Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 23, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 23-6175 & 23-6178 (D.C. Nos. 5:06-CR-00114-R-1 & JEREMY VAUGHN PINSON, 5:07-CR-00023-R-1) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant Jeremy Vaughn, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and was denied relief. She1 then
unsuccessfully filed for reconsideration in that court. She appeals, raising two main
issues: that the district court (1) “insufficiently explained its reasoning,” and (2)
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 We follow the gender attribution used by the district court. Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 2
“abused its discretion in denying relief prior to full briefing.” Aplt. Br. at 3
(capitalization omitted). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Defendant’s request for compassionate release.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was born in 1986. She has a long history of adjudications for
criminal offenses dating back to age 13. At age 17 she was convicted of
embezzlement and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment with all but three years
suspended. During that incarceration Defendant was convicted in 2006 of threatening
then-President George W. Bush. While awaiting sentencing she pleaded guilty to
making false statements (about an inmate planning to kill the judge who would be
sentencing her) and to mailing a threatening communication (to a juror in her trial).
For those three convictions Defendant was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment.
Defendant appealed her jury convictions and sentence, and this court upheld them.
See United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008). While in prison
Defendant has amassed a lengthy disciplinary record of more than 90 incidents, with
two as recent as 2023.
Defendant first filed a motion under § 3582 for compassionate release in
January 2020 and was denied relief because she did not exhaust her administrative
remedies with the Bureau of Prisons as required by the statute. Defendant filed a
second motion for compassionate release that July, claiming that COVID-19 put her
“at an extreme risk of death” because of her underlying health conditions of “asthma,
Page 2 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 3
obesity, hormone therapy and a history of hypertension.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 32. The
district court denied the motion, finding that Defendant’s medical records did not
support her health claims, other than obesity. Further, the court found her underlying
convictions and extensive prison disciplinary record weighed against early release
and that it would be “nearly impossible to conclude that Defendant is not a danger to
the safety of other people or the community.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 64. This court
affirmed the district court’s denial of her § 3582 motion. See United States v. Pinson,
835 Fed. App’x 390 (10th Cir. 2020).
Defendant’s third attempt at compassionate release has fared no better. In its
denial of her third motion for compassionate release, the district court said it need not
resolve the exhaustion issue because it “may only reduce a sentence under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction, (2) such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission, and (3) the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent they are applicable warrant a reduced sentence.” R. at 107 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2021).
Again, Defendant’s underlying convictions and extensive ongoing disciplinary record
weighed against her, as they indicated that “she continues to have difficulty
complying with the requirements of incarceration.” R. at 107. The court considered
“each of the § 3553(a) factors and [found] the following to be particularly relevant:
the nature and circumstances of the offense[s]; Defendant’s history and
Page 3 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 4
characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense[s], to promote
respect for the laws, and to provide just punishment for the offense[s]; and the need
to protect the public from further crimes of Defendant.” Id. The court recognized that
Defendant had raised some potential mitigating factors but found they did not support
a sentence reduction. See id. Defendant’s later motion for reconsideration was denied
for substantially the same reasons.
II. DISCUSSION
We review for abuse of discretion both “a district court’s order denying relief
on a § 3552(c)(1)(A) motion” and a “decision to reconsider a prior ruling.” United
States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an
incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Defendant first complains that the district court insufficiently explained its
reasoning and that it must “explain what the judge found persuasive in each 3553(a)
factor.” Aplt. Br. at 6. But while § 3553 “imposes on the [sentencing] court a duty to
‘consider’ a variety of important sentencing considerations, . . . it nowhere imposes
on the court a duty to address those factors on the record.” United States v. Chavez-
Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 585 U.S. 109 (2018) (further
internal quotation marks omitted). And a court considering a sentence reduction need
not do anything more in explaining its decision than a court imposing a defendant’s
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Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 23, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 23-6175 & 23-6178 (D.C. Nos. 5:06-CR-00114-R-1 & JEREMY VAUGHN PINSON, 5:07-CR-00023-R-1) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant Jeremy Vaughn, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and was denied relief. She1 then
unsuccessfully filed for reconsideration in that court. She appeals, raising two main
issues: that the district court (1) “insufficiently explained its reasoning,” and (2)
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 We follow the gender attribution used by the district court. Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 2
“abused its discretion in denying relief prior to full briefing.” Aplt. Br. at 3
(capitalization omitted). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Defendant’s request for compassionate release.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was born in 1986. She has a long history of adjudications for
criminal offenses dating back to age 13. At age 17 she was convicted of
embezzlement and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment with all but three years
suspended. During that incarceration Defendant was convicted in 2006 of threatening
then-President George W. Bush. While awaiting sentencing she pleaded guilty to
making false statements (about an inmate planning to kill the judge who would be
sentencing her) and to mailing a threatening communication (to a juror in her trial).
For those three convictions Defendant was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment.
Defendant appealed her jury convictions and sentence, and this court upheld them.
