CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:
In our view, these are cases of symbolic speech. In No. 73-1939 the defendants declined to participate in the traditional ceremony of rising upon entrance and departure of the presiding judge and were cited for contempt. In No. 73-1938 defendant engaged in hyperbole — claiming 3 billion dependents on a tax withholding form — and was charged with a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205. In the latter criminal tax case we hold the government failed to prove an essential element of the offense. In the contempt case we hold that refusal. to rise is not “misbehavior [which] obstruct [s] the administration of justice” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401. In neither case do we find it necessary to decide whether the first amendment bars prosecution. Both convictions will be reversed with instructions to enter verdicts of acquittal.
Lyle and Sue Snider are Quakers. They moved to North Carolina in August 1971 after Lyle was employed as a teacher at Carolina Friends School in Chapel Hill. Their Quaker background1 soon led them to join the Society of Friends Meeting in Durham.2 They lived an ascetic life — residing in a farmhouse without running water and subsisting as vegetarians. According to their testimony and that of other members of the Durham Meeting, their concern for the consistency of their beliefs with their actions grew. They were particularly concerned with that portion of the Quaker Discipline3 which opposed war in any form. The Discipline consisted of “Queries” and “Advices” which each Quaker was to read and consider individually. The Query on war asked:
Do we endeavor to live in the virtue of that light and power that takes away the occasion of all wars, seeking to do our part in the work of reconciliation between individuals, groups, and nations? Do we faithfully maintain our testimony against military participation in war? Are we trying to build a world order to prevent war and to insure a just and durable peace?
The Advice on witnessing for peace 4 admonished :
Take care in your relationship with others that you respect and cherish each man for men of all races and nationalities have a glow within their beings which unites all men as broth- ■ ers. Take care also, therefore, to maintain a consistent witness for [647]*647peace, opposition to war, and to all acts of violence or coercion, that you may remain in accord with the timeless guidance of the Inner Light.
Believing that they could not follow the Advice nor answer the Query in the affirmative while voluntarily paying taxes, a large portion of which was used for military purposes, appellants decided that they could no longer voluntarily pay their taxes. The decision, they testified, was not made overnight. In college both had participated in protests aimed at ending the Vietnamese conflict. In March 1972 they sought a refund for their 1971 taxes on a theory of violation of their “freedom of religion.” 5
On May 30, 1972, Snider submitted to his employer an Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate (Form W-4) which was dated a day earlier. On line 1, calling for “Total number of allowances you are claiming,” Snider had written “3 billion.” Together with the W-4 Form he enclosed a letter, addressed to “U. S. Government, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service” explaining his claim. It read:
Dear Friends,
We are claiming 3 billion exemptions on our W-4 form, because we are be-eoming more and more aware of our responsibility to our 3 billion fellow human beings all over the world. The military establishment of this country threatens the peace and security of every person on earth. Our country’s military is destroying life on a horrifying scale in Southeast Asia, and it threatens to expand this destruction to other areas of the globe. Our responsibility to our fellow men leads us to resist this military establishment by refusing to pay willingly any of our tax money to it. We cannot continue to contribute money to the death and destruction which our military wreaks in Southeast Asia or to the fear which it generates in people the world over.
We also refuse to pay our taxes willingly to the U. S. Government on the ground that we are conscientiously opposed to any and all wars. We have a strong Christian faith which is the basis of our opposition to war and violence among men. We are conscientiously opposed to the use of violence to settle conflicts and we are committed to removing the causes of violent conflict. We cannot in good conscience support a government which devotes over 60 percent of its re[648]*648sources to war. We must work to change the priorities of that government and its people. As one of the most powerful military nations on earth, we must start leading the world toward peace.
We are not trying to avoid our responsibilities to the people of this country and the world by refusing to pay our taxes. We will pay our share of money and resources to life-affirming, positive programs such as medical care, welfare, psychological care and counseling, and education, to name a few. We are called by God to affirm life and love with our resources and to resist and eliminate war and violence among men.
