are, of course, deplorable, but we conclude that the judgments of the district court must be affirmed.
The parties address several issues relating to the manner in which bail was determined. We have serious reservations about whether these matters can be adjudicated at this late date, since Skipper did not appeal the conditions of his release immediately after their imposition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3147(b). See, e. g., United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971). Even if properly before us, however, these arguments are without merit.
The appellants maintain that the $50,000.00 bond was excessive, and therefore it should not have been forfeited in the full amount. They suggest that the offense for which Skipper was indicted was not a serious one, and note that the Bail Reform Act provides that a magistrate should not require sureties unless other enumerated conditions “will not reasonably assure the appearance” of the accused. 181 U.S.C.A. § 3146(a)(4).
As noted, Skipper was free to appeal the conditions of his release at the time of the magistrate’s order, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3147(b). The Supreme Court has cautioned against granting habeas corpus relief before this avenue has been exhausted. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951). The courts of appeals have consistently held that precise observance of the statutory review procedures is a prerequisite to appellate amendment of the terms and conditions of release. See e. g., Grimes v. United States, 394 F.2d 933 (D.C.Cir. 1967); Shackleford v. United States, 383 F.2d 212 (D.C.Cir. 1967). Similarly, after the entry of a judgment of conviction they have refused to consider questions relating to pretrial release. United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179,1184 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877, 89 S.Ct. 176, 21 L.Ed.2d 149 (1968); Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1, 6 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 641, 60 S.Ct. 1089, 84 L.Ed. 1409 (1940). Of course, Skipper has not yet been convicted. Indeed, he has not yet been apprehended. Nevertheless, the principle announced in these cases-that conditions of release should be appealed, if at all, upon their imposition-is plainly relevant. Assuming we should reach the matter now, we may certainly consider the fact that Skipper jumped bail. Having the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious to us now that the conditions of release were inadequate and the a.mount of the bond was too small.
The appellants insist that in any event they were not sureties on the bond. They point out that in his Order Reducing Bond the magistrate stated that the $20,-000.00 surety bond was “reduced to $50,000, Fifty Thousand Dollars Own Recognizance,” and that the bond itself stated that “We, the undersigned, ... are bound to pay the United States of America the sum of Fifty Thousand dollars ($50,000.00-0wn Recognizance).” Like the district court, we can reach no conclusion except that the appellants were sureties. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 465 F.2d 964, 965 (10th Cir. 1972) (clear error); United States v. Gonware, 415 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1969) (bond is a contract to be construed to give effect to intent of parties). One of the conditions of the Order Reducing Bond was the requirement that Mrs. McQuinn and Thomas Henderson “co-sign [the] appearance bond.” The bond itself stated unequivocally that Skipper and the appellants would have to pay the United States if Skipper failed to appear as ordered. Henderson signed the bond as surety, as did Mrs. McQuinn.
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HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
On March 6,1973, a federal grand jury in Atlanta indicted Robert Skipper for importing approximately five pounds of hashish through the mails.1 On July 18,1975, Skipper was arrested, and taken before the United States magistrate in the Southern District of Florida on July 21, 1975. At that time a removal hearing was scheduled for July 31, 1975, and bail was set at “$20,-000 S/B [surety bond].” Skipper waived the hearing and agreed to return to Atlanta. Skipper’s counsel orally requested that bail be reduced. The magistrate assented, and ordered
that the defendant’s Motion for Reduction of Bond be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. The defendant’s bond is hereby reduced to $50.000. Fifty Thousand Dollars Own Recognizance.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS of the defendant’s release are as follows: defendant’s mother Mrs. William E. McQuinn and brother-in-law Mr. Thomas Hunter Henderson. Ill co-sign appearance bond, and the defendant shall reside at: 11435 S.W. 56 St., Miami. Florida during this action.
(The underlined portion was inserted on a prepared form). On the same day an appearance bond 2 was prepared, stating that “if the defendant fails to obey or perform any of these conditions, payment of the amount of this bond shall be due forthwith.” Skipper executed the bond, Thomas Hunter Henderson, III signed on the line marked “SURETY,” and Mrs. McQuinn signed below Henderson’s signature.
On January 9, 1976, Skipper was ordered to appear for arraignment at the United States Courthouse in Atlanta on January 20, 1976. He failed to appear, and on January 27, 1976, the district court in Atlanta ordered the bond forfeited.3
On March 1, 1979, judgment issued on the bond. On April 19, 1979, the court denied remission. The appellant-sureties now seek reversal of the judgment on the [1179] forfeiture, or, in the alternative ask that we hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying their petition for remission.4 The sad circumstances the defendant created for his relatives are, of course, deplorable, but we conclude that the judgments of the district court must be affirmed.
The parties address several issues relating to the manner in which bail was determined. We have serious reservations about whether these matters can be adjudicated at this late date, since Skipper did not appeal the conditions of his release immediately after their imposition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3147(b). See, e. g., United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971). Even if properly before us, however, these arguments are without merit.
The appellants maintain that the $50,000.00 bond was excessive, and therefore it should not have been forfeited in the full amount. They suggest that the offense for which Skipper was indicted was not a serious one, and note that the Bail Reform Act provides that a magistrate should not require sureties unless other enumerated conditions “will not reasonably assure the appearance” of the accused. 181 U.S.C.A. § 3146(a)(4).
As noted, Skipper was free to appeal the conditions of his release at the time of the magistrate’s order, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3147(b). The Supreme Court has cautioned against granting habeas corpus relief before this avenue has been exhausted. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951). The courts of appeals have consistently held that precise observance of the statutory review procedures is a prerequisite to appellate amendment of the terms and conditions of release. See e. g., Grimes v. United States, 394 F.2d 933 (D.C.Cir. 1967); Shackleford v. United States, 383 F.2d 212 (D.C.Cir. 1967). Similarly, after the entry of a judgment of conviction they have refused to consider questions relating to pretrial release. United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179,1184 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877, 89 S.Ct. 176, 21 L.Ed.2d 149 (1968); Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1, 6 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 641, 60 S.Ct. 1089, 84 L.Ed. 1409 (1940). Of course, Skipper has not yet been convicted. Indeed, he has not yet been apprehended. Nevertheless, the principle announced in these cases-that conditions of release should be appealed, if at all, upon their imposition-is plainly relevant. Assuming we should reach the matter now, we may certainly consider the fact that Skipper jumped bail. Having the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious to us now that the conditions of release were inadequate and the a.mount of the bond was too small.
The appellants insist that in any event they were not sureties on the bond. They point out that in his Order Reducing Bond the magistrate stated that the $20,-000.00 surety bond was “reduced to $50,000, Fifty Thousand Dollars Own Recognizance,” and that the bond itself stated that “We, the undersigned, ... are bound to pay the United States of America the sum of Fifty Thousand dollars ($50,000.00-0wn Recognizance).” Like the district court, we can reach no conclusion except that the appellants were sureties. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 465 F.2d 964, 965 (10th Cir. 1972) (clear error); United States v. Gonware, 415 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1969) (bond is a contract to be construed to give effect to intent of parties). One of the conditions of the Order Reducing Bond was the requirement that Mrs. McQuinn and Thomas Henderson “co-sign [the] appearance bond.” The bond itself stated unequivocally that Skipper and the appellants would have to pay the United States if Skipper failed to appear as ordered. Henderson signed the bond as surety, as did Mrs. McQuinn.
[1180] Finally, the appellants urge that the forfeiture should be set aside because the magistrate failed to require them to “justify by affidavit” as provided in Rule 46(d), F.R.Crim.P. That rule states that “[n]o bond shall be approved unless the surety thereon appears to be qualified.” Little has been written about the justification requirement, but the case law makes clear that sureties must reveal their property resources so that the government can be assured of their financial ability and so that the court can be satisfied that they have an incentive and purpose to secure the defendant’s presence at trial. United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1966); see generally 8B Moore’s Federal Practice, H 46.12[2] (1980). Since Rule 46(d) was designed to protect the government, the appellants cannot avail themselves of the magistrate’s failure to follow its mandate.5 In any case, the rule allows non-corporate sureties such as the appellants to justify by affidavit, cf. illustrative form 17, F.R. Crim.P., and the appellants do not explain how compliance would have affected their conduct.
Moving on to the problem of whether the district court erred in refusing to remit part of the forfeited bond, we are limited in our review by the division of functions between trial and appellate courts. In our opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying remission.
The district court may remit a forfeited bond, in whole or in part, “if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture.” F.R. Crim.P. 46(e)(2), (4). The parties agree and it is beyond dispute that the district court’s determination may be overturned only if it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shelton, 444 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1971).
Thomas Henderson is a young married man charged with the care of his father. Mrs. McQuinn is a widow, and cancer treatment has dissipated much of what little property she once had. Both assert, and the government does not deny, that enforcement of the forfeiture will result in financial hardship. Moreover, the government admits the appellants have cooperated in its search for defendant. On the other hand, the United States has spent substantial amounts of money seeking Skipper, who is still at large.6
As the district judge observed, “this case presents an unquestionably sad situation for the sureties.” We agree, but it is sad because of the distress this young man has caused his family, not because the government insists that its contract be honored. The district court said, and its opinion evinces deep reflection, that “[gjiven that the defendant has not yet been located” remittance would be inappropriate.
Release is conditioned on the execution of a bail bond in order to assure the presence of the accused, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146. Remission of forfeited bonds while their subjects are still at large would undermine that purpose. The duty rested with the district court to make the decision on remission. Our task is only to determine whether that decision was arbitrary and capricious, not to substitute our discretion for that of the district judge. United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 998, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 97 L.Ed. 1404 (1953). [1181] Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
AFFIRMED.