Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 15, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-7038 (D.C. No. 6:19-CR-00010-RAW-1) GUY COLESTON MCDONALD, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Guy McDonald pled guilty to participating in a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment—the bottom of
the Guidelines’ range—and we upheld his sentence. United States v. McDonald,
43 F.4th 1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 2022). After the U.S. Sentencing Commission
adopted Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines, he moved for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which “authorizes a district court to reduce a
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 2
sentence ‘based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 657
(10th Cir. 2017) (Chavez-Meza I) (quoting § 3582(c)(2)), aff’d, 585 U.S. 109 (2018)
(Chavez-Meza II).
The district court entered an order that stated his motion was granted but did
not shorten his sentence. It engaged in the “two-step inquiry” required by
§ 3582(c)(2). United States v. Green, 886 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2018). First, it
concluded Mr. McDonald was eligible for relief based on Amendment 821. Second,
it addressed “in its discretion” whether a sentence reduction was “warranted in whole
or in part under the particular circumstances of the case,” considering the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). At this second
step, the court determined Mr. McDonald’s sentence should not be shortened:
[T]he Court cannot justify a sentence at the low end of the amended guideline range of 262–327 months due to the nature of the case and [Mr. McDonald’s] involvement in the case, which included violent conduct. Therefore, [his] original sentence of 292 months will remain the same, which is still within the amended guideline range.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 (quoting R. vol. 2 at 325). The court further stated that its
decision was supported by several of the § 3553(a) factors, including that the
292-month sentence “reflects the seriousness of the offense,” “promotes respect for
the law,” “provides just punishment for the offense,” “affords adequate deterrence,”
and “protects the public from further crimes of [Mr. McDonald].” Id. at 9. It found
the sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the objectives set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id.
2 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 3
Mr. McDonald appeals, arguing the district court 1) committed procedural
error by not giving a sufficient explanation for its decision and 2) erred by not
reducing his sentence based on the lowered Guidelines’ range. We are unpersuaded.
Our review is for abuse of discretion, Chavez-Meza I, 854 F.3d at 657, and the
district court acted well within its discretion.
First, the district court sufficiently explained its application of the § 3553(a)
factors and its ruling. As we explained in Chavez-Meza I, Ҥ 3582(c)(2) does not
incorporate the explanatory requirement from § 3553(c)” that applies at the time of
original sentencing. 854 F.3d at 658 (citing United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 824 F.3d
1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016)). “The original sentencing procedures required by
§ 3553(c) . . . supply the ceiling for sentence-reduction procedures,” and “[w]e
cannot require more for sentence reduction . . . than we require for original
sentencing.” Id. Even at an original sentencing, the district court is not required to
provide an “extensive explanation[] for sentences within the guidelines range.”
Id. at 658–59. For a within-Guidelines sentence, the court “must provide only a
general statement of its reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a)
factors or respond to every argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a
reasonable sentence.” United States v. Clark, 981 F.3d 1154, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The decisions of this court and the Supreme Court in Chavez-Meza show the
district court’s explanation here was sufficient. In Chavez-Meza, the district court
granted the defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion but reduced his sentence less than he
3 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 4
requested. It ruled on the motion using a standard form order (an AO 247 form),
without giving a longer explanation. We held that given the “absence of an
explanatory requirement” under § 3582(c)(2), the district court had not abused its
discretion.1 Chavez-Meza I, 854 F.3d at 661. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that “[e]ven assuming . . . district courts have equivalent duties when initially
sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence, what the District
Court did here was sufficient.” Chavez-Meza II, 585 U.S. at 115.
We see no meaningful distinction between the record here and the facts in
Chavez-Meza. As in Chavez-Meza, the district court ruled using the same AO 247
standard form order. It explained that a shorter sentence was not warranted by the
§ 3553(a) factors, particularly the nature of Mr. McDonald’s conduct. As in
Chavez-Meza, the same district judge who imposed the original sentence ruled on the
§ 3582(c)(2) motion, and both that judge and this court can look to the original
sentencing record as relevant to deciding the § 3582(c)(2) motion. See id. at 119
(“[T]he record of the initial sentencing sheds light on why the court picked a point
. . . above the bottom of the reduced Guidelines range”). Also as in Chavez-Meza,
Mr.
