United States v. Marigold

50 U.S. 560, 13 L. Ed. 257, 9 How. 560, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1443
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 13, 1850
StatusPublished
Cited by108 cases

This text of 50 U.S. 560 (United States v. Marigold) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 13 L. Ed. 257, 9 How. 560, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1443 (1850).

Opinion

Mr. Justice DANIEL

delivered .the opinion of the court.

This is a certificate division of opinion from the Northern District of New York. ,

' The case, is clearly and succinctly stated in the following abstract from the record: —

‘rAt a Circuit Court of the United States, begun and held at Albany, for the Northern District of New York, in the Second Circuit, on the third Tuesday of October, in the year of our Lord 1848, and in the seventy-third year of American Independence.
“ Present, the Honorable Samuel Nelson and Alfred Conk-ling, Esquires.
“ The United States op America v. Peter Marigold.
State of the Pleadings.
“ This i» an indictment against the defendant, charging him, under the twentieth section of the act of Congress entitled ‘An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes,’ approved March 3, 1825, —
*566 “ 1st. With having brought into the United States, from a foreign place, with intent to pass, utter, publish, and sell as true, certain false, forged, and -counterfeit ■ coins, made, forged, and counterfeited in the resemblance and similitude of certain gold and silver coins of the United States, coined at the mint, he knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeit, and intending-thereby to defraud divers persons unknown.
“ 2d. With having uttered, published, and passed such counterfeit coins, with intent to defraud, &c.
To this indictment the defendant demurs, and Géorge W. Clinton, attorney of the United States for the said district, who prosecutes in this behalf, joins in demurrer.
.“ This cause coming on to be argued at this term, the following questions occurred: —
“ First. Whether Congress, under and by the Constitution, had power and authority to enact so much of the said twentieth section of the said act as relates to bringing into the United States counterfeit coins.
“ Second. Whether Congress, under and by virtue of the Constitution, had power to enact so much of the said twentieth section as relates to uttering; publishing, passing, and selling of the counterfeit coins therein specified.
w On which said several questions, the opinions of the judges were opposed.
“ Whereupon, on motion of the said attorney, prosecuting for the United States in this behalf,, that the points on which the disagreement has happened may, during the term, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court to the Supreme Court, to be finally decided, — it is ordered, that the foregoing state of the pleadings, and statement of the points upon which the disagreement has happened, which is made under the direction of the judges, be certified, according to the request of the attorney, prosecuting as aforesaid, and the law in that case made and provided.”

The inquiry first propounded upon this record points, obviously, to the answer which concedes to Congress the power here ’drawn in question. Congress are, by the Constitution, vested with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations ; and however, at periods of high excitement, an application of the terms “ to regulate commerce ” such as would-embrace absolute prohibition may have been questioned, yet, since the passage of the embargo and. non-intercourse laws, and the repeated judicial sanctions those statutes have received, it can scarcely, at this day, be open to doubt, that every subject falling within the legitimate sphere of commercial regulation *567 may be partially or wholly excluded, when either measure shall be demanded by the safety or by Jhe important interests of the entire nation. Such exclusion cannot be limited to particular classes or descriptions of commercial subjects; it may embrace manufactures, bullion, coin, or any other thing. The power once conceded, it may operate on any and every subject of commerce to which the legislative discretion may apply it.

But the twentieth section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1825, or rather those provisions of that section brought-to the view of Hhis court by the second question certified, are not properly referable to commercial regulations, merely as such; nor to considerations of ordinary commercial advantage. They appertain rather to the execution of an important trust invested by the Constitution, and to the obligation to fulfil that trust on the part of the government, namely, the trust and the duty of creating and maintaining a uniform and pure metallic standard of value throughout the Union. • The power of coining money and of regulating its value was delegated to Congress by the Constitution for the very purpose, as assigned by the framers of that instrument, of creating and preserving the uniformity and purity of such a standard of value ; and on account of the impossibility which was foreseen of otherwise preventing, the inequalities and the confusion necessarily incident to different, views of policy, which in different communities would be brought to bear on this subject. The power to coin money being thus given to Congress, founded on public necessity, it must carry with it the correlative power of protecting the creature and object of that power. It cannot be imputed to wise and practical statesmen, nor is it consistent with common sense, that they should have vested this high and exclusive authority, and with a view to objects partaking of the ihagnitúde of the authority itself, only to be rendered immediately vain and useless, as must have been the case had the government been left disabled and impotent as to the only means of securing the objects in contemplation.

If the medium which the government was authorized to create and establish could immediately be expelled, and substituted by one it had neither created, estimated, nor authorized, — one possessing no intrinsic value, — then the power conferred by the Constitution would be useless, — wholly fruitless of every end it was designed to accomplish. . Whatever functions Congress are, by the Constitution, authorized, to perform, they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform; and on this principle, having emitted a circulating medium, a standard of value *568 indispensable for the purposes of the community, and for the action of the government itself, they are accordingly authorized and bound in duty to prevent its debasement and expulsion, and the destruction of the general confidence and convenience, by the influx and substitution of a spurious coin in lieu of the constitutional currency. We admit that the clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide- for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States does not embrace within its language the offence of uttering or circulating spurious or counterfeited coin (the term counterfeit,

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Bluebook (online)
50 U.S. 560, 13 L. Ed. 257, 9 How. 560, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1443, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-marigold-scotus-1850.