United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc.

862 F. Supp. 717, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973, 1994 WL 539266
District Court, D. Rhode Island·Decided September 26, 1994·No. Civ. A. 93-0455 P·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Senior District Judge.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), the plaintiff moves to amend a judgment entered by this Court against the defendants, Kasz Enterprises, Inc. and James Kaszyk (collectively “Kasz”) on June 24,1994 wherein a permanent injunction was entered in favor of the plaintiff, enjoining the defendants from distributing their products in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. 855 F.Supp. 534. The issue here centers on the Court’s authority to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b) and the rule of specificity embodied in Rule 65(d). For reasons which follow, the Court amends the judgment and enters the detailed order hereinafter set forth.

I.

This case was initiated by a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, filed by the plaintiff, seeking to enjoin the defendants from distributing their product. The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen. Since 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) clearly does not authorize a Magistrate Judge to enter injunctive orders, he rightfully treated the referral as one for a Report and Recommendation. He found that the defendants’ product, a hair solution to be applied to the scalp as a hair *719 restorer, was a “new drug” under the FDCA and that the defendants were distributing it in interstate commerce without having first obtained the required approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”); he further concluded that the defendants were likely to continue to do so unless enjoined by the Court. On May 6, 1994, he recommended that the Court grant the plaintiff injunctive relief. On June 15, 1994, I approved his report by merely stating:

The Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen filed on May 6, 1994 in the above-captioned case is hereby accepted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1).

As is obvious, I failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ.P. 65(d); it provides:

[ejvery order granting an injunction ... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained____

II.

The need for specificity in injunctive orders is well settled:

... the specificity provisions of Rule 65(d) are no mere technical requirements. The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.

Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S. Ct. 713, 715, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974).

The Eighth Circuit defined the Schmidt language as follows:

In Schmidt, [supra ], the Supreme Court identified two interests which the rule of specificity serves to advance. It prevents uncertainty on the part of those faced with injunctive orders and gives them explicit notice of what conduct is unlawful. Second, it allows a reviewing court “to know precisely what it is reviewing.” Id. at 476-77, 94 S.Ct. at 715-716. To these two functions we would also add that a specific injunction allows those who are protected by its terms to know when the order is being violated so that they may then effectively police the order and enforce its mandate.

Daniels v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir.1984).

No further elaboration is necessary to conclude that the judgment, as it now stands, is entirely inadequate. It does not comport with Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d).

Having thus concluded, the Court’s authority to amend an entered judgment must be resolved.

Once a judgment has been entered, it can only be modified or vacated as specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The pertinent Rule here is either 59(e) or 60(b).

Rule 59(e) provides that “[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” The time for appeal is tolled by the filing of the motion within the requisite time period and courts do not have the power to extend the deadline except to the extent and under the conditions stated in the rule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b).

The judgment was entered on June 24, 1994 and the motion to amend was filed on July 5, 1994. “When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). A simple reference to the calendar shows the motion to amend was filed within the prescribed time period.

Even if the movant had exceeded the 10 day deadline, resort could still be had to Rule 60(b). It provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ...; (3) fraud ...; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) *720 any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation____

See Pfizer Inc. v. Aceto Corp., No. 93 Civ. 7160, 1994 WL 97224 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1994) (using broad language of Rule 60(b)(6) to “clarify” a default judgment); Padco, Inc. v.

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United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 717, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973, 1994 WL 539266 (D.R.I. 1994).

862 F. Supp. 717 (United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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