BOGGS, Circuit Judge.
Kelvin Johnson was pulled over for speeding. But that was the least of his worries. Johnson was a convicted felon, and' there was a loaded gun beneath the driver’s seat of his car. During the stop that followed, Chattanooga Police Officer Jason Duggan began to suspect that Johnson was involved in some sort of criminal activity. After he finished writing Johnson a warning ticket, Officer Duggan engaged Johnson in conversation and ultimately asked for consent to search Johnson’s car. When Johnson refused, Officer Duggan detained him and called for a drug dog. The dog alerted, indicating that it smelled drugs on or in the car. Clothed with power from the dog’s alert, Officer Duggan searched the car, found the gun, and arrested Johnson. Johnson moved to suppress the gun, as the fruit of an unlawful search. He argued that Officer Duggan’s extending the stop after writing the warning ticket violated the Fourth Amendment because there were not specific facts that would lead a reasonable officer to suspect criminal activity. The district court denied Johnson’s motion, and Johnson pleaded guilty. Johnson appeals the suppression decision. We reverse.
I
Around 9:00 p.m. on June 2, 2009, Chattanooga Police Officer Jason Duggan spotted a Chrysler PT Cruiser traveling north on 1-75 at seventy-two miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. Because the PT Cruiser was speeding, Officer Duggan initiated a traffic stop. Kelvin Johnson, a six-foot five-inch tall, three-hundred-pound African American male, and the driver of the PT Cruiser, pulled promptly to the side of the road.
Officer Duggan came to the passenger side of the car. He told Johnson that he was speeding and asked for Johnson’s “driver’s license and paperwork on the vehicle.” Johnson complied, but initially gave Officer Duggan only his license. When reminded, Johnson produced a contract, indicating that the PT Cruiser was a rental car that he had picked up approximately four hours earlier. Officer Duggan also asked “where [Johnson] was headed. [Johnson] told [Officer Duggan] Kentucky.” With this information in hand, Officer Duggan returned to his patrol car, telling Johnson “we’ll see if we can’t work something out,” as he went.
During this initial encounter, Officer Duggan claims, Johnson was “already ... showing signs of excessive nervousness.” Specifically, Johnson was “staring at [Officer Duggan] very intently.... like he was overly focusing on making eye contact,” “[h]is hands were visibly shaking,” even [139]*139though the PT Cruiser’s air conditioning was on, “beads of sweat were beginning to form across the top of his forehead,” and, when Officer Duggan asked for Johnson’s license and paperwork, Johnson only gave him his license, and had to be reminded to produce his paperwork. Officer Duggan also testified that he found the vehicle’s contents suspicious. A PT Cruiser does not have a separate trunk. Instead, the passenger cabin and cargo area are one space, divided only by seats. Officer Dug-gan could, therefore, see “most items ... from the outside of the vehicle.” Inside the PT Cruiser, he saw only “two little shopping bags ... [and] industrial strength degreaser or cleaner.” The shopping bags were full. On top, Officer Dug-gan could see some “new clothing,” but he could not see everything that was in the bags. The degreaser, Officer Duggan explained,
could be a sign that [Johnson] wants to get the grease off of the steering wheel after he works on the vehicle. It could be a sign that he wants to clean his fingerprints off a stolen handgun. It could be a sign that he wants to clean the area off of a bale of marijuana in the trunk.1 It could be a sign that the cocaine that he may be trafficking he may be trying to clean up.
In any event, Officer Duggan found Johnson’s having degreaser with him in the rental car “very rare, very unusual.... [and] not consistent with innocent motoring public.”
When Officer Duggan returned to his patrol car, he called his “teammate ... Officer Curvin.” Officer Duggan told Officer Curvin that he “was about to call for a records check,” and asked that Officer Curvin join him as back-up. Next, Officer Duggan called the Blue Lightning Operations Center (“BLOC”) to initiate a detailed record check. Officer Duggan also testified that, during this time, he noticed that Johnson’s rental contract only allowed the driver to operate the vehicle in Georgia and Florida. Because “Mr. Johnson at the [sic] point had already told [Officer Dug-gan] that he was headed to Kentucky and [Officer Duggan] had pulled him over in Tennessee,” Officer Duggan considered the language in the rental contract further cause for suspicion.