‘In peace and love,’
/s/ Lyle Snider and Susan Snider
(emphasis added). The letter and the W-4 Form were forwarded by the school’s business manager to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service, together with a letter from the business manager inquiring as to any action which the school should take in the matter. During the summer, while Snider was working with the American Friends’ Service Committee in West Virginia, the school ignored the symbolic claim of 3 billion dependents and continued to withhold from Snider’s paycheck on the basis of four dependents, the number listed on his previous W-4 Form. Upon his return at the end of the summer, there having been no reply to the school’s inquiry to IRS, the school returned to Snider the sums that had previously been withheld. The school’s faculty, in its capacity as a Quaker Meeting) shortly thereafter declared its support of Snider and its belief his position was one of conscience.
On December 15, 1972, after investigation by an IRS Special Agent confirmed that Snider was entitled to only four allowances (dependents) as previously claimed, Snider was arrested. Some two months later the grand jury returned an indictment against Snider, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7205,6 for willfully supplying his employer with “false and fraudulent” information.7
After a plea of not guilty, Snider was brought to trial on June 12, 1973. As court was convened, the clerk-crier’s command that “All rise” went unheeded by a number of persons in the courtroom including the defendant and his wife. Despite the district judge’s explanation of his understanding of the reasons for the rising requirement and the express request that Mr. and Mrs. Snider stand, each replied that he could not, in good conscience, do so.
During the trial the motivation for Snider’s having claimed 3 billion dependents became apparent — his religious belief that he could not voluntarily pay his taxes. The sincerity of his motivation was not seriously questioned at -trial and we have no reason to doubt it. Equally clear, however, was the fact that Snider submitted the W-4 Form knowing that, according to the definition of “dependents” on the form, he was entitled to no more than four allowances. This act was admittedly deliberate, though, according to Snider’s testimony and that of his wife, he was unsure as to whether the act was protected by that portion of the first amendment which vouchsafes the free exercise of religion.
After seven communications to the judge, four returns for reinstruction (including a dynamite charge after deadlock), and approximately eight hours of deliberation over two days, the jury found Snider guilty. He was sentenced to eight months and, after summary contempt proceedings under Rule 42(a), given an additional 30 days for contempt. Sue Snider received a ten-day sentence, suspended for two years, for contempt.
[650]*650I.
In the tax case appellant Snider contests his conviction under section 7205 on six grounds: (1) that the statute, as applied to him, is unconstitutional as an infringement of his right to the free exercise of religion; (2) that it was error for the district judge not to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the government’s case on the ground that the government had failed to prove two essential elements of the crime charged, viz., that Snider had supplied “false or fraudulent” information and that he had acted “willfully; ” (3) that the trial judge erroneously charged the jury as to the meaning of “false” and “willfully” in section 7205 so as to entitle Snider to a new trial; (4) that the failure to resubmit the entire charge to the jury upon the jury’s request for reinstruction on the meaning of “false or fraudulent” was an abuse of discretion and amounted to prejudicial error because the portion of the instruction which was reiterated was favorable to the government; (5) that the Allen [Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)] charge given to the jury after it reached a deadlock was coercive; and (6) that the imposition of an active prison sentence, while within the statutory maximum, was arbitrary and constituted an abuse of discretion. Because we find the appellant’s second and third contentions to be meritorious we do not reach the other points of error.8A We turn, then, to a consideration of the meaning of “false or fraudulent” and “willfully” in section 7205 of the Internal Revenue Code.
A. “False or Fraudulent”
The district judge’s view of the meaning of “false” and “fraudulent” in 26 U.S.C. § 7205 is reflected in his charge to the jury. “A statement, including a statement in a claim or document, is ‘false,’ ” he instructed, “if it were untrue when made, and was then known to be untrue by the person making it, or causing it to be made. A statement or claim or document is ‘fraudulent’ if it was falsely made, or caused to be made, with the intent to deceive.” In so charging, the district judge rejected defendant’s interpretation of “false” as meaning more than untrue in the sense that the statement must be made “with an intent to deceive or mislead,” an interpretation offered by defendant both on argument for his motion for judgment of acquittal and through his proposed jury instructions.9 Despite the fact that the language of the statute is [651]*651written in the disjunctive, the appellant urges that the words “false or fraudulent” should be read “false and fraudulent” or, to the same purpose, that “false” be given the restrictive definition set out in his proposed jury instruction in order to save the words “or fraudulent” from being surplusage.