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Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 15, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-7038 (D.C. No. 6:19-CR-00010-RAW-1) GUY COLESTON MCDONALD, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Guy McDonald pled guilty to participating in a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment—the bottom of
the Guidelines’ range—and we upheld his sentence. United States v. McDonald,
43 F.4th 1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 2022). After the U.S. Sentencing Commission
adopted Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines, he moved for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which “authorizes a district court to reduce a
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 2
sentence ‘based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 657
(10th Cir. 2017) (Chavez-Meza I) (quoting § 3582(c)(2)), aff’d, 585 U.S. 109 (2018)
(Chavez-Meza II).
The district court entered an order that stated his motion was granted but did
not shorten his sentence. It engaged in the “two-step inquiry” required by
§ 3582(c)(2). United States v. Green, 886 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2018). First, it
concluded Mr. McDonald was eligible for relief based on Amendment 821. Second,
it addressed “in its discretion” whether a sentence reduction was “warranted in whole
or in part under the particular circumstances of the case,” considering the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). At this second
step, the court determined Mr. McDonald’s sentence should not be shortened:
[T]he Court cannot justify a sentence at the low end of the amended guideline range of 262–327 months due to the nature of the case and [Mr. McDonald’s] involvement in the case, which included violent conduct. Therefore, [his] original sentence of 292 months will remain the same, which is still within the amended guideline range.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 (quoting R. vol. 2 at 325). The court further stated that its
decision was supported by several of the § 3553(a) factors, including that the
292-month sentence “reflects the seriousness of the offense,” “promotes respect for
the law,” “provides just punishment for the offense,” “affords adequate deterrence,”
and “protects the public from further crimes of [Mr. McDonald].” Id. at 9. It found
the sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the objectives set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id.
2 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 3
Mr. McDonald appeals, arguing the district court 1) committed procedural
error by not giving a sufficient explanation for its decision and 2) erred by not
reducing his sentence based on the lowered Guidelines’ range. We are unpersuaded.
Our review is for abuse of discretion, Chavez-Meza I, 854 F.3d at 657, and the
district court acted well within its discretion.
First, the district court sufficiently explained its application of the § 3553(a)
factors and its ruling. As we explained in Chavez-Meza I, Ҥ 3582(c)(2) does not
incorporate the explanatory requirement from § 3553(c)” that applies at the time of
original sentencing. 854 F.3d at 658 (citing United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 824 F.3d
1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016)). “The original sentencing procedures required by
§ 3553(c) . . . supply the ceiling for sentence-reduction procedures,” and “[w]e
cannot require more for sentence reduction . . . than we require for original
sentencing.” Id. Even at an original sentencing, the district court is not required to
provide an “extensive explanation[] for sentences within the guidelines range.”
Id. at 658–59. For a within-Guidelines sentence, the court “must provide only a
general statement of its reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a)
factors or respond to every argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a
reasonable sentence.” United States v. Clark, 981 F.3d 1154, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The decisions of this court and the Supreme Court in Chavez-Meza show the
district court’s explanation here was sufficient. In Chavez-Meza, the district court
granted the defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion but reduced his sentence less than he
3 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 4
requested. It ruled on the motion using a standard form order (an AO 247 form),
without giving a longer explanation. We held that given the “absence of an
explanatory requirement” under § 3582(c)(2), the district court had not abused its
discretion.1 Chavez-Meza I, 854 F.3d at 661. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that “[e]ven assuming . . . district courts have equivalent duties when initially
sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence, what the District
Court did here was sufficient.” Chavez-Meza II, 585 U.S. at 115.