After he contacted BLOC, Officer Dug-gan returned to the PT Cruiser and asked Johnson to join him in front of his patrol car. Johnson complied. Officer Duggan asked that Johnson not put his hands in his pockets. Johnson complied. Officer Duggan then told Johnson that he would write him a warning citation for speeding.
Although Johnson complied with all of his requests, Officer Duggan testified that Johnson’s posture was suspicious. He believed that Johnson had taken a “bladed stance,” with “his strong leg [here, his right leg] back ... turn[ing][his] body sideways to help defend [himself],” like a boxer might do during a fight. Officer Duggan, ■ nevertheless, began to write Johnson’s warning citation, chatting with Johnson about the PT Cruiser and Johnson’s travel plans as he worked.2
Through this casual conversation, Officer Duggan learned that Johnson was driving to Ashland, Kentucky, near the West Virginia-Kentucky-Ohio border. Johnson planned to stay there for three or four nights, visiting a woman he had spoken with “for a long time” but had not [140]*140met.3 This, in Officer Duggan’s estimation, made the two plastic bags even more suspicious. “[T]hat a young man would be visiting a woman for the very first time that he spoke to many times on the phone and he doesn’t take any clothes. That just blew my mind.”
Officer Duggan continued to talk casually with Johnson as he wrote the warning citation. He had just mentioned to Johnson the geographical limitation in the rental contract, when BLOC called him with the results of the record check he requested. BLOC told Officer Duggan that Johnson’s license was valid, and that there was no warrant for Johnson’s arrest. However, BLOC also gave Officer Duggan an “officer safety alert” because Johnson had a criminal history that included aggravated assault, felony gun charges, and felony narcotics charges.
As Officer Duggan hung up the phone, Officer Curvin arrived and walked toward Officer Duggan’s patrol car. Johnson noticed Officer Curvin’s arrival, and began “cutting his eyes, watching the approaching officer.” As “a way of trying to deescalate [sic] any type of added stress,” Officer Duggan told Johnson that Officer Curvin was his supervisor, and that he was “here for me [Officer Duggan], not for you [Johnson].”
After Officer Curvin arrived, Officer Duggan finished writing the warning citation. He handed the citation to Johnson and asked whether Johnson could “see what [he] was talking about” with the rental car contract’s geographical limitations. Johnson did not know about these limitations, insisted that he “told [the rental-car company] where [he] was going,” and suggested that the language could be a mistake, since, when he rented the car, “they were kind of busy.”
At that point, Officer Duggan had “given [Johnson] all of his paperwork back.” Because of Johnson’s size and “obvious nervous reaction to the traffic stop,” Officer Duggan felt that he “needed to make sure the situation stayed as deescalated [sic] as possible. So, ... [he] intended] to make [Johnson] feel free to go.” To this end, he “asked [Johnson] if he had everything ... [that was] taken from him ... [and] asked him if he was good to go[,] trying to ensure that he felt like he was free to leave.” Johnson said he was, shook Officer Dug-gan’s hand, and turned back toward the PT Cruiser.4
Officer Duggan had other ideas.5 He “wantfed] to engage in a consensual encounter with [Johnson],” to gather more information about what he believed “was something more than just a traffic violation.” Thus, as Johnson walked away, Officer Duggan said: “Hey, you know what, let me tell you about those speeds, if you don’t mind. You want to know about them?” Johnson said that he would like to know, and Officer Duggan spent the next twenty seconds explaining how the speed limit would change in the coming miles. Immediately after finishing this discussion, and without any further comment from Johnson, Officer Duggan said: “Can I ask [141]*141you a couple questions, since my boss is here?” Johnson agreed. Officer Duggan asked whether Johnson had “anything illegal in the car.” Johnson said that he did not. Officer Duggan then told Johnson that he would “go through the whole list,” and asked that Johnson “please [not] take offense to any of them.” First were drugs: marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, LSD, heroin, and ecstasy. Johnson flatly denied having any drugs. Officer Duggan then asked whether Johnson had any “guns, knives, weapons of any kind.” Both Johnson and Officer Duggan appeared to chuckle as Johnson denied having weapons. “Prescription medications not prescribed to you ... packages ... [and] large amounts of cash” were next. Again, Johnson denied having any of the items Officer Duggan mentioned.