1.
It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that Congress is presumed to have used words according to their ordinary meaning, unless a different signification is clearly indicated. Avery v. C. I. R., 292 U.S. 210, 214, 54 S.Ct. 674, 78 L.Ed. 1216 (1934). Though the first dictionary meaning of “false” corresponds with the district judge’s charge,10 it is important to note that the word, as judicially construed, means much more in other statutes. For example, “false” in section 14(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2), which creates an objection to the discharge of a bankrupt where he makes a “materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition,” has been interpreted to mean “more than erroneous or untrue” and to “[import] an intention to deceive.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy § 14.40 (14th ed.). See Third Nat’l Bank v. Schatten, 81 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1936); In re Rosenfeld, 262 F. 876 (2d Cir. 1919); Doyle v. First Nat’l Bank of Baltimore, 231 F. 649 (4th Cir. 1916). And the use of “falsely” in section 346(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 746 (now incorporated into Chapter 18 at sections 911 and 1015), to make criminal the act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be a citizen of the United States was interpreted as follows: “In law this word usually means something more than untrue; it [false] means something designedly untrue and deceitful and implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud.” United States v. Martinez, 73 F.Supp. 403, 407 (M.D.Pa.1947) (emphasis added). Even 18 U.S.C. § 1001, prohibiting the making or using of “any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements” within the province of any government “department or agency,” utilizes “false” in a context that signifies more than mere untruth. Seizing upon the reference to a “material fact” in the first part of the statute,11 [652]*652courts have developed “materiality” as an element of the offense. The test for materiality under this statute was explained in Weinstock v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 231 F.2d 699, 701-702 (1956), as “whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.” In other words, though the false statement need deceive no one in actuality, Robles v. United States, 279 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 836, 81 S.Ct. 750, 5 L.Ed.2d 745 (1961); United States v. Coastal Contracting and Engineering Co., 174 F.Supp. 474 (D.Md. 1959), it must be deceptive, “calculated to induce agency reliance or action,” United States v. Quirk, 167 F.Supp. 462, 464 (E.D.Pa.1958), aff’d, 266 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1959).12 The gloss put upon “false” in various contexts throughout the United States Code, if not sufficient to demonstrate that the ordinary meaning of the word in a statutory context is more than untrue and implies an intention to deceive or mislead,13 is at least sufficient to point up the ambiguity of the term. We must accordingly utilize several familiar methods of statutory construction to arrive at the meaning of the phrase “false or fraudulent” in section 7205.
2.
We begin with the premise that all parts of the statute must be read together, neither taking specific words out of context, United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940), nor interpreting one part so as to render another meaningless, Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 55 S.Ct. 60, 79 L.Ed. 232 (1934). Were we to accept the government’s position, as did the district judge, that “false” means “untrue” and “fraudulent” means “falsely made [653]*653with the intent to deceive,” then the phrase “or fraudulent” in 26 U.S.C. § 7205 is rendered a nullity. That which is “fraudulent” within the district judge’s instructions to the jury is also, by definition, “false;” thus the government need only prove that Snider’s claim was untrue and is relieved of any obligation to show that the statement is deceptive or that it was made with an intention to deceive. Such an interpretation not only renders “or fraudulent” superfluous, it may give the statute “unintended breadth” 14 so as to make criminal an act which the Congress did not consider punishable.
On the other hand, adoption of appellant’s view would result in giving virtually the same meaning to both words, an interpretation which should also be avoided if possible. Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). But, given the meaning attached to “false” in similar statutes discussed above, it is not unlikely that Congress’ choice of words was indicative either of a cumulative effect, in which each of several words is used to convey a similar meaning, as in the “false, fictitious or fraudulent” language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 1001, or of a conjunctive connotation,15 similar to the meaning of “false and fraudulent” as used in the Food and Drug Act of 1906,16 and the interpretation given to the use of “false or fraudulent” as used at three places within the Corporation Tax Law of 1909, 36 Stat. 112.17
3.
