Judge ERDMANN
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Private Cassandra M. Riley, pursuant to her plea, of kidnapping a minor in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). A panel of officers sentenced Riley to confinement for five years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged. The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) summarily affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. Riley, No. ARMY 20100084 (A.Ct.Crim.App. July 7, 2011). This court granted review, set aside the CCA’s decision, and remanded for further appellate inquiry and consideration of the granted issues. United States v. Riley, 70 M.J. 415 (C.A.A.F.2011) (summary disposition). On remand, the CCA again affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. Riley, No. ARMY 20100084, 2012 CCA LEX[117]*117IS 175, at *10, 2012 WL 1816206, at *4 (A.Ct.Crim.App. May 11, 2012).
We granted review of two issues in this ease: whether Riley’s trial defense counsel were ineffective; and, whether there is a substantial basis to question the providence of Riley’s guilty plea.1 As we conclude that the military judge abused his discretion when he accepted Riley’s guilty plea without ensuring that Riley was aware of the sex offender registration consequences of her plea, we need not reach Issue I. The findings and sentence are set aside and the record of trial returned to the Army Judge Advocate General.
Facts
a. Background
The incident giving rise to the charges took place in the Mother/Baby Unit at Dar-nall Army Medical Center on Fort Hood, Texas, on July 27, 2009. Dressed in scrubs, apparently pretending to be a nurse, Riley entered the room of MB and her newborn son. Believing Riley to be the charge nurse, MB asked her for a few items from the front desk. Riley began to exit the room and MB went into the bathroom. When MB came out of the bathroom her baby was not in the bassinet where he had been sleeping. MB went out in the hallway and found Riley putting the baby in a backpack. MB took the baby and Riley left the Mother/Baby Unit of the hospital. Riley was apprehended five days later and during a subsequent interview with Army investigators, admitted taking the baby.
b. Riley’s Pretrial Agreement and the Sex Offender Registration Consequences of the Plea
Riley entered into a pretrial agreement that capped possible confinement at eleven years in exchange for her guilty plea. She was ultimately sentenced to five years confinement. Because she was convicted of kidnapping a minor, Riley was required to register as a sex offender. According to her post-trial affidavit, Riley did not learn of the sex offender registration requirement until several months after her court-martial was complete. In her post-trial affidavit, Riley wrote:
Had I known that after pleading guilty I would have to take my place among the ranks of sex offenders, I would not have entered the pre-trial agreement as written. I would have asked [my attorney] to do whatever she could during negotiations with the government to ensure that any guilty plea would not require sex offender registration. I would have been open to pleading guilty to another offense or an amended Specification of the Charge, provided I would not have to register as a sex offender. Unless a deal removed the prospect of sex offender registration, I would have made clear to the government that I was not going to plead guilty, as charged, and I would have insisted on going to trial.
Riley’s court-martial took place in the fall of 2009, three years after we issued our decision in United States v. Miller, in which we held “[f]or all cases tried later than ninety days after the date of this opinion, trial defense counsel should inform an accused prior to trial as to any charged offense listed on the DoD [Instruction] Listing Of Offenses Requiring Sex Offender Processing.”2 63 M.J. 452, 459 (C.A.A.F.2006). Riley’s lead defense counsel submitted a post-trial affidavit addressing the issue of sex offender regis[118]*118tration. Riley’s attorney wrote that she did not advise Riley that a conviction for kidnapping a minor was an offense requiring sex offender registration because she “was not aware of the requirement or consequence for such a kidnapping conviction.”
Defense counsel’s affidavit reveals, however, that throughout the fall of 2009 when she was handling Riley’s case, her superiors repeatedly reminded defense counsel to notify clients about potential sex offender registration consequences of convictions:
On or about 15 September 2009,1 received an email forwarded to me from my Regional Defense Counsel concerning an updated Post Trial & Appellate Rights form and Advice Concerning Possible Requirements to Register as a Sex Offender ....
During the Fiscal Year 2010 Fall TDS CONUS Conference held at Naval Station Newport in Rhode Island from 28 through 30 October 2009, Mr. Keith Hodges, one of the TDS Highly Qualified Experts, asked all attendees if we had received the email from 15 September 2009. Once he verified that we had received the email, he mentioned that it should be self-explanatory, but that if anyone had any questions about its use to contact him ....
On or about 4 December 2009, I received another email forwarded to me from my Regional Defense Counsel which was entitled “DCAP Sends 3-31 — Sex Offender Registration Advice (1 Dec 09)” which contained a word document entitled, “DCAP SENDS 3-31 Sex Offender Registration Advice (1 December 2009).”