Officer Duggan next asked Johnson why he didn’t have “any luggage or anything in the car ... [no] change of clothes or anything.” “Actually,” Johnson replied, “I do have a change of clothes back there in the back. I have some ... boxers, a pair of shorts, some shoes with me. When I got up there I was actually going to get me [sic] some more clothes.” Officer Duggan replied: “I just thought that was a little bit suspicious, if you’re going to go for that time, you want to look sharp, man.” He then asked: “Can I search your car, sir?” Johnson replied: “there’s no need for you to search my car, sir.” Officer Duggan clarified: “Are you telling me no?” Johnson confirmed: “Yes.”
In response, Officer Duggan asked Johnson to sit on the rail at the side of the road and called a canine unit. Officer Duggan next asked permission to search Johnson’s person. When Johnson refused, Officer Duggan brought him to the front of the patrol car, conducted a Terry frisk, and ultimately let him sit on the railing near the side of the road. As he waited for the canine unit, Officer Duggan walked around the PT Cruiser, “in hopes of seeing something illegal, maybe whatever it is that he’s so nervous about in plain view in hopes that maybe I wouldn’t even need the dog.” Before Officer Duggan could finish looking, however, Johnson called to him, complaining that his continued detention was “unfair, [that] he[ ][had] been profiled, [and that] he don’t [sic] understand why [Officer Duggan] want[ed] to search.” Over time, Johnson grew “argumentative.” He was “very upset that [he had] to wait on the dog.”6
Officer Marty Penny and his dog, Max, arrived approximately nineteen minutes after Officer Duggan issued Johnson’s warning citation. Officer Penny and Max walked around the car twice. Max, a passive-alert dog, sat near the left rear door, indicating that he smelled drugs.7 Officer Penny told Officer Duggan that there was probable cause to search the PT Cruiser. Officer Duggan proceeded to search the vehicle. On the front passenger seat, he found “what appeared] to be the preliminary stages of rolling a marijuana blunt.”8 He determined that the bags in the back seat contained only brand new underwear and t-shirts. Underneath the driver’s seat, Officer Duggan found a loaded gun. A later forensic examination showed that the gun had been stolen in Georgia. At no [142]*142point did Officer Duggan find drugs in the PT Cruiser.
The officers took Johnson into custody. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Johnson moved to suppress the gun from evidence. He argued that Officer Duggan did not have the reasonable suspicion required to detain him after Officer Duggan finished writing the warning citation. After a hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the motion. The magistrate judge acknowledged that.whether Officer Duggan had reasonable suspicion was “a difficult call,” but he believed that the totality of the circumstances justified the decision to detain Johnson temporarily. The circumstances of that detention, the magistrate judge continued, were reasonable: no one handcuffed Johnson or otherwise treated him roughly, and the detention was not longer than necessary to achieve the purposes of the stop.9 The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, with the small exception noted below. Johnson pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a belowrguidelines sentence of fifty-five months of imprisonment, with a three-year term of supervised release. Johnson also had to “participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse ... until such time as ... [the probation officer] released [Johnson] from the program,” and pay a $100 special assessment. Johnson appeals.
II
“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Johnson, 656 F.3d 375, 377 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir.2010)). The reasonableness of a seizure is a matter of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir.2008). Also de novo is our review of the mixed legal and factual question whether an officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify extending a traffic stop. Ibid.; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).10
By contrast, we may only upset a district court’s finding of fact when, “utilizing the entire evidence ... [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir.1999)). “When the district court has denied the motion to suppress, we review all evidence in a light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir.2003). Because “the district court is at an institutional advantage, having observed the testimony of the witnesses and understanding local cóndi-[143]*143tions.... ‘due weight’ should [also] be given to the inferences drawn from the facts by ‘resident judges.’ ” United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted).
