F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 04-5011 Respondent-Appellee, v. Northern District of Oklahoma PETER J. McMAHON, JR., (D.C. No. 97-CV-1058-H)
Petitioner-Appellant.
ORDER *
Before EBEL , MURPHY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Peter J. McMahon, a federal prisoner, seeks a certificate of appealability
(COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s order denying his
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
Because we conclude that Mr. McMahon has failed to make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request for a COA
and dismiss this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. I.
In early 1995, Mr. McMahon, and his co-defendant Kandy Thomas, were
indicted in the Northern District of Oklahoma and charged with possessing a
firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and using a firearm
“during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Ms. Thomas pled guilty during their trial after the
Government discovered she and Mr. McMahon had suborned perjury; Mr.
McMahon was found guilty by jury. The district court enhanced Mr. McMahon’s
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),
and sentenced him to 235 months for his § 922(g) convictions, to be served
consecutively with a 60-month sentence for his § 924(c)(1) conviction.
On direct appeal, this Court reversed Mr. McMahon’s § 924(c)(1)
conviction based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Bailey v. United States , 516
U.S. 137 (1995), that a § 924(c) conviction requires “active employment” of the
weapon “in relation to the predicate crime.” United States v. McMahon , 91 F.3d
1394, 1396 (10th Cir. 1996), quoting Bailey , 516 U.S. at 143. We vacated the
portion of Mr. McMahon’s sentence based on his § 924(c)(1) conviction, affirmed
the enhancement of the sentence on his § 922(g) convictions, and remanded the
case for resentencing. 91 F.3d at 1396–98.
-2- On remand, the district court again sentenced Mr. McMahon to 235 months
for his § 922(g) convictions; as before, the court enhanced the sentence under §
924(e). Mr. McMahon appealed his new sentence, and we affirmed. United
States v. McMahon , 182 F.3d 934, 1999 WL 363040 (10th Cir. June 7, 1999)
(unpublished decision).
Mr. McMahon then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The district judge referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who, in a forty-three
page Report and Recommendation, recommended the district court deny Mr.
McMahon’s § 2255 petition. After considering Mr. McMahon’s objections, the
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. This
appeal followed.
II.
Mr. McMahon posits four reasons why we should issue a COA. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a) and 2255, we consider each.
A.
Mr. McMahon first argues the district court erred by considering his 1986
state conviction for Unlawful Delivery of Controlled Drug a qualifying predicate
felony under § 924(e), which requires a district court to enhance a defendant’s
sentence for a § 922(g) conviction if that defendant “has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C.
-3- § 924(e)(1). Mr. McMahon claims his 1986 conviction was unconstitutionally
obtained—either because he is actually innocent or because of ineffective
assistance of counsel—and that it thus should not qualify as a predicate “serious
drug offense.”
Mr. McMahon’s argument is a collateral attack on a prior state conviction
that later was used to enhance his federal sentence. In Daniels v. United States ,
532 U.S. 374 (2001), the Supreme Court limited a prisoner’s ability to collaterally
attack a prior state conviction in a § 2255 proceeding:
If . . . a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant is without recourse. The presumption of validity that attached to the prior conviction at the time of sentencing is conclusive, and the defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a motion under § 2255.
Id. at 382. The only exceptions are claims that a prior conviction was obtained
without the assistance of appointed counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment
and Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963), or “rare cases in which no
channel of review was actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior
conviction, due to no fault of his own.” Daniels , 532 U.S. at 382–83.
Daniels did not discuss what type of non- Gideon “rare cases” would permit
a prisoner to collaterally attack a prior conviction in a § 2255 motion once the
standard opportunities for review expired. Mr. McMahon, however, claims that
-4- Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss , 532 U.S. 394 (2001)—where the
Court extended Daniels ’s holding to § 2254 petitions—provides guidance.
Coss states that a defendant may not be “faulted for failing to obtain timely
review of a constitutional claim” if “a state court . . . , without justification,
refuse[s] to rule on a constitutional claim that has been properly presented to it,”
or if, “after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant . . .
obtain[s] compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.”
532 U.S. at 405.
These statements are not Coss ’s holding, but rather helpful dicta. See id. at
406 (“As in Daniels , this case does not require us to determine whether, or under
what precise circumstances, a petitioner might be able to use a § 2254 [or § 2255]
petition in this manner.”). We nonetheless assume these examples typify the “rare
cases” that would qualify as exceptions to the rule in Daniels and measure Mr.
McMahon’s claims against them.
First, Mr. McMahon claims that “he is actually innocent of the predicate
1986 state conviction.” Aplt.Br. 14. He claims that, despite his innocence, he
pled guilty—on counsel’s advice—to the 1986 charges because he had been
assaulted while in prison for a separate crime and the plea bargain “would allow
him to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be served concurrently with his”
-5- earlier sentence and “almost immediately discharge the imprisonment portion of
his [new] sentence.” Id. at 11. Thus, Mr. McMahon, though allegedly innocent,
pled guilty because he feared “for his safety within a prison system which had
failed to protect him from a life threatening assault.” Id.
Even assuming these facts are true, this claim does not qualify as a “rare
case” exception. Based on Coss , a prior state conviction is subject to collateral
attack only if “ after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a
defendant . . . obtain[ed] compelling evidence” of actual innocence that “ he could
not have uncovered in a timely manner .” 532 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
According to Mr. McMahon’s story, he knew immediately following his guilty
plea—well before his chance to seek direct review in Oklahoma courts
expired—that he was actually innocent. A timely appeal could have addressed his
actual innocence claim. Because he failed to appeal this issue in Oklahoma, Mr.
McMahon foreclosed his chance to seek review in a § 2255 proceeding, and he “is
not entitled to another bite at the apple simply because that conviction is later
used to enhance another sentence.” Daniels , 532 U.S. at 383.
Additionally, Mr. McMahon argues we should permit this collateral attack
on his 1986 conviction because the public defender who represented him in 1986
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims he “was denied the
opportunity to challenge his 1986 conviction through no fault of his own”
-6- because, after he accepted the plea agreement, “McMahon was abandoned by his
counsel. The court had not advised McMahon of his appellate rights, and
McMahon’s trial counsel never met with him to advise him of his right to
challenge the conviction on appeal.” Aplt.Br. 15.
Mr. McMahon asserts that we should consider this ineffective assistance
collateral challenge to his 1986 conviction under the “rare case” exception in
Daniels . However, Daniels and Coss both considered ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, and neither held—though both were squarely confronted with the
issue—that an ineffective assistance claim was a “rare case.” Daniels , 532 U.S.
at 384 (“No such claim [of a rare case] is made here. The sole basis on which
petitioner Daniels challenges his current federal sentence is that two of his prior
state convictions were the products of inadequate guilty pleas and ineffective
assistance of counsel.”); Coss , 532 U.S. at 399 (“In his [§ 2254] petition, Coss
contended that his 1986 assault conviction was the product of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”). Accordingly, if his ineffective assistance claim is
excepted from Daniels ’s rule prohibiting collateral attacks, it must be as an
extension of Gideon .
It is well established that “[a]n indigent defendant in a criminal trial has the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.” Baker v. Kaiser , 929 F.2d 1495,
1498 (10th Cir. 1991), citing Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963). “The
-7- right to counsel also extends to a defendant’s first appeal as of right.” Id. , citing
Douglas v. California , 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Appointed counsel, both at trial and
on the first appeal as of right, must render effective assistance. See McMann v.
Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Evitts v. Lucey , 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
In Baker, the Court concluded “that the right to counsel applies to the period
between the conclusion of trial proceedings and the date by which a defendant
must perfect an appeal.” 929 F.2d at 1498–99. The Court found this right “is
‘required in the hiatus between the termination of trial and the beginning of an
appeal in order that a defendant know that he has the right to appeal, how to
initiate an appeal and whether, in the opinion of counsel, an appeal is indicated.’”
Id. at 1499, quoting Nelson v. Peyton , 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th Cir. 1969).
Mr. McMahon asserts that, based on Gideon , Douglas , Evitts , and Baker , he
was denied effective assistance of counsel because his appointed attorney never
spoke to him about appealing his 1986 conviction. We disagree. Baker only
speaks to a counsel’s duties following a jury trial and conviction. When a
defendant pleads guilty, “an attorney has no absolute duty in every case to advise
a defendant of his limited right to appeal.” Laycock v. State of New Mexico , 880
F.2d 1184, 1887-88 (10th Cir. 1989). Mr. McMahon cannot succeed on an
ineffective assistance claim solely by showing that his attorney failed to notify
him of his limited appeal rights. Id. at 1889. Instead, Mr. McMahon must
-8- demonstrate that his counsel failed to inform him of his appeal rights after he
inquired about them or that there was a constitutional error that might have
resulted in a court setting aside his guilty plea. Id. Mr. McMahon claims only
that his “trial counsel failed to consult with him about his right to appeal,”
Aplt.Br. 11, that he was “abandoned by his counsel,” id. at 15, and that his “trial
counsel never met with him to advise him of his right to challenge the conviction
on appeal.” Id. He does not claim that he asked his counsel about his right to
appeal, nor does he allege that a court would have set aside his guilty plea
because it was constitutionally infirm. Thus, Mr. McMahon was not denied the
right to counsel. This claim therefore does not qualify as a Gideon exception to
Daniels .
In sum, Daniels prevents Mr. McMahon from collaterally challenging his
1986 Oklahoma conviction in a § 2255 motion. Once a prisoner’s time for
directly attacking a prior state conviction has expired, as Mr. McMahon’s has for
his 1986 conviction, the prisoner may collaterally attack such a conviction in a §
2255 proceeding only if he was unrepresented in violation of Gideon when
convicted or in other “rare cases.” Daniels , 532 U.S. at 382–84. Mr. McMahon’s
claims do not qualify under Daniels ’s exceptions. Accordingly, “[t]he
presumption of validity that attached to [Mr. McMahon’s] prior conviction at the
time of sentencing is conclusive,” id. at 382, and the district court did not err by
-9- considering Mr. McMahon’s 1986 conviction as a qualifying predicate felony for
ACCA sentence enhancement purposes.
B.
Mr. McMahon next contends he is entitled to a COA because the
Government sought a downward departure for substantial assistance for Ms.
Thomas, but not for him, after they both testified at Mr. Michael Sinclair’s
perjury trial. We disagree.
Mr. McMahon and Ms. Thomas were each charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) after police found a shotgun in their bedroom closet. During their trial,
they presented the testimony of Mr. Sinclair, who testified that neither defendant
placed the gun in their closet, but that it belonged to, and was placed in their
closet by, Ms. Thomas’s former husband. Later that evening, the Government
discovered Mr. Sinclair’s testimony was false and that Mr. McMahon and Ms.
Thomas had suborned it.
After Mr. McMahon’s trial concluded, the Government charged Mr.
Sinclair with perjury. Mr. McMahon and Ms. Thomas were two of the
Government’s key witnesses in Mr. Sinclair’s trial. Thereafter, the Government
filed a substantial assistance downward departure motion for Ms. Thomas but not
for Mr. McMahon. Mr. McMahon asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief
because the “record affords no rational reason for the disparity.” Aplt.Br. 20.
-10- It is not entirely clear whether Mr. McMahon seeks habeas relief because of
the disparity between his sentence and Ms. Thomas’s sentence or because the
Government moved for a downward departure for Ms. Thomas but not for him.
Compare id. at 18 (“The disparity between McMahon’s sentence and the sentence
of his co-defendant warrants relief.”) with id. at 24 (“The issue is not acceptance
of responsibility, but substantial assistance to the Government.”). In the end,
however, this distinction makes little difference: the result is the same in either
circumstance.
When sentencing a defendant, a district court must consider “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
“However, the purpose of the guidelines is to ‘eliminate unwarranted disparities
[in sentencing] nationwide,’ not to eliminate disparity between co-defendants.”
United States v. Gallegos , 129 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1997), quoting United
States v. Garza , 1 F.3d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1993) (brackets in original). Thus,
“‘the mere fact of a difference between the applicable guideline range for a
defendant [and] that of his co-defendant would [not] permit a departure, either
because the difference was too large or too small.’” Id. , quoting Garza , 1 F.3d at
1100. We permit disparate sentences “‘where the disparity is explicable by the
facts on the record.’” Garza , 1 F.3d at 1101, quoting United States v. Goddard ,
-11- 929 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1991).
Here, the record adequately explains the disparate sentences. While Ms.
Thomas pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Mr.
McMahon was found guilty by jury trial of two counts of the same offense. That
Mr. McMahon was found guilty of more offenses than Ms. Thomas is one
explanation for the difference in “the applicable guideline range” and sentence
length. Gallegos , 129 F.3d at 1143 (citation omitted). Moreover, Mr.
McMahon’s sentence was enhanced under the ACCA, and it is unclear whether
this same enhancement applied to Ms. Thomas. Therefore, the disparity between
the two sentences does not entitle Mr. McMahon to § 2255 relief.
Additionally, the Government’s failure to file a downward departure on Mr.
