United States v. Noe Lugo

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 27, 2019
Docket18-50107
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Noe Lugo (United States v. Noe Lugo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Noe Lugo, (9th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 27 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-50107

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:17-cr-00482-JAH-1 v.

NOE RENE LUGO, AKA No-No, AKA MEMORANDUM* Wolfie,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 15, 2019 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and WU,** District Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Noe Rene Lugo appeals his convictions and sentences

for one count of dealing in firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), and four

counts of felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable George H. Wu, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. contends that: (1) the district court plainly erred at trial in allowing improper expert

testimony from three law enforcement officers; and (2) it erred in failing to give a

jury instruction on separate acquisition or storage of the firearms as to his felon-in-

possession counts, resulting in multiplicitous convictions. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and VACATE Count 4 but

AFFIRM as to the remaining counts. In light of the partial vacatur, we REMAND

to the district court for re-sentencing.

As to the expert testimony contention, Defendant did not object to that

testimony at trial, so we review for plain error. United States v. Gomez-Norena,

908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1990). We hold that the three law enforcement

officials were not testifying as experts because their testimony was based on their

personal involvement in the investigation. See United States v. Barragan, 871

F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err.

Next, Plaintiff contests his convictions for Counts 3, 4, and 5 citing to: (1)

the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on separate acquisition or storage of

the weapons, (2) the duplicitous nature of the convictions, and (3) the lack of

sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.1 Because Defendant failed to

1 In its Opposition Brief, the United States requests that we vacate one of Defendant’s felon-in-possession counts (Count 4) based on evidence in the record that Defendant acquired or stored the weapons underlying Count 3 and Count 4 at the same time. challenge the instructions below or raise the Double Jeopardy issue, we review that

claim for plain error.2 See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir.

2009). We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. United States v.

Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 727 (9th Cir. 2011).

Under the plain error standard, we will affirm unless there has been: (1) an

error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4)

seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). To determine

whether the failure to give a jury instruction, even on an element of a charge,

seriously affected the fairness of the proceeding, courts analyze whether there was

“overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted” evidence that establishes the

omitted element. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997);

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002).

In order to sustain multiple convictions of felon-in-possession, a jury must

find that the weapons charged in different counts were either stored or acquired

separately from one another. United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 653 (9th

Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“This court has held that only one offense is charged for

2 Relying on United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994), Defendant argues that we should review his instructional error challenge de novo because it relates to Defendant’s sentencing. Garcia is inapplicable here as it simply stands for the premise that a district court has a duty to instruct the jury that it must specify the object of a conspiracy charge. See Garcia, 37 F.3d at 1370. possession of firearms by a felon, regardless of the number of firearms involved,

absent a showing that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times and

places.”). However, even in the absence of an instruction on separate acquisition

or storage, we find that there is overwhelming evidence of separate acquisition of

the weapons charged in Counts 3 and Counts 5. Because there is essentially

uncontroverted evidence of separate storage, Defendant’s Double Jeopardy and

insufficient evidence arguments also fail.3 On Count 4, we agree with the United

States’ request and VACATE Defendant’s conviction of that count.

Despite the vacatur of Count 4, the United States urges us to affirm

Defendant’s sentence based on evidence in the record that the district court will

impose the same sentence. We instead follow the customary practice and remand

to allow the district court to consider the effect of the vacatur on Defendant’s

sentence. See United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 821 (9th Cir. 2015), as

amended (July 8, 2016).

VACATED as to Count 4; AFFIRMED as to the remaining counts; and

REMANDED.

3 Defendant has pointed out that, during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court held that the United States must prove that a possessor of a firearm knew he or she fell within one of the prohibited groups listed in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). Defendant, however, is not entitled to relief under Rehaif because the record is clear that he knew he was a felon as per 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) during the times he possessed the firearms.

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Related

United States v. Olano
507 U.S. 725 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Johnson v. United States
520 U.S. 461 (Supreme Court, 1997)
United States v. Cotton
535 U.S. 625 (Supreme Court, 2002)
United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez
642 F.3d 717 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Jaime Leon Gomez-Norena
908 F.2d 497 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Gene Szalkiewicz
944 F.2d 653 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Darnell Garcia
37 F.3d 1359 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Kilbride
584 F.3d 1240 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
United States v. Terry Christensen
828 F.3d 763 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Jesus Barragan
871 F.3d 689 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Rehaif v. United States
588 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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