KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Pamela M. Manapat was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits “knowingly and willfully” making false statements to any department or agency of the United States.
I. Background
The case arose after Manapat submitted an application for an Airman Medical Certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration. On the application form, Manapat checked “No” to two questions asking for “Record of traffic convictions” and “Record of other convictions.” In fact, she had been convicted three times prior to filling out the form.
Manapat moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the application form was ambiguous and misleading. Item 21 of the form was entitled “MEDICAL HISTORY.” Item 21 then contained four columns, each with the heading “Condition.” The form instructed the applicant to check “Yes” or “No” to whether or not the applicant had had any of the “conditions” listed. The twenty-four item list started with “Frequent or severe headaches,” “Dizziness or fainting spells,” “Unconsciousness [1099]*1099for any reason,” and proceeded to list many other medical conditions. The twenty-second and twenty-third items listed, however, were “Record of traffic convictions,” and “Record of other convictions.” The final item was “Other illnesses.” See Appendix. The district court originally denied the motion to dismiss, but then reconsidered the motion sua sponte. After making the following statement from the bench, the trial judge dismissed the indictment:
I have determined that it is a matter of fundamental fairness. And the way their question has been put on this form, which is basically to determine medical conditions, is fundamentally unfair; that the way it is put is vague. It is misleading and confusing. It is ambiguous, and the way it is configured in the form amounts to a trick question; and I think it is fundamentally unfair to base a felony prosecution on any answers that may be given by anybody on this form. And it is so fundamentally unfair that it amounts to a denial of due process.
II. Discussion
The district court dismissed the indictment upon its conclusion that the application form was ambiguous as a matter of law. Our review of the dismissal is therefore plenary. See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir.1987).
The issue of ambiguous questions has rarely arisen in cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Several other federal statutes, however, prohibit making false statements in other contexts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements intended to influence a financial institution); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (false statements to a grand jury or court (perjury)). The reasoning in cases concerning those statutes is equally applicable to the issue in this case, and we therefore look to those cases to guide our inquiry.
Judge Ely of the Ninth Circuit noted a number of years ago the unfairness of convicting a defendant for giving a possibly false answer to a vague question:
I do not think it proper to indict and prosecute an individual for perjury when the questions forming the basis of the charge are so vaguely and inarticulately phrased by the interrogator as to require the jury to probe the inner workings of the accused’s mind to seek to ascertain which of several plausible meanings he attributed to the ambiguous inquiries when he gave the allegedly per-jurious responses.
United States v. Cook, 497 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1972) (Ely, J., dissenting) (emphasis original), majority opinion withdrawn by and dissenting opinion cited approvingly in, 489 F.2d 286 (9th Cir.1973). The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning shortly thereafter: “Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.” Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 93 S.Ct. 595, 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973).
This court has held that when a question is “arguably ambiguous,” “the defendant’s understanding of the question is a matter for the jury to decide.” United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1980);1 see also United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1981). Both parties agree, however, that “[w]hen a line of questioning is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support [a] perjury conviction.” United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.1986). See also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir.1976) (“Absent fundamental ambiguity or impreciseness in the questioning, the meaning and truthfulness of appellant’s answer was for the jury.”); United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 1003 (7th Cir.1989) (fundamental ambiguity requires court to take question away from jury); United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 943 [1100]*1100(7th Cir.1982) (same). Because the district court dismissed the indictment, rather than allowing the issue to go to trial, we must determine whether the application form was so fundamentally ambiguous as to preclude a conviction as a matter of law.
The practice of dismissing perjury indictments based on fundamentally ambiguous questions originated in United States v. Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. 405 (D.D.C.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C.Cir.1955). In Lattimore, the court recognized that “[wjhile the proper test of perjury is subjective, insofar as it is based upon the understanding of the witness himself regarding the words that he used, a criminal prosecution must have certain objective standards.” Id. at 409. Thus, a question or phrase is ambiguous as a matter of law when it “is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.” Id. at 410. See also Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015; Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375.
In
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KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Pamela M. Manapat was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits “knowingly and willfully” making false statements to any department or agency of the United States.
I. Background
The case arose after Manapat submitted an application for an Airman Medical Certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration. On the application form, Manapat checked “No” to two questions asking for “Record of traffic convictions” and “Record of other convictions.” In fact, she had been convicted three times prior to filling out the form.
Manapat moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the application form was ambiguous and misleading. Item 21 of the form was entitled “MEDICAL HISTORY.” Item 21 then contained four columns, each with the heading “Condition.” The form instructed the applicant to check “Yes” or “No” to whether or not the applicant had had any of the “conditions” listed. The twenty-four item list started with “Frequent or severe headaches,” “Dizziness or fainting spells,” “Unconsciousness [1099]*1099for any reason,” and proceeded to list many other medical conditions. The twenty-second and twenty-third items listed, however, were “Record of traffic convictions,” and “Record of other convictions.” The final item was “Other illnesses.” See Appendix. The district court originally denied the motion to dismiss, but then reconsidered the motion sua sponte. After making the following statement from the bench, the trial judge dismissed the indictment:
I have determined that it is a matter of fundamental fairness. And the way their question has been put on this form, which is basically to determine medical conditions, is fundamentally unfair; that the way it is put is vague. It is misleading and confusing. It is ambiguous, and the way it is configured in the form amounts to a trick question; and I think it is fundamentally unfair to base a felony prosecution on any answers that may be given by anybody on this form. And it is so fundamentally unfair that it amounts to a denial of due process.