That no particular care was given to the choice of the disjunctive form is further substantiated by the legislative history of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, which adopted the pay-as-you-go (withholding) method of collecting income tax. Section 470(d) of the Act was incorporated into the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as section 1626(d) and became, without material change, section 7205 of the 1954 Code. The Senate Report on the bill contained the following discussion of section 470(d):
Section 470(d) was a new provision added to the code by the House bill. This section provides appropriate penalties applicable to employees who willfully supply false or fraudulent withholding exemption certificates or who willfully fail to supply information which would decrease the withholding exemption. The penalty in each instance is a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or both, and such penalties are in lieu of those provided, in section 145(a) of the code. This provision with minor modifications is retained in your committee bill as section 1626(d). As amended the statutory language makes clear that the penalties are applicable in the case of an employee who willfully supplies false and fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply information, which would require an increase in the tax to be withheld at source on his wages.
S.Rep.No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1943) (emphasis added). This interchangeable use of “or” and “and,” when considered in light of the interpretation given to “false or fraudulent” in prior revenue statutes, is in[654]*654structive. The first employment of the phrase appears to have been in the Corporation Tax Law of 1909, 36 Stat. 112, which provided for the collection of a corporate excise tax. The fifth paragraph of section 38 of the Act provided for the assessment of additional tax within three years after the tax was due but not paid due to the filing of “false or fraudulent returns.” The phrase was also employed at three other places within the Act — once to describe the intent necessary for the Commissioner to add on a 100 percent penalty (“false or fraudulent intent”) and twice to describe an act punishable as a misdemeanor (“make a false or fraudulent return”). The First Circuit, in a case brought under section 38, para. 5 of the Act, framed the issue as
whether “false or fraudulent,” in that clause of the fifth subdivision which authorizes the assessment of additional taxes upon discovery within three years after the original return, is to be taken as meaning only such returns as are fraudulently false, or as including also such returns as are false only in the sense of being incorrect.
Eliot Nat’l Bank v. Gill, 218 F. 600, 603 (1914). Noting that the use of the phrase in each of the other three contexts denoted a penalty, either civil or criminal, and that, in such a context, “may be taken ... to mean ‘false and fraudulent,’ ” the court agreed that in this context, where no penalty was imposed and no offense created, “false” should properly be interpreted as “incorrect.” Accord, National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, 223 F. 472 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 642, 36 S.Ct. 163, 60 L.Ed. 482 (1915). Here, like the three other uses of the phrase in Gill, the purpose is not restitutionary — allowing the Commissioner to recoup taxes owed but not paid — but rather penal.
After the reinstitution of the personal income tax in'1913 the phrase found its way into the revenue statutes. See section 278(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918; section 276(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936; section 276(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Each usage was limited, however, to a determination of when the statute of limitations was tolled so as to permit the Commissioner to assess for taxes owed but not paid or to impose a penalty of civil fraud. None was concerned with defining a criminal sanction. Subsequent acts have continued to incorporate a similar provision, the effect of which is to toll the statute of limitations where a “false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax,” 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1), is submitted. Such use of the phrase has been interpreted to require a clear showing of fraud — the fact that the return was false, in the sense of incorrect, being insufficient. Mitchell v. C.I.R., 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941); Davis v. C.I.R., 184 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1950). In Davis the court stated: “[A] failure to file a correct return does not necessarily constitute fraud. Fraud implies bad faith, intentional wrong doing and a sinister motive.” 