United States v. Knoche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-4063
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-4063 Document: 21 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 26, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-4063 (D.C. No. 2:16-CR-00079-CW-1) DAVID GENE KNOCHE, (D. Utah)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

David Gene Knoche, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of his motion to reopen his criminal case. Exercising jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Knoche accepted a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to one count of

possession of child pornography involving a minor less than 12 years of age, in

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-4063 Document: 21 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 2

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Although the plea agreement

was reached under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the district court

rejected the parties’ agreed 144- to 204-month sentencing range. At sentencing, it

imposed the statutory maximum of 240 months.

Mr. Knoche did not appeal or move to collaterally attack his sentence.

Instead, more than four years after sentencing, he filed a motion to reopen his

criminal case, requesting to withdraw his plea. The district court concluded it could

not exercise jurisdiction over the motion under either 18 U.S.C. § 3582 or 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Knoche did not appeal. Nearly a

year later, however, he filed a second motion to reopen based on certain statements in

the order dismissing the first motion to reopen. The district court also dismissed the

second motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction. In addition to referring to its

reasons for denying the first motion to reopen, it held that Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(e) precluded it from considering the motion. This appeal is from the

dismissal of the second motion to reopen.

DISCUSSION

We review a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.

See Česká Zbrojovka Defence SE v. Vista Outdoor, Inc., 79 F.4th 1255, 1259

(10th Cir. 2023).

Mr. Knoche seeks to withdraw his plea. But at this stage of the proceedings,

he cannot withdraw his plea by moving to reopen his criminal case. Rule 11(e)

provides that “[a]fter the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a

2 Appellate Case: 25-4063 Document: 21 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 3

plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal

or collateral attack.” (emphasis added). Rule 11(e) is jurisdictional. See United

States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1127 (10th Cir. 2015). Because the second

motion to reopen was neither an appeal nor a collateral attack, the district court did

not err in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

Mr. Knoche asserts the district court did not follow the required procedures to

reject the sentencing range stipulated in his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5). Arguing he was deprived of his rights to a jury trial,

the assistance of competent counsel, and due process, he states that “[u]ltimately a

loss of constitutional rights merits relief.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 17. Under

Rule 11(e), however, any relief must come through direct appeal or on collateral

attack. (Mr. Knoche’s citation to United States v. Conine, 775 F. App’x 458

(10th Cir. 2019), is misplaced because Conine was a direct appeal, which Rule 11(e)

expressly allows.) To the extent Mr. Knoche requests an exception, the courts cannot

create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements. See Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The government suggests an alternative ground to conclude the district court

lacked jurisdiction—that the second motion to reopen was an unauthorized second or

successive § 2255 motion. See § 2255(h); In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251

(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). It makes this argument because the district court

discussed § 2255 in analyzing Mr. Knoche’s first motion to reopen. But the first

motion to reopen was not a § 2255 motion, and the government does not show that

3 Appellate Case: 25-4063 Document: 21 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 4

the district court ever properly recharacterized it as such. See Castro v. United

States, 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003) (establishing requirements for recharacterizing a

filing as an initial § 2255 motion). The government therefore has not established the

first motion to reopen counts as an initial § 2255 motion that would support treating

the second motion to reopen as a second or successive § 2255 motion. See Castro,

540 U.S. at 377.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the second motion to reopen.

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge