United States v. Michael Rapp, A/K/A Michael Hellerman, Charles J. Bazarian, Mario Renda, John A. Bodziak, Jr., William Smith

871 F.2d 957, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5542, 1989 WL 33630
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedApril 27, 1989
Docket87-3180
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 871 F.2d 957 (United States v. Michael Rapp, A/K/A Michael Hellerman, Charles J. Bazarian, Mario Renda, John A. Bodziak, Jr., William Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Michael Rapp, A/K/A Michael Hellerman, Charles J. Bazarian, Mario Renda, John A. Bodziak, Jr., William Smith, 871 F.2d 957, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5542, 1989 WL 33630 (11th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

COX, Circuit Judge:

I.

This is a case about an elaborate financial scheme that hastened the demise of the Florida Center Bank (FCB) and that ultimately led to the convictions from which these appeals are taken. According to the indictment and the evidence, the plan was two-fold: the board of directors of FCB, whose membership included three of the defendants, would approve a $30 million loan application submitted by PaceCom, a company owned by another of the appellants, and the proceeds of the PaceCom loan would be used as collateral for the loan and as a source of money for the purchase of a substantial block of FCB stock. Each part of the scheme was related to, and depended upon, the other.

This conspiracy had its genesis in financial problems faced by Clyde Pitchford, a co-conspirator turned government witness. In the fall of 1985, Pitchford, a stockbroker in Richmond, Virginia, sought money to replenish that which he had stolen from the cash accounts of certain clients. 1 The source to which he turned was Michael Rapp.

While conducting business in Dallas on behalf of the Rex Group, an association of three individuals formed for the purpose of investing, Pitchford was contacted by Rapp, who was responding to a financial resume sent to him by Pitchford. Rapp described the financial opportunities available in the pay telephone business, which, according to Rapp, was a burgeoning industry due to recent deregulation. Rapp offered Pitchford a five million dollar fee if he could obtain a $20 million loan for Pace-Com, Rapp’s pay telephone company.

Pitchford was intrigued at the prospect of receiving such an enormous fee. He explained Rapp’s proposal to Rex Group partner Hugh Wiley and to Ben Cotton and Forrest Watson, principals in the Cornerstone Group, an investment firm in Dallas. All were interested. The following day, Rapp, William Smith, who was introduced as president of PaceCom, and their attorney met with members of the Rex and Cornerstone groups to explain the proposed deal in more detail. Initially, Rapp emphasized that his role in the loan transaction must not be revealed because he had served a prison sentence for involvement in a stock fraud swindle. Rapp then divulged his plan in great detail. Eventually, Smith, Cotton, and Pitchford executed a “Memorandum of Understanding” incorporating that which Rapp had explained. According to the memorandum, Cornerstone and Rex would marshal a $19 million loan in favor of PaceCom at a federally insured lending institution, and share the five million dollar fee. The loan would be secured by a $20 million certificate of deposit, as well as 2,000 pay telephones and the profits generated thereby. Interest on the certificate of deposit would be pre-paid. To calm concerns about the legality of the transaction, Rapp agreed to obtain an opinion letter from mutually acceptable counsel stating that the loan comported with all regulations, laws, and guidelines.

*960 The search for a bank that would make such a substantial loan to PaceCom continued over the next few weeks. The task was not an easy one because PaceCom was a fledgling company with a brief and dismal credit history. At the suggestion of mortgage broker Joseph Daddio, Rapp contacted John Bodziak, chairman of FCB’s board of directors. Bodziak showed interest in the PaceCom loan; in it, he saw an opportunity to sell his FCB stock holdings, which he unsuccessfully had been attempting to do for some time. Cotton and Wiley met with Bodziak in Florida on October 10, 1985, to discuss Rapp’s plan for success in what had become an interrelated loan and stock purchase transaction.

At this meeting, Cotton, 2 on behalf of Cornerstone/Rex and, surreptitiously, Rapp, and Bodziak, for himself, board member Robert Duncan, and minority stockholder Lawrence Whittle, executed an “Option to Purchase Bank Stock.” Paragraph 17 of that agreement explicitly sets forth the relationship between the stock purchase and the PaceCom loan: “Cotton and Sellers agree that the motivating reason underwriting [sic] Cotton’s acquisition of a majority of the stock in the Institution is the accommodation of the PaceCom transaction.” Ownership of 55% of FCB stock, the portion offered in the option, would include the right to name a number of people to FCB’s board of directors and would bring an influx of capital into the bank. Thus, the board could be stacked and the capital position strengthened, thereby insuring board approval of the PaceCom loan.

Rapp and Smith began the search for a source of funds to finance PaceCom’s purchase of the certificate of deposit that would serve as security for the loan. The more difficult task, however, was securing a favorable opinion letter on the legality of the transactions. Initially, Rapp, Smith, and Bodziak, through Bodziak’s attorney, Dominic Massari, hired Palmer Hamilton, a partner in the Mobile, Alabama law firm of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, to author a favorable letter addressing the merits of certain specific issues involved in the FCB-PaceCom transactions. A large fee was promised if the letter was written forthwith. Despite assurances by Rapp that the stock purchase and the PaceCom loan were not related and a promise that affidavits would be executed to that effect, Hamilton suspected otherwise. Following an investigation of the proposed transaction and the parties involved, Hamilton opined that the loan would be an unsafe and unsound banking practice. Rapp and Bodziak were displeased. Eventually, however, they obtained a favorable opinion from a Miami lawyer.

On October 25, 1985, as the self-imposed deadline for consummation of the FCB-PaceCom transaction drew nigh, Rapp, Smith, and Pitchford met with Charles Ba-zarian at his palatial Oklahoma City, Oklahoma home. Bazarian was joined by Mario Renda, a money broker from New York who was visiting Bazarian for the weekend. Rapp explained that PaceCom wanted to rent $20 million for one day so that it could buy a certificate of deposit to offer as security for FCB’s loan to PaceCom. Assurances were given that the money actually never would leave Bazarian’s possession. The “rental” of the money would work this way: Bazarian would provide a cashier’s check that PaceCom would cash only after enough of the proceeds of the PaceCom loan to fund the cheek, plus a substantial fee, had been wired to Bazarian’s bank account. Ed Mittlestet, president of the United Federal Savings and Loan Association, an institution at which Bazarian maintained an account, agreed to issue the check on the oral promise that the transaction would proceed as Rapp had described.

Rapp also had other preparations to make during those busy days prior to consummation of the transaction. In order to make the loan to PaceCom and to pay the interest on the certificate of deposit, FCB needed an infusion of cash. Rapp, Smith, and their cohorts turned to money brokers *961 —intermediaries who generate deposits for banks. Bodziak, acting alone, approved a $250,000 undersecured loan for PaeeCom to pay the brokers’ fees. Three and one-half million dollars in deposits were brokered into FCB during the days preceding the closing. In addition, Renda brokered approximately four million dollars for FCB on the day the loan was closed, but after the closing had taken place.

The FCB board of directors met on October 28, 1985.

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Bluebook (online)
871 F.2d 957, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5542, 1989 WL 33630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-michael-rapp-aka-michael-hellerman-charles-j-ca11-1989.