184 F.2d at 87 (emphasis added). If such is the content of the “false or fraudulent return” necessary to show civil tax fraud, we think no less should be required under the criminal sanction of section 7205, even though section 6501(c)(1) contains the additional phrase “with the intent to evade tax.” 18 Surely Congress could not have intended to require a showing of fraud, Carter v. Campbell, 264 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1959), merely to toll a statute of limitations for supplying “false or fraudulent returns” and yet impose a criminal sanction for the supplying of a withholding certificate that is false only in the sense of being “incorrect.” Nev[655]*655ertheless, the government urges upon us a position in which a violation of § 7205 would require proof only that Snider submitted incorrect information.19 We cannot agree. The use of the phrase “false or fraudulent” throughout the history of the revenue acts as well as in other statutes belies such an interpretation. So does the existence of adequate civil sanctions which prevent widespread abuse of the withholding system through protests of the type attempted by Snider.20 But neither should we adopt the position advocated by the appellant. Though an examination of the legislative history of section 7205 together with a consideration of the past usage of similar phrases in other statutes indicates that “or” may be read “and,” we decline to go so far. To do so would, we believe, render difficult, if not impossible, the distinction between felony and misdemeanor which the 1954 recodification of the criminal sanctions was designed to implement.21 Instead, we hold that in order for a taxpayer to be convicted of supplying “false or fraudulent” information contrary to section 7205 the information must either be (1) supplied with an intent to deceive, or (2) false in the sense of deceptive — of such a nature that it could reasonably affect withholding to the detriment of the government. This interpretation gives meaning to both words and avoids the judicial rewriting of “or” as “and.” Furthermore, it maintains the integrity of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7207 by differentiating the section 7205 misdemeanor from the two felony provisions in much the same way as we believe the Supreme Court in United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), indicated the section 7207 misdemeanor should be distinguished from sections 7201 and 7206: by “the additional misconduct essential to a violation of the felony statutes.” 412 U.S. at 358-359, 92 S.Ct. at 2016, quoting United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 1966). Finally, such an interpretation is consistent with the rule that “[t] axing statutes must be applied within reasonable limits and construed in the light of their purpose.” Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. C.I.R., 139 F.2d 65, 67 (6th Cir. 1943). We find nothing in the legislative history which might indicate that a less restrictive definition of “false or fraudulent” should apply,22 whereas we believe it reasonable and consistent with past interpretations that “false” means more than merely “untrue” or “incorrect.”
4.
We think United States v. Malinowski, 347 F.Supp. 347, 351-353 (E.D.Pa.1972), aff’d 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973), is not necessarily to the contrary. In Malinowski the defendant filed a Form W-4 claiming 15 exemptions and with it sent a letter to his employer advising that he had “entered into a relationship of economic and social dependency with a group of 15 per[656]*656sons . . . . ” 472 F.2d at 852. Although Malinowski stated that one of his aims was to exercise greater control over the use of taxes and especially that large portion used for war-making, both the district court, 347 F.Supp. at 352, and the court of appeals, 472 F.2d at 856, refused to consider what was characterized as his motivation and held it to be irrelevant. As we read the opinion of Judge Aldisert, Malinowski’s contention on appeal was that the information was not supplied “willfully.” There was no discussion at the appellate level of the meaning of “false;” the issue apparently was not raised. The district court’s treatment of the question, hinging on its belief that a stricter interpretation of “false” would reduce the withholding system “to a shambles,” 347 F. Supp. at 352, is inadequate. This is especially true in light of the power of the IRS to treat a claim such as Snider’s as constituting no information and withhold on the basis of zero dependents. I. R.S. Reg. § 31.3401 (e)-l.23 Under the test which we adopt today it is entirely possible that a jury might find a claim of 15 exemptions to be deceptive and capable of misleading employer and IRS alike as to the amount properly to be withheld. A similar possibility exists under the facts of United States v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973), where defendants claimed 10, 10, and 17 exemptions respectively. A claim of “3 billion,” on the other hand, could deceive no one. It is purely symbolic, the attached letter aside. To this extent both Malinowski and Smith are distinguishable; to the extent that they are not distinguishable, we decline to follow them.
5.