Riley’s defense counsel went on to state that, “[o]ther than the two email forwards and the one reference at the ... conference to the first email, I did not receive any formal training or instruction about providing clients with advice on collateral consequences stemming from convictions, in particular, requirements for sex offender registration.” She did, however, have experience advising clients about sex offender registration consequences.
The standard post-trial and appellate rights form used at the time of Riley’s court-martial did not address sex offender registration, but the instructions to defense counsel using the form advised counsel of the additional steps that needed to be taken if the accused was charged with any sex offense or an offense involving a minor. In her affidavit, defense counsel stated:
Between the issuance of the email containing this form on 15 September 2009 and my explanation to appellant of her post-trial and appellate rights on 2 February 2010, I had not used the updated Post Trial and Appellate Rights form that was issued on 15 September 2009. When I advised appellant of her post-trial and appellate rights using the 15 September 2009 form, I had not read the instruction sheet; I printed the form and advised appellant of her rights using the form itself.
Emphasis added. The instructions for the post trial and appellate rights form, which defense counsel did not read, provides in part: “If the accused has been charged with any sex offense or offense involving a minor (see table below), also have the accused execute the ‘Advice Concerning Requirements to Register as a Sex Offender form.’” The table included on the instruction sheet listed the various UCMJ, state, territorial and federal laws, the violation of which would trigger registration as a sex offender. The Article 134 offense of kidnapping of a minor by other than a parent or guardian is specifically listed as an offense requiring sex offender registration.
e. The Providence Inquiry
The military judge questioned Riley about her plea during the providence inquiry. The military judge explained the rights she was giving up by pleading guilty, reviewed the stipulation of fact with her, reviewed the elements of the offense, and asked Riley to tell him, in her own words, why she was guilty of kidnapping. The military judge reviewed the maximum punishment with Riley and the attorneys. The military judge asked Riley whether she entered into the pretrial agreement of her own free will, and whether she understood the pretrial agreement and how it would affect her case. The military judge also asked Riley if she was [119]*119satisfied with her defense counsel and their advice.
The military judge, however, did not address the sex offender registration consequences of Riley’s plea before finding the plea provident and issuing his findings. As a result, there was no mention or discussion of the sex offender registration consequences of Riley’s guilty plea by anyone, either prior to, or during the court-martial proceedings. The military judge found Riley guilty and the panel sentenced her to forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for five years, and a dishonorable discharge.
d. Review by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals initially summarily affirmed Riley’s conviction. On appeal to this court, we remanded the case to the CCA for further appellate inquiry and consideration of the granted issues including the sex offender registration issue. The CCA again affirmed the findings and sentence, concluding that Riley suffered no prejudice and the military judge did not err in accepting Riley’s guilty plea, because “nothing in the record [showed] any misunderstanding of a collateral consequence [by Riley] [that] was made readily apparent to the judge.” Riley, 2012 CCA LEXIS 175, at *7-*9, 2012 WL 1816206, at *2-*3.
Discussion
On appeal to this court Riley argues that sex offender registration is a major consequence of her plea because: she will have to endure the societal stigma of being a sex offender for the rest of her life; she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial unless the Government removed the prospect of sex offender registration; Miller implicitly elevated sex offender registration as a “major” collateral consequence of a plea; and, the Government’s case against Riley was worth “nowhere near her cap of eleven years of confinement.” According to Riley, this court’s decision in Miller, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1487, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (finding defense counsel’s performance “constitutionally deficient” based on his failure to advise defendant that his plea of guilty made him subject to automatic deportation), compel the conclusion that the accused must be aware of sex offender registration requirements in order for the plea to be knowing and voluntary under Article 45, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845 (2006). She goes on to argue that the military judge had an affirmative duty to ask if she had been informed of the sex offender registration requirements, in accordance with the Military Judges’ Benchbook. Riley maintains that the military judge’s failure to do so provides a substantial basis in law to question the plea.
In response, the Government contends that military judges have no affirmative obligation to inquire into whether an accused is aware of sex offender registration consequences of a plea. The Government reads our decision in Miller as placing the burden to inform the accused of sex offender registration requirements on defense counsel rather than the military judge. In addition, the Government argues that nothing in Riley’s guilty plea evidenced any misunderstanding about collateral consequences readily apparent to the military judge and there is no substantial basis to question Riley’s guilty plea.
‘“A military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’ ” United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008) (citations omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when there is “something in the record of trial, with regard to the factual basis or the law, that would raise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea.”
Article 45(a), UCMJ provides:
If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular pleading, or after a plea of guilty sets up matter inconsistent with the plea, or if it appears that he has entered the plea of guilty improvidently or through lack of understanding of its meaning and effect, or if he fails or refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered in the record, and the court shall proceed as though he had pleaded not guilty.