II. Discussion
The district court dismissed the indictment upon its conclusion that the application form was ambiguous as a matter of law. Our review of the dismissal is therefore plenary. See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir.1987).
The issue of ambiguous questions has rarely arisen in cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Several other federal statutes, however, prohibit making false statements in other contexts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements intended to influence a financial institution); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (false statements to a grand jury or court (perjury)). The reasoning in cases concerning those statutes is equally applicable to the issue in this case, and we therefore look to those cases to guide our inquiry.
Judge Ely of the Ninth Circuit noted a number of years ago the unfairness of convicting a defendant for giving a possibly false answer to a vague question:
I do not think it proper to indict and prosecute an individual for perjury when the questions forming the basis of the charge are so vaguely and inarticulately phrased by the interrogator as to require the jury to probe the inner workings of the accused’s mind to seek to ascertain which of several plausible meanings he attributed to the ambiguous inquiries when he gave the allegedly per-jurious responses.
United States v. Cook, 497 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1972) (Ely, J., dissenting) (emphasis original), majority opinion withdrawn by and dissenting opinion cited approvingly in, 489 F.2d 286 (9th Cir.1973). The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning shortly thereafter: “Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.” Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 93 S.Ct. 595, 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973).
This court has held that when a question is “arguably ambiguous,” “the defendant’s understanding of the question is a matter for the jury to decide.” United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1980);1 see also United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1981). Both parties agree, however, that “[w]hen a line of questioning is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support [a] perjury conviction.” United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.1986). See also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir.1976) (“Absent fundamental ambiguity or impreciseness in the questioning, the meaning and truthfulness of appellant’s answer was for the jury.”); United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 1003 (7th Cir.1989) (fundamental ambiguity requires court to take question away from jury); United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 943 [1100]*1100(7th Cir.1982) (same). Because the district court dismissed the indictment, rather than allowing the issue to go to trial, we must determine whether the application form was so fundamentally ambiguous as to preclude a conviction as a matter of law.
The practice of dismissing perjury indictments based on fundamentally ambiguous questions originated in United States v. Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. 405 (D.D.C.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C.Cir.1955). In Lattimore, the court recognized that “[wjhile the proper test of perjury is subjective, insofar as it is based upon the understanding of the witness himself regarding the words that he used, a criminal prosecution must have certain objective standards.” Id. at 409. Thus, a question or phrase is ambiguous as a matter of law when it “is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.” Id. at 410. See also Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015; Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375.
In Ryan, the defendant was charged with making a false statement to a federally insured bank. In that case, a loan application required the defendant to indicate his “PREVIOUS ADDRESS (last 5 years).” The defendant listed an address in West Germany and stated that the address had been his address for ten years. The government contended that the defendant had made a false statement because the defendant had actually been living at addresses in the United States for the last four years. The court reversed his conviction, finding that the question was ambiguous in several ways. The court stated that “address” was unclear because the term does not necessarily refer to someone’s residence, but could refer to a mailing address. Furthermore, “previous” could mean any previous address, the most recent previous address, or all previous addresses. Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015-16. Based on this ambiguity, the court held that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the defendant’s answers as a basis for conviction. Id. at 1017.
In Lighte, the court overturned a perjury conviction based on the fundamental ambiguity of the questions asked to the defendant. The court held that several questions posed by an attorney referring to the defendant as “you” failed to distinguish the defendant in his personal capacity from the defendant in his capacity as a trustee. Lighte, 782 F.2d 375-76.
Although the above cases illustrate the types of cases where courts have found that “men of ordinary intellect” might disagree over the meaning of particular questions, the cases do not answer precisely the question in the case at bar. In the present case, the defendant-appellee does not argue that any specific term is susceptible of many meanings, or that depending on the meaning one ascribes to a term, that her answer is literally true. It is undisputed that defendant’s answers to the questions were literally false. Appellee’s argument, rather, is that the application form is so confusing that one could inadvertently mark the wrong answer without realizing the import of such an action.
We find the reasoning in Lattimore useful in addressing Manapat’s argument. In Lattimore, the defendant was indicted for perjuring himself before a Senate subcommittee when he denied he was a “follower of the Communist line.” Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. at 406. The court dismissed the indictment, holding that the phrase was too vague to support a conviction. The court stated:
This count, even with its apparent definition, is an open invitation to the jury to substitute, by conjecture, their understanding of the phrase for that of the defendant____ To ask twelve jurors to agree and then decide that the definition of the Communist line found in the indictment is the definition that defendant had in mind and denied believing in, is to ask the jury to aspire to levels of insight to which the ordinary person is incapable, and upon which speculation no criminal indictment should hinge.