McMahon’s behalf is no basis for § 2255 relief. As Mr. McMahon notes, the
Government has “a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has
substantially assisted.” Wade v. United States , 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). A
prosecutor’s decision not to file a substantial assistance motion is subject to
district court review only if “the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive,” such as the defendant’s race or religion, id. at 185–86, or “was not
rationally related to any legitimate Government end.” Id. at 186.
Mr. McMahon claims “[t]he Government’s refusal to move for downward
departure was unconstitutionally motivated because: (1) it was a retaliatory action
-12- for McMahon’s exercise of a protected right (his insistence on trying the very
charge that Thomas also denied); and (2) it was not rationally related to any
government end.” Aplt.Br. 25. We disagree. The magistrate judge noted “the
government expressly declined to request a reduction for McMahon because
McMahon refused to cooperate at the perjury trial unless he received use
immunity and even then the government had to use prior sworn testimony to help
McMahon ‘remember.’” Report and Recommendation at 31 n.30. Thus, contrary
to Mr. McMahon’s assertion, the Government’s refusal to move for a downward
departure was based on factors other than his decision to continue his trial.
Because the Government’s reason was constitutionally permissible and rationally
related to a government end, Mr. McMahon is not entitled to habeas relief on this
claim.
C.
Mr. McMahon next claims he is entitled to a COA because he was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. He points to six
specific instances of allegedly ineffective assistance. Before discussing the
specifics, however, we note that each instance must fall below the standard
announced in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
-13- show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687. The “deficient” prong requires a defendant to “show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at
689. The “prejudice” component requires the defendant to prove “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. To
determine if appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise
an issue on appeal “we examine the merits of the omitted issue.” United States v.
Cook , 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995). If the omitted issue is meritless,
counsel’s failure to appeal it is not a Sixth Amendment deprivation. Id. at
392–93. We now address each of Mr. McMahon’s claims.
1. Trial Counsel Failed to Challenge the Classification of McMahon’s 1981 Second Degree Burglary Conviction as a Qualifying Predicate Felony.
Mr. McMahon’s presentence report classified his 1981 Oklahoma second
degree burglary conviction as a qualifying “violent felony” for purposes of
sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Mr. McMahon claims his trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to object to that classification.
We need not reach this claim’s merits. Mr. McMahon twice concedes in his
-14- brief that, to secure relief from his ACCA enhancement, he must successfully
prove both that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
classification of his 1981 conviction and that the district court improperly relied
on his 1986 conviction. See Aplt.Br. 10 n.4 (“In Proposition III.A., below,
McMahon alleges his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
challenge the classification of his 1981 state conviction for Second Degree
Burglary as a predicate offense for §924(e) enhancement. McMahon concedes he
must prevail on both propositions to warrant relief from his ACC[A] sentence.”);
id. at 34 n.5 (“As discussed in Proposition I, above, McMahon must prevail on
both propositions to obtain relief from the §924(e) enhancement.”). Since the
district court properly enhanced Mr. McMahon’s sentence based on his 1986
conviction, Mr. McMahon cannot satisfy Strickland ’s prejudice component even
if his counsel improperly failed to challenge the presentence report’s
classification of his 1981 conviction.
2. Appellate Counsel Failed to Seek Appropriate Relief for Retroactive Misjoinder.
Mr. McMahon next claims his appellate counsel was ineffective because he
failed to raise the issue of retroactive misjoinder. Retroactive misjoinder is the
concept that evidence adduced to support a claim that an appellate court vacates
may have prejudiced any surviving counts. Mr. McMahon argues that this claim
is not novel, so the failure to raise it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
-15- We disagree because we find that his retroactive claim has no merit.
The Tenth Circuit has not developed a specific standard to determine when
retroactive misjoinder occurs. However, the crux of retroactive misjoinder—that
evidence presented at trial to support one charge can spill over to other
charges—is familiar ground. We have articulated several standards for evaluating
whether an evidentiary spillover prejudices a criminal defendant. These standards
share a common feature—where the evidence supporting the contested charge is
strong, evidentiary spillovers do not warrant relief. See, e.g. , U.S. v. McClatchey ,
217 F.3d 823, 833 (10th Cir. 2000) (determining whether evidence introduced
against coconspirators involved in separate conspiracies prejudiced a defendant);
U.S. v. Edwards , 69 F.3d 419, 433 (10th Cir. 1995) (evaluating whether a
variance between the indictment and evidence adduced during trial prejudiced the
defendant). Courts that explicitly recognize claims for retroactive misjoinder also
focus on the strength of the evidence supporting claims that survive appeal. See,
e.g. , United States v. Hamilton , 334 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly,
we evaluate the strength of the evidence against Mr. McMahon on the § 922(g)
convictions to determine the merit of his retroactive misjoinder argument.
The Government’s evidence against Mr. McMahon on the § 922(g) charges
was extremely strong. For example, Mr. McMahon took the witness stand to
testify to his possession of the shotgun. This evidence was more than sufficient
-16- for the jury to convict Mr. McMahon. The claim that joining the § 924(c) charge
prejudiced Mr. McMahon when there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt on
the § 922(g) charges is meritless. Consequently, we conclude that Mr.
McMahon’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he failed to appeal
this issue. See Cook , 45 F.3d at 392–93.
3. Trial Counsel Failed to Present the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel .
Mr. McMahon next asserts his counsel’s failure to present the defense of
entrapment by estoppel constitutes ineffective assistance. “[E]ntrapment by
estoppel is implicated where an agent of the government affirmatively misleads a
party as to the state of the law and that party proceeds to act on the
misrepresentation so that criminal prosecution of the actor implicates due process
concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.” United States v.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez , 184 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted),
quoting United States v. Nichols , 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994). To invoke
this defense successfully, a defendant must show “an ‘active misleading’ by the
government agent, and actual reliance by the defendant. Further, the defendant’s
reliance must be reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law
misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation.” Id. (emphasis
omitted), quoting Nichols , 21 F.3d at 1018.
-17- Mr. McMahon claims dictum in United States v. Sanders , 18 F.3d 1488
(10th Cir. 1994), led him to believe it was lawful for him to possess the shotgun.
However, even assuming the dictum was misleading and that he relied on it, his
claim fails because he could not have shown that government agents actively
misled him. The authors of the Sanders dictum presumably did not know Mr.
McMahon and had no intention of leading him astray. At worst, it was an
unfortunate misunderstanding by a federal court regarding a point of state law not
necessary to the decision before it. Especially in light of our “highly deferential”
review of counsel’s actions, Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, we can find neither
deficiency nor prejudice in Mr. McMahon’s counsel’s decision not to advance an
entrapment by estoppel defense.
4. Trial Counsel Failed to Investigate Transfer of the Shotgun.
Mr. McMahon argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to request an ATF form showing the transfer of the shotgun to Terry
Young. This form did not appear in the Government’s file, which trial counsel
reviewed, and Mr. McMahon concedes that the Government did not present this
form at trial. Mr. McMahon contends that if his trial counsel had obtained the
form, he would have known that Mr. McMahon’s proposed defense was a
fabrication and he would have prevented Mr. McMahon from suborning perjury.
Because evidence that he suborned perjury undermined Mr. McMahon’s
-18- credibility, he argues that his counsel’s failure to investigate the ownership of the
shotgun constituted deficient performance. Mr. McMahon raised this issue below,
which the magistrate judge dismissed as “patently ridiculous.” R&R 22. Even
Mr. McMahon recognizes the “seeming absurdity” of imposing a duty on his
counsel to save him from himself. Aplt.Br. 46. We agree with the magistrate
judge. Mr. McMahon may not place the blame for his deceitful conduct on his
trial counsel’s shoulders. Any prejudice attributed to evidence that Mr. McMahon
suborned perjury stemmed from his attempt to defraud the court rather than the
failure of his trial counsel to trace possession of the shotgun.
5. Trial Counsel Stipulated that the Ammunition and Shotgun Traveled in Interstate Commerce.
Mr. McMahon argues that his trial counsel’s decision to stipulate that the
shotgun and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce was deficient
performance. He contends that because § 922(g) requires that a firearm or
ammunition travel in interstate commerce, conceding this point constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. McMahon raised this issue below and the
court concluded that this decision did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We agree. Deciding whether or not to concede an element of a
statute is a tactical decision. We review tactical decisions made by trial counsel
with substantial deference. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 689-91
(1984) (there is a strong presumption trial strategy was effective); United States v.
-19- Chavez-Marquez , 66 F.3d 259, 263 (10th Cir. 1995) (“highly deferential” review
for trial counsel’s decision to stipulate to a prior conviction).
As the magistrate judge noted, it is standard practice in the Northern
District of Oklahoma to stipulate to the interstate commerce requirement. In
addition, the government presented testimony from an ATF agent that the shotgun
and ammunition were not made in Oklahoma. Given this standard practice, and
the testimony that the shotgun at issue would satisfy interstate commerce element,
we cannot possibly conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel
to stipulate this point. Accordingly, we hold that this tactical decision did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
6. Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Search and Seizure Issues.
