Opinion by Judge TASHIMA; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Michael Gill (“Gill”) appeals the restitution imposed for his willful failure to pay child support under the Child Support Recovery Act (“CSRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). We must decide whether the restitution order properly included accrued interest as part of his unpaid child support obligation when the underlying state court order made no express mention of interest, but the applicable state law clearly mandated the accrual of interest on any delinquent payments as set forth in the order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I.
There is no dispute as to the facts relevant to this appeal. Gill and his ex-wife, Odettelynn Murphy, together had two children. They were born on August 4, 1981, and January 14, 1985. The couple divorced in November, 1987. On November 6, 1987, the San Joaquin County Superior Court, in California, ordered Gill to pay child support in the amount of $150 per child, per month, until the children reached the age of 18, were married, or were otherwise emancipated. The state child support order made no express mention of interest on delinquent payments. California law, however, mandates that “[ujnless the judgment provides otherwise, if a money judgment is payable in installments, interest commences to accrue as to each installment on the date the installment becomes due.” Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 685.020(b). State law also explicitly pro[931] vides that “[i]nterest accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied.” Id. § 685.010(a). Moreover, child support arrearages, including any interest computed thereon, are enforceable until paid in full. Cal. Fam.Code § 4502.
The San Joaquin County Family Support Division administered the support order from 1987 to 1994; from 1994, the Fresno County Family Support Division has attempted to collect the child support. Gill voluntarily made intermittent payments in 1988 and 1989, totaling $1,300. Between 1991 and 1994, San Joaquin County also managed to intercept Gill’s tax refunds. No further payments were collected after June, 1994. To date, payments and collections from Gill total approximately $2,926.69.1 Gill no longer resides in California.
On December 12, 1997, Gill was charged with one count of willfully failing to pay child support, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1).2 After he consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, he pled guilty and was sentenced to five years’ probation. He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $64,787.48, which, according to the records of the Fresno County Family Support Division, included $41,268.38 in principal and $23,519.10 in accrued interest on the delinquent child support. Gill appealed his sentence to the district court, which affirmed the order of restitution on June 14, 2000. Gill timely filed notice of appeal to this court.
II.
Gill contends that only the principal amount of his delinquent child support, and not the accrued interest, can be included in the restitution order. We review the legality of a restitution order de novo. United States v. Craig, 181 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir.1999). Both the statutory text and legislative purpose of the CSRA, however, clearly refute Gill’s position on appeal.
The mandatory restitution provision of the CSRA provides:
Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order restitution under section 3663A in an amount equal to the total unpaid support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
18 U.S.C. § 228(d). The term “support obligation” is, in turn, defined as:
[A]ny amount determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State or of an Indian tribe to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living.
Id. § 228(f)(3).
Gill suggests that the accrued interest may not be included as part of his “support obligation” within the meaning of the CSRA because such interest was not “determined under” the state court order, which made no express mention of interest. We disagree. The plain wording of the statute defines “support obligation” more specifically as that amount “determined under a court order ... pursuant to [932] the law of a State ... to be due” for child support. Id. (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the law of California requires interest to be imposed on Gill’s delinquent payments at the pre-deter-mined statutory rate from the date that each installment became due, in accordance with the schedule and amount as set forth in the court order. Although the order did not expressly mention interest (presumably because there is no need to do so in light of applicable state law), it was nonetheless mandatorily imposed “pursuant to” state law.
Gill’s statutory interpretation argument would interpret “determined under” a state court support order to mean “determined in” or “determined by” that order. We do not believe that such a reading is appropriate. As the Seventh Circuit has stated:
These are not the words Congress chose to use.... Congress could have explicitly required that there be a specific arrearage order entered by a state court or agency which establishes the exact amount owed by the wayward parent. Congress instead required that there be a state court order which creates the underlying obligation due by the nonpaying parent .... The CSRA does not envision a formal state order or agency ruling of arrearage as a prerequisite to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
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Opinion by Judge TASHIMA; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Michael Gill (“Gill”) appeals the restitution imposed for his willful failure to pay child support under the Child Support Recovery Act (“CSRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). We must decide whether the restitution order properly included accrued interest as part of his unpaid child support obligation when the underlying state court order made no express mention of interest, but the applicable state law clearly mandated the accrual of interest on any delinquent payments as set forth in the order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I.
There is no dispute as to the facts relevant to this appeal. Gill and his ex-wife, Odettelynn Murphy, together had two children. They were born on August 4, 1981, and January 14, 1985. The couple divorced in November, 1987. On November 6, 1987, the San Joaquin County Superior Court, in California, ordered Gill to pay child support in the amount of $150 per child, per month, until the children reached the age of 18, were married, or were otherwise emancipated. The state child support order made no express mention of interest on delinquent payments. California law, however, mandates that “[ujnless the judgment provides otherwise, if a money judgment is payable in installments, interest commences to accrue as to each installment on the date the installment becomes due.” Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 685.020(b). State law also explicitly pro[931] vides that “[i]nterest accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied.” Id. § 685.010(a). Moreover, child support arrearages, including any interest computed thereon, are enforceable until paid in full. Cal. Fam.Code § 4502.
The San Joaquin County Family Support Division administered the support order from 1987 to 1994; from 1994, the Fresno County Family Support Division has attempted to collect the child support. Gill voluntarily made intermittent payments in 1988 and 1989, totaling $1,300. Between 1991 and 1994, San Joaquin County also managed to intercept Gill’s tax refunds. No further payments were collected after June, 1994. To date, payments and collections from Gill total approximately $2,926.69.1 Gill no longer resides in California.
On December 12, 1997, Gill was charged with one count of willfully failing to pay child support, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1).2 After he consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, he pled guilty and was sentenced to five years’ probation. He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $64,787.48, which, according to the records of the Fresno County Family Support Division, included $41,268.38 in principal and $23,519.10 in accrued interest on the delinquent child support. Gill appealed his sentence to the district court, which affirmed the order of restitution on June 14, 2000. Gill timely filed notice of appeal to this court.
II.
Gill contends that only the principal amount of his delinquent child support, and not the accrued interest, can be included in the restitution order. We review the legality of a restitution order de novo. United States v. Craig, 181 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir.1999). Both the statutory text and legislative purpose of the CSRA, however, clearly refute Gill’s position on appeal.
The mandatory restitution provision of the CSRA provides:
Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order restitution under section 3663A in an amount equal to the total unpaid support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
18 U.S.C. § 228(d). The term “support obligation” is, in turn, defined as:
[A]ny amount determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State or of an Indian tribe to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living.
Id. § 228(f)(3).
Gill suggests that the accrued interest may not be included as part of his “support obligation” within the meaning of the CSRA because such interest was not “determined under” the state court order, which made no express mention of interest. We disagree. The plain wording of the statute defines “support obligation” more specifically as that amount “determined under a court order ... pursuant to [932] the law of a State ... to be due” for child support. Id. (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the law of California requires interest to be imposed on Gill’s delinquent payments at the pre-deter-mined statutory rate from the date that each installment became due, in accordance with the schedule and amount as set forth in the court order. Although the order did not expressly mention interest (presumably because there is no need to do so in light of applicable state law), it was nonetheless mandatorily imposed “pursuant to” state law.
Gill’s statutory interpretation argument would interpret “determined under” a state court support order to mean “determined in” or “determined by” that order. We do not believe that such a reading is appropriate. As the Seventh Circuit has stated:
These are not the words Congress chose to use.... Congress could have explicitly required that there be a specific arrearage order entered by a state court or agency which establishes the exact amount owed by the wayward parent. Congress instead required that there be a state court order which creates the underlying obligation due by the nonpaying parent .... The CSRA does not envision a formal state order or agency ruling of arrearage as a prerequisite to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1997) (emphasis added). While Gill does not suggest that an arrearage order is necessary to include the aggregate amount of his delinquent principal payments in the restitution order (or to exercise federal jurisdiction), the rationale of Black applies here as well. Just as the cumulative principal arrearage of his state support obligation is “determined under” the court order mandating periodic payments, so too is accrued interest “determined under” the court order. When those payments are not made on the specified dates, state law automatically imposes interest on the delinquent principal. In other words, the court order need only create an underlying obligation pursuant to state law; it need not explicitly determine the exact amount due in arrears as long as state law makes the cumulative delinquent principal, and any interest accrued thereon, enforceable solely on the basis of that pre-existing obligation.
Such an understanding is supported by our language in Craig, where restitution was ordered for all of the defendant’s unpaid child support, even though it extended beyond only those payments that became delinquent during the period charged in the indictment. See Craig, 181 F.3d at 1126-27. We indicated that “the statutory language of § 228(c) [the mandatory restitution provision under the CSRA as codified prior to amendment in 1998] — ‘at the time of sentencing’ — evinces Congress’ desire to charge the parent for all unpaid child support.” Id. at 1127 (emphasis added). We concluded that “the Act must be read to mandate that a federal court order restitution of the entire past due child support obligation.” Id. Accordingly, the definition of the term “support obligation” should be interpreted to allow federal courts to order restitution in the amount of the “total unpaid” child support debt that is due “at the time of sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 228(d).
Moreover, this understanding of “support obligation” is also consistent with the reference in the mandatory restitution provision to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(d) (“the court shall order restitution under section 3663A”). Section 3663A(d) incorporates § 3664, which in turn mandates that “the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full [933] amount of each victim’s losses.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Here, the losses to the children and custodial parent include not only the delinquent principal, but also the interest mandated by state statute on the delinquent principal.
As we have previously stated, “[w]hat matters is that an obligation, already imposed by state law, comes to wear an interstate face. Then, and only then, does the CSRA intervene and forbid frustration of the obligation’s satisfaction.” United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of CSRA against commerce clause challenge). In enacting the CSRA, Congress expressly recognized that the collection of unpaid child support from out-of-state deadbeat parents had outgrown state enforcement mechanisms. See H.R.Rep. No. 102-771, at 6 (1992) (“the ability'' of those states [that passed laws making the willful failure to pay child support a crime] to enforce such laws outside their own boundaries is severely limited ... [because] interstate extradition and enforcement in fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and slow method of collection.”).
The CSRA was meant to address the problem “by taking the incentive out of moving interstate to avoid payment.” Id.; see also Black, 125 F.3d at 458 (discussing the legislative history of CSRA). Interpreting the terms of the statute so as to prevent restitution for the accrued interest on delinquent child support payments— when the interest is mandatorily imposed pursuant to state law — would both frustrate the objective of interstate collection and preserve the incentive for moving out of state when the state-incurred obligation is significant enough (as is the ease here/ where accrued interest accounts for over one-third of the total delinquent support obligation). To adopt such an interpretation would not only contradict the plain language of the statute, but also “would create an additional obstacle to compliance, contrary to the manifest purposes of the Act.” United States v. Collins, 921 F.Supp. 1028, 1031-32 (W.D.N.Y.1996).
III.
We hold that Gill’s restitution order properly included the interest accrued on his delinquent child support payments, as required by state law and incorporated into the terms of the CSRA. Thus, the sentence, including the restitution order, is
AFFIRMED.