United States v. Noshir Gowadia

760 F.3d 989, 2014 WL 3702583, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14375
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 28, 2014
Docket11-10058
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 760 F.3d 989 (United States v. Noshir Gowadia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Noshir Gowadia, 760 F.3d 989, 2014 WL 3702583, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14375 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

*990 OPINION

OPINION McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 1

Noshir Gowadia appeals his conviction for violations of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [“AECA”], the Espionage Act of 1917, and related provisions on charges that he unlawfully exported defense services and technical data related to the design of the B-2 stealth bomber and other classified government projects to the People’s Republic of China, and that he disclosed related classified information to persons in Switzerland, Israel, and Germany. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778; 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 794(a).

At issue is Gowadia’s claim that his right to prompt presentment before a magistrate judge was triggered before he was actually arrested, and that the inculpatory statements he made to federal agents investigating his activities should have been suppressed. Gowadia also challenges the jury instructions as unconstitutional on the ground that the government was wrongly relieved of its burden to prove that the information Gowadia exported was not in the public domain and was not “basic marketing information” exempted from the definition of “technical data” under the AECA. 2 Because these arguments fail as a matter of law, we affirm Gowadia’s conviction.

Background

Gowadia is a naturalized American citizen who worked for nearly twenty years as an engineer at the Northrop Corporation on the design of the B-2 stealth bomber and other highly classified projects. The B-2 became the United States’s “premier strategic bomber,” in part because it was designed to be “low-observable.” Gowadia was a lead engineer of a system designed to enable the B-2 to avoid detection by suppressing the infrared signature emanating from the aircraft. The United States maintains a “significant operational lead” in the manipulation of aircraft signatures. Because of its strategic importance, information relating to this system and other stealth technologies is especially tightly controlled.

Shortly after leaving Northrop, Gowadia started a business, N.S. Gowadia, Inc. (“NSGI”), to provide consulting services to the aerospace engineering industry. At NSGI, Gowadia developed and marketed a system called AIRSS (Advanced Infrared Suppression System), which, like the systems he designed at Northrop, was intended to reduce the infrared signature of aircraft.

Through NSGI, Gowadia sent a series of letters and emails to three foreign individuals revealing information that he later admitted was classified. In October 2002, for example, Gowadia sent a letter to an official at the Swiss Ministry of Defense detailing Gowadia’s success in suppressing the infrared signature of the B-2 and offering his services to help reduce the signature of Swiss military helicopters. He sent similar communications to individuals working for defense contractors in Germany and Israel. None of the individuals Gowadia contacted was authorized to receive classified information.

*991 Around the same time, Gowadia began a working relationship with the Chinese government. Gowadia exchanged a series of emails with a Chinese operative, and agreed to brief Chinese officials on aircraft “propulsion” and “survivability” and to design, for a fee, certain aircraft parts. Between 2003 and 2005, Gowadia made six trips to China, paid for by the Chinese government, often entering and exiting China without a visa or stamp in his passport and communicating while there via pseudonymous email accounts.

Among other things, Gowadia gave Chinese officials a presentation and a computer file that analyzed how a Chinese cruise missile, if modified with Gowadia’s designs, would perform against a United States AIM-9 class missile. The Chinese government paid Gowadia more than $100,000 for his work. Gowadia would later admit that he “shared military secrets ... [and] technical knowledge” with China that he “had acquired over many years working with U.S. systemsf ] like [the] B-2,” and would surmise that his activities amounted to “espionage and treason.”

The United States government began to suspect Gowadia of unlawful activities, and secured a search warrant for Gowadia’s house. Federal agents arrived at Gowa-dia’s house in Maui on October 13, 2005, executed the search warrant, and asked Gowadia whether there was a private place where they could talk. After adjourning to the crafts room, they reviewed an Advice of Rights form with Gowadia, informing him of his rights, among others, to seek the advice of counsel and to terminate the interview at any time, and advised him on more than one occasion that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Gowa-dia signed the form, and the agents then interviewed him for roughly six hours. The agents completed their search late that evening and seized computers, papers, his passport, foreign currency, and other materials. Before departing, the agents and Gowadia agreed to meet the following day.

The group met at a coffee shop the next day but, because it was impossible to discuss classified information there, the agents asked Gowadia if there was another location where they could talk. Gowadia did not suggest an alternative site, and the agents proposed continuing their conversation at the Maui County Police Department. Gowadia agreed to accompany them in his own vehicle. After Gowadia signed another Advice of Rights form, he and the agents spoke for about six and a half hours. During this session, Gowadia stated that he had retained classified material and used it for business purposes 3 and that he had disclosed classified information to foreign individuals and governments, including China. In a pattern that would continue throughout the following several days of interrogation, Gowadia “volunteered to write down” detailed handwritten statements describing his activities. Gowadia agreed to continue the conversation at another time and returned home.

The next day, October 15, 2005, Agent Mohaj erin contacted Gowadia and requested that he “consider flying to Honolulu for further discussions” with federal agents at the government’s expense. Gowadia agreed to do so and arrived in Honolulu on October 16. The agents interviewed Gowadia in seven sessions between Monday, October 17, and Monday, October 24, at the FBI office in Honolulu. Gowadia signed an Advice of Rights form before each interrogation session. The *992 seven Honolulu sessions lasted between 6.5 and 7.5 hours each day. During these sessions, Gowadia wrote out copious notes — the record contains seventy-odd pages of them — for the agents, detailing his activities and his motivations, and admitting wrongdoing. Gowadia also acknowledged on each occasion that he was free to leave.

On Wednesday morning, October 26, Gowadia arrived by taxi at the Honolulu Federal Building. Federal agents met him there and escorted him to the FBI office, where he was arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained earlier in the day.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
760 F.3d 989, 2014 WL 3702583, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-noshir-gowadia-ca9-2014.