We see no meaningful distinction between the record here and the facts in
Chavez-Meza. As in Chavez-Meza, the district court ruled using the same AO 247
standard form order. It explained that a shorter sentence was not warranted by the
§ 3553(a) factors, particularly the nature of Mr. McDonald’s conduct. As in
Chavez-Meza, the same district judge who imposed the original sentence ruled on the
§ 3582(c)(2) motion, and both that judge and this court can look to the original
sentencing record as relevant to deciding the § 3582(c)(2) motion. See id. at 119
(“[T]he record of the initial sentencing sheds light on why the court picked a point
. . . above the bottom of the reduced Guidelines range”). Also as in Chavez-Meza,
Mr. McDonald’s sentence is within the amended Guidelines range, and both the
district court’s original explanation of its chosen sentence and its explanation for not
reducing that sentence show it concluded a 292-month sentence was appropriate.
Accordingly, as in Chavez-Meza, “it is unsurprising that the judge considered a
1 In Chavez-Meza I, the court “[did] not address . . . whether a district court must justify rejecting a sentence-reduction motion.” 854 F.3d 655 n.2. 4 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 5
sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate,”
and “there was not much else for the judge to say.” Id. at 118–19.
Given Chavez-Meza, and considering the nature and record of this case, we
conclude the district court provided a sufficient explanation for its denial of
Mr. McDonald’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See id.; see also United States v. Solis-
Rodriguez, No. 24-2030, 2025 WL 785198, at *8 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025)
(unpublished) (affirming denial of § 3582(c)(2) motions as adequately explained by
AO 247 form order and “the ‘context and the record’” of the case (quoting Chavez-
Meza II, 585 U.S. at 117); holding that in denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion a district
court “need not render detailed or specific findings on the § 3553(a) factors where (1)
the judge denying the motion sentenced the defendant; (2) the case is not
complicated; (3) the defendant fails to raise novel or atypical arguments as to the
§ 3553(a) factors; and (4) the district court’s denial does not result in an above-
Guidelines sentence”); United States v. Pineda-Rodriguez, No. 24-2052, 2025 WL
350467, at *4 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2025) (unpublished) (holding that under Chavez-
Meza II the district court adequately explained denial of § 3582(c)(2) motion using
AO 247 form; also suggesting “a slightly more fulsome explanation” might have
“benefitted the parties and judicial system”).2
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not shortening
Mr. McDonald’s sentence. Mr. McDonald argues that by not lowering his sentence,
2 We cite these unpublished decisions only for their persuasive value. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 5 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 6
the district court “essentially refus[ed] to apply” the amended Guidelines range, and
that because it had already accounted for his violent conduct when imposing
sentence, that same conduct provided an insufficient basis to deny a sentence
reduction after the Guidelines were amended. Aplt. Opening Br. at 21.
These arguments are unavailing. It is not disputed that Amendment 821 made
Mr. McDonald eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), “[b]ut an
ameliorative amendment to the Guidelines in no way creates a right to sentence
reduction.” United States v. Osborn, 679 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012).3 Rather,
the decision whether or not to reduce a sentence based on the particular facts of a
case lies within the district court’s discretion. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. Our
review of the reasonableness of a district court’s chosen sentence is “highly
deferential,” and we “do not reweigh the [§ 3553(a)] sentencing factors” on appeal.
United States v. McCrary, 43 F.4th 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Other than arguing the district should have shortened his sentence
based on the amended guidelines, Mr. McDonald has not identified any way it abused
its discretion when weighing the § 3553(a) factors and concluding that the nature of
his conduct warranted a 292-month sentence both before and after the Guideline
amendments.
3 Mr. McDonald’s reliance on Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675, 688 (2018) is misplaced. Hughes addressed when a defendant is “eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. The disputed issue here is not whether Mr. McDonald was eligible for relief but whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied relief after considering the § 3553(a) factors. 6 Appellate Case: 24-7038 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025 Page: 7
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. McDonald’s motion
for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge