20-4192 United States v. Peña
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2021 (Argued: March 10, 2022 Decided: December 13, 2022) (Amended: January 27, 2023) Docket No. 20-4192
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v.
JOSE PEÑA, ALSO KNOWN AS CHELO, Defendant-Appellant,
RAFAEL FRANCISCO, ALSO KNOWN AS 67, OMAR FLORES, JOSE SANCHEZ- FERNANDEZ, ALSO KNOWN AS EDDIE, ELYN REYNOSO, ALSO KNOWN AS BB, VLADIMIR DELACRUZ, ALSO KNOWN AS VLADI, HECTOR RAYMOND PEÑA, ALSO KNOWN AS C.O. MONTANA, Defendants.
Before: SACK, LOHIER, AND NARDINI, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellant Jose Peña was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in five counts of an eight-count indictment in connection with the killings of Jose Suarez and Juan Carmona. Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Peña with conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Counts Seven and Eight charged Peña with use of a firearm to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). Peña was convicted on all five counts and received a sentence of five concurrent life terms, one for each count. 20-4192 United States v. Peña
In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Peña filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting that his two § 924(j) convictions on Counts Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court (Marrero, Judge) agreed, and granted the motion. The court declined, however, to resentence Peña de novo. Peña argues that this was error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Peña de novo. We conclude that § 2255's statutory text vests district courts with the discretion to decide when to conduct a de novo resentencing and that de novo resentencing was not mandatory here. We also conclude that because resentencing Peña would have been “strictly ministerial,” resulting in the same sentence of mandatory life imprisonment that he received in the first instance, the district court did not abuse its discretion. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's July 6, 2020 amended judgment and its December 17, 2020 order.
YUANCHUNG LEE, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant;
SAMUEL P. ROTHSCHILD (Karl Metzner, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
SACK, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-appellant Jose Peña was charged in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in five counts of an eight-count
indictment in connection with the killings of Jose Suarez and Juan Carmona.
Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Peña with conspiring to commit, and
committing, murder for hire punishable by life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
2 20-4192 United States v. Peña
§ 1958. Counts Seven and Eight charged Peña with use of a firearm to commit
murder punishable by life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). Peña was
convicted on all five counts. The district court sentenced him to five concurrent
terms of life imprisonment.
In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Peña filed a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting that his two § 924(j) convictions on Counts
Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court (Marrero, Judge) granted
the motion, but it did not resentence Peña de novo. Peña argues that this was
error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district
court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Peña de novo. We conclude
that § 2255's statutory text vests district courts with discretion in such
circumstances to decide whether or not to conduct a de novo resentencing; de novo
resentencing was not, under the circumstances presented here, mandatory. We
also conclude that because resentencing Peña would have resulted in the same
sentence of mandatory life imprisonment as to which he was originally
sentenced, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to engage in
such a strictly ministerial de novo resentencing.
3 20-4192 United States v. Peña
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On April 15, 2013, a Southern District grand jury returned an eight-count
indictment against Jose Peña and two others, including Peña's brother. Peña was
charged in five of the eight counts. Count Four charged him with conspiracy to
commit murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, alleging that he
conspired to kill Jose Suarez, which resulted in the deaths of Suarez and Juan
Carmona. Count Five charged Peña with murder for hire in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1958 for the killing of Suarez. Count Six charged him with
murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1958 for the killing of Carmona.
Count Seven charged him with use of a firearm to commit murder for the killing
of Suarez in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(j), both in relation to a crime of
violence—the conspiracy to commit murder for hire charged in Count Four of
the indictment—and in relation to an uncharged drug trafficking conspiracy.
Count Eight charged Peña with use of a firearm to commit murder for the killing
of Carmona in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(j), both in relation to a crime of
violence—the conspiracy to commit murder for hire charged in Count Four of
the indictment—and in relation to an uncharged drug trafficking conspiracy.
4 20-4192 United States v. Peña
Trial began on October 15, 2013. At trial, the government proffered
evidence that Peña and his brother disguised themselves as police officers; used
those disguises to stop and kidnap Suarez and Carmona on June 25, 1997; fatally
shot them; and set fire to their bodies. The government's case included, among
other evidence, the testimony of more than two dozen witnesses; ballistics
reports; crime-scene evidence including video surveillance and handcuffs used
in the disguise; and a gun recovered from Peña's brother, Hector.
