United States v. Munoz-Fontanez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: 23-1795
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit _____________________

No. 23-1795

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

EMANUEL MUÑOZ-FONTÁNEZ,

Defendant, Appellant. __________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] __________________

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges. __________________

Leonardo M. Aldridge and ECIJA-SBGB Law Offices on brief for appellant.

Gregory B. Connor, Assistant United States Attorney, W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá- Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

February 27, 2026 PER CURIAM. Defendant-Appellant Emanuel Muñoz-Fontánez

("Muñoz") appeals from his sentence, imposed at resentencing

following remand, for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D).

Muñoz again challenges the substantive and procedural

reasonableness of his above-guidelines sentence of 144 months'

incarceration.

After carefully reviewing the record and the parties'

arguments, we conclude that affirmance is in order. Even assuming

in Muñoz's favor that he preserved his arguments for our review,

the record provides no basis to conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in sentencing Muñoz. See United States v.

Ruperto-Rivera, 16 F.4th 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2021). Particular to

Muñoz's arguments, there is nothing to suggest that the district

court improperly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or

otherwise erred in considering potentially mitigating facts. See

United States v. Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d 232, 240 (1st Cir.

2019) ("While a sentencing court must consider all the incorporated

§ 3553(a) factors, it 'need not verbalize its evaluation of each

and every [§] 3553(a) factor.'" (quoting United States v. Reyes-

Rivera, 812 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2016)). Further, the court did

not err in not explicitly addressing why in its estimation the

-2- parties' recommended sentence was not sufficient. See United

States v. Cortes-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 2016)

(explaining that this court has "consistently refused to accord

any decretory significance to [parties'] non-binding

recommendations -- or even to require a sentencing court to explain

why it decided to eschew those recommendations."). Muñoz has

similarly not established that the district court's reliance on

the incidence of gun violence in Puerto Rico was impermissible,

particularly given the district court's specific explanation that

Muñoz's actions in storing weapons thereby fueled gun violence in

Puerto Rico. In addition, the applicable guidelines do not

incorporate the district court's particular concerns related to

the number and nature of the firearms involved, the amount of

ammunition and drugs, or the other facts of the underlying offense.

See United States v. Morales-Vélez, 100 F.4th 334, 343-44 (1st

Cir. 2024) ("Accordingly, when a defendant is convicted under

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and sentenced under section 2K2.4(b), neither

the statute nor the applicable guideline accounts for the nature

of machine guns, and the district court did not legally err in

considering this factor in its upward variance analysis.").

And there is nothing in the record to suggest that the

district court's explanation for the sentence was otherwise

wanting, as it tied its upwardly varying sentence to the specific

facts of the case, relying on the number of firearms, amount of

-3- ammunition and drugs involved, Muñoz's admission that he was paid

to store firearms for friends, and the dismissed charges. See

United States v. Fuentes-Echevarria, 856 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.

2017) ("When a court imposes a variant sentence, 'its reasons for

doing so "should typically be rooted either in the nature and

circumstances of the offense or the characteristics of the

offender."'" (quoting United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d

16, 21 (1st Cir. 2013))); United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d

20, 28 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that district "court also considered

the seriousness of the other charges in the indictment, which the

parties had agreed to dismiss pursuant to the plea agreement, and

the need to deter future crimes.").

As to substantive reasonableness, despite the

significant upward variance, Muñoz has not identified anything to

suggest that the court's sentence was not supported by a plausible

rationale or was not a defensible result. See United States v.

Melendez-Hiraldo, 82 F.4th 48, 56 (1st Cir. 2023). Accordingly,

Muñoz has not demonstrated that the district court erred in

sentencing him to 144 months' total incarceration.

Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).

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