The interpretation of “false or fraudulent” by the district court constitutes an error of law which is reflected not only in the jury instructions on the meaning of “false” but also in the denial of defendant’s motion, styled a “motion to dismiss,” made at the conclusion of the government’s case. Treating the motion as one for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, we reverse the district judge’s denial of the motion and enter judgment of acquittal. Whether Rule 29 confines our power of disposition to either grant or refuse the motion or includes the power to remand for a new trial,24 this is not a case in which “the defect in the evidence might be supplied on another trial.” Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 559, 70 S.Ct. 317, 321, 94 L.Ed. 335 (1950). Additional facts could not enable a jury to conclude that the entry of “3 billion” on defendant’s W-4 Form was “false or fraudulent” as we have construed the term. Since the evidence as to “false or fraudulent” is insufficient and cannot be cured at a second trial, dismissal of the indictment, rather than a new trial, is appropriate. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1970); Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1968); Phillips v. United States, 311 F.2d 204, 207 (10th Cir. 1962). See generally Griffin v. United States, 269 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1959).
[657]*657B. “Willfully”
On appeal, Snider also urges, alternatively, that he is entitled (1) to judgment of acquittal on the basis of the government’s failure to prove that he acted “willfully” or (2) to a new trial because of an erroneous jury instruction on the issue of willfulness. He contends that his belief that he had a first amendment right to symbolically claim three billion dependents in protest of the Vietnam War and war in general could be found by a jury to negate the element of willfulness.25 In United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), the Supreme Court settled the question of whether the word willfully has the same meaning in the felony statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206, as it does in the misdemeanor statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7202-7205, 7207. It does. The Court also made it clear that it had consistently interpreted the word “willfully” to require an element of mens rea and that “[ujntil Congress speaks otherwise, we therefore shall continue to require, in both tax felonies and tax misdemeanors that must be done ‘willfully,’ the bad purpose or evil motive described in [United States v.] Murdock [290 U. S. 389, 398, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933)] . . . . ” 412 U.S. at 361, 93 S.Ct. at 2017. Thus it is no longer clear, as we would have previously thought, that the element of willfulness in a tax statute is established by proof of a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty — without more. It is possible that purpose and motivation may be found by a jury to negate willfulness. But see United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973), and United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 908, 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970).
Because disposition of the appeal is sufficiently governed by our holding in section A with respect to the interpretation of “false or fraudulent,” we need not presently decide this question.
II.
Both Lyle and Sue Snider appeal from their summary contempt convictions under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). They urge that (1) their conduct, even if contemptuous, did not merit summary disposition under Rule 42(a), (2) the failure to rise was not contempt within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401, and (3) even if within the meaning of the statute, their failure to rise was protected by the first amendment.
A. Summary Contempt
Assuming for the moment that appellants’ behavior amounted to contempt, the language of Rule 42(a) — “that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court”— would seem to support the district judge’s actions in dealing summarily with appellants. But Rule 42(a) has been interpreted more narrowly by the Supreme Court. It has thus been said that the rule was “reserved ‘for exceptional circumstances,’ Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 54, [79 S.Ct. 539, 548, 3 L.Ed.2d 609] (dissenting opinion) [where] speedy punishment may be necessary in order to achieve ‘summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority’ Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, [534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed. 767] . . . . ” Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164, 86 S.Ct. 352, 354, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965). Harris’ assertion of a fifth amendment privilege not to testify before a grand jury, like the Sniders’ claim of a first amendment privilege not to stand, was not “such an open, serious threat to orderly procedure” nor such an “unusual situation” that “instant action [was] necessary to protect the judicial institution itself.” 382 U.S. at 167, 86 S.Ct. at 356. The length of time between the initial contemptuous behavior by Snider [658]*658(the only such behavior by his wife) and the summary punishment (two days) together with the questionable disruptiveness of the behavior itself indicate that appellants were entitled to the full notice and hearing provided by Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972); cf. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952).
B. “Contempt” within the Statute
The federal contempt statute, 18 U.S. C. § 401, provides
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-(l) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(emphasis added). This statute rests on the unquestioned premise that courts must be free to conduct their business without interruption, interference or obstruction. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). The contempt power which it grants is inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction, state as well as federal, 25a United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L.Ed. 319 (1906), but the fact that the authority of federal courts to punish contempt has been codified is recognition of the fact that such a power, unrestrained by judicial discretion, can encroach upon the very rights and privileges which the courts are designed to foster. For that reason the language of the statute defining the authority to use such power must be closely considered and the judges who are given that authority are admonished to be “men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate,” Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1255, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947), and continually “on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.” Brown v. Unitted States, 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958).