[120]*120This article “includes procedural requirements to ensure that military judges make sufficient inquiry to determine that an accused’s plea is knowing and voluntary, satisfies the elements of charged offense(s), and more generally that there is not a basis in law or fact to reject the plea.” United States v. Hayes, 70 M.J. 454, 457 (C.A.A.F.2012). In order to determine whether Riley’s plea was knowing and voluntary, we look to the record of trial and the documents considered by the court below. United States v. Gar-lick, 61 M.J. 346, 350 (C.A.A.F.2005).
A “guilty plea is a grave and solemn act” which should be accepted “only with care and discernment.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). “[T]he plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial — a waiver of his right to trial before a jury and judge.” Id. “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id.
“It is axiomatic that ‘[t]he military justice system imposes even stricter standards on military judges with respect to guilty pleas than those imposed on federal civilian judges.’ ” United States v. Soto, 69 M.J. 304, 306 (C.A.A.F.2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Perron, 58 M.J. 78, 81 (C.A.A.F.2003)). “[I]t is the military judge’s ‘responsibility to police the terms of pretrial agreements to insure compliance with statutory and decisional law as well as adherence to basic notions of fundamental fairness.’ ” Id. at 307 (quoting United States v. Partin, 7 M.J. 409, 412 (C.M.A.1979)).
a. Sex Offender Registration as a Collateral Consequence of the Plea
The Government, quoting United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotations omitted), argues that the military judge had no affirmative obligation to inquire into whether Riley was aware of sex offender registration consequences of her plea because “a court conducting a plea colloquy must [only] advise the defendant of the direct consequences of his plea, [and] need not advise him of all the possible collateral consequences.” Indeed, in Miller, 63 M.J. at 457-58, we addressed sex offender registration as a collateral consequence which was “separate and distinct from the court-martial process,” when we held that the military judge “did not err in his responsibility to ensure that Appellant understood all the consequences of his guilty plea.” Our analysis in Miller was informed, in part, by the reasoning of other federal courts related to collateral consequences and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that “ ‘deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal proceeding and therefore the failure to advise does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” Id. at 458 (quoting Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir.1992)). However, following our decision in Miller, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482, holding that “[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.”3
State courts have grappled with the import of Padilla with respect to sex offender registration consequences. For example, in People v. Fonville, 291 Mich.App. 363, 804 N.W.2d 878, 894 (2011), the Court of Appeals of Michigan analogized Padilla as follows:
Like the consequence of deportation, sex offender registration is not a criminal sanction, but it is a particularly severe penalty. In addition to the typical stigma that convicted criminals are subject to upon release from imprisonment, sexual offenders are subject to unique ramifications, including, for example, residency-reporting require[121]*121ments and place of domicile restrictions. Moreover, sex offender registration is “intimately related to the criminal process.” The “automatic result” of sex offender registration for certain defendants makes it difficult to “divorce the penalty from the conviction .... ”
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481).4 We agree with this reasoning. Indeed, when we set forth the prospective rule in Miller, we emphasized the specific need for knowledge of sex offender registration consequences in the court-marital setting:
[T]he importance of this rule springs from the unique circumstances of the military justice system. More often than not, an accused will be undergoing court-martial away from his or her state of domicile. Also, the court-martial and the plea may occur without the assistance of counsel from the accused’s domicile state. Finally, every state has its own version of Megan’s Law. These circumstances can contribute to an accused being uninitiated to the collateral consequence of mandatory registration requirement as a result of his court-martial conviction.
Miller, 63 M.J. at 459.
Last term in United States v. Rose, 71 M.J. 138, 143 (C.A.A.F.2012), we referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla in our analysis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on defense counsel’s failure to respond to the defendant’s question about the sex offender registration consequences of his plea. We held the failure to respond to his client’s request for information about sex offender registration requirements amounted to “deficient performance where counsel knew that this was a ‘key concern,’ and where, had the request been investigated and answered, even counsel acknowledge[d] that his advice would have been different.” Id. at 144.
Thus, in light of the concerns we expressed about sex offender registration consequences in Miller and Rose, and following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Padilla, we hold that in the context of a guilty plea inquiry, sex offender registration consequences can no longer be deemed a collateral consequence of the plea.
b. The Role of the Military Judge
At the time of Riley’s court-martial, the Military Judges’ Benchbook set forth detailed instructions for the acceptance of a guilty plea. Dep’t of the Army, Pam. 27-9, Legal Services, Military Judges’ Benchbook ch. 2, § II, para. 2-2-8 (Jan. 1, 2010). Paragraph 2-2-8, included the following provision:
If the accused has pleaded guilty to an offense listed in DoD Instruction 1325.7, Enclosure 27: Listing of Offenses Requiring Sex Offender Processing, the MJ must ask the following question:
MJ: Defense Counsel, did you advise the
accused prior to trial of the sex offender reporting and registration requirements resulting from a finding of guilty of (state Specification(s) and Charge(s))‘l
DC: (Responds.)