Id. at 410. We conclude that the questions at issue in this case, like the phrase in [1101]*1101Lattimore, are too ambiguous to allow a jury to speculate as to the defendant’s intentions at the time she filled out the application form.
Here, Manapat was attempting to obtain a private, non-commercial Airman Medical Certificate. The application form, which was filled out at the doctor's office, included a “Medical History.” Within the medical history, the form asked for information about twenty-four “Conditions.” The first twenty-one of the “conditions” were medical in nature. Questions twenty-two and twenty-three asked about convictions. The twenty-fourth was again medical in nature. We cannot accept the government’s argument that a reasonable applicant would not be confused by this configuration of questions. It is conceivable that an applicant might believe that the form was asking for convictions somehow related to medical conditions.2 Or, an applicant could fail to understand the importance of such questions on a form concerning medical conditions and simply not give proper thought before answering. Or, more likely, an applicant in generally good health could routinely check off the many items on the standardized form without reading them carefully, resulting in an inaccurate response.3
Although the single statements “Record of traffic convictions,” or “Record of other convictions” may not be ambiguous standing alone, they become quite confusing when buried in a list headed “Medical History” and purportedly concerned with medical conditions. Several courts have stated that “[a] defense to a charge of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from context, giving it in this manner a meaning entirely different from that which it has when the testimony is considered as a whole.” United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir.1976). See also United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir.1989) (questioning becomes clearer when looked at in totality). This principle applies equally to prosecutions as well as to defenses. In order to successfully prosecute an indictment for making a false statement, the government must not remove questions from the context in which their answers were given in an attempt to prove their clarity.
Members of our society are often asked to fill out standardized forms containing large numbers of general background questions. Such forms, usually hastily completed in waiting rooms, rarely require critical information that, if inaccurate, could result in criminal prosecution. If these forms do require such critical information, unwary citizens should be able to expect that important questions will not be hidden in laundry lists of unrelated topics. Unlike other crimes, the crime of making a false statement is unique in that there is no separately demonstrable actus reus. The actus reus and the mens rea unite into a single inquiry: Did the defendant know the statement was false when made? See Cook, 497 F.2d at 763. When the question that led to the allegedly false response is fundamentally ambiguous, we cannot allow juries to criminally convict a defendant based on their guess as to what the defendant was thinking at the time the response was made.4
[1102]*1102Having concluded that the application form was ambiguous as a matter of law, it is important to make a few further observations. First, our holding in no way questions the authority of the government to seek information necessary to determine the fitness of those who desire to fly in our nation’s skies. Furthermore, our holding does not preclude the government from refusing to grant a certificate, or from revoking a certificate already granted, if the applicant falsely responds to the government’s requests for information. Finally, we do not mean to suggest that careless responses on standardized forms can absolve a citizen of the obligation to fill out such forms truthfully. We merely hold that the government may not provide someone with a confusing and ambiguous form and then prosecute when the answers are inaccurate. The government could avoid this problem by providing a separate form for convictions, or by redesigning the Airman Medical Certificate application form so that it clearly shows that critical non-medical information is being requested of the applicant.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the above discussion, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.5
[1103]*1103APPENDIX
INFORMATION FOR APPLICANT
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Application For Airman Medical Certificate Or Airman Medical And Student Püot Certificate — Privacy Act
The information on the attached FAA Form 8500-8, Application For Airman Medical Certificate Or Airman Medical And Student Pilot Certificate is solicited under the authority of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and the Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 67, Medical Standards and Certification.
Except for your Social Security Number (SSN), submission of this information is mandatory and incomplete submission will result in delay of further consideration or denial of your application for an airman medical certificate or airman medical and student pilot certificate. Other than your SSN, the purpose of the information is to determine whether you meet Federal Aviation Administration medical requirements to hold an airman medical certificate or airman medical and student pilot certificate. The information will also be used to provide data for the FAA’s Automated Medical Certification Data Base and Automated Comprehensive Airman Information System, to depict airman population patterns and to update certification procedures and medical standards. For air traffic control specialists employed by the Federal Government, the information requested will be used as a basis for determining medical eligibility for initial and continuing employment.
Submission of an SSN is not required by law and is voluntary. Your refusal to furnish your number will not result in the denial of any right, benefit or privilege provided by law. Your SSN is solicited to assist in performing the agency’s functions under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and if supplied, it will be used by the FAA to associate all information in agency files relating to you. If you refuse to supply an SSN, a substitute number or other identifier will be assigned as required.
APPLICANT TEAR OFF THIS SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING APPLICATION FORM
FAA Form 8500-8 tto-75)
SUPERSEDES FAA FORM 8500-22
[1104]*1104APPENDIX — Continued
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[1105]*1105APPENDIX — Continued