United States v. Park

825 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2011 WL 5593139
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedNovember 16, 2011
DocketCriminal L-11-0600
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 825 F. Supp. 2d 644 (United States v. Park) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Park, 825 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2011 WL 5593139 (D. Md. 2011).

Opinion

RESTRAINING ORDER

BENSON E. LEGG, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the ex parte motion of the United States for a restraining order issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(e)(1)(A) and (4).

On November 8, 2011, the grand jury returned a criminal indictment charging the defendants with bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1349, respectively. The forfeiture count in the indictment also alleges that the proceeds of those offenses, and any assets that may be substituted therefore, are subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).

A. Authority to Issue a Restraining Order

Title 21, Section 853(e)(1)(A) authorizes the pre-trial restraint of assets subject to forfeiture upon the filing of an indictment or information. 1 In the Fourth Circuit, this provision applies equally to property directly traceable to the alleged offense and to substitute assets. See In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 920 (4th Cir.1990).

The Government’s motion for the restraining order may be made ex parte. See United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C.Cir.2008) (agreeing with Monsanto that no pre-restraint hearing is required); United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 493 F.3d 469, 475 (5th Cir.2007) (en banc); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192-92 (2d Cir.1991) (en banc). The criteria for granting a defendant a post-restraint hearing to seek modification of the restraining order are set forth in United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804-05 (4th Cir.2001) (defendant entitled to pretrial hearing if property is seized for civil forfeiture if he demonstrates that he has no other assets available with which to retain counsel, and defendant makes a prima facie showing that the restrained property is not subject to forfeiture).

The standard for issuing a restraining order is probable cause. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615-16, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). In issuing a restraining order, the court may rely on the finding of probable cause made by the grand jury in returning the indictment. See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 421 (4th Cir.2001) (the grand jury’s finding of probable cause is sufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden); In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Adams, 782 F.Supp.2d 229 (N.D.W.Va.2011) (the court may rely on the grand jury’s finding of probable cause in determining the amount of money the defendant will be ordered to repatriate under § 853(e)(4)); United States v. Wingerter, 369 F.Supp.2d 799, 806 n. 10 (E.D.Va.2005) (the listing of the property in the forfeiture allegation in the indictment reflects the grand jury’s finding of probable cause regarding the forfeitability of the property; the restraining order may be issued based on the showing of probable cause alone; there is no need to show, as there is for preindictment orders, that the property is likely to disappear).

*647 Once the Government has made the required probable cause showing, the entry of a pre-trial restraining order is mandatory with respect to both the directly forfeitable property and any substitute assets. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 612-13, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (the word “may” in section 853(e) means only that the district court may enter a restraining order if the Government requests it, but not otherwise, and that it is not required to enter the order if a bond or other means exists to preserve the property; it “cannot sensibly be construed to give district court[s] discretion to permit the dissipation of the very property that section 853(a) requires to be forfeited upon conviction”); United States v. Wingerter, 369 F.Supp.2d 799, 811 (E.D.Va.2005) (“there is no discretion to permit a defendant to spend assets that are subject to forfeiture, including substitute assets. They must be preserved for forfeiture.”); United States v. Amoruso, 2009 WL 1037917 (N.D.W.Va. Mar. 30, 2009) (following Monsanto and Wingerter; issuance of a pre-trial restraining order is mandatory; the court’s only discretion relates to the manner of the restraint; in the Fourth Circuit, this applies to substitute assets).

Property in which a third party has an interest may be subject to pre-trial restraint so that the Government’s forfeitable interest in the property may be preserved. See United States v. Bailey, 419 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that the Government is not without remedy when the forfeitable property is in the hands of a third party: it can request a pretrial restraining order); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir.1988) (restraining orders may include third party property where no other means are available and the property is - in danger of dissipation); United States v. Madoff, 2009 WL 1055792 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2009) (setting forth text of order restraining defendant, his wife, and anyone acting in concert with them or on their behalf from transferring or dissipating any of their assets). Third parties may not intervene in the criminal case to object to, or to seek modification of, the restraining order, but their rights are protected by their ability to contest any ensuing order of forfeiture in the post-trial ancillary proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Rule 32.2(c), F.R.Crim.P. See United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
825 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2011 WL 5593139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-park-mdd-2011.