See United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008). While in prison
Defendant has amassed a lengthy disciplinary record of more than 90 incidents, with
two as recent as 2023.
Defendant first filed a motion under § 3582 for compassionate release in
January 2020 and was denied relief because she did not exhaust her administrative
remedies with the Bureau of Prisons as required by the statute. Defendant filed a
second motion for compassionate release that July, claiming that COVID-19 put her
“at an extreme risk of death” because of her underlying health conditions of “asthma,
Page 2 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 3
obesity, hormone therapy and a history of hypertension.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 32. The
district court denied the motion, finding that Defendant’s medical records did not
support her health claims, other than obesity. Further, the court found her underlying
convictions and extensive prison disciplinary record weighed against early release
and that it would be “nearly impossible to conclude that Defendant is not a danger to
the safety of other people or the community.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 64. This court
affirmed the district court’s denial of her § 3582 motion. See United States v. Pinson,
835 Fed. App’x 390 (10th Cir. 2020).
Defendant’s third attempt at compassionate release has fared no better. In its
denial of her third motion for compassionate release, the district court said it need not
resolve the exhaustion issue because it “may only reduce a sentence under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction, (2) such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission, and (3) the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent they are applicable warrant a reduced sentence.” R. at 107 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2021).
Again, Defendant’s underlying convictions and extensive ongoing disciplinary record
weighed against her, as they indicated that “she continues to have difficulty
complying with the requirements of incarceration.” R. at 107. The court considered
“each of the § 3553(a) factors and [found] the following to be particularly relevant:
the nature and circumstances of the offense[s]; Defendant’s history and
Page 3 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 4
characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense[s], to promote
respect for the laws, and to provide just punishment for the offense[s]; and the need
to protect the public from further crimes of Defendant.” Id. The court recognized that
Defendant had raised some potential mitigating factors but found they did not support
a sentence reduction. See id. Defendant’s later motion for reconsideration was denied
for substantially the same reasons.
II. DISCUSSION
We review for abuse of discretion both “a district court’s order denying relief
on a § 3552(c)(1)(A) motion” and a “decision to reconsider a prior ruling.” United
States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an
incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Defendant first complains that the district court insufficiently explained its
reasoning and that it must “explain what the judge found persuasive in each 3553(a)
factor.” Aplt. Br. at 6. But while § 3553 “imposes on the [sentencing] court a duty to
‘consider’ a variety of important sentencing considerations, . . . it nowhere imposes
on the court a duty to address those factors on the record.” United States v. Chavez-
Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 585 U.S. 109 (2018) (further
internal quotation marks omitted). And a court considering a sentence reduction need
not do anything more in explaining its decision than a court imposing a defendant’s
Page 4 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 5
original sentence. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 948. The district court stated that Defendant’s
serious crimes and “her long record of disciplinary infractions, including a recent
infraction on February 23, 2023 for threatening bodily harm to a staff member,
indicates that she continues to have difficulty complying with the requirements of
incarceration.” R., Vol I at 107. It added that it had “considered each of the § 3553(a)
factors” and acknowledged that Defendant had “identified some potential mitigating
factors.” Id. “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only set forth enough to satisfy
the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district
court’s explanation for its decision fulfilled those requirements.
Defendant also complains that the court abused its discretion by ruling before
full briefing. This argument misstates both the record and the relevant legal standard.
“[T]he inmate bears the burden to establish that compassionate release is warranted,
and the district court is not required to investigate possible avenues for relief or to
develop the record in support of a motion.” United States v. Avalos Banderas, 39
F.4th 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Defendant chose when to submit
her third motion for compassionate release, and then the burden was on her to support
her legal arguments with evidence. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(d) (“The moving party
must serve any supporting affidavit with the motion.”). The district court provided
her with ample opportunities to do so. The court allowed Defendant to freely
Page 5 Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 6
supplement the record up until it disposed of her motion, which she did with several
pages of exhibits, declarations, and a news article. And the court said that it had
“considered all the letters and filings submitted by Defendant in ruling on her
motion.” R., Vol. I at 104 n.2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing
to give Defendant additional (unrequested) opportunities to fulfill her burden of
supporting her claims with evidence.
Defendant argues that she should have been provided an evidentiary hearing to
dispute her present dangerousness. But an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate
only “when any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in
dispute.” United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). And Defendant has not proffered any
evidence to put the issue in dispute.
Finally, Defendant appears to challenge the district court’s decision not to
appoint her counsel. But “there is no constitutional right to counsel to aid in a
defendant’s request for compassionate release.” Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1032. The
decision to appoint counsel is a matter of judicial discretion. See Engberg v.
Wyoming, 265 F.3d 1109, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2001). And as the district court
explained, it did not appoint counsel here because “Defendant’s claim is not
particularly complex factually or legally, and Defendant’s filings show that she is
able to adequately present her claim.” R., Vol. I at 108. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in so concluding.
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III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendant’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motion for compassionate release.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge
Page 7