United States v. Mission Golf Course, Inc.

548 F. Supp. 1177, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15155
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedOctober 12, 1982
DocketCiv. 80-3073, Civ. 80-3074
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 548 F. Supp. 1177 (United States v. Mission Golf Course, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Mission Golf Course, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1177, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15155 (D.S.D. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DONALD J. PORTER, District Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff United States brought these two actions, seeking to enjoin defendants Mission Golf Course and the City of Mission from the sale of any intoxicating beverage on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation except in conformity with the liquor ordinance adopted by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. Having found that the evidence presented at the trial of these two cases fails to establish 1 that defendants are located in a “non-Indian community” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1161, the Court must grant the permanent injunction plaintiff seeks.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The first statute governing the determination of this case is 18 U.S.C. § 1154, which provides in pertinent part that:

(a) ... whoever introduces or attempts to introduce any malt, spirituous, or vinous liquor, including beer, ale, and wine, or any ardent or intoxicating liquor of any kind whatsoever into the Indian country, shall, for the first offense, be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, for each subsequent offense, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(c) the term “Indian country” as used in this section does not include fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities or rights-of-way through Indian reservations, and this section does not apply to such lands or rights-of-way in the absence of a treaty or statute extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.

The second statute which has application here is 18 U.S.C. § 1161:

The provisions of sections 1154 ... of this title shall not apply within any area that is not Indian country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.

Only a few cases have attempted to define precisely what is a “non-Indian community”, as that term is used in this statutory framework. The leading case, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) found that a bar located on the outskirts of Fort Washakie, Wyoming, within the boundaries of the Wind River Reservation, was not located in a non-Indian community. The Court noted that Fort Washakie was the location of the Wind River Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and of the Tribal Headquarters of the tribes on the reservation; that the population within the 20 square miles surrounding the bar was heavily Indian, that the students in the public school serving Fort Washakie were mostly Indian; and that the bar was “near a public housing development populated largely if not entirely by Indians.” 419 U.S. at 552, 95 S.Ct. at 715. The Court concluded from this evidence that, “[gjiven the nature of the [bar’s] location and surrounding populations, the . .. bar was not excepted from tribal regulation by virtue of being located in a non-Indian community.” 419 U.S. at 553, 95 S.Ct. at 715.

*1179 A somewhat more detailed exposition of this subject was made in United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980). Two liquor establishments within the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota were there under consideration: one at a locality called Mahto ten miles east of McLaughlin, South Dakota, and one called the Cattleman’s Saloon, three-quarters of a mile from McLaughlin. (It was recognized in the opinion that McLaughlin was a non-Indian community.) Mahto, historically, had been inhabited predominantly by non-Indians; of the 27 people using Mahto as a polling place, 24 were non-Indian; it was claimed that 95 percent of the business at the bar was non-Indian; the law and order and other governmental services were provided by the county and township, rather than by the tribe and United States; the former public school at Mahto had been used by almost entirely non-Indian pupils; and it appeared that few Indians did business in Mahto. The court found that Mahto was a non-Indian community:

The federal statute uses the term “community” and not “town,” “city” or incorporated entity with a minimum population. Basic to the definitions of “community” which we have reviewed is the existence of an element of cohesiveness. This apparently can be manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality. Cohesiveness or common interests can be more necessary to the existence of a community than can mere density of population. We believe that the political and social focal point which the Mahto locality provides year round for the surrounding township could give a man of average intelligence the understanding that as an inhabitant in this area, he lived in a “community.” As a large percentage of such inhabitants are non-Indian and the history and background of the area is non-Indian, we believe it can be said that Mahto is a community serving the non-Indian inhabitants of the township.

614 F.2d at 170. As for the Cattleman’s Saloon, the court observed that this establishment was entirely surrounded by deeded non-Indian land, all governmental services to the bar were from the nearby town of McLaughlin, and 70 percent of the bar’s business came from non-Indian residents of McLaughlin. In the court’s view, the Cattleman’s Saloon was part of the non-Indian community of McLaughlin “even though it is not technically within the town’s incorporated boundaries. The statute’s exception requires only that [the] business be ‘in a non-Indian community itself. [The] business serves the area of McLaughlin and is in all respects within that community of interest and influence.’ ” 614 F.2d at 170-71. 2

Though not directly on point, several other cases deal with the question of what constitutes a dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b), and establish factors which are relevant to the Court’s inquiry here. United States v. State of South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981); Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mound, 477 F.Supp. 156 (D.S.D.1979).

Taken together, the cases cited, supra,

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Bluebook (online)
548 F. Supp. 1177, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mission-golf-course-inc-sdd-1982.