Ultimately, “[i]t is the [Government’s] burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
Ill
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Detention of an individual during a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir.2009),11 analogous to a brief investigative detention. United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999). “Once the purpose of the traffic stop is completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless something that occurred during the stop caused the officer to have a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Hill, 195 F.3d at 264. The extension of a stop beyond its original purpose, in other words, is a new Fourth Amendment event. It resets the Terry clock.
Whether an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to justify such extended detention depends on “the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer.” United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir.2012). “Police officers are permitted to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An officer’s subjective belief about what he is investigating, though, is irrelevant. If the circumstances, objectively, would have given an officer reason to believe that criminal activity was afoot, the officer may extend the stop, even if there is no reasonable suspicion for the crime that he believes he is investigating. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also United States v. Haskins, 430 Fed.Appx. 727, 728-29 (10th Cir.2011) (“[I]f the facts known to the officer support reasonable suspicion ... it does not matter that the officer was motivated by a belief that a different offense (even one for which there was not reasonable suspicion) had been committed.”). An “inchoate and unparticularized ... ‘hunch,’ ” however, will not do. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). The Government must, instead, point to specific facts, and describe how those facts would lead a reasonable officer to suspect illicit activity.
If the officer has a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion of criminal activity, he may extend a traffic stop long enough to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Any such extension, though, must be “limited in scope and duration.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319; United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir.2005) [144]*144(“[I]f we conclude that the basis for the Terry stop was proper, then we must determine whether the degree of intrusion ... was reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time,” and the “investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319. “While there is no rigid time limitation on the lawfulness of a Terry stop, we must examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Davis, 430 F.3d at 354 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Throughout this analysis, of course, we must bear in mind that “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is [objective] ‘reasonableness.’” Kentucky v. King, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011); see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996).12
The parties agree that the initial stop was proper. Appellant’s Br. at 23 (challenging “Mr. Johnson’s continued detention after he was issued the warning citation.”). The only issue, then, is whether Officer Duggan had a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, after he finished writing Johnson’s warning citation.
Officer Duggan had no difficulty articulating his grounds for suspicion. First, he focused on Johnson’s behavior, or what he called “nervous indicators.” Johnson, Officer Duggan claimed, “was overly focusing on making eye contact,” “[h]is hands were visibly shaking,” “beads of sweat were beginning to form across the top of his forev head,” and he forgot to hand over his paperwork, along with his license. Once Johnson got out of the car, Officer Duggan claims, he took a “bladed stance,” with “his strong leg back ... turn[ing][his] body sideways to help defend [himself],” like a boxer might do during a fight, and looked at both Officers Duggan and Curvin, when Officer Curvin arrived.
The PT Cruiser’s contents also made Officer Duggan suspicious. He saw only a container of industrial-strength degreaser and two plastic bags, which appeared to contain new clothing. Officer Duggan believed that possessing degreaser was “very rare, very unusual.... [and] not consistent with innocent motoring public.” And, once he learned that Johnson planned to go on at least a three-night vacation to meet a woman he had never met before, the absence of conventional luggage “blew [his] mind.”
Finally, Officer Duggan testified that the rental contract’s limitations and Johnson’s prior criminal history aroused his suspicions. He summed up:
I noticed the sweat, the abrupt sweating that came on when I was at the vehicle even though the air conditioner was on. He’s got visible shaking when he hands me his driver’s license. His attention is divided in so much [sic] he couldn’t follow the simple instruction of give me the [145]*145paperwork initially I had to ask for it twice. I noticed circumstances surrounding what was inside the vehicle including a heavy duty cleaner, no luggage, just two small shopping bags appeared to have new clothing which later to be determined was nothing more than new underwear, new T-shirts, no clothing. His travel account was awkward in that he had taken no luggage to meet a new female. The contract was invalid in that it stated he only operated in the state of Georgia and Florida. And yet he was in Tennessee headed to Kentucky. ... The fact his criminal history showed past propensity to commit felony drug case [sic], felony gun charges, and has an aggravated assault which show propensity for violence. All of these things along with the demeanor, stance, the guarded stance the whole time he was speaking with me. All of these escalated my suspicion, I believe a reasonable person would believe that there was something more than just a traffic violation occurring.