MJ: Take a moment now and consult again with your defense counsel, then tell me whether you still want to plead guilty? (Pause.) Do you still want to plead guilty?
ACC: (Responds.)
The military judge did not conduct this inquiry during Riley’s providence inquiry. Riley challenges his failure to do so and argues that there is a substantial basis in law or fact to question the plea. The CCA dismissed this argument by holding, “[although this inquiry of the defense counsel by the military judge is stated as a requirement, we find that this is countered by the objective of the Benchbook, which serves as a publication intended only as a guide with suggestions for military judges.” Riley, 2012 CCA LEXIS [122]*122175, at *9, 2012 WL 1816206, at *3. The CCA reasoned that that military judge did not err because “chief reliance must be placed on defense counsel to inform an accused about the collateral consequences.” Id., 2012 WL 1816206, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
While we agree that the Benchbook is not binding as it is not a primary source of law, the Benchbook is intended to ensure compliance with existing law. In our view, the Benchbook accurately reflects the Miller and Padilla line of cases therefore “an individual military judge should not deviate significantly from these instructions without explaining his or her reasons on the record.” United States v. Rush, 54 M.J. 313, 315 (C.A.A.F.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Meaningful appellate review of the trial judge’s decision on this important sentencing matter requires that he articulate his reason for his decision.” Id. In this case, there is no evidence on the record as to why the military judge failed to ensure that Riley understood the sex offender registration consequences of her plea. The record is completely devoid of any reference to sex offender registration.
“In order to ensure that pleas of guilty are not only knowing and voluntary but appear to be so, detailed procedural rules govern the military judge’s duties with respect to the plea inquiry.” Soto, 69 M.J. at 306 (citing United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458, 458-59 (C.M.A.1977)). Here, the military judge failed to adhere to the straightforward guidance set forth in the Benchbook, which simply instructed the military judge to ensure that defense counsel complied with this court’s decision in Miller as to advice concerning sex offender registration requirements. Such an instruction is clearly consistent with a military judge’s responsibilities while conducting a plea inquiry. As “[t]he trial judge must shoulder the primary responsibility for assuring on the record that an accused understands the meaning and effect of each condition as well as the sentence limitations imposed by any existing pretrial agreement,”5 it was incumbent upon the military judge to ensure that Riley’s plea was a “knowing, intelligent aet[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463. “The failure to inform a pleading defendant that the plea will necessarily require registration as a sex offender affects whether the plea was knowingly made.” Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 895.
Given the lifelong consequences of sex offender registration, which is a “particularly severe penalty,”6 the military judge’s failure to ensure that Riley understood the sex offender registration requirements of her guilty plea to kidnapping a minor results in a substantial basis to question the providence of Riley’s plea. Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 322.
We note that the Government argues, and the CCA held, that the burden is only on the defense counsel to notify clients about sex offender registration consequences. However, the military judge “shoulder[s] the primary responsibility” for the acceptance of a knowing plea. King, 3 M.J. at 458. Our decisions as far back as United States v. Care, 18 USCMA 535, 541-42, 40 C.M.R. 247, 253-54 (1969), indicate that while the defense counsel plays an important role in securing a provident plea, it is the duty of the military judge to ensure “that there is a knowing, intelligent, conscious waiver in order to accept the plea.” To be sure, as we explained in Miller, defense counsel must inform the accused of these consequences, but it is the military judge who bears the ultimate burden of ensuring that the accused’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.
We therefore conclude that the military judge abused his discretion when he accepted Riley’s guilty plea without questioning defense counsel to ensure Riley’s knowledge of the sex offender registration consequences of her guilty plea to kidnapping a minor. The remedy for finding a plea improvident is to set aside the finding based on the improvident plea and authorize a rehear[123]*123ing. United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 143-44 (C.A.A.F.2004); see also United States v. Williams, 53 M.J. 293 (C.A.A.F.2000); United States v. Marsh, 15 M.J. 252 (C.M.A.1983).7 A rehearing will provide Riley with the opportunity to enter a guilty plea, or plead not guilty, with full knowledge of the consequences of her decision.
Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The findings and sentence are set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. A rehearing may be ordered.