[408]*408
Opinion of the Court
COX, Judge:
Appellant stands convicted of offenses1 arising from a bar fight in Mainz, Germany, including unpremeditated murder.
On January 6, 1989, appellant and some friends met at an apartment and began drinking alcoholic beverages before going to Charly’s Club, a disco where appellant’s girlfriend worked. Meanwhile, Specialist Jonathan Gray, Private Richard Livingston, and Private Joe Seitz (the deceased) drank several beers at a bar called Mainzer’s before going to Charly’s, which was nearby. Gray testified that, while Seitz was dancing with a girl at Charly’s, he (Gray) noticed a black male — appellant—watching from the edge of the dance floor, as if he were angry. Seitz was apparently aware of appellant’s watching and seemed to dance toward him. The next time Gray saw the two, appellant had evidently just shoved Seitz and began hitting Seitz while holding him in a headlock. The fight broke up quickly, and the two combatants left the bar with their companions. Once outside the bar, Gray noticed Seitz was bleeding and somewhat dazed. Gray went inside to get his coat and telephone a cab to take him (Seitz) and Livingston home. When Gray walked back outside, he heard Livingston yelling, that Seitz was dead; appellant was gone.
Private Livingston and a German friend of Private Seitz corroborated Gray’s account of the events leading up to the incident. Livingston testified that he helped Seitz walk out to the parking lot after the fight on the dance floor. Livingston asked Seitz about the fight, and Seitz identified appellant as the one “who hit him.” Livingston began yelling at appellant and told him to stay away from Seitz. When Livingston heard the sound of breaking glass, he prepared to defend himself because he had been shouting, but appellant went toward Seitz instead. Appellant thrust a broken bottle toward Seitz’ neck. The blow severed the victim’s carotid artery and embedded a piece of glass in his vertebra. Livingston tried to stop the flow of blood from Seitz’ throat but was unsuccessful, and Seitz bled to death shortly thereafter. Specialist Lewis was talking with Seitz when Seitz was stabbed, and he testified Seitz never saw appellant coming toward him.
Later that night, appellant told a friend that he had “punched that mother f...... in the jaw, man.” He appeared scared and repeatedly said he had “f...... up.”
During trial, the defense requested two expert witnesses to testify that appellant’s blood alcohol at the time of the incident was at a level which would impair an individual to the extent that he could not form the specific intent necessary for premeditated murder. When the charge was amended to reflect unpremeditated murder, the request was withdrawn. The defense also requested appellant be examined for mental disorders, but such a defense was not pursued. Appellant’s case was based, rather, on self-defense, and three witnesses were called at trial. Appellant’s girlfriend testified that Livingston called appellant a “nigger” and asked why he was “hiding behind a woman’s skirt.” Another defense witness, who did not see the fight but was in the parking lot, described Seitz as “aggressive.” Appellant did not testify.
We granted review of the following issues:
I
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF [409]*409COUNSEL AS IS REQUIRED BY BOTH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
II
WHETHER UNPREMEDITATED MURDER REQUIRES A SPECIFIC INTENT WHICH APPELLANT COULD NOT FORM DUE TO THE VOLUNTARY CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL.
I
Before this Court, appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial defense counsel failed to investigate or present a potentially viable insanity defense arising from his personality disorder. Evidence of his personality disorder, maintains appellant, could also have been used in mitigation of his sentence. Further, he argues that trial defense counsel failed to require any instruction regarding the combined effect of alcohol and his personality disorder on his ability to entertain specific intent.
In evaluating appellant’s claim, we must determine, first, whether trial defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, second, whether any deficiencies were prejudicial to appellant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); United States v. Scott, 24 MJ 186 (CMA 1987). While partial mental responsibility due to a personality disorder might have been a potential defense,2 heavy deference is given to trial defense counsel’s judgments, and this Court presumes counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. See United States v. Stephenson, 33 MJ 79, 82 (CMA 1991).
Counsel requested that appellant be examined for possible mental disorders, and such examination was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Hanson on April 17, 1989. Trial defense counsel, under oath, made the following statement after trial about his conclusions regarding appellant’s defense:
5. During the initial preparation of PVT Morgan’s defense, we also as a matter of course requested the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation given the severity of the offense. Unfortunately, the preliminary information we received was so unhelpful and potentially so extremely damaging that we did not persist in efforts to secure a full sanity board or bring the evidence before the panel. Specifically, LTC Hanson did not merely state that a sanity board was not required, but categorically rejected the notion that PVT Morgan was mentally impaired in any manner with or without the intake of alcohol that would have an impact on his ability to form specific intent or to possess the requisite mental responsibility for the crimes committed.