Mr. McMahon argues that his trial counsel did not adequately investigate
evidence to support his suppression motion. To support this argument, Mr.
McMahon points to information developed by a private investigator about the
controlled buys that provided probable cause for the warrant to search his
premises. An affidavit filed by this private investigator alleges a number of
inconsistencies in the search warrant affidavits. The investigator claims that the
Tulsa Police Department’s property room could not produce receipts from the
controlled buys that took place on August 31 and October 3, 1994. He contends
that he requested these receipts twice, once in May 1998 and again in February
-20- 2000. In addition, he claims that a physical survey of the apartment building
where the buys took place impeached allegations in the police officers’ affidavits.
Mr. McMahon’s trial counsel did not conduct an independent investigation to
counter the veracity of police officer accounts of the controlled buys. Instead,
trial counsel presented testimony from an alibi witness attesting that Mr.
McMahon was in her presence during the buys. Mr. McMahon argued this point
below and the court concluded that this failure to investigate did not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.
A habeas petitioner cannot succeed on an ineffective assistance claim by
showing that there was some evidence that the trial counsel failed to investigate.
Rather, the habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the failure to investigate
additional evidence was objectively unreasonable and would have produced a
different result at trial. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687. Even if we assume that an
investigation by Mr. McMahon’s trial counsel would have produced the
information developed by the private investigator, he fails to show that this
information “undermine[s] confidence in the outcome” of his trial. Id. at 694.
At the suppression hearing McMahon’s trial counsel argued that there were
inconsistencies in search warrant affidavits provided by officers involved in the
controlled buy. Despite trial counsel’s efforts to impeach the search warrant
affidavits, the trial court denied the suppression motion, noting that the officers’
-21- testimony was more believable than the testimony of Mr. McMahon and his alibi
witness. At most, the information in the private investigator’s affidavit, which has
not been subjected to adversarial testing, would have diminished the credibility of
the officers’ testimony. That the police department could not produce receipts
some three to five years after the events in question does not mean the events did
not take place, and factual discrepancies not necessarily going to the ultimate
issue are highly unlikely to have led the court to a different result. Accordingly,
we reject Mr. McMahon’s argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate the testimony of officers involved with the
controlled buy. Because we can resolve Mr. McMahon’s claim that his trial
counsel failed to investigate the officers’ testimony on the record before us, we
deny his request to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this matter. Foster v.
Ward , 182 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999).
D.
Finally, Mr. McMahon argues that he is actually innocent and was only
convicted as a result of officers lying in their search warrant affidavits. He
asserts that habeas relief is appropriate because the officers’ actions constituted
egregious misconduct by the government. Mr. McMahon did not raise this issue
at trial or on direct appeal. In most cases, the failure to raise an issue at trial or
on direct appeal results in waiver of the claim. See, e.g. , U.S. v. Cervini , 379
-22- F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A § 2255 motion is not intended as a substitute
for an appeal.”). However, Mr. McMahon argues that the misconduct by the
government was a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” that justifies an exception
to any procedural bar. Id. at 990-91 (where a failure to consider federal claims
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice the procedural bar does not
apply). Moreover, he argues that his trial counsel’s failure to raise this argument
amounted to ineffective assistance. We may combine our analysis of these two
arguments. Where a claim has no merit, the failure to raise the issue is not
constitutionally deficient performance. See Cook , 45 F.3d at 393 (10th Cir.
1995). Because we conclude that Mr. McMahon’s claim that his prosecution was
a fundamental miscarriage of justice has no merit, the failure to raise this issue
was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
To demonstrate that his allegations of misconduct by the government
produced a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Mr. McMahon must show that a
constitutional violation probably caused the conviction of an innocent person.
See Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). To support his contention
that he was actually innocent Mr. McMahon must provide “new reliable
evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v.
Delo , 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Mr. McMahon provides no new and reliable
-23- evidence to support his claim of actual innocence. Instead, he rehashes evidence
that was available at trial and speculates, without any credible evidence, that the
Government acted deceitfully. These arguments do little to counter the strongest
piece of evidence pointing to his guilt—his sworn testimony attesting to
possession of the shotgun. Mr. McMahon’s claim of egregious misconduct by the
government has no merit and we reject it.
III.
Accordingly, we DENY Peter J. McMahon’s request for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk
-24-