United States v. Richardson

33 M.J. 127, 1991 CMA LEXIS 861, 1991 WL 180372
United States Court of Military Appeals·Decided September 12, 1991·No. No. 65,390; CM 8801211·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinions

Opinion of the Court

COX, Judge:

Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial, consisting of officer and enlisted members, convicted appellant of violating a general regulation; attempted espionage; unauthorized sale and disposition of military property; and larceny, in violation of Articles 92, 106a, 108, and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 892, 906a, 908, and 921, respectively. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 10 years, forfeiture of $300.00 pay per month for 120 months, and reduction to E-1. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence.

In light of this Court’s decision in United States v. Heyward, 22 MJ 35 (CMA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 656, 93 L.Ed.2d 710 (1986), the Court of Military Review set aside the findings of guilty of Charge I and its specification (violating a general regulation) and dismissed the [128] Charge. The remaining findings were affirmed, as was the adjudged sentence. 30 MJ 1239 (1990). Appellant then petitioned this Court and we granted review of the following issues:

I
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTING THE PANEL ON THE INTENT REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ATTEMPTED ESPIONAGE CHARGES (CHARGE II).
II
WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW ERRED BY HOLDING THAT ANY INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE INTENT REQUIREMENT FOR ATTEMPTED ESPIONAGE WAS HARMLESS.
III
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED ESPIONAGE (CHARGE II, SPECIFICATION 1).
IV
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF CRITICAL FACTS REASONABLY DISPUTED AT TRIAL.

In July 1986, an anonymous caller telephoned the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and offered information about the M-1 Abrams tank, our nation’s primary battle tank. Although personnel at the Soviet Embassy rebuffed the unknown caller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation caught wind of the attempted transfer of information, and an investigation ensued. More than a year later, on August 3, 1987, U.S. counterintelligence agents succeeded in identifying appellant as the 1986 caller. Then the FBI and the Army Intelligence and Security Command initiated “ground” surveillance of appellant. From September 1987 through January 1988, appellant was followed at various times for certain periods. However, the surveillance proved inconclusive.

It was discovered that appellant had experienced some financial difficulties, including numerous gambling debts, yet there was no evidence that any information was passed or that appellant received any large, unexplained amounts of money.

With the surveillance operation yielding no evidence, the investigating agencies initiated a “sting” operation. One and a half years after appellant’s phone call to the Soviet Embassy, in the summer of 1986, an FBI agent, posing as a Soviet official, began the operation by contacting appellant on January 12,1988. The agent introduced himself as “Vladimir Kosov” from the Soviet Embassy’s Military Office. “Vladimir” told appellant that he was returning appellant’s call of July 1986. The undercover agent repeatedly made reference to appellant’s offer to provide information about the M-l; he referred to it as the “proposal.” After subsequent phone calls, the two met at a nearby hotel room.

There, appellant told “Vladimir” that he wanted to get back at the Army for “screwing [him] over,” and he claimed he was an instructor of the electrical system of the M-l and would be able to obtain much information in return for $50,000. The two agreed to the gist of the operation; appellant would provide information and “Vladimir” would forward it to his superiors. Appellant left the hotel room waiting for a confirmation from “Vladimir.” When this confirmation was received, appellant prepared the information.

He gathered and prepared five pages of unclassified schematic diagrams and an unclassified electronic circuit board, all relating to and part of the M-1 tank.* [129] On January 13,1988, he placed the material in a brown towel and deposited the bundle behind “Vladimir’s” hotel for pick up. The next day, January 14,1988, while appellant thought the “Soviets” were looking at the information, he met “Vladimir” at a hotel for an advance payment. At this meeting, appellant provided “Vladimir” with another unsolicited, unclassified document also relating to the M-l. Appellant received $1500.00 from “Vladimir,” exchanged receipts for the money, and left the hotel room. In the hotel hallway, government agents immediately arrested appellant and conducted a fake arrest of “Vladimir.”

Immediately thereafter, appellant waived his rights and consented to be interviewed by the agents. He claimed he had been trying to catch a spy to make up for a recent reduction-in-rank suffered as a result of nonjudicial punishment (Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 USC § 815). He said that, when he was arrested, he was on his way to report the events to CID (Criminal Investigation Command), with the money and a receipt he had had the Soviet agent sign. Appellant also stated that he believed the information he had given the Soviet agent was not classified and would not harm the United States, and that this was “the truth.”

Issues I & II require us to consider whether the military judge correctly instructed the members on the elements of proof of attempted espionage, and if not, whether the erroneous instruction was “harmless.”

The Espionage statute governing military members is found in Article 106a, UCMJ, 10 USC § 906a. It tracks the language of 18 USC § 794(a). H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 235, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 424-25 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 472, 571, 577. Article 106a provides in part:

(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any entity described in paragraph (2), either directly or indirectly, anything described in paragraph (3) shall be punished as a court-martial may direct,____

(Emphasis added.)

Regarding the element of intent, the military judge gave the following instruction:

Now, with respect to the elements of espionage, “intent, or reason to believe” that the information is “to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation” means that the accused acted in bad faith, or otherwise without authority with respect to information that is not lawfully accessible to the public.

(Emphasis added); see para. 3-64A, Military Judge's Benchbook at 3-136.1 (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 (Change 2, 15 October 1986)).

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United States v. Richardson, 33 M.J. 127, 1991 CMA LEXIS 861, 1991 WL 180372 (cma 1991).

33 M.J. 127 (United States v. Richardson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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