Whether Officer Duggan’s suspicion of criminal activity was reasonable, in light of these facts, is a close question. First, “factors such as a person’s nervousness ... while part of the reasonable suspicion analysis, are given little weight.” United States v. Samuels, 443 Fed.Appx. 156, 161 (6th Cir.2011) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-76, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see also United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir.2004) (“[A]lthough nervousness has been considered in finding reasonable suspicion in conjunction with other factors, it is an unreliable indicator, especially in the context of a traffic stop. Many citizens become nervous during a traffic stop, even when they have nothing to hide or fear.”) (internal citations omitted). Rightly so. Especially where, as here, the “nervous indicators” an officer cites are such relatively commonplace behaviors as eye contact, apprehensiveness while handing over a license, sweating, forgetting to provide paperwork, standing,13 and looking back and forth between two officers, a court risks impaling the defendant on Morton’s Fork.14 Had Johnson averted his eyes and slouched, he might have been considered evasive. Because he stood straight and maintained eye contact, Officer Dug-gan considered him aggressive. Johnson simply could not win. Nervous indicators are weak indicators in the traffic-stop context.
[146]*146But Officer Duggan pointed to more than Johnson’s behavior. He also cited Johnson’s taking a vacation without conventional luggage, his possessing industrial-strength degreaser, the geographical limitations in the rental contract, and the fact that he had prior felony convictions.
Like Johnson’s behavior, his lack of conventional luggage is not a particularly strong indicator of illicit activity. Of course, as the Government points out, a paucity of luggage can be a factor in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Bravo, 306 Fed.Appx. 436, 441-42 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.2005); but see United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir.1990) (“[B]eing Mexican, having few pieces of luggage, being visibly nervous or shaken during a confrontation with a state trooper, or traveling on the interstate with Texas license plates (not yet a crime in Alabama), do not provide a minimal, particularized basis for a conclusion of reasonable suspicion....”). Here, though, all that Officer Duggan knew when he decided to prolong the stop was that Johnson had newly bought clothing near the top of two plastic bags, and no suitcases. He could not have known anything else about the bags’ contents at that time. Perhaps it is most common to pack in a suitcase when going out of town. But this does not mean that putting clothes in a plastic bag, instead of some other container, is inherently suspicious. Johnson’s trip was relatively short. He was alone. He did have some clothing with him. And he explained to Officer Duggan that he planned to buy more clothes when he arrived in Ashland. Cf. Bravo, 306 Fed.Appx. at 441-42 (finding allegedly honeymooning couple’s one small duffel bag suspicious); Hernandez, 418 F.3d at 1211 (finding two small bags for two-person weeklong trip suspicious).15 Thus, while Johnson’s paucity of luggage has a place in the reasonable-suspicion analysis, it does not play a large role here.
The remaining three factors that Officer Duggan cited are more substantial indicia of criminal activity. An otherwise innocuous item that, in the officer’s experience, suggests criminal activity, see, e.g., Hill, 195 F.3d at 272 (“it was reasonable to conclude that Deputy Whitlock’s observance of the large amount of used Kleenex on the floorboard of the truck, indicating that one or both of Defendants were using cocaine based upon his experience as an interdiction officer that cocaine users have to wipe their noses often ... contributed to his suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”), an oddity in a rental-car contract, see, e.g., United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir.2008) (listing defendants’ having driven “a rental car that was several weeks overdue” as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion), and a driver’s criminal history, see Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir.2003), are all legitimate considerations in the reasonable-suspicion analysis.
Here, Officer Duggan noticed industrial-strength degreaser on the floor of the PT Cruiser. He believed that degreaser could be used to wipe fingerprints from a gun, or to clean drug residue from a car. Johnson’s possessing it, Officer Duggan testified, was “very rare, very unusual.... [and] not consistent with innocent motoring public.” Also, Johnson was driving through Tennessee, en route to Kentucky, even though he could only drive in Florida and Georgia, under the terms of his rental contract. Of course, this could have been [147]*147an innocent mistake, as Johnson claimed during the stop. But the possibility of an innocent explanation does not keep the inconsistency between Johnson’s rental contract and travel plans out of the reasonable-suspicion analysis. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78, 122 S.Ct. 744. Finally, Officer Duggan learned about Johnson’s criminal history during the part of the traffic stop that the parties agree was valid. That history could, therefore, bolster Officer Duggan’s suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. See Joshua, 341 F.3d at 446.
The dispositive question is whether these relatively stronger indicia, combined with Johnson’s behavior and his lack of conventional luggage, would have led to a reasonable belief that Johnson was involved in criminal activity. “Undoubtedly, each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. But this is beside the point. “Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer.” Jones, 673 F.3d at 502.
“The process [of determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion] does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact-finders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). “[T]he concept [of reasonable suspicion, then] ... is somewhat abstract,” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, and “the standards are not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that, in the course of adjudicating reasonable suspicion, one determination will seldom be a useful precedent for another.” Townsend, 305 F.3d at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).
And, perhaps predictably, our reasonable-suspicion cases do not offer a coherent principle that resolves the question we face. United States v. Garrido, 467 F.3d 971, 982 (6th Cir.2006) (collecting cases); compare United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 542-45 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify extending traffic stop based on defendant’s cooperative behavior, late-night travel from a known source city for narcotics, possession of three cell phones, presence of a bible, what appeared to be rolls of currency, defendant’s criminal history, indications of nervousness, food wrappers and clothing in the car, and driver’s not being registered owner of car), with Hill, 195 F.3d at 271-73 (holding that implausible explanation for trip, inconsistent explanation of itinerary, presence of Kleenex in U-Haul truck, and nervousness furnished reasonable suspicion to extend stop long enough for canine sniff), and Branch, 537 F.3d at 588 (holding that reasonable suspicion existed where defendants actively avoided officer at mini-mart, drove rental car that was two weeks overdue, had driver’s licenses that did not match alleged residences, and displayed nervousness), and United States v. Walton, 258 Fed.Appx. 753, 758 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that stack of cash in glove box, coupled with denial of traveling with large amounts of money, conflicting explanation of travel plans, and passenger’s not having a driver’s license, but admitting to having driven, furnished reasonable suspicion for one-minute eighteen-second extension of stop). Our task, therefore, is to “slosh our [148]*148way through the factbound morass of reasonableness,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 383, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (internal quotation marks omitted), and decide whether Officer Duggan had enough reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson after he finished writing the warning ticket.
Officer Duggan clearly believed that criminal activity was afoot. This belief, however, was not reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. Johnson’s behavior and his lack of conventional luggage are exceptionally weak indicators of criminal activity. The fact that he had committed crimes in the past, while it has a place in the reasonable-suspicion analysis, is not, without more, strong evidence of criminal activity in the present. Nor is it clear how the disconnect between the rental-car contract’s geographical limitations and Johnson’s travel plans implicated criminal activity. There was, without question, inconsistency. But the relationship between that particular inconsistency and any illicit activity is tenuous, at best. Unlike a rental car several weeks past-due, driving a car in a state neighboring the state where the contract allows the driver to operate does not suggest theft or other wrongdoing. Cf. Branch, 537 F.3d at 588. That leaves the degreaser. Degreaser could, of course, have a number of unsavory uses. But it is also commonplace for people who work on cars. “Since 2006, [Johnson] has owned and operated JK’s Motors and Transmission.” This, of course, does not affect whether Officer Duggan’s suspicion was objectively reasonable.16 Rather, it shows that mere possession of degreaser is not a strong, or even sure, sign of criminal activity. The totality of these weak indicia could lead to little more than a hunch. That is simply not enough. See Townsend, 305 F.3d at 545 (“Although the government has pointed to several factors, present in this case, which we have recognized as valid considerations in forming reasonable suspicion, they are all relatively minor and, in many cases, are subject to significant qualification. The fact of the matter is that this case lacks any of the stronger indicators of criminal conduct that have accompanied these minor factors in other cases. We hold that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants until the canine unit arrived.”).17 Officer Duggan violated the Fourth Amendment.
IV
This is a close case. But the weak indicators that Officer Duggan cited, even combined, do not lead to the conclusion that he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, in the totality of the circumstances. Officer Duggan’s detaining Johnson after he finished writing the citation, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment. The gun found after that detention should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We REVERSE the decision below, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.