United States v. Payson

27 F. Cas. 474, 1863 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29
District Court, N.D. California·Decided April 8, 1863·Published

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The claim for the Rancho Cañada de Guadalupe, La Visitación y Rodeo Viejo, granted by Governor Alvarado to Jacob P. Leese, July 31, 1841, was finally confirmed to Henry R. Payson, with the exception of a certain tract which had been sold by Ridley, the assignee of Leese, to parties from whom Pierce derived title. For this excepted tract William Pierce duly presented his claim and obtained a final decree of confirmation. In the decree in the Payson case the land excepted from its operation is described in the language of the deed under which Pierce claimed, and, in the Pierce suit the land confirmed to him is described in the same terms. As the deed describes the tract by courses and distances, and as its execution and validity are not disputed, it would seem that there should be no difficulty in running off and establishing the lines. But, on attempting to apply the calls of the deed to the ground, most embarrassing questions have arisen. It is found that of the three last courses mentioned in the deed one is partly, and two others are wholly, in the waters of the Bay of San Francisco. These courses, as given in the deed, are as follows: “Thence east, 37 chains 37 links; thence south, 75° 30' east, 44 chains 16 links; thence north, 18° east, to place of beginning.”

In running the lines called for in the deed and decree, taking them as true, the surveyor found that the first of these courses could not be completed without running into the bay. He therefore stopped at the shore, leaving the length of the course less by 3 chains and 2 links than that called for. The next course, if run in the direction and to the length called for, would have terminated at a point in the bay nearly 5/8ths of a mile distant from the point on the shore at which the surveyor stopped; while the last course would, in like manner, be wholly in the bay, terminating at a rock on the shore from which the survey began. It will be observed that, in each of these courses, except the last, distance is given as well as direction. It might seem, therefore, that the first two must have been surveyed and their lengths determined by actual measurement. But this, if the deed is to be literally followed, is evidently impossible; for the 14th, or next- to the last, course in the deed, is a point on he bay more than half a mile distant from the shore, and inaccessible to the surveyor. It was therefore impossible for him to determine the length of this course by measurement, or to ascertain by observation how its points of termination bore from the point of beginning. It is possible, however, that the surveyor, after running out the previous courses on land, may have drawn the courses on his map and determined their length by calculation. But this seems highly improbable. The official survey has followed, with some slight variations, the calls of the deed— except that on reaching the shore in the [475]*47513tli course, the margin of the hay is meandered to the place of beginning, and the remainder of the 13th, together with the 14th and 15th courses, is discarded, as including lands not embraced within the original grant.

To this survey the claimants of the tract and the United States object. It is contended that the line of a fence, erected in the winter of 1851-2, should be adopted as the true boundary of the tract. It appears that, in 1849, Leese, the grantee, conveyed the entire tract to Ridley. In January, 1851, Ridley conveyed to Hammond, Votes, and Gorham the tract now in question, and known as “Visitación Valley.” In September, 1851, Gorham released to Hammond and Votes, and in the same month Hammond conveyed to Votes. In October, 1851, Votes sold to Baton and Bryant, but the deed was to Baton alone. The present claimants derive title from Eaton. In July, 1851, all the right, title, and interest of Rid-ley in and to the remaining portion of the rancho was sold under execution by the sheriff of the county. The claimant, Pay-son, derives title from the purchaser at this sale. The fence in question was erected by Eaton and Bryant in the winter succeeding the sheriff’s sale. It does not appear that any attempt was made to place it on the lines called for in the deed. On the northerly side a line indicated by some stakes was followed, but by whom these stakes were planted, or with what object, does not appear. On the southerly side of the valley the fence was erected on the hill side, about one-third the distance from the base to the crest, in accordance, it would seem, with a general idea derived by Bryant and Eaton from Votes that the land purchased included the valley and the slope of the hills to about that distance. It does not appear that Ridley was aware of these proceedings. Xo proof is offered that he pointed out the land inclosed by the fence as the tract sold by him, or that he has in any way indicated an intention to sell any other tract than that described in the deed. An attempt is made by Mr. Matthewson, the surveyor, to reconcile the calls of the deed with the lines of the fence. He observed that the line of the fence begins at the rock admitted to be the point of beginning and ends on the shore of the bay at a point from which the point of beginning bears north 1S° 23' east magnetic. This last course agrees within 23' of the last course mentioned in the deed, taking it, also, as magnetic. Mr. Matthewson was of opinion that this coincidence was too remarkable to be accidental, and therefore supposed that the fence was intended to be placed on the lines described in the deed, especially as it seemed far more probable that the last course was determined by observation, and that the surveyor obtained the bearings of the point of beginning by sighting it with an instrument placed on the land, than that he laid down by calculation two courses and part of a third wholly in the water. But in attempting to make the calls of the deed conform to the lines of the fence he is obliged to alter three of them by substituting a southwesterly for a northwesterly direction. But even with this alteration the lines do not exactly coincide. In fact no one of the courses of the fence corresponds with a course described in the deed. The difference, however, is slight, and the tract enclosed is substantially the same. The hypothesis of Mr. Matthewson derives some additional probability from the fact that the tract granted seems to have been known as “Visitación Valley,” though it is not so named in the deed. It would seem probable therefore that the whole valley was intended to be granted, bounded on either side by lines drawn along the slope of the hills at a uniform distance from their base. On the south side the line must be located along the falda or hillside, whether we take the courses of the deed as magnetic or as true, or adopt the line of the fence. It would seem probable that a corresponding line was intended to be adopted as the boundary of the valley on the northern side, and not a line running through and excluding a portion of the level land. On the other hand the area of the tract included in the survey, as proposed by Mr. Matthewson, is more than 1,100 acres, while the deed mentions the extent of the land at 700 acres, “more or less.” That its extent was not accurately known is evident, but a difference of 400 acres between its actual and its supposed area is so great a discrepancy as to afford an argument of some force against Mr. Matthewson’s theory. That the deed was intended to convey the tract surrounded by the fence is also rendered probable by another circumstance.

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United States v. Payson, 27 F. Cas. 474, 1863 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29 (N.D. Cal. 1863).

27 F. Cas. 474 (United States v. Payson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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