The record in this case shows no attempt on the part of appellants to make Snider’s trial a forum or a circus for the expression of their own political or religious beliefs. Never was their conduct anything but quiet and respectful. Neither by word nor sign did they do anything “to obstruct the administration of justice” — except they would not stand. When ordered to do so, their response was a simple “I cannot, in good conscience, stand” or words of similar content. Nothing in the record reveals that these words were spoken maliciously, antagonistically, belligerently or were, in the slightest degree, disrespectful in tone or decibel volume or by reason of gesture or demeanor. This case thus presents the bald question whether a failure to stand (accompanied only by such interruption of proceedings as are thought necessary by the district judge to explain the consequences of contempt and cite the alleged contemnor for his actions) is “misbehavior” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401.
We are inclined to think it is not, but at least one circuit has reached a conclusion directly to the contrary.26 In United States ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (1969), the Seventh Circuit, in the context of a refusal to stand, expressed some doubt that a district judge was empowered to require spectators to perform “purely ceremonial or symbolic acts,” citing West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1942). 412 F.2d at 850. Yet the court over[659]*659came its doubt and held in a per curiam opinion, without citation of authority, that a district court may require such rising and that, if “the requirement is proper, it follows that it can be enforced.” 27 412 F.2d at 850.
Subsequently, in United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit recognized that its own prior decisions required “an actual material obstruction” and in a companion case, In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir. 1972), conceded that a symbolic act' such as refusal to stand, “when not coupled with further disturbance or disruption, sometimes might not rise to the level of an actual and material obstruction of the judicial process.”
Finally, in In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit found that a refusal to stand coupled with what the court deemed to be necessary interruption of the trial by reason of the time consumed in citing the defendant for contempt constituted misbehavior obstructing the administration of justice. 468 F.2d at 132. The court de-. dined, however, to create a per se rule that failure to stand was itself contempt, although the government argued that without such a rule “the determination of the offense would not rest on the wrongful character of the conduct, but upon the resulting reaction of the judge.” 468 F.2d at 133. Under Chase, the same conduct in one court would be contempt while in another it would not, depending upon the judge. We find it difficult to accept such a subjective interpretation of “misbehavior.” Either it is or it is not contemptuous, and such a judgment should rest not on the judge’s sensibility but upon the purposes served by the requirement.
That the custom of rising contributes to the functioning of the court by “marking the beginning and end of the session” and by “serv[ing] to remind all that attention must be concentrated upon the business before the court,” United States ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1969), we do not question. But the words of the clerk or the judge may serve this function as well. The rising requirement seems to us not essential to the functioning of the court; as such, the failure to rise does not constitute a material obstruction. If the failure to rise distracts others, provokes a reaction on their part or even causes “a failure to become silent or focus attention on the business before the court,” 468 F.2d at 133, we think the fault may better be resolved by compelling silence and attention than by coercing a gesture of respect. What others do may constitute misbehavior on their part, but it does not justify the finding of criminal contempt as to the person who simply refuses to stand and does nothing more. Of course, improper language or gestures accompanying such a refusal may be separately punishable as contempt.
We share the doubt expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (1969), that failure to rise per se, whether stemming from religious belief, conscience or symbolic protest, can be punished as “misbehavior” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401 without violating the Constitution. Where behavior in the courtroom reaches the level of speech or expression, it is protected, absent • “an imminent . threat to the administration of justice.” In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555, 92 S.Ct. 659, 660, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972); 28 see In re McConnell, 370 U.S. [660]*660230, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962). If Snider’s refusal to rise constitutes symbolic speech,29 and if we should construe the statute so as to embrace that refusal to rise within the meaning of “misbehavior,” a very serious constitutional question would be presented — not unlike that in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1942). It is not easy to distinguish the rising requirement from the flag salute. Both seem to require affirmation, if not of a belief, at least of “an attitude of mind.” 30 319 U.S. at 633, 63 S.Ct. 1178. As Mr. Justice Jackson said in Barnette,
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
319 U.S. at 642, 63 S.Ct. at 1187 (emphasis added).,
We are thus led to the conclusion, and so hold, that the mere failure to rise upon command of the marshal in a United States courtroom is not misbehavior within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401 and does not constitute criminal contempt of the court. To so hold will not, we think, tend to diminish respect for the judiciary and for the administration of justice. We do not envision, as the result of our decision today, disorder flourishing in the courtroom. Instead, we anticipate the custom of rising upon the convening and adjournment of court will continue and become more significant because wholly voluntary. There was a time when an unwary parishioner was tapped by the warden to enforce traditional religious observance, including rising, the bowing of knee and head. The gestures of piety are still observed —but without coercion.
We have no doubt that the judges of this circuit will continue to maintain order in the courtroom and to conduct business expeditiously. We think they fully share our belief that “real respect of the citizenry for the judiciary is earned, not commanded.” In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128, 137 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Reversed.
. Whether aware or not of the precedent, Mr. and Mrs. Snider’s refusal to stand was the counterpart of what two early leaders of the Quaker faith had done when tried for preaching in the street and causing an unlawful and tumultuous assembly to disturb the King’s peace. The defendants themselves, William Penn and William Mead, wrote an account of their trial at the Old Bailey in 1670 which is reported at 6 How[649]*649ell’s State Trials 951 (1661-1678). Two excerpts are particularly noteworthy:
The 3d of September, 1670, the court sat.
Crier. O Yes, &c.
Clerk. Bring William Penn and William Mead to the bar.
Mayor. Sirrah, who bid you put off their hats? put on their hats again.
Ob.ter. Whereupon one of the officers putting the prisoners hats upon their heads (pursuant to the order of the court) brought them to the bar.
Record. Do you know where you are?
Penn. Yes.
Record. Do not you know it is the king’s court.
Penn. I know it to be a court, and I suppose it to be the king’s court.
Record. Do you not know there is respect due to the court? — Penn. Yes.
Record. Why do you not pay it then?
Penn. I do so.
Record. Why do you not pull off your hat then?
Penn. Because I not believe that to be any respect.
Record. Well, the court sets forty marks a piece upon your heads, as a fine for your contempt of the court.
Penn. I desire it might be observed, that we came into the court with our hats off (that is, taken off,) and if they have been j)ut on since, it was by order from the bench; and therefore not we, but the bench should be fined.
Mead. I have a question to ask the Recorder : am I fined also ?
Record. Yes.
Mead. I desire the Jury, and all people to take notice of this injustice of the recorder. Who spake to me to pull off my hat? and yet hath he put a fine upon my head. O fear the Lord, and dread his power, and yield to the guidance of his holy spirit, for he is not far from every one of you.
6 Howell’s State Trials at 956.
Penn. I demand my liberty, being freed by the Jury.
Mayor. No, you are in for your fines.
Penn. Fines, for what?
Mayor. For contempt of the Court.
Penn. I ask, if it be according to the fundamental laws of England, that any Englishman should be fined or amerced, but it expressly contradicts the 14th and 29th chapters of the Great Charter of England, which say, ‘No freeman ought to be amerced but by the oath of good and lawful men of the vicinage,’
Rec. Take him away, take him away, take him out of the Court.
Penn. I can never urge the fundamental laws of England, but you cry, Take him away, take him away. But it is no wonder, since the Spanish Inquisition hath so great a place in the Recorder’s heart. God Almighty, who is just, will judge you all for these things.
Observ. They hauled the prisoners into the Bale-dock, and from thence sent them to Newgate, for non-payment of their fines and so were their Jury. But the Jury were afterwards discharged upon an Habeas Corpus, returnable in the Common-Pleas, where their commitment was adjudged illegal.
6 Howell’s State Trials 969.