United States v. Littleton Fred Capps

421 F.2d 1341, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10722

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 1970
• Docket: 24335_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted for violating the Dyer Act (18 U.S.C. § 2312). We affirm.

Appellant’s first contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He relies upon Julian v. United States, 391 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1969). We think, however, that Julian is distinguishable on its facts, and that the evidence of appellant’s possession of the stolen car was sufficient.

Appellant’s second contention is that the evidence that the automobile was stolen should have been suppressed as the “fruit” of post-arrest questioning conducted by the police without giving appellant the requisite Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). Appellant admits in his reply brief, however, that other evidence which was not suppressed at trial and which appellant does not contend was unlawfully obtained “prompted * * * (the police officer) to call Budget Rent-A-Car and learn that the car was stolen.” Thus “the exclusionary rule has no application because the Government learned of the evidence ‘from an independent source,’ Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

Affirmed.