The district court’s instruction to the jury on Count Four included the
statement: "[Y]ou may find the defendants guilty of the crime of conspiring to
commit a murder for hire even if no murder for hire was actually committed.
Conspiracy is a crime, even if the conspiracy was not successful. Substantive
murder for hire is also charged in Counts Two, Five and Six, as you know." Jose
Peña App’x 44, Excerpts of Jury Trial dated October 28, 2013. That portion of the
instruction was erroneous. While the jury was not required to find that a victim
of the crime died in order to convict Peña for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), such a
finding was required to subject Peña to the enhanced punishment of death or life
imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (providing inter alia that whoever
conspires to use interstate commerce to commit murder for hire shall be
5 20-4192 United States v. Peña
imprisoned for not more than ten years if death or personal injury does not result
and punished by death or life imprisonment if death does result); see also Burrage
v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (concluding while interpreting an
unrelated statute that "[b]ecause the 'death results' enhancement increased the
minimum and maximum sentences to which [the defendant] was exposed, it is
an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt").
Similarly, the district court erroneously instructed the jury regarding
Counts Five and Six, stating that: "The government does not have to prove that
the murder was committed or even that it was attempted. It must prove that the
travel in interstate or foreign commerce or the use of the facility of interstate or
foreign commerce was done with the intent to further or facilitate the
commission of the murder." Jose Peña App’x 44, Excerpts of Jury Trial dated
October 28, 2013. Again, the instruction was erroneous inasmuch as the jury was
indeed required to find that death resulted to subject Peña to the maximum
punishment for these offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).
Trial concluded on October 29, 2013. The jury convicted Peña on all five
counts against him.
6 20-4192 United States v. Peña
On December 19, 2014, the district court held Peña's sentencing hearing.
The Presentence Report ("PSR") concluded that the three § 1958 counts qualified
for a mandatory life sentence, the two § 924(j) counts carried a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment, and the Sentencing Guidelines range was life. The
district court sentenced Peña to five concurrent terms of life imprisonment, one
for each count, and imposed a $500 mandatory special assessment.
Procedural History
Peña appealed to this Court, which affirmed the district court's judgment
in 2016. See United States v. Francisco, 642 F. App'x 40, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2016)
(summary order). Later that same year, Peña moved pursuant to § 2255 to vacate
his convictions on several grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Pena v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 3d 483, 486–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The district
court denied the motion. Id. at 496. In 2017, Peña moved in this Court for a
certificate of appealability. See Pena v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 578, 579
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining procedural history). We dismissed the appeal
because the notice of appeal was untimely. See id. Later in 2017, Peña again
moved to reopen his § 2255 proceeding. Id. In 2018, the district court denied that
motion. Id. at 578. Peña then moved in this Court for a certificate of
7 20-4192 United States v. Peña
appealability, which we denied in 2019. See Pena v. United States, No. 18-3315,
2019 WL 11891995, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2019).
In February 2020, Peña moved in this Court for permission to file another
§ 2255 motion in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Davis held
that an offense could qualify as a predicate "crime of violence" for purposes of
§ 924(c) only if it was a felony that "ha[d] as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Id. at
2323–24 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2336 (declaring unconstitutional a
separate clause of § 924(c) that defined a predicate "crime of violence" as a felony
"that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense" (citation omitted)). Peña argued that conspiracy to commit murder for
hire no longer qualified as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) because
such a conspiracy does not require actual or threatened use of physical force. We
granted Peña permission to file another § 2255 motion. See Pena v. United States,
No. 19-1545, 2020 WL 6846397, at *1 (2d Cir. July 15, 2020).
The government consented to the vacatur of Peña's convictions on Counts
Seven and Eight, agreeing that those convictions could not stand after Davis. On
8 20-4192 United States v. Peña
July 6, 2020, the district court granted Peña's motion to vacate Counts Seven and
Eight. However, the court decided that a full resentencing was not warranted
"[b]ecause vacatur of Counts Seven and Eight will not affect Peña's other
convictions, each of which carries a mandatory term of life imprisonment." Jose
Peña App’x 68, Order dated July 6, 2020. The district court amended the
judgment to reflect concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on Counts Four,
Five, and Six.
