Vance v. Marshall

6 Ky. 148, 3 Bibb 148, 1813 Ky. LEXIS 70
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedNovember 16, 1813
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 6 Ky. 148 (Vance v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vance v. Marshall, 6 Ky. 148, 3 Bibb 148, 1813 Ky. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1813).

Opinion

[148]*148OPINION of the Court, by

Judge Owsley.

Tina is a contest for land, between adversary titles. Théap-Pe^ant> who was defendant in the court below, holds the eldest entry and patent : we will therefore first inquire into the validity of his claim.

■ J,_,hn Vance, under whom he claims, obtained from the court of commissioners, the 14th of J anuary 1780, the following certificate, viz. “ John Vance, by Oavid Yance, this day claims a pre-emption of 1000 acres of at, See. lying on a fork of the east branch of Licking creek, called Mill creek, to include his improve-metlti by marking and improving the same in 1776, by building a cabin,” &c. And on the first day of June 1780, made the following entry with the surveyor: fohn Vance entert a pre-emption warrant of 1000 ^cres, on a fork of the east branch of Licking creek, called Mill creek.”

That both the certificate and entry are defective in precise description, we have no doubt. Mill creek is admitted to be about six miles long, with various improvements thereon ; but on what part of the creek Vance’s improvement could be found, or when found how distinguishable from other improvements on the neither the certificate nor entry has shewn. Ualess, therefore, Vance’s improvement had acquired the requisite notoriety at the date of his entry, to supply tbis defect in description, his entry must fail : and that the evidence does not prove such a notoriety, we think [149]*149evident: for although it is proven that if a subsequent locator had happened to.have fallen in with one of the company who assisted in making Vance’s improvement,' he might have acquired information where it could be found, yet it is not proven to have obtained that degree of notoriety by which a subsequent locator, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, might have certainly found it.

That it was known to one company ofim-provers,not fuf-ficient evidc-ice of no'oriefv — « Accord' man vs Melton, voi 2 155 6 Harrison's heirs •vs Dertmiab, 349*

TRe appellant then can have no advantage from the elder date of his entry, but,must rely for success on his elder patent. We will therefore inquire into the validity of the appellee’s claim. He derives title under the following entry :

“ June 16, 1780 — Col. Thomas Marshall enters 1050 acres, upon a treasury warrant, to begin at the end of two miles and a half east of William May’s spring, where the said May’s settlement and pre-emption is lo cated, then to run N. 22 1-2 east, 1280 poles, and to extend from each end of said line eastwardlv for quantity ; tying on the waters of the north fork of Licking creek, on the south side thereof.”

In the progress of this cause in the court below, it was admitted by the parties that the just arid legal construe-tion of the appellee’s entry is to begin two and a half miles east from May’s lick, and then run as called for in the entry ; and it is now urged for the appellant tha# this admission should not bind him, because it ¡3 contended it is an admission of law contrary to the just construction of the entry.

It is proven that a large buffalo road, leading from. Limestone to the Blue licks and usually travelled by passengers, passed May’s lick qt the date of this entry ; and that the lick was then generally known by those conversant in that part-of the country.

To justify the construction given to the entry by the parties in their agreement, May’s lick and May’s spring alluded to in the entry must be one and the same place. Of this the parties appear not to have been ignorant previous to making the admission: for whether the lick and spring is the same place, was a fact then in contest, to which evidence had been taken. The admission, therefore, was not a conclusion of law only, contrary'to .the just construction of the entry, but contains an admission of the fact of identity in the spring and [150]*150lick, and the regular conclusion, of law applicable to tha$ fact.

•i Tbewordsc>f conftrued »ccor. ding to their u. fuai andordina. Accord. fíiVers Graham, voi. a, ?4S* Entry catling to begin two s a half miles E. fec.^the Sbéginl ning is to be af-certamed by the magnetic meridian, and the furveyexecuted according to the magnetic meridian at thc'dace of the entry. The court cannot judicially take notice that any variation of the mag. netic meridian has occurred be. tween the date of the entry and the date of :he (urvey — theva. riation between given periods,id a ¡aft to be proved.

[150]*150The parties by their admission having agreed the appellee’s entry should begin two and a half miles east of the lick, and the identity and notoriety of the lick having been abundantly proven, the question occurs, should the beginning be at the end of two and a half miles from the lick, according to the true, or magnetic meridian ? *

The words of the entry should be construed accord. • tQ usual and ordinary acceptation ; and it is believed that call;-, m entries for given courses, were usually and generally understood to be according to the magnetic median. This, we apprehend, is evident from the general, it not universal custom which has prevailed in this country among surveyors in executing surveys according to the magnetic meridian. Besides, to have made subsequent locators regard such calls according to the true meridian, would have been requiring more perhaps than could have been attained by most of the locators in the country: for it is believed instruments were not then to be had in the country by which the true meridian could have been correctly ascertained.

We are of opinion, therefore, the beginning of the ap-pellee’s survey should be ascertained according to the fuagnetic

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Ky. 148, 3 Bibb 148, 1813 Ky. LEXIS 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vance-v-marshall-kyctapp-1813.