6. In addition, PVT Morgan had an extensive file of potential admissions made to the Community Counseling Center that was in the possession of the government as well as threats to kill and other evidence of antisocial behavior that LTC Hanson rejected as anything more than evidence of a violent young man. The increased likelihood that such testi[410]*410mony would be elicited on cross-examination and become relevant tin evaluating the opinion of any favorable psychiatric evidence led us to conclude that the risks far outweighed the potential benefits from such marginally helpful testimony. The wealth of available evidence to the contrary also led us not to adduce evidence of PVT Morgan’s personality disorder on sentencing so as not to jeopardize what we believed would be a more effective plea for leniency based on PVT Morgan’s other favorable attributes.
(Emphasis added.)
Trial defense counsel’s statement addresses his reasoning in not using partial mental responsibility or insanity as a defense, in mitigation of appellant’s offense, or alone or in conjunction with intoxication in an attack on the mens rea element of the crime. “We will not second-guess the strategic or tactical decisions made at trial by defense counsel.” United States v. Rivas, 3 MJ 282, 289 (CMA 1977). See also United States v. Stephenson, 33 MJ at 82.
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[408]*408
Opinion of the Court
COX, Judge:
Appellant stands convicted of offenses1 arising from a bar fight in Mainz, Germany, including unpremeditated murder.
On January 6, 1989, appellant and some friends met at an apartment and began drinking alcoholic beverages before going to Charly’s Club, a disco where appellant’s girlfriend worked. Meanwhile, Specialist Jonathan Gray, Private Richard Livingston, and Private Joe Seitz (the deceased) drank several beers at a bar called Mainzer’s before going to Charly’s, which was nearby. Gray testified that, while Seitz was dancing with a girl at Charly’s, he (Gray) noticed a black male — appellant—watching from the edge of the dance floor, as if he were angry. Seitz was apparently aware of appellant’s watching and seemed to dance toward him. The next time Gray saw the two, appellant had evidently just shoved Seitz and began hitting Seitz while holding him in a headlock. The fight broke up quickly, and the two combatants left the bar with their companions. Once outside the bar, Gray noticed Seitz was bleeding and somewhat dazed. Gray went inside to get his coat and telephone a cab to take him (Seitz) and Livingston home. When Gray walked back outside, he heard Livingston yelling, that Seitz was dead; appellant was gone.
Private Livingston and a German friend of Private Seitz corroborated Gray’s account of the events leading up to the incident. Livingston testified that he helped Seitz walk out to the parking lot after the fight on the dance floor. Livingston asked Seitz about the fight, and Seitz identified appellant as the one “who hit him.” Livingston began yelling at appellant and told him to stay away from Seitz. When Livingston heard the sound of breaking glass, he prepared to defend himself because he had been shouting, but appellant went toward Seitz instead. Appellant thrust a broken bottle toward Seitz’ neck. The blow severed the victim’s carotid artery and embedded a piece of glass in his vertebra. Livingston tried to stop the flow of blood from Seitz’ throat but was unsuccessful, and Seitz bled to death shortly thereafter. Specialist Lewis was talking with Seitz when Seitz was stabbed, and he testified Seitz never saw appellant coming toward him.
Later that night, appellant told a friend that he had “punched that mother f...... in the jaw, man.” He appeared scared and repeatedly said he had “f...... up.”
During trial, the defense requested two expert witnesses to testify that appellant’s blood alcohol at the time of the incident was at a level which would impair an individual to the extent that he could not form the specific intent necessary for premeditated murder. When the charge was amended to reflect unpremeditated murder, the request was withdrawn. The defense also requested appellant be examined for mental disorders, but such a defense was not pursued. Appellant’s case was based, rather, on self-defense, and three witnesses were called at trial. Appellant’s girlfriend testified that Livingston called appellant a “nigger” and asked why he was “hiding behind a woman’s skirt.” Another defense witness, who did not see the fight but was in the parking lot, described Seitz as “aggressive.” Appellant did not testify.
We granted review of the following issues:
I
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF [409]*409COUNSEL AS IS REQUIRED BY BOTH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
II
WHETHER UNPREMEDITATED MURDER REQUIRES A SPECIFIC INTENT WHICH APPELLANT COULD NOT FORM DUE TO THE VOLUNTARY CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL.
I
Before this Court, appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial defense counsel failed to investigate or present a potentially viable insanity defense arising from his personality disorder. Evidence of his personality disorder, maintains appellant, could also have been used in mitigation of his sentence. Further, he argues that trial defense counsel failed to require any instruction regarding the combined effect of alcohol and his personality disorder on his ability to entertain specific intent.
In evaluating appellant’s claim, we must determine, first, whether trial defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, second, whether any deficiencies were prejudicial to appellant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); United States v. Scott, 24 MJ 186 (CMA 1987). While partial mental responsibility due to a personality disorder might have been a potential defense,2 heavy deference is given to trial defense counsel’s judgments, and this Court presumes counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. See United States v. Stephenson, 33 MJ 79, 82 (CMA 1991).
Counsel requested that appellant be examined for possible mental disorders, and such examination was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Hanson on April 17, 1989. Trial defense counsel, under oath, made the following statement after trial about his conclusions regarding appellant’s defense:
5. During the initial preparation of PVT Morgan’s defense, we also as a matter of course requested the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation given the severity of the offense. Unfortunately, the preliminary information we received was so unhelpful and potentially so extremely damaging that we did not persist in efforts to secure a full sanity board or bring the evidence before the panel. Specifically, LTC Hanson did not merely state that a sanity board was not required, but categorically rejected the notion that PVT Morgan was mentally impaired in any manner with or without the intake of alcohol that would have an impact on his ability to form specific intent or to possess the requisite mental responsibility for the crimes committed.
6. In addition, PVT Morgan had an extensive file of potential admissions made to the Community Counseling Center that was in the possession of the government as well as threats to kill and other evidence of antisocial behavior that LTC Hanson rejected as anything more than evidence of a violent young man. The increased likelihood that such testi[410]*410mony would be elicited on cross-examination and become relevant tin evaluating the opinion of any favorable psychiatric evidence led us to conclude that the risks far outweighed the potential benefits from such marginally helpful testimony. The wealth of available evidence to the contrary also led us not to adduce evidence of PVT Morgan’s personality disorder on sentencing so as not to jeopardize what we believed would be a more effective plea for leniency based on PVT Morgan’s other favorable attributes.
(Emphasis added.)
Trial defense counsel’s statement addresses his reasoning in not using partial mental responsibility or insanity as a defense, in mitigation of appellant’s offense, or alone or in conjunction with intoxication in an attack on the mens rea element of the crime. “We will not second-guess the strategic or tactical decisions made at trial by defense counsel.” United States v. Rivas, 3 MJ 282, 289 (CMA 1977). See also United States v. Stephenson, 33 MJ at 82. Giving due deference to counsel’s decisions, we are convicted that trial defense counsel’s performance did not fall below “prevailing professional norms.” United States v. Scott, 24 MJ at 188 (citing United States v. DiCupe, 21 MJ 440, 442 (CMA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826, 107 S.Ct. 101, 93 L.Ed.2d 52 (1986); United States v. Jefferson, 13 MJ 1, 5 (CMA 1982); United States v. Rivas, 3 MJ at 288); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
II
The second granted issue asks, somewhat academically, whether evidence of voluntary intoxication can be introduced to rebut the elements of proof of unpremeditated murder. See Art. 118(2), UCMJ, 10 USC § 918(2). Since the defense did not request an instruction on this matter or present expert testimony, the question more properly is whether the military judge erred in failing, sua sponte, to instruct the members that they might consider the lay evidence of record regarding appellant’s possible state of inebriation on the night of the incident in arriving at their conclusion about his forming an intent to kill.3 We will so construe it.
RCM 916(Z)(2), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, states the general rule for the partial defense of voluntary intoxication as follows:
Voluntary intoxication, whether caused by alcohol or drugs, is not a defense. However, evidence of any degree of voluntary intoxication may be introduced [411]*411for the purpose of raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill, if actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill is an element of the offense.
Cf. § 2.08, ALI Model Penal Code, reprinted in ALI Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Part I) 353 (1985).
As it pertains to murder, however, the rule has long been otherwise:
Voluntary Intoxication (see RCM 916(1)(2)) not amounting to legal insanity may reduce premeditated murder (Article 118(1)) to unpremeditated murder (Article 118(2) or (3)) but it does not reduce either premeditated murder or unpremeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or any other lesser offense.
Para. 43c(2)(c), Part IV, Manual, supra; United States v. Ferguson, 17 USCMA 441, 38 CMR 239 (1968); United States v. Craig, 2 USCMA 650, 10 CMR 148 (1953); and United States v. Roman, 1 USCMA 244, 2 CMR 150 (1952)4.
As a point of beginning, we first must look at the elements of proof for unpremeditated murder. Paragraph 43b(2) provides the following elements of proof:
(2) Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
(a) That a certain named or described person is dead;
(b) That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
(c) That the killing was unlawful; and
(d) That, at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a person.
In United States v. Vaughn, 23 USCMA 343, 49 CMR 747 (1975), we put to rest any question of whether unpremeditated murder was a specific-intent crime. We said:
[T]his Court clearly interprets the provisions of Article 118(2) to require an intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm and that no lesser or other state of mind will do. Indeed, as was said in United States v. Thomas, [17 USCMA 103, 37 C,R 367 (1967) ], we cannot do away with the express requirement of the statute and substitute some generalized mental process for that specifically and unequivocally set out by Congress. Absent, therefore, the subjective intent of the accused to kill or seriously harm his victim, the homicide he commits cannot be unpremeditated murder.
23 USCMA at 345, 49 CMR at 749.
However, Vaughn did not put to rest the question of whether voluntary intoxication was a defense to unpremeditated murder. In United States v. Tilley, 25 MJ 20 (CMA 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060, 108 S.Ct. 1015, 98 L.Ed.2d 980 (1988), then-judge Sullivan, writing for an unanimous court, observed:
Another question which is raised in this unpremeditated-murder case is whether evidence of voluntary intoxi[412]*412cation should ever be considered on the question of one’s capacity to form the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. See 1 W. LaFave & A Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.19(a) (1986); cf. 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 7.11(d). The Government, relying on older decisions of this Court, asserts that voluntary intoxication, as a matter of law, cannot reduce unpremeditated murder to manslaughter. See United States v. Ferguson, 17 USCMA 441, 38 CMR 239 (1968); United States v. Craig, 2 USC-MA 650, 10 CMR 148 (1953); United States v. Roman, 1 USCMA 244, 2 CMR 150 (1952). See also para. 197, Manual [for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition)]. Accordingly, it concludes that evidence of voluntary intoxication is legally irrelevant in all cases of unpremeditated murder. Mil.R.Evid. 402, Manual, supra. The defense, relying on United States v. Thomson [3 MJ 271, (CMA 1977) ], and United States v. Vaughn, 23 USCMA 343, 49 CMR 747 (1975), suggests that the older decisions are no longer good law or are inapplicable to cases where evidence of voluntary intoxication does not stand alone.
25 MJ at 22.
In Tilley, we carefully reviewed all the instructions given by the military judge and concluded that the instructions made it “unnecessary for us to resolve this question.” Id. Today, we are faced once again with the question — can voluntary intoxication defeat the capacity of an accused to entertain “the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm” involved in unpremeditated murder (para. 43 b(2)(d))?
After careful consideration, we see no reason to overrule the long-standing decisions of this Court which have consistently held that voluntary intoxication will not in military law negate that criminal intent necessary for the commission of unpremeditated murder. See United States v. Ferguson, United States v. Craig, United States v. Roman, all supra. These cases have been followed for over 40 years.5 The [413]*413law has been reflected in the language of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. See para. 43c(3)(c). The underlying rationale for rejecting the intoxication defense is consistent with that given by other Federal courts.6 And importantly, Judge Sullivan noted in Tilley that
the primary rationale [for these decisions may have] been eroded. On the other hand, [ Vaughn ] cites Ferguson without expressly repudiating its holding. Moreover, a related rationale expressed in United States v. Roman and United States v. Ferguson, that the intent to drink may suffice for malice aforethought or other intent necessary for unpremeditated murder has not yet been rejected.
25 MJ at 22 (citations omitted).
Thus, although recent decisions have rejected the notion that unpremeditated murder is a general-intent rather than a specific-intent crime, the underlying policy remains for rejecting the voluntary-intoxication defense. One who voluntarily intoxicates himself or herself cannot be heard to complain that they were incapable, by virtué of that intoxication, of committing intentionally the acts leading to the death of another human being. While the law may mitigate and recognize that one in a voluntarily induced intoxicated state may not have the capacity to carefully premeditate and willfully and deliberately carry out a murder, thus reducing premeditated murder to a lesser offense, it does not mitigate or forgive one whose conduct reflects an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Often, it is the very ingestion of alcohol or other intoxicating substances that induces the malicious and wrongful conduct. It would be paradoxical to allow a person to voluntarily intoxicate himself or herself, and then forgive them for the consequences of their conduct while under the influence of the same intoxicant. The military judge did not err in failing to instruct that voluntary intoxication was a defense to unpremeditated murder.
The decision of the United States Army Court of Military Review is affirmed.
Judges CRAWFORD and GIERKE concur.