Peña moved for reconsideration. He argued that de novo resentencing was
mandatory, citing United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2009). He
also argued that, because the court erroneously failed to instruct the jury to
determine whether death resulted from the murder-for-hire conspiracy described
in the three § 1958 counts, the district court erred in denying de novo
resentencing. Peña claimed that, because the jury did not specifically find that
death was a result of Peña's offenses in Counts Four, Five, and Six, the district
court could sentence him to only ten years of imprisonment on each of those
counts.
On December 17, 2020, the district court denied Peña's motion for
reconsideration. It reasoned that the "rule requiring de novo resentencing" is
9 20-4192 United States v. Peña
"expressly limited to instances in which a conviction was overturned on direct
appeal" and "does not apply in the Section 2255 context." Jose Peña App’x 94,
Decision and Order dated December 17, 2020. The court also rejected Peña's
argument that—because of the deficient jury instructions for Counts Four, Five,
and Six—Peña could be sentenced to no more than ten years on each count,
stating that "in convicting Peña of Counts Seven and Eight, the jury necessarily
found that Peña was a substantial factor in causing the victim's death and also
that the victim was in fact murdered, i.e., that death resulted." Id. at 96 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Peña timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. De Novo Resentencing Was Not Mandatory
Section 2255 grants district courts the discretion to choose among four
remedies when reviewing a sentence that was not authorized by law or is
otherwise open to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). A court may: "[1]
vacate and set the judgment aside and . . . discharge the prisoner or [2]
resentence him or [3] grant a new trial or [4] correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate." Id.
10 20-4192 United States v. Peña
Peña relies on our decisions in United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d
Cir. 2002), and Rigas to argue that the district court was required to conduct a de
novo resentencing. Neither of these decisions justifies a conclusion that de novo
resentencing was mandatory here.
In Quintieri, we considered whether a district court was required to
resentence a defendant de novo after we had vacated the defendant's sentence and
remanded for resentencing. 306 F.3d at 1221–22. We commented that
resentencing "usually" should be de novo after a conviction is reversed on appeal.
Id. at 1228. But the defendant there did not have any of his convictions
overturned on appeal. See id. at 1223, 1229. We had remanded because his
sentence was incorrectly calculated; his convictions, however, were valid. See id.
at 1223 (explaining that the Court affirmed the defendant's convictions on direct
appeal and that, in later habeas litigation, the Court remanded for resentencing
because it appeared that the offense level for one of the defendant's convictions
was improperly enhanced); id. at 1229 (noting that the remand "was limited to
the issue" of sentence calculation). 1 Quintieri therefore held that, in large part
because the defendant complained of an error that impacted only his sentence
1The original version of this Opinion incorrectly stated that Quintieri was decided in the context of a direct appeal. We issue this Amended Opinion to correct that error.
11 20-4192 United States v. Peña
and not the validity of his underlying conviction, de novo resentencing was not
mandatory. Id. at 1228. Hence, while Quintieri contains dicta about what
"usually" and "likely" should happen when a conviction is overturned on appeal,
the case's holding is limited to the modest proposition that de novo resentencing
was not required to correct the sentencing error under the circumstances
presented in that case. Id. Quintieri does not stand for the assertion that de novo
resentencing is mandatory whenever a conviction is overturned by this Court.
In contrast to Quintieri, Rigas did involve defendants who had a portion of
their convictions overturned on appeal. 583 F.3d at 113, 118. We held that the
defendants were entitled to de novo resentencing because "de novo resentencing is
required where a conviction is reversed in part on appeal." Id. at 115, 118; see also
id. at 117 (underscoring that this requirement is a "rule, not a guideline"). But
Rigas was decided in the context of a direct appeal, not a collateral challenge
pursuant to § 2255 such as the case before us now. See id. at 113. Peña argues
that this procedural posture is a distinction without a difference and urges us to
extend the default rule in Rigas to the § 2255 context. We decline to do so. While
the default rule in Rigas may apply whenever a conviction is reversed on direct
appeal, § 2255's plain text, which vests district courts with discretion to select the
12 20-4192 United States v. Peña
appropriate relief from a menu of options, precludes us from applying the Rigas
default rule to all cases that arise in the § 2255 context.
District courts in this Circuit have come to a similar conclusion. For
example, in United States v. Medunjanin, No. 10-cr-0019 (BMC), 2020 WL 5912323
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), the district court held that "the default rule does not
require a de novo resentencing in the § 2255 context" because the "plain text of
§ 2255 vests the Court 'with the discretion to determine first the nature of the
relief that 'may appear appropriate,''" id. at *8 (citation omitted). Similarly, in
Ayyad v. United States, No. 16-cv-4346 (LAK), 2020 WL 5018163 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2020), the district court noted that it was not "aware of[] any case in which the [de
novo resentencing] default rule has been applied in the habeas context" and
reasoned that such a rule "would be in tension with the narrow scope of Section
2255," id. at *2.
We have held that judges have discretion with respect to resentencing in
the § 2255 context. In United States v. Gordils, 117 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), we
rejected the defendant's argument that district courts have no discretion to
engage in de novo resentencing under § 2255, id. at 104. "[A]t least in the context
of a 'truly interdependent sentence' such as where a mandatory consecutive
13 20-4192 United States v. Peña
sentence affects the applicable offense level under the guidelines—the language
of § 2255 provides sufficient statutory authority for a district court to exercise its
jurisdiction to resentence defendants 'as may appear appropriate.'" Id. (citations
omitted). Peña argues that the discretion discussed in Gordils was erased by
Quintieri and Rigas. We conclude to the contrary that § 2255's statutory text
continues to grant district courts discretion in the matter.
The government argues that every circuit to analyze this issue has held
that de novo resentencing is not required in this context. That appears to be
correct.
A recent opinion of the Sixth Circuit is instructive. In United States v.
Augustin, 16 F.4th 227 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1458 (mem.) (2022), a
defendant was convicted on eight counts of an indictment, including a conviction
under § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence, id. at 231. After
Augustin argued that his § 924(c) conviction was no longer valid under Davis,
the district court vacated his § 924(c) conviction and the corresponding 120-
month sentence without a de novo resentencing. Id.
Augustin argued on appeal that the district court should instead have
resentenced him. Augustin, 16 F.4th at 231. The Sixth Circuit noted that
14 20-4192 United States v. Peña
resentencing is "akin to 'beginning the sentencing process anew'" and requires a
full sentencing hearing. Id. at 232 (citation omitted). A sentence correction, on
the other hand, is appropriate when "it simply vacates 'unlawful convictions
(and accompanying sentences)' without choosing to reevaluate 'the
appropriateness of the defendant's original sentence.'" Id. (citation omitted). The
Sixth Circuit concluded that "district courts have broad [but not unbounded 2]
discretion to choose between these remedies." Id.
At oral argument, Peña conceded that no other circuit has held that de novo
resentencing is required in the § 2255 context. See, e.g., Troiano v. United States,
918 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2019) ("[T]he decision to unbundle a sentencing
package—that is, to conduct a full resentencing on all remaining counts of
conviction when one or more counts of a multi-count conviction are undone—
rests within the sound discretion of the district court."); United States v. Palmer,
2 For example, [R]esentencing may be necessary if the error "undermines the sentence as a whole" such that the district court must "revisit the entire sentence." In that case, a court would need to start from scratch—that is, to recalculate the Guidelines range, reconsider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and "determine[] anew what the sentence should be." Resentencing may also be necessary if a court must exercise significant discretion "in ways it was not called upon to do at the initial sentencing." For instance, if the court "vacates a mandatory-minimum sentence and then is able to consider the statutory sentencing factors for the first time." Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The issue is discussed further below. 15 20-4192 United States v. Peña
854 F.3d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("The district court was required to do no more,
for Section 2255(b) accords it discretion in choosing from among four remedies,
'as may appear appropriate.'"). We find our sister circuits' reasoning to be
persuasive. We conclude that § 2255 grants district courts discretion in selecting
a remedy.
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Peña argues that even if a district court is not required to conduct a de novo
resentencing in the § 2255 context after a conviction has been reversed, the
district court abused its discretion by not resentencing Peña de novo. Peña bases
his argument on the contention that—under the flawed jury instructions for
Counts Four, Five, and Six—he was convicted of only the base offense under
§ 1958: conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire. Inasmuch as
that crime carries a ten-year maximum sentence, he asserts, a full resentencing
would result in a significantly lower sentence on those counts. According to
Peña, the district court did not fully appreciate these points and misunderstood
the authority it had to impose a non-life sentence at his resentencing. Peña's
argument fails for two reasons.
First, Peña's argument regarding his § 1958 convictions and the sentences
16 20-4192 United States v. Peña
he would receive on resentencing is procedurally defaulted. "In general, a
defendant is barred from collaterally challenging a conviction under § 2255 on a
ground that he failed to raise on direct appeal." United States v. Thorn, 659 F.3d
227, 231 (2d Cir. 2011). Peña had the opportunity to challenge the erroneous jury
instructions associated with his convictions on Counts Four, Five, and Six before
the verdict or after his trial. He did not do so. He then failed to raise the issue on
his direct appeal. See Francisco, 642 F. App'x at 45 (describing Peña's arguments
on appeal). These failures constituted a procedural default. 3
Peña asserts that "[t]he Government . . . attacks a straw person in arguing
that such an argument is procedurally defaulted" because Peña is simply
claiming that the district court abused its discretion when declining to resentence
him. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8–9. But Peña's abuse-of-discretion argument is
3 The Supreme Court has "acknowledged that in certain circumstances counsel's ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve the claim for review . . . will suffice" as cause to excuse a procedural default, Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000), but that argument is unavailable here. Peña challenged the validity of his convictions on Counts Four, Five, and Six in his first § 2255 motion, citing ineffectiveness of counsel. See Pena, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 494 ("Pena claims that Sentencing Counsel was ineffective because she failed to raise the claim . . . that the jury must determine whether death did in fact result from Pena's conduct as required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1958."). The district court rejected Peña's argument, id. at 494–95, and we dismissed his appeal, see Pena, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 579. Any claim raised in a § 2255 motion "that was also raised in [a] previous § 2255 motion . . . is precluded from consideration by this Court." Riascos-Prado v. United States, 66 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1995) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 17 20-4192 United States v. Peña
the same as the procedurally defaulted argument that the sentences he received
on Counts Four, Five, and Six were unlawful because he was charged on
erroneous jury instructions. See id. at 9 ("[T]he court mistakenly believed that
resentencing was pointless because it would be required to reimpose the same
life sentences on the § 1958 counts at such a proceeding."). A defendant can raise
new arguments in a § 2255 motion "if the defendant establishes (1) cause for the
procedural default and ensuing prejudice or (2) actual innocence." Thorn, 659
F.3d at 231. Peña cannot establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence; he
does not even attempt to do so. We reject Peña's attempt thus to sidestep the
procedural-default rule. A district court's decision to deny a defendant's request
for resentencing in the § 2255 context does not empower a defendant to raise
otherwise procedurally defaulted arguments against the merits of the
defendant's convictions and sentence. 4
Second, even if Peña were allowed to raise his challenges to his sentences
on Counts Four, Five, and Six in this § 2255 motion, his challenges would fail.
Peña contends that because the district court instructed the jury that it did not
need to find that death resulted in order to convict him of these three counts,
4We need not and do not express any opinion about the arguments Peña would be permitted to make at resentencing had the district court granted his request for a resentencing de novo. 18 20-4192 United States v. Peña
Peña's sentences for those convictions may not exceed 10 years on each count,
Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Peña with conspiracy to commit murder for
hire, and murder for hire, in violation of § 1958. This statute contains three levels
of punishment depending on the result of the murder-for-hire conduct. Those
who violate the base offense, use of interstate commerce in the commission of
murder for hire, "shall be fined . . . or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or
both." 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). "[I]f personal injury results" from the base offense,
violators "shall be fined . . . or imprisoned for not more than twenty years, or
both." Id. But "if death results, [violators] shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment, or shall be fined not more than $250,000, or both." Id.
Peña is correct that the district court should have instructed the jury it
needed to determine whether death was a result of the conduct alleged in Counts
Four, Five, and Six. Under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), any fact, other than a prior conviction,
that triggers statutory mandatory minimums and maximums must be found by a
jury or admitted by the defendant. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103 ("[A]ny fact that
increases the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that must be submitted to the
jury."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
19 20-4192 United States v. Peña
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (holding that
Apprendi is not violated when the relevant fact is “admitted by the defendant”).
Whether death resulted is a fact that triggered a higher mandatory minimum
sentence, and the district court erred by not instructing the jury to make a
finding as to this fact if it determined that Peña was guilty of Counts Four, Five,
and Six.
But the district court's error was harmless. Alleyne and Apprendi errors are
subject to harmless-error analysis. See United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 156
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2002). "In
undertaking a harmless-error analysis, we must determine whether it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Friedman, 300 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) ("[W]here a
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is
20 20-4192 United States v. Peña
properly found to be harmless.").
There is overwhelming evidence that the jury would have found that
death was the result of the conduct alleged in Counts Four, Five, and Six had it
received proper instructions. As an initial matter, Peña's murder-for-hire
conspiracy did result in the deaths of Suarez and Carmona, and the jury heard
evidence of this fact at trial. The jury also convicted Peña of use of a firearm to
commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) in Counts Seven and Eight. The
jury could not have returned this verdict without finding that Peña's conduct
resulted in death. Although Peña's convictions on Counts Seven and Eight are
no longer valid following Davis, the jury's verdict demonstrates that it would
have found that death resulted from Peña's murder-for-hire conspiracy had it
received proper instructions on Counts Four, Five, and Six.
Peña objects to our inquiry into what the jury would have found had it
received proper instructions, but he bases his objection largely on cases where
the indictment failed to allege an element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v.
Lang, 732 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) ("We cannot combine the allegations
from separate counts to allege what the indictment itself does not."); see also
United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667–69 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (district
21 20-4192 United States v. Peña
court erred in sentencing defendant based on its own finding that the defendant's
crime involved a specific drug quantity when the indictment did not allege any
specific drug quantity and the jury did not make a finding on this issue). There
was no such indictment error here: Counts Four, Five, and Six of the indictment
did allege that Peña's murder-for-hire conspiracy resulted in death. And even if
that allegation had been omitted, our case law makes clear that the mistaken
omission of an element from an indictment is amenable to harmless-error
analysis. See United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n
Apprendi violation concerning an omission from an indictment is not noticeable
as plain error where the evidence is overwhelming that the grand jury would
have found the fact at issue. We think the same analysis should apply to
harmless error.” (internal citation omitted)). Any such omission would have
been harmless for the same reasons as the instructional error.5
5 We decided a similar case in United States v. Ventura, 742 F. App'x 575 (2d Cir. 2018). Ventura is a summary order and therefore not binding precedent. We note nonetheless that the defendant- appellant there argued "that the district court erroneously sentenced him to a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment on Counts Two and Three, the murder-for-hire charges, in the absence of a jury finding specifically authorizing such a minimum." Id. at 579. As in this case, "the district court did not charge the jury with specifically finding that 'death resulted'" from the conduct alleged in the two murder-for-hire charges. Id. at 580. The panel in Ventura reasoned that this error was harmless because "the evidence was overwhelming that the deaths did result from Ventura's murder for hire conduct," and observed that "the jury convicted Ventura of causing the death . . . of those two victims when it convicted him of" use of a firearm to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). Id. at 578, 580. Binding or not, we see no fault in Ventura’s harmless-error analysis. 22 20-4192 United States v. Peña
Having concluded that Peña's challenges to his § 1958 sentences are
defaulted and in any event meritless, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying to resentence Peña de novo. Any resentencing
would have been "strictly ministerial," serving simply to delete the sentences on
the now-vacated counts. Cf. United States v. Powers, 842 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir.
2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted). As noted in our discussion of Augustin
above, a district court's discretion to not conduct a de novo resentencing has
limits. It may be that in most cases in which resentencing would not be strictly
ministerial, a district court abuses its discretion when it denies de novo
resentencing. But we need not and do not attempt today to define the
circumstances under which a district court abuses its discretion in denying de
novo resentencing. It is enough, in light of the facts of the case at bar, to conclude
only that a district court may properly deny de novo resentencing when the
exercise would be an empty formality, as it would be here.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Peña's remaining arguments on appeal and conclude
that they are without merit. For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the
district court's July 6, 2020 amended judgment and